| Item | Content |
|---|---|
| Rating | Neutral |
| Target Price Range | RMB 42.5-48.2 (base-case fair value; 2027E net profit attributable to parent RMB 4.4-4.7 billion × 16-17x) |
| Current Price | RMB 44.82 (close on 2026-10-27, price anchor for this report) |
| Market Cap / Shares Outstanding | RMB 74.27 billion / 1.657 billion shares |
| Margin of Safety | Approximately -5% (base-case fair value lower bound of RMB 42.5 is below the current price; calculated as (base-case lower bound − current price)/current price) |
| Probability-Weighted Expected Value | Approximately RMB 45.9 (about +2.4% vs. current price; scenario weights 30%/50%/20%) |
| Time Horizon | 12 months |
| Key Metrics | PB 2.89x (2nd percentile over 5 years, 1st percentile over 10 years); 16.1-17.7x PE on normalized earnings; dividend yield approximately 2.9% |
Haid Group is the absolute global leader in feed sales volume (total 2025 sales of 32.08 million tonnes, +21% YoY, roughly 2.4x the industry growth rate of 8.6%). Its triple moat—procurement scale, formula R&D, and technical services—has enabled it to maintain scaled profitability through a year when peers broadly lost money; earnings quality is first-class (operating cash flow/net profit above 1 for more than three consecutive years; FY2025 ROIC approximately 15.8%). The company's earnings are currently at a cyclical trough: net profit attributable to parent for the first three quarters of 2026 was RMB 2.907 billion (-29.83%), non-GAAP -42.45%, mainly due to a double squeeze from deeply troughed hog prices (2025 farming profit down more than RMB 900 million YoY) and fishmeal hitting a record high of RMB 25,000/tonne. At the current price of RMB 44.82, PB sits at the 1st percentile of the past 10 years and normalized earnings imply roughly 16-18x, meaning the market is essentially pricing in "perpetuation of the cyclical trough," embedding only about 2.3% perpetual growth—the valuation is reasonably to modestly low but not deeply undervalued, and the "cheapness" of the low PB percentile is premised on a stable ROE center for the core feed business. The biggest near-term risk is downward revision of sell-side earnings estimates (the consensus FY2026E implies Q4 alone at RMB 1.61 billion, 11.7x the actual value in 2025Q4), while 2027 hog price pass-through is hedged by the "fewer sows but not less pork" efficiency offset, and fishmeal's decline is delayed by Peru's cancellation of the second-season anchovy quota. Overall rating Neutral: the quality warrants tracking, the price is already within a reasonable range; we recommend waiting for 2026Q4 results to be finalized and for validation of hog-price pass-through to pig sales in H1 2027 before making directional additions.
Opportunity characterization (evidence strength: Grade B): global feed leader at an earnings cycle trough + historically low valuation percentiles + overseas second growth curve, but the margin of safety is only about -5% (base-case lower bound below the current price) and the probability-weighted expected value is only about +2.4%—a deployable window of "left-side justified, right-side unconfirmed," not an immediate action signal.
Most important sources of change over the next 6-12 months (in chronological order):
Primary share price driver: the hog price path—the company sells about 5-6 million pigs annually (about 6 million disclosed for 2024; disclosure discontinued from 2025). Each ±1 yuan/kg in hog prices affects pre-tax profit by roughly ±RMB 550-720 million, directly determining where 2027E net profit attributable lands between the bear case of RMB 3.8-4.0 billion and the bull case of RMB 5.6-6.0 billion—the single largest variable in valuation disagreement.
Verifiable expectation gaps (two-way): this report's base-case 2027E net profit attributable of RMB 4.4-4.7 billion is 14-23% below the sell-side consensus of RMB 6.03 billion (East Money, n=18) and Guosen Securities' RMB 5.462 billion—the disagreement centers on the 2026Q4 base (street implies RMB 1.61 billion vs. the actual RMB 138 million in 2025Q4) and the magnitude of hog price recovery. If the market completes the downward revision during annual report season, short-term expectation-gap volatility ensues; conversely, if Q4 beats expectations, the recovery rally starts directly.
Key evidence:
The company is the only feed company in China in the first tier across all three product lines—aquafeed, poultry, and pigs—with external aquafeed sales accounting for about 30% of the national total, forming a "duopoly" with Tongwei. Industry total volume has peaked (see the industry panorama section), but the exit of backyard farming and rising scale operations are concentrating commercial feed among leaders: in 2024, when industry output fell -2.1%, Haid's volume still grew +18%, and it grew another +21% in 2025. On a group-wide basis (net profit attributable / total sales volume, including contributions from seedlings, animal health, and farming), per-tonne net profit in 2025 was approximately RMB 133 (approximately RMB 143 if based on external sales)—caveat: the numerator of this metric includes non-feed business profits, so pure feed per-tonne profit is lower; however, against the backdrop of New Hope, Tongwei, and Wellhope posting overall losses in H1 2026 and Guanghai being only marginally profitable, Haid maintaining a net profit in the RMB 4 billion range is itself evidence of systemic advantages (procurement scale, formula substitution, technical service networks) that second-tier peers operating under the same raw material and hog price environment cannot replicate.
