| Meta Information | Content |
|---|---|
| Rating | Neutral |
| Target Price | RMB 39–44 (base-case fair value range, 12 months) |
| Current Price (closing price 2026-10-30) | RMB 37.05 |
| Total Market Cap | Approx. RMB 98.76 billion (total shares outstanding: 2.6656 billion) |
| Margin of Safety | Approx. +5.3% (= (base-case fair value floor RMB 39 − current price) / current price; probability-weighted expected value approx. RMB 39.6, approx. +7.0% vs. current price) |
| Time Horizon | 12 months |
| Key Levels | 52-week range RMB 32.33–62.09; current price has retraced approx. 40.3% from the high, sitting at approx. the 22nd percentile of the range |
AECC Aviation Power is virtually the sole listed platform for domestic military aero-engines (four major engine plants: Liming, Xi'an, South, Liyang; ~100% share in complete engines), with extremely strong strategic scarcity. However, its financials show an extreme pattern of "revenue growth without profit growth": 9M2026 revenue of RMB 29.415 billion (+28.38%) hit a record high for the period, yet net profit margin attributable to parent was only 0.52%; operating cash flow has been negative for consecutive years and accounts receivable rose to RMB 53.65 billion. The current price of RMB 37.05 corresponds to a PB of 2.46 (approx. the 22nd percentile over the past 5 years) and PS(TTM) of 1.87 (below the median of engine OEMs), which is not expensive on asset and revenue metrics. However, back-solving the current price implies normalized net profit attributable to parent of approx. RMB 1.3–2.5 billion (net margin of 2.6%–4.9%, or 0.8–1.5x the FY2023 peak of 3.25%), whereas TTM net profit attributable to parent is only RMB 679 million and the company's own 2026 plan is only RMB 524 million — the market has already paid in advance for "net margin recovery." Zero-growth cash flow value (EPV) is only approx. RMB 2.75/share. The base-case fair value of RMB 39–44 implies +5.3% to +18.8% vs. the current price, with bear case at -35% and bull case at +48% — near-symmetric odds with no significant margin of safety. We assign a Neutral rating: wait for the earnings call on November 4 and hard signals such as Q4 deliveries and contract liabilities before reassessing.
In one sentence: Not yet actionable, but the falsification window has opened — the revenue inflection is real, profits have not inflected, and the current price has fairly priced a medium-probability net margin recovery; hard signals are required.
The revenue recovery was driven by first-half deliveries (H1 +47.21%, a half-year record); achieving the full-year plan of RMB 49.949 billion requires only ~RMB 20.5 billion in Q4 standalone (-12.3% YoY), so the probability of achievement is not low. But the "15th Five-Year Plan order cycle restart" currently has only indirect signals such as inventory and procurement for production; the most direct leading indicator, contract liabilities, is still declining YoY, and no large-scale advance payment replenishment of the 2021–2022 style has appeared. Moreover, the company has underdelivered its revenue budget for two consecutive years, so the "inflection" claim needs a verification margin. The prosperity of upstream forging companies (e.g., AVIC Precision Machinery with 2026H1 backlog +48.7%) mainly comes from overseas civil and gas turbine long-term agreements, offering limited confirmation of military demand and should not be used as evidence of a military order recovery.
Over four years, accounts receivable rose from RMB 20.94 billion to RMB 53.65 billion (+156%), while revenue grew only +6% over the same period — the collection scissors gap keeps widening; ROIC of ~1.6% is far below the cost of capital. The suppressive factors must be distinguished by nature: the military pricing-review regime and new product maturity ramp are structural variables, hard to resolve in the short term; while the main cause of the -47.36% drop in 2026Q3 total profit is the change in VAT super-deduction policy (9M26 other income -63.99%), which is a trackable, stabilizable policy variable — Q3 standalone gross margin has rebounded to ~11% (+0.6pct YoY), showing bottoming characteristics rather than monotonic deterioration.