Key evidence:
The causes of the trough are clear and decomposable: ① hog prices fell roughly 30% YoY, with the farming segment swinging from profit to loss (dragging down more than RMB 900 million in 2025; H1 2026 gross margin halved to 6.41%); ② fishmeal rose from about RMB 16,000/tonne at the start of the year to a record RMB 25,000/tonne (Peru's 2026 fishing quota sharply cut and the second season cancelled), pressuring aquafeed costs and suppressing farmers' stocking; ③ under a price war, feed gross profit per tonne fell from RMB 363.9/tonne in 2024 to RMB 341.0/tonne in 2025. The recovery path is likewise verifiable: the low-price soybean meal/corn dividend materializing quarter by quarter from 2026Q4, declining purchased piglet costs lowering farming costs in H2 (per the company's 2026-09-16 investor relations record), and sow herd reduction transmitting over roughly 10 months to pig sales in H1 2027. But this report takes a conservative view on the magnitude of recovery: first, the "fewer sows but not less pork" efficiency offset may mean 2027 supply contraction falls short of the sow herd reduction (Wang Zuli, 2026-10-22, Farmers' Daily); second, fishmeal's decline is postponed past the first 2027 fishing season due to the cancelled second season. Base-case expectation: 2027E net profit attributable of RMB 4.4-4.7 billion (recovering to slightly above 2025's RMB 4.28 billion), significantly below the sell-side consensus of RMB 6.03 billion. If hog prices trough for another year while fishmeal stays high, we retreat to the bear case of RMB 3.8-4.0 billion (see the scenario table in the valuation section). Falsification conditions: 2026Q4 standalone net profit attributable below RMB 200 million; hog prices persistently below RMB 10/kg in H1 2027; fishmeal still above RMB 22,000/tonne by mid-2027.
Key evidence:
Overseas is currently the most certain growth segment: 2025 volume +47%, growth still above 25% in H1 2026; the company plans overseas sales of 7.20 million tonnes by 2030 (implying a roughly 15.8% CAGR over the next five years). The annual report's regional table shows overseas gross margin of 15.53%, significantly higher than domestic; the penetration of scaled farming in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America is a multi-year demand engine. The exact figure for overseas per-tonne net profit versus domestic has not been disclosed on an audited basis (previously seen only in media reports citing the lapsed prospectus); this report uses regional gross margin as a proxy. Two points must be squarely acknowledged: ① the Haid International HK spin-off has been substantively delayed by about 3.5 months; as of 2026-10-27 there has been no second filing or regulatory filing publicity, and overseas expansion is temporarily funded by the parent company's offshore borrowing (the +135.69% short-term borrowings is the funding footprint of this); ② overseas expansion is accompanied by accounts receivable +103.11% from the beginning of the year and credit impairment +40.66% YoY—credit and FX risk in emerging markets must be tracked quarter by quarter. Falsification conditions: overseas sales volume growth in the 2026 annual report falling below 20%; systematic rise in the bad-debt provision rate on overseas receivables.
Key evidence:
For this thin-margin, high-turnover feed manufacturing business, cash flow actually strengthened in a year of declining profit (a supply-chain position of extending credit upstream while collecting cash downstream), so the cash content of book profit is high. Shareholder returns show a clear upward trend: the payout ratio rose from 30.3% to 50.1% over three years (dividend yield at the current price approximately 2.9%); a single buyback of RMB 1.001 billion cancelled 1.10% of share capital; and a member of management bought in with real money at a price essentially flat with the current level. Offsetting signals to flag alongside: in mid-October 2026, institutional-dedicated seats sold a combined ~3.79 million shares over two days (about 0.23% of total share capital), and controlling shareholder Haihao Investment conducted multiple rolling pledges/unpledges within the year (as of 10-22, cumulative pledged shares of 54.30 million, only 5.96% of its holding—no margin call risk)—a single executive's purchase carries more signal value than monetary value, and the "shareholder-friendly" conclusion should rest on the sustainability of dividends and buybacks. Falsification conditions: controlling shareholder's pledge ratio rising above 8% of its holding; significant decline in payout ratio.
Key evidence:
The market is currently pricing this traditional manufacturer on the basis of "the cyclical trough in perpetuity": normalized earnings of RMB 4.2-4.6 billion correspond to only 16.1-17.7x, and the implied growth of 2.3% is significantly below the reality of feed volume growth of 7-8% annually, +47% overseas, and the 2030 volume target implying roughly a 9.5% CAGR. But the "cheapness" of the low percentile comes with a mirror risk that must be stated: the historical range to which the PB percentile is anchored corresponds to years with ROE of 17.4%-20.9%, whereas the weighted ROE for the first three quarters of 2026 has already fallen to about 11.5%; if pig farming becomes a chronically recurring drag and the ROE center systematically falls to 12-14%, then 2.89x PB is not extremely cheap but rather matched to the new center—the valuation support holds only if the feed core business's profitability (FY2025 ROIC approximately 15.8%; mid-cycle ROE 17-18%) is revalidated in 2027. Falsification conditions: H1 2027 ROE still below 13% with no recovery in feed gross profit per tonne.
Key evidence:
Two structural facts make a high probability of annual-report-season volatility: first, the company has concentrated asset impairments in Q4 for two consecutive years (in 2024, impairments were reversals in the first three quarters with about RMB 220 million booked for the full year; in 2025 the same pattern—first-three-quarter reversals, RMB 47 million booked for the full year, with Q4 profit collapsing to RMB 138 million), and the 2026 Q3 report has already reappeared warning signals of increased inventory write-down provisions; second, the headline 9M26 net profit decline (-29.83%) is smaller than the non-GAAP decline (-42.45%), with the difference mainly the RMB 503 million of futures position-closing gains (futures were a drag in the prior-year period; these are two-way hedging gains/losses and cannot be linearly extrapolated). This report forecasts FY2026 net profit attributable of RMB 3.26-3.7 billion (implying a standalone Q4 of RMB 350-790 million), 18%-28% below consensus—if realized, the base for the 2027 consensus (RMB 6.03 billion) will be passively revised down; conversely, if Q4 reaches RMB 800 million or above (the 2024Q4 level) and FY26 exceeds RMB 3.7 billion, the "cyclical bottom" judgment is confirmed early and the expectation gap turns positive. Falsification and validation conditions: the absolute amount of Q4 standalone net profit attributable in the January-February 2027 earnings pre-announcement/flash report (≥RMB 1 billion = strong confirmation; <RMB 200 million = confirmation of a repeat collapse).