On FY2025 audited basis, this capital increase would annually divert approx. RMB 35 million of profit attributable to parent (approx. 6.7% of the 2026 plan); on 2026H1 annualized basis, approx. RMB 120 million (approx. 24%) — the difference stems from South's H1 net profit of RMB 356 million being an abnormally high 19.3x its FY2025 full-year figure of RMB 18 million; the true diversion center awaits verification of South's profit structure. Additional clarification: of the RMB 5.43 billion, only approx. RMB 500 million is cash injection from the state capital operating budget, while the remaining approx. RMB 4.9 billion is conversion from state-exclusive capital reserve (a book equity reclassification, with no new funds flowing into the subsidiaries); the RMB 1.9 billion for General Aviation Power is market-based cash contribution, and that subsidiary is still loss-making (minority shareholders share the losses proportionally) — different in nature from capital reserve conversion. Approx. RMB 4.2 billion (approx. 10.5%) of net assets attributable to parent is reclassified to minority interests, passively shrinking the PB denominator; the mechanism of "profit recovery → incomplete recovery attributable to parent" warrants continued tracking.
Back-solving the current price: market cap of RMB 98.76 billion ÷ reasonable OEM PE of 40–55x (Shenyang/Xi'an static range) = implied normalized net profit attributable to parent of RMB 1.80–2.47 billion; even using a lenient 76x Xi'an Aircraft anchor requires RMB 1.30 billion — corresponding to a net margin of 2.6%–4.9%, or 0.8–1.5x the FY2023 peak of 3.25%. Reality: TTM net profit attributable to parent of RMB 679 million (net margin 1.29%), and only 0.52% for 9M26. The coexistence of low PS and extremely low net margin indicates the valuation anchor is the "recovery option" rather than current earnings: EPV (equity basis, normalized FCFE of RMB 0.22/share ÷ 8% cost of equity) is approx. RMB 2.75/share, with growth options accounting for ~92.6% of market cap; if receivables and inventory occupation does not improve and normalized FCFE remains negative, EPV approaches zero. The probability-weighted value across three scenarios is approx. RMB 39.6, only +7.0% vs. the current price — near-symmetric odds, not constituting a significant margin of safety.
Confirmation combination: full-year net profit attributable to parent ≥RMB 500 million + annual-report contract liabilities ≥RMB 7.5 billion + standalone quarterly gross margin ≥11% for two consecutive quarters. Falsification combination: full-year net profit attributable to parent <RMB 450 million (still low after excluding diversion) or contract liabilities falling below RMB 5.5 billion, or standalone quarterly gross margin <9.5% for two consecutive quarters. Note: the company's historical operating plans disclose only revenue and profit, with no precedent of gross margin budget disclosure; "2027 gross margin stabilization" can only be verified indirectly from annual report attribution language and quarterly data. Moreover, in 2026 the company emphasizes "improved production balance," so the Q4 revenue share will likely fall below 2025's 50.5%; extrapolating the 2026 Q4 threshold from 2025's extreme seasonality involves baseline drift.
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | 2026Q1–Q3 (latest period) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating revenue (RMB 100mn) | 437.34 | 478.80 | 463.31 | 294.15 |
| Revenue YoY | +18.2%* | +9.48% | -3.23% | +28.38% |
| Net profit attributable to parent (RMB 100mn) | 14.21 | 8.60 | 6.34 | 1.53 (+41.55%) |
| Ex-non-recurring net profit (RMB 100mn) | 12.22 | 7.92 | 2.94 | 2.11 (+209.79%) |
| Gross margin | 10.60% | 10.06% | 9.12% | 9.62% |
| Net margin attributable to parent | 3.25% | 1.80% | 1.37% | 0.52% |
| Operating cash flow (RMB 100mn) | -67.39 | -143.09 | -44.18 | -85.51 |
| Free cash flow (RMB 100mn, OCF−CapEx) | -100.83 | -172.28 | -81.86 | -105.59 |
| Cash + cash-like assets (RMB 100mn, period-end) | — | 77.30 | 54.55 | 58.21 (as of 2026-09-30) |
| Interest-bearing debt (RMB 100mn, period-end) | — | 211.03 | 275.53 | 365.67 (net interest-bearing debt 307.45) |
| Contract liabilities (RMB 100mn, period-end) | 118.76 | 44.86 | 54.99 | 60.03 |
| Accounts receivable (RMB 100mn, period-end) | 209.39 | 357.20 | 444.48 | 536.51 |
| Debt-to-asset ratio | — | — | — | 62.31% (2026-09-30) |
*FY2023 revenue growth is the aero-engine and derivative products basis as disclosed in the annual report. Cash + cash-like assets include trading financial assets (2026Q3: cash RMB 3.820 billion + structured deposits RMB 2.002 billion).