| Metric | 2023FY | 2024FY | 2025FY | 2026Q1-Q3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating revenue (RMB 100mn) | 1,161.17 | 1,146.01 | 1,284.68 | 1,033.49 |
| Revenue YoY | — | -1.31% | +12.10% | +7.55% |
| Net profit attributable to parent (RMB 100mn) | 27.41 | 45.04 | 42.80 | 29.07 |
| Attributable profit YoY | — | +64.30% | -4.97% | -29.83% |
| Recurring net profit attributable to parent (RMB 100mn) | 25.41 | 45.39 | 42.79 | 24.04 |
| Gross margin | 8.47% | 11.31% | 10.33% | 9.08% |
| Net margin | 2.36% | 3.93% | 3.33% | 2.81% |
| Weighted ROE | 14.53% | 20.88% | 17.42% | —(9M not annualized, approx. 11.5%) |
| Net operating cash flow (RMB 100mn) | 126.98 | 79.96 | 62.60 | 60.57 |
| Free cash flow (est.: OCF − purchases of long-term assets, RMB 100mn) | 93.45 | 48.59 | 29.23(est.) | 35.16(est.) |
| Debt-to-asset ratio (period-end) | 53.27% | 47.87% | 46.42% | 51.17% |
| Cash + trading financial assets (RMB 100mn, est.) | — | — | — | 74.97(est.) |
| Interest-bearing debt (short-term borrowings + current portion of LT + LT borrowings, RMB 100mn, est.) | — | — | — | 33.25(est.; 2026-09-30) |
| Net cash (RMB 100mn, est.) | — | — | — | +41.73(est.; 2026-09-30) |
| Total feed sales volume (10k tonnes) | — | 2,652 | 3,208(+21%) | —(H1 external sales 1,478, +8%) |
| Feed gross profit per tonne (RMB/tonne) | — | 363.9 | 341.0 | 349.4(H1) |
Note: Balance-sheet stock items are taken from the 2026 Q3 report period-end (2026-09-30); annual stock figures not extracted item by item are shown as "—". Free cash flow is defined as net operating cash flow minus cash paid for purchases of fixed assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets; where not verified against the original text item by item, it is computed from verified OCF and capex.
Drivers of metric changes (YoY ≥ ±20% excerpts, all with company explanations):
Q3 single quarter: revenue RMB 39.109bn (+4.95%), attributable net profit RMB 1.296bn (-13.81% YoY, +79% QoQ vs Q2's RMB 724mn), recurring net profit RMB 1.098bn (-27.88%), single-quarter gross margin 8.64%. 9M cumulative: revenue RMB 103.349bn (+7.55%), attributable profit RMB 2.907bn (-29.83%), recurring profit RMB 2.404bn (-42.45%), gross margin 9.08% (-2.05pp), operating cash flow RMB 6.057bn (+20.72%).
Key interpretations:
Business model in brief: a feed-manufacturing-centered business with "thin gross margin, high turnover, quasi-manufacturing" characteristics—raw materials account for over 90% of feed costs; the company is essentially a large-scale processor and distributor of global agricultural commodities (soybean meal, corn, fish meal), capturing excess share through procurement scale, multi-formula substitution capability (soybean meal reduction, alternative meals), and a technical service system reaching down to ponds and pig farms. Revenue is transactional rather than subscription-based; pricing power is limited (raw material cost pass-through is lagged and incomplete), and excess profits come from turnover efficiency and service premiums. Seedlings (2025 revenue RMB 1.44bn) and animal health products (RMB 890mn, gross margin 45.47%) are high-margin adjuncts; pig farming ("company + family farm" asset-light, with over 40% of piglets purchased externally) is the source of cyclical volatility.
Cash content of earnings test: OCF/attributable net profit for 2023-2025 was 4.63, 1.78, and 1.46 respectively, reaching 2.08 in 9M26—above 1 for three consecutive years. The feed industry's float model (bill settlement with upstream, largely cash-on-delivery with downstream) yields extremely high cash conversion of book profit—cash quality rarely seen across the market. FCF/net profit for 2023-2025 was 3.41, 1.08, 0.68; the drop to 0.68 in 2025 reflects rising overseas plant construction capex (CapEx RMB 3.337bn) rather than deteriorating collections; 9M26 rebounded to 1.21 (FCF est. RMB 3.516bn). Recurring earnings test: FY2025 attributable profit of RMB 4.280bn vs recurring profit of RMB 4.279bn—virtually no difference (non-recurring items only RMB 1mn); the company does not rely on one-off gains. But 2026 is an exception—9M26 non-recurring gains of RMB 503mn (17.3% of attributable profit) came mainly from futures hedging position-closing gains, two-way hedging-related P&L (a drag in the same period of 2025), and cannot be viewed as recurring earning power.
Return on capital: FY2025 ROIC approx. 15.8% (NOPAT approx. RMB 4.68bn / invested capital approx. RMB 29.6bn), significantly above the ~9.5% WACC estimate and industry cost of capital; weighted ROE 14.53%/20.88%/17.42% for 2023-2025, 17-18% mid-cycle—above the 15% "true moat" threshold, a rare level of manufacturing capital returns. Capex quality: total CapEx/depreciation approx. 1.35-1.38 for 2024-2025, moderate expansion; the company does not disclose a maintenance/growth split, but management explicitly stated "domestic fixed-asset investment is slowing, overseas plant construction is the capex focus" (2026-09-16 IR record); the current capex body is growth-oriented overseas investment, while domestic is entering harvest phase.
Red flags and concentration: customers are extremely dispersed (top five customers only 2.45% of sales), no large-customer dependence; top five suppliers at 15.75% (bulk agricultural procurement, normal level). Quality signals to track: ① accounts receivable of RMB 6.050bn at end of 2026Q3, +103.11% vs start of year (overseas expansion + peak-season financing; growth far outpacing revenue, collection quality needs quarterly verification); ② concentrated Q4 impairment provisioning for two consecutive years; ③ pig sales volume disclosure discontinued since the 2025 annual report, reducing external verifiability of farming exposure.
Consistency of words and deeds: volume targets prudently delivered, profit-type targets ambitious but missed—verdict "partially delivered, target setting leans aggressive".
Shareholder friendliness: trend of improvement, verdict "shareholder-friendly". Cash payout ratio for fiscal 2023-2025: 30.3% → 40.6% → 50.1% (FY2025 total RMB 2.143bn, dividend yield approx. 2.9% at current price); buybacks of RMB 1.001bn from Nov 2025 to Apr 2026, all cancelled, retiring 1.10% of share capital (average buyback price approx. RMB 54.4, above current price—management judged it undervalued at higher prices and put real money into cancellation); in Jul 2026 the board again proposed cancelling all remaining shares in the buyback account, zeroing it out; no additional issuance or rights offering records (only ~0.71% dilution from option exercises). The board secretary added approx. RMB 22mn of shares at RMB 45.05 in May 2026. Contrary signals: institutional seats sold approx. 3.79mn shares in October (0.23% of total shares, small magnitude); rolling share pledges by the controlling shareholder (5.96% of its holdings, at low levels).
Risk signals: ① postponement of Haidao International's Hong Kong spin-off listing (no second filing after prospectus lapsed), with no public comment from management on the timetable; ② hog sales volume disclosure halted from the 2025 annual report, coinciding with weakening farming profits—marginal decline in disclosure transparency; ③ controlling shareholder's 54.95% stake is highly concentrated; frequent but low-ratio pledging. On related-party transactions, the 2026 interim report's summary of non-operating fund occupation showed no anomalies.
FY2025 segment structure (annual report, by product/region):
| Segment | Revenue share | Gross margin | Gross margin YoY | Revenue YoY | Business logic in one sentence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feed | 81.93% | 9.67% | -0.07pp | +15.41% | Core business: volume growth (+21%) + mix upgrade offsetting the price war; overseas as growth engine |
| Agricultural products (pigs + aquaculture) | 13.98% | 13.66% | -4.62pp | -4.61% | Asset-light "company + family farm" model; profit drag during hog price downturn |
| Trading | 3.21% | 2.61% | +1.96pp | +20.06% | Raw material trading adjunct, low-margin volume play |
| Animal health products | 0.69% | 45.47% | -11.01pp | +5.35% | High-margin adjunct synergizing seedling-feed-medicine; still small in scale |
| Overseas (pre-elimination) | 12.95% | 15.53% | +2.15pp | +16.02% | Overseas profitability significantly above domestic; carrier of the second curve |
Profit mainstay: measured by "revenue share × gross margin", feed contributed gross profit of approx. RMB 10.18bn, 77.4% of total segment gross profit (approx. RMB 13.14bn)—feed, at 82% of revenue, is also the absolute profit mainstay; agricultural products contributed approx. RMB 2.45bn (18.7%), a source of volatility rather than the main profit engine; animal health has the highest gross margin at 45.47% but contributes only approx. RMB 400mn. Reason for the gross margin structure gap (highest 45.47% vs lowest 2.61%, nearly 43pp apart): animal health is a high-margin pharmaceutical-type business, feed is large-scale processing manufacturing, and trading is pure pass-through—three entirely different business models. The structural signal truly worth noting is overseas gross margin of 15.53%, about 5pp above the domestic overall and +2.15pp YoY—overseas is a segment with both volume and profitability rising. 2026 marginal change: farming segment gross margin deteriorated from 13.66% to 6.41% in 2026H1 (-13.85pp), while the feed segment was relatively stable at 9.76% (-0.28pp)—the trough profit deterioration mainly comes from the farming segment; the core business's resilience remains.
Accounting red flags:
Cross-period consistency:
The generic financial framework for the feed industry (PE/PB/cash flow) easily misses three defining dimensions; this chapter presents them separately.
(1) Per-tonne profit model—the industry's core profitability metric. Feed is a "volume × per-tonne profit" business: Haid's feed gross profit per tonne was 363.9→341.0→349.4 RMB/tonne for 2024-2026H1, with per-tonne attributable net profit (group-wide basis, including seedling, animal health and farming contributions) at approx. RMB 133-143. Per-tonne profitability drivers are the raw material procurement cost differential (leaders gain a RMB 30-100/tonne advantage via global multi-port procurement and hedging) and formulation technology (soybean meal reduction/substitution: national soybean meal usage share has fallen to 13.4%). Peer comparisons require caution on basis: Hefeng's 2025 "net profit per tonne approx. RMB 11" is a distorted group-level reading flattened by poultry- and pig-chain losses (its recurring result was a loss), and cannot prove a per-tonne profit gap in pure feed operations; but Haid maintaining group-level net profit in the RMB 4bn range under the same raw material and hog price environment shows the gap in system-level profitability is real. Tracking points: quarterly feed segment gross margin (9.76% in 2026H1) and whether per-tonne gross profit can recover to the RMB 350-360 range as soybean meal/corn tailwinds emerge.