Reasons for metric changes (YoY≥±20% excerpts, all company-stated): FY2024 net profit attributable to parent -39.48% — reduced gross profit from new product maturity and higher financial expenses; FY2025 net profit attributable to parent -26.27%, ex-non-recurring -62.81% — same causes, plus non-recurring gains of RMB 340 million (land acquisition RMB 296 million + transfer of AECC Control shares) embellishing net profit; FY2024 contract liabilities -62.23% — changes in contract settlement terms; FY2024 receivables +70.59% — some payments not yet due for settlement; 9M2026 revenue +28.38% — improved production balance and increased deliveries; 9M26 ex-non-recurring +209.79% — revenue growth and YoY improvement in profitability; Q3 standalone total profit -47.36% — reduced other income due to VAT super-deduction policy changes (9M other income -63.99%); period-end inventory +26.04% / accounts payable +36.72% / short-term borrowings +36.90% — increased production investment, procurement, and financing needs; 9M26 asset impairment provisions of RMB 133 million (receivables bad debt RMB 143 million, inventory write-down reversal RMB 10 million).
Record revenue for the period, profits still at the bottom: 9M revenue of RMB 29.415 billion (+28.38%), the highest for the period since listing, mainly driven by first-half delivery volume (H1 +47.21%); Q3 standalone revenue turned negative YoY at RMB 8.660 billion (-1.74%), moving in the same direction as AECC Control (Q3 revenue -7.15%, net profit attributable to parent -81.41%), pointing to industry-wide Q3 pressure across the supply chain — a sector-wide delivery/settlement pacing issue rather than company-specific. For the first three quarters, net profit attributable to parent was RMB 153 million (+41.55%) and ex-non-recurring RMB 211 million (+209.79%) — a recovery off a low base, but absolute levels remain weak; Q3 standalone net profit attributable to parent was approx. RMB 7 million (-59.22%) with total profit -47.36%, mainly due to the VAT super-deduction policy change (sharp drop in other income) compounded by impairment provisions of RMB 133 million. Divergent balance sheet signals: inventory of RMB 40.581 billion (+26.04%) and accounts payable +36.72% show production-preparation procurement is still ramping, but contract liabilities of RMB 6.003 billion were -27.8% YoY, operating cash flow of -RMB 8.551 billion showed no YoY improvement (-1.0%), and short-term borrowings rose to RMB 35.506 billion (+36.90%). Judgment: the coexistence of high revenue growth and profit stalling reflects the triple characteristics of "military pricing review + pricing/tax policy + concentrated deliveries"; Q4 standalone (2025Q4 revenue was 50.5% of the full year, net profit 83%) will determine the full-year outcome. Against the company's full-year plan (revenue RMB 49.949 billion / net profit attributable to parent RMB 524 million), 9M revenue progress was 58.9% but net profit progress only 29.2% — the latter is consistent with the historical Q4 concentration pattern but leaves extremely little room for error. Market reaction: the day after the Q3 report disclosure (2026-10-30), the stock closed down approx. 4.7% at RMB 37.05.