(2) Raw material cost cycle—divergence across soybean meal/corn/fish meal. Raw materials are over 90% of feed costs: soybean meal spot at RMB 3,220/tonne (10-27; abundant US soybean crop + high domestic inventories, trending weak), corn at RMB 2,170-2,248/tonne (new grain arrivals, low levels)—the two constitute a cost tailwind for livestock and poultry feed (poultry feed 14.7mn tonnes + pig feed 7.7mn tonnes, approx. 75% of external sales); soybean meal is about 20-25% of formulations, so every RMB 100/tonne decline cuts per-tonne cost by approx. RMB 20-25. Fish meal at RMB 25,000/tonne hit a record high (sharp cut in Peru quota + cancellation of the B season; IFFO estimates 2026 global output <4.6mn tonnes, a decade low)—fish meal is about 2-3% of general aquafeed formulations and 8-12% of specialty feed, so every RMB 1,000/tonne increase adds annualized costs of approx. RMB 350-840mn, and high prices suppress fingerling stocking (company IR confirmed "sharply lower stocking early in the year"). The company expanded hedging from Aug 2026 (announcement 2026-08-01); 9M26 futures position-closing gains + mark-to-market gains contributed approx. RMB 550mn of pre-tax non-recurring income—hedging is a two-way tool, and its P&L should be viewed as part of cost management, not a profit source. Net judgment: costs show "two declines and one rise"; the key to 2027 aquafeed recovery lies in Peru's first 2027 fishing season quota (2026-12~2027-01 window).
(3) Hog cycle sensitivity—the dual channel of farming segment and pig feed demand. The company sold approx. 6mn hogs in 2024 (disclosure halted from 2025; estimated 5-6mn heads); every ±1 RMB/kg in hog prices affects pre-tax profit by approx. ±RMB 550-720mn—equivalent to 13%-17% of 2025 attributable net profit, a hog cycle exposure in this "feed company" far beyond market intuition. Current coordinates: national average hog selling price RMB 9.75-9.84/kg (late October; the industry self-breeding-self-raising model is loss-making for consecutive periods, approx. RMB 160 loss per head), breeding sow inventory 36.02mn heads at end of Q3 (96% of the 37.5mn regulatory target), hog futures down approx. 23% cumulatively since July. Looking forward: capacity reduction transmits over approx. 10 months, and contraction in hog slaughter in 2027H1 is institutional consensus (Guosen: "hog prices rising steadily in 2027"); but official monitoring expert Wang Zuli cautions "fewer sows but not less meat"—rising PSY and slaughter weights may absorb much of the reduction effect. Dual-channel impact on Haid: farming segment loss narrowing (base case: returning to near breakeven in 2027) + pig feed demand (on 2025's +37% high base, sow herd reduction implies loosening total pig feed volume in 2026H2-2027, offset via share gains). This report sets as its base case "hog prices merely stabilize at low levels in 2027 (RMB 10.5-11.5/kg) rather than clearly recovering", with a clear recovery placed in the bull scenario—this is the core divergence from sell-side consensus (which implies a V-shaped recovery).
Current market data and percentiles (2026-10-27 close, frozen anchor RMB 44.82): Market cap RMB 74.27 billion; PB 2.89x (1-year 11%/3-year 4%/5-year 2%/10-year 1% percentile); PE(TTM) 24.39x (1-year 97% percentile — TTM net profit attributable of RMB 3.045 billion is trough earnings, so that percentile is distorted and recorded for reference only); static PE 17.35x (5-year 5% percentile); PS(TTM) approx. 0.55x; dividend yield approx. 2.9% (FY2025 dividends RMB 2.143 billion / current market cap). Peer comparison (all PEs distorted — New Hope/Tongwei/Hefeng loss-making in 2026H1, Yuehai marginally profitable with triple-digit PE, hence benchmarking via PB+ROE):
| Company | PB | ROE status | 2026H1 revenue growth | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Haid Group | 2.89 | 17.4% (FY2025)/approx. 11.5% (9M26 weighted) | +9.19% | Only scaled profitable leader, net profit per ton RMB 133-143 |
| New Hope | 1.86 | Negative (H1 net loss RMB 1.70 billion) | +7.68% | Second-largest feed volume, dragged by swine chain |
| Tongwei | 1.60 | Negative (H1 net loss RMB 5.12 billion, dragged by PV) | — | Direct rival in aqua feed, focus shifted to PV |
| Yuehai Feed | 1.80 | Marginally profitable | +30.81% (first three quarters) | Small-cap specialty aqua feed elasticity stock, roughly 1/20 of Haid's size |
| Hefeng | 0.88 | Near zero (FY2025 attributable RMB 53 million) | +8.94% | Northeast poultry chain integration, weak earnings quality |
Haid's PB is above all peers; the premium corresponds to its own 17%+ mid-cycle ROE against peers' negative/near-zero ROE, plus an order-of-magnitude gap in earnings quality — the premium is justified, but the "low-percentile cheapness" call is conditional on a stable ROE center (see mirror risk in C5).
What expectations are already priced in: Reverse DCF shows EV of approx. RMB 70.1 billion (market cap 74.27 billion − net cash 4.17 billion) implies only a perpetual growth rate of 1.8%-2.7% (center 2.3%) at WACC 9%-10%; equivalently, the current price equals about 16.9x normalized net profit of RMB 4.4 billion. What the price demands vs. reality: the current price only demands the company "maintain current earnings with zero growth," while reality shows feed volume growing 7-8% annually (+21% in 2025), overseas +47%, 2030 targets implying a 9.5% CAGR, and a 17-18% mid-cycle ROE intact — implied expectations are clearly below what fundamentals support, which is the core logic of valuation support. The reverse constraint is the normalization itself (RMB 4.2-4.6 billion), which depends on the farming segment no longer dragging results in 2027; until that premise is verified, the conclusion can only be "fairly cheap" rather than "undervalued."
Three-layer value (EPV): Asset value (book value per share) RMB 15.50 — book value of an asset-heavy manufacturer is far below earnings power value, serving only as a floor reference (current price is 2.9x that; pricing centers on earnings power, not liquidation value). EPV (zero-growth earnings power value): normalized FCFF approx. RMB 4.75 billion (attributable 4.4 billion + minority interests 0.15 billion + after-tax interest 0.20 billion; depreciation of 2.43 billion offset by maintenance capex of 2.43 billion; neutral working capital)/WACC 9.5% = RMB 50 billion, plus net cash 4.17 billion (estimated), totaling approx. RMB 54.2 billion → approx. RMB 32.7 per share (range RMB 29.7-36.1, corresponding to FCFF 4.5-5.0 billion × WACC 9-10%). Current price of RMB 44.82 = EPV of RMB 32.7 (73%) + growth option residual of approx. RMB 12.1 (27%) — the growth option is not low (27%); the market is not "paying only for zero growth," having paid approx. RMB 18 billion for the overseas second curve and cyclical mean reversion; whether that premium is justified depends on delivery of C2/C3. Normalization notes: the base is FY2024-25 attributable average of RMB 4.39 billion (one boom year, one downturn), raised to RMB 4.4 billion, between the 3-year average of RMB 3.84 billion and the 2024 peak of RMB 4.50 billion — 14.5% above the 3-year average because 2023 was a triple-pressure year (raw material squeeze + aquatic disease + hog price trough, an abnormal mid-cycle). Normalizing at the 3-year average of RMB 3.84 billion would imply a PE of 19.3x and the conclusion would retreat to "fairly priced" — this report presents the sensitivity honestly.
Three scenarios and odds (2027E attributable net profit × exit PE, 1.657 billion shares):
| Scenario | Probability | 2027E attributable | Exit PE | Fair value range | vs. current | Key drivers |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 30% | RMB 3.8-4.0 billion | 14-15x | RMB 32.1-36.2 | -23.8% (midpoint) | Another year of hog price grinding + fishmeal holding above RMB 22,000/ton + overseas growth halved; PB approx. 2.0x (below the 3-year low of 2.67x stress level) |
| Base | 50% | RMB 4.4-4.7 billion | 16-17x | RMB 42.5-48.2 | +1.2% (midpoint) | Soybean meal/corn tailwind delivered + hog price stabilization (RMB 10.5-11.5/kg) + farming losses narrowed to breakeven + net profit per ton back to RMB 145-150 |
| Bull | 20% | RMB 5.6-6.0 billion | 18-19x | RMB 60.8-68.8 | +44.6% (midpoint) | Fishmeal falling sharply with 2027 fishing season normalization + clear hog price recovery + overseas sustaining +35%+ |
Exit multiple anchors: base 16-17x — below the company's 5-year PE median of 23.3x (historical median distorted by hog cycle boom years) and the approx. 19.6x implied by sell-side target prices, close to the current normalized multiple of 16.9x, without self-referencing the current multiple; anchored as a "conservative center for a recovery-confirmation year." Bear case 14-15x anchored to the company's 5-year lowest PE range (15.7-15.9x) with a discount (corresponding to a PB approx. 2.0x stress level). Bull case 18-19x anchored to a discount on sell-side target-implied multiples (historical boom segments above 25x not used). External anchor comparison: the most pessimistic sell-side target of RMB 43.5 (Investing.com low, read 2026-10-27) is near the lower bound of this report's base range; the most optimistic RMB 64.6 (East Money median, n=11) is nearly identical to this report's bull midpoint of RMB 64.8 — this report's distribution is shifted down overall vs. sell-side, due to more conservative normalized earnings and 2026Q4 base assumptions.
In-house earnings forecast (reconciliation anchor) vs. management guidance and sell-side, side by side:
| Basis | FY2026E attributable | FY2027E attributable | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Management | No quantitative guidance disclosed | Not disclosed | Qualitative: lower farming costs in H2, domestic CapEx moderating, overseas as focus (2026-09-16 IR) |
| Sell-side consensus | RMB 4.52 billion (n=19, revised down -5.4% over past 90 days) | RMB 6.03 billion (n=18) | Guosen (10-27): RMB 4.199/5.462 billion |
| This report | RMB 3.26-3.7 billion | RMB 4.4-4.7 billion (base) | Divergence: Q4 single quarter RMB 0.35-0.79 billion vs. street-implied RMB 1.29-1.61 billion; hog price stabilization rather than V-shaped rebound |
Forecast methodology: external feed sales +7% approx. (overseas +25-30%) × net profit per ton RMB 145-155 (lower end of mid-cycle center) + farming segment at breakeven + stable seed & animal health contribution; FY2026 revenue RMB 136.8-137.7 billion (+6.3%~+7.2%), FY2027 revenue RMB 148.4-151.5 billion (+8%~+10%).
Valuation conclusion: Fairly cheap — separate quality from price. Quality is first-tier (global #1 share, ROIC 15.8%, cash conversion 2x, rising shareholder returns); price sits in cyclical-trough pricing territory (PB at 10-year 1% percentile, normalized 16-18x, implied growth 2.3% vs. actual 7-8%). But the current price of RMB 44.82 is already within the base fair range (RMB 42.5-48.2), about 1.2% above midpoint — margin of safety is negative (base-case lower bound about 5% below current price); probability-weighted expectation approx. RMB 45.9 (+2.4%). The odds structure is asymmetrically positive (upside +44.6% vs. downside -23.8, roughly 1.9:1), but the expected magnitude does not support chasing. Target price range RMB 42.5-48.2 (= base-case fair value).