Business model: Asset-heavy military order manufacturing. A single end customer (the military, with the top five customers accounting for 90.78%), state procurement plus military pricing review (cost-plus constraint); revenue recognition fluctuates with military acceptance and settlement timing, highly concentrated in Q4; aero-engines and derivative products (including maintenance and support) account for 95.2% of core revenue, supplemented by foreign trade subcontracting (4.3%) and non-aero civilian products (0.5%). No independent pricing power is the defining feature of this business—gross margin declined steadily from ~19.5% in 2016 to 9.12% in 2025, which the company attributes to "immaturity of new products" compounded by price and tax reform.
Cash content of earnings: OCF/net profit for FY2023–2025 were -4.74x/-16.63x/-6.96x respectively, and FCF/net profit -7.09x/-20.03x/-12.90x—book profits cannot be converted into cash, and operations themselves are a persistent net cash drain (cumulative three-year FCF of approximately -35.5 billion yuan), with the gap covered by rolling short-term borrowings (35.5 billion yuan at period end) and funding from the group's finance company (related-party borrowing interest accounted for 69.2% of interest expense). The entire profit-to-cash bridge is blocked by the "two receivables": accounts receivable plus inventory totaled 94.2 billion yuan at end-2026Q3, roughly twice annual revenue.
Recurring earnings: Of FY2025 net profit attributable to shareholders of 634 million yuan, 340 million yuan (53.6%) came from one-off items such as land requisition and the disposal of AECC Aero Engine Control shares; recurring net profit was only 294 million yuan. The company does not disclose a Non-GAAP measure, so recurring net profit is the closest proxy for core earnings. Reverse check: the company has no aggressive add-backs such as large SBC, so the recurring figures are credible.
Return on capital: FY2025 ROIC was approximately 1.6% (net profit + after-tax financial expenses / interest-bearing debt + equity), ROE 1.58% (2023 peak of 3.65%)—far below a cost of capital of about 8%, implying negative value creation; this is precisely the accounting expression of "2015–2025 revenue +97% with no EPS accretion" (as the company itself states).
Capex quality: FY2025 CapEx of 3.768 billion yuan / D&A of 2.428 billion yuan (1.55x); the 2026 four-plant investment plan totals approximately 2.96 billion yuan with a high share of government-funded projects (state appropriations); maintenance vs. growth capex is not separately broken out, but aero-engine capacity building under the national "Two Engines" special program (test stands and maintenance capacity projects already completed) is typical state-led capacity expansion—investment is not driven by shareholder-return logic.
Red flag list: ① OCF negative for four consecutive years (including 9M26); ② more than half of FY2025 attributable profit came from one-off gains; ③ customer concentration of 90.78% and rising (73.53% in 2024); ④ state-appropriated funds forming state-exclusive capital reserve belongs to the Group rather than listed-company shareholders (7.474 billion yuan at period end). Overall judgment: the book profit of this business can essentially not be viewed as discretionary cash; its investment value lies in the revenue scale of a national strategic asset and a long-term margin option, not in current earnings quality.
Word-deed consistency: pragmatic-to-conservative revenue targets, volatile profit targets. The 2025 plan called for revenue of 47.663 billion yuan / attributable profit of 592 million yuan → actuals of 46.331 billion yuan (97.21%) / 634 million yuan (107.09%); in 2024, the revenue plan was 96.22% achieved while attributable profit was only 56.9%; the 2026 plan calls for revenue of 49.949 billion yuan / attributable profit of 524 million yuan (a profit target below 2025 actuals, unusually conservative). Verdict: partially delivered—revenue guidance has been met at 96–97% for two straight years, while the profit line is dominated by pricing review and exogenous policy variables with weak verifiability.