(1) Industry size: total volume peaked, structural divergence. China's industrial feed output in 2025 totaled 342.253 million tons (+8.6% YoY, first time above 340 million tons), with total feed industry output value of RMB 1,290.96 billion (+2.3%) — data from the China Feed Industry Association's "2025 National Feed Industry Development Overview" (published March 2026, official basis). Three-year trajectory: 2023: 322 million tons (+6.4%) → 2024: 315 million tons (-2.1%, first decline in a decade) → 2025: 342 million tons (+8.6%) — two-year CAGR only about 3.1%; 2025's high growth mainly came from hog feed rebound (+15.6%) and 2024's low base. Industry consensus holds domestic total demand is "essentially saturated," with total volume CAGR of about 1-3% over the next 3-5 years (CAAS Institute of Agricultural Economics annual report). Global: 2025 approx. 1.44 billion metric tons (+2.9%, Alltech 15th Global Survey), China approx. 23.8%. Structural increments lie in three areas: pet feed (+17.9% in 2025), specialty aqua feed, and most importantly overseas markets (scaled livestock/aqua farming in Southeast Asia/Africa/Latin America; leading companies' overseas growth 25-47%) — precisely the industry soil for Haid's second curve. By segment in 2025: hog feed +15.6%, broiler feed +3.5% (first time above 100 million tons), layer feed +1.4%, aqua feed +2.7% (approx. 23.23 million tons), ruminant feed +1.8%. 2026H1 national output 168.5 million tons (+3.9%), of which hog feed 83.53 million tons (+7.9%), a record for the period — but sow herd reduction implies hog feed volume loosening in 2026H2-2027.
(2) Value chain and value distribution: raw materials—feed—farming; Haid is positioned in the relatively advantaged "midstream manufacturing + downstream services" segment. Upstream raw materials account for over 90% of feed cost: protein sources — soybean meal (2025 imported soybeans 111.83 million tons, +6.5%, import dependence above 80%, Brazil 71%) and fishmeal (heavily dependent on Peru; domestic marine raw material output only approx. 570,000 tons/year — IFFO); energy sources — corn (feed use is 70% of domestic consumption). Midstream: approx. 13,500 licensed companies (about 5,000 active), overcapacity, gross margins generally 8-12%. Downstream is swine/poultry/aqua farming (2024: meat/eggs/milk over 176 million tons, aquatic products 73.66 million tons). The essence of value distribution: raw materials are globally commodity-priced, feed mills are price takers, earning "manufacturing-like" profits of only RMB 100-150 net per ton. Excess profits come from three sources: procurement scale cost advantage (RMB 30-100/ton), formula substitution capability (soybean meal share reduced to 13.4% via policy-driven reduction/substitution), and downstream service premium (seed + animal health + technical services binding farmers). Haid holds a relative cost advantage upstream via hundred-billion-RMB-scale procurement (no absolute pricing power over global commodities), and strong bargaining power downstream over small/mid farmers via its technical service system (top five customers only 2.45%), but weak bargaining power over large farming groups (Muyuan, Wens building in-house feed mills) — the biggest structural substitution threat on the hog feed side. In gross profit distribution, farming has high elasticity but extreme volatility (deep industry losses in 2025-2026), while feed offers thin but stable margins — Haid's mix of 82% revenue from the stable segment and 14% exposed to the volatile one explains earnings volatility far below pure farming stocks.
(3) Supply-demand and competitive structure: zero-sum competition, accelerating concentration, price wars clearing out small mills. Two concentration measures side by side — association official basis: 37 enterprise groups with annual output above one million tons, together 57% of national output; 1,127 mills above 100,000 tons holding 65.2%. Enterprise research basis (New Pig Pie, June 2026, production/sales including group self-use): TOP20 total approx. 220 million tons, 65% of national total, with Haid 32.08 million tons (#1), New Hope 29.74 million tons (#2), Shuangbao 22 million tons (#3); CR3 approx. 24.5%; 7 companies above 10 million tons holding 48%. The difference between the two bases lies mainly in statistical scope (association classifies by output scale; New Pig Pie ranks by group production/sales including self-use), but trend conclusions agree: the pyramid oligopoly structure is set; nearly 5,000 small mills below 100,000 tons hold only 14% and are exiting/being managed out at an accelerating pace. Aqua feed sub-segment "two superpowers, many strong players": Haid + Tongwei combined share above 30% (Leadge Consulting basis); Haid's external aqua feed sales of 6.96 million tons approx. 30% of national (numerator is Haid external sales, denominator estimated from association output — estimated basis). Entry barriers: procurement scale (multi-port global + hedging), formula R&D (Haid R&D expense +14% YoY in 2026Q3), technical service network (dense truck + sales rep + pond-level system), capital and receivables tolerance, and the 2026 "Feed Quality and Safety Supervision Work Plan" raising compliance costs across the chain — five barriers keeping new entrants out. Competitive intensity: 2025 industry saw "intensifying price wars and lengthening payment terms" (New Pig Pie survey verbatim), with leaders trading price for volume; bulk feed at 170.5 million tons (+18%, 53.4% of compound feed) marks scaled logistics as a new threshold. Substitution threats: large farming groups' on-farm mixing internalization (structurally diverting external sales) + low-protein diets/microbial protein upstream (Yarrowia lipolytica protein approved in 2025 — a cost-side substitution that actually favors formula-strong Haid).
(4) Cycle and regulation. Regulatory direction is neutral-to-positive for leaders: ① soybean meal reduction/substitution program and low-protein diet technology — directly rewards R&D-driven leaders' formula capability; ② hog production capacity regulation (May 2026 revised plan, normal sow holding lowered to 37.5 million head with tightened regulation bands) — suppresses hog feed volume elasticity (negative) but shortens the hog price bottoming period (indirectly positive for 2027 farming chain repair); ③ full-chain quality/safety supervision — accelerates clearing of small capacity; ④ soybean import diversification (Brazil 71%) and corn quota system — raw material supply security broadly controllable. Cycle position: feed demand is in a divergent phase of "hog cycle bottoming + aqua recovery" (hog price and sow coordinates detailed in the industry characteristics chapter, not repeated here); company earnings already priced at trough.
(5) Peer comparison table (same basis side by side; Haid data from FY2025 annual report/2026 periodic reports):
| Company | 2025 feed sales | Revenue scale | Growth | Earnings | Key differences vs. Haid |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Haid Group | 32.08 million tons (+21%) | RMB 128.47 billion (FY2025) | +12.10% | Attributable RMB 4.28 billion, ROE 17.42% | First tier across all categories + global footprint, only scaled profitable player |
| New Hope | 29.74 million tons | RMB 55.59 billion (2026H1 whole group) | +7.68% (H1) | 2026H1 net loss RMB 1.702 billion | Far higher swine chain exposure; feed volume close but earnings dragged down |
| Tongwei | Not precisely disclosed (mid-tier of million tons, record high) | RMB 84.13 billion (FY2025, agriculture + PV) | — | 2026H1 net loss RMB 5.119 billion (PV drag) | Direct aqua feed rival but focus shifted to PV; agri investment lagging |
| Hefeng | External sales 4.64 million tons (+17%) | RMB 35.76 billion (FY2025) | +9.88% | FY2025 attributable only RMB 53 million (-84.7%) | Northeast region + poultry chain integration; vast earnings quality gap |
| Yuehai Feed | Not disclosed (<1 million tons) | RMB 6.54 billion (first three quarters 2026) | +30.81% | First three quarters attributable RMB 54 million | Specialty aqua feed-focused small cap; high growth from low base and aqua elasticity |
| Shuangbao (unlisted) | 22 million tons | — | — | — | Unlisted giant focused on hog feed, no disclosure obligation |
(6) Company industry positioning: absolute leader, rising share, verifiable moat. Haid is #1 in feed sales globally and nationally (first globally to exceed 30 million tons), with a clear upward share trend: total-volume national share rose from approx. 8.4% (2024) to approx. 9.4% (2025), growth consistently and sharply outpacing the industry (2024: industry -2.1% vs. company +18%; 2025: +8.6% vs. +21%; 2026Q1: external sales +25% vs. industry approx. +4%); #1 globally in aqua feed (approx. 30% of national). The moat's three pillars — procurement (global multi-ingredient multi-port + hedging; cost advantage converts to share during price wars), R&D (specialty/premium feed structural upgrade; feed gross margin stable above industry average), services (seed + animal health + technical services binding sub-scale farmers) — all have quantitative evidence. Consistency note: "global #1" has two sources: the WATT 2025 global ranking (based on 2024 sales of 26.52 million tons, third-party estimate, unaudited) and the New Pig Pie enterprise survey (32.08 million tons in 2025); both are production/sales bases (including self-use) with consistent conclusions. National share of 9.4% is total sales / association national output basis (external-sales basis approx. 8.7%) — this report uniformly uses the total-sales-including-self-use basis and notes it here. Current pressure point: first three quarters of 2026 attributable -29.8% (hog farming drag + raw material squeeze + price war), offset by the overseas second curve (+47% in 2025) and cost tailwinds — the leader's share logic has not loosened; what has loosened is the cyclical coordinates of earnings.
Rating: Neutral, confidence 0.55, time horizon 12 months. Haid Group's long-term quality (market share, per-tonne profit, cash flow, shareholder returns) is fully supported by data in this comprehensive verification; the current debate lies not in the company itself but in the combination of cycle and price. The current price of 44.82 yuan already falls within the baseline fair-value range of 42.5–48.2 yuan, implying a negative margin of safety (baseline lower bound about 5% below the current price) and a probability-weighted expected return of roughly +2.4% — the odds are asymmetrically positive (downside to the bear case of -23.8%, upside to the bull case of +44.6%), but the expected magnitude is thin. Strategy statement: Existing holders should stay invested (a dividend yield of 2.9% plus buyback-and-cancellation provides downside support, with a zero-growth value floor at EPV of 32.7 yuan); those not invested should avoid chasing, and treat two timing windows as decision points — ① the January–February 2027 earnings pre-announcement (if Q4 standalone net profit attributable lands within the 350–790 million yuan range, downward expectation revisions will be flushed out, and a break below the 42.5 yuan baseline lower bound would actually offer better odds); ② verification of hog price transmission in the first half of 2027 (the showdown between sow herd reduction and efficiency offsets). Catalyst sequence: soybean meal/corn dividend (from Q4) → 2026 annual report (2027-04) → Peru's first 2027 fishing season (announced 2026-12 to 2027-01) → Haid International's second listing filing (timing uncertain) → hog price transmission (2027H1).
Risk and falsification checklist (presented in writing for tracking purposes): ① Hog prices grind at the bottom again in 2027 (sow herd reduction offset by PSY/weight gains) → the farming segment continues to bleed losses, activating the bear case; ② Fishmeal stays above 22,000 yuan/tonne (Peru's 2027 fishing season restricted again) → delayed recovery in aquafeed per-tonne profit; ③ 2026Q4 repeats 2025Q4's concentrated impairment collapse (single-quarter net profit attributable < 200 million yuan) → systematic downward revision of sell-side 2027E base, a double kill on valuation and earnings; ④ Credit and FX risk exposure in overseas receivables/foreign borrowings (receivables +103% vs. the start of the year, short-term foreign borrowings +135.69%) → discount on overseas growth; ⑤ Controlling shareholder's pledge ratio rising above 8% of its holdings, or the spin-off stranded long-term → governance and narrative discount; ⑥ Continued institutional selling and declining northbound holdings (HKSCC from 6.67% down to 3.38%) pressuring the shareholder register.
Data and materials sources: Haid Group's 2023/2024/2025 annual reports, 2026 Q1/interim/Q3 reports (CNINFO), investor relations activity records (9 documents from 2026-04-29 to 2026-09-16), China Feed Industry Association's "2025 Overview of National Feed Industry Development", Xinzhupai 2026 survey, Guosen Securities Q3 report review (2026-10-27), Investing.com/Eastmoney consensus estimates (2026-10-27), Baichuan Yingfu/Mysteel raw material price data, etc.; price anchor is the closing price of 44.82 yuan on 2026-10-27. The valuation calculations in this report (normalized earnings, EPV, three scenarios) are the author's independent estimates based on the above materials; assumptions are disclosed in the main text.