Shareholder friendliness: neutral to weak. The payout ratio is a constant 30% but the absolute amount shrinks with profit (FY2025: 0.72 yuan per 10 shares, 192 million yuan for the year, dividend yield only 0.19% at the current price); no buybacks; three private placements (2014/2017/2020) plus debt-to-equity financing—share count has expanded through repeated issuances without EPS accretion; in 2026, the Group's 5.43 billion yuan capital injection into a subsidiary without proportional follow-on participation + a 1.9 billion yuan external capital injection into Tonghang Power, with minority interests rising from 5.63 to 11.72 billion yuan over three years. Verdict: central-enterprise mission (national aero-engine capability building) takes precedence over listed-shareholder returns; nominally the 30% payout ratio is stable, but in substance the shareholder-return channel is being continuously diluted.
Risk signals: General Manager Shen Peng resigned on 2026-07-28 due to work reassignment, becoming Vice Chairman; as of 10-30, more than three months had passed with no announced successor, precisely during the critical period for 15th Five-Year Plan production scheduling and annual budgeting; high density of related-party transactions (30.46% of total purchases from related parties, 97.09% of deposits and 51.53% of loans through the Group's finance company); military order pricing and capacity exemption disclosures cannot be externally verified against management's statements.
| Segment | Revenue Share (Core) | Gross Margin | YoY | Business Logic in One Sentence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aero-engines and derivative products | 95.2% | 8.50% (-1.04pp) | -3.37% | State military procurement + maintenance support + civilian supply; delivery-driven, margins locked by pricing review |
| Foreign trade export subcontracting | 4.3% | 20.61% (+0.89pp) | -5.94% | Component subcontracting for Safran/Rolls-Royce/GE etc.; highest margin but orders shrinking |
| Non-aero products and others | 0.5% | 25.61% (+7.20pp) | +17.83% | Civilian products such as process equipment; negligible scale |
Profit driver: aero-engines and derivatives, at 95.2% revenue share × 8.50% gross margin, contribute about 94% of gross profit—the company is in substance a single-business company, and both valuation and judgment should be anchored on the military complete-engine business. The gross margin structure gap reaches 17pp (8.50% vs. 25.61%): subcontracting and non-aero businesses face market-based customers and international pricing, while military complete engines face cost-plus pricing review—the margin differential of the same company under two pricing regimes is the most direct internal evidence of "military pricing suppression." Foreign trade subcontracting revenue fell 5.94% YoY (1.951 billion yuan), indicating volatility in the overseas civilian chain; its marginal growth drivers (AES100 low-altitude power, gas turbines, commercial engine supply) have not yet formed observable standalone revenue line items—the company has confirmed on its investor platform that these are "classified under the aero-engines and derivative products segment."
Accounting red flags: ① Accounts receivable growth far outpaces revenue (FY2024 +70.6% vs. revenue +9.5%; FY2025 revenue -3.2% while receivables still +24.4%)—the company attributes this to "some payments not yet due for settlement and changes in contract settlement terms"; the explanation is consistent, but the +156% four-year slope of balances is rare; ② state-appropriated project acceptance converted into "state-exclusive capital reserve" (7.474 billion yuan at period end, up 3.383 billion yuan YoY)—equity formed by state investment is allocated to the Group, continuously diluting the parent-company shareholders' share; ③ revenue and profit recognition highly concentrated in Q4 (2025Q4 revenue was 50.5% of the full year, recurring profit 76.9%)—military acceptance and settlement concentrate at year-end, making revenue recognition weakly verifiable; ④ one-off gains supporting profit (land requisition of 296 million yuan); ⑤ related-party borrowing interest at 69.21% of interest expense, finance company loan balance of 15.641 billion yuan—financing highly dependent on the Group's finance company (rates of 2.11–2.70%, below LPR, i.e., intra-system funding rather than market pricing).
Cross-period consistency: ① The receivables/revenue growth scissors gap—the company's explanations are consistent across periods; ② deep divergence between OCF and net profit (-4.7x/-16.6x/-7.0x)—the company has not explained the mechanism behind consecutive negatives, only describing improvement; ③ continuous gross margin decline—attribution is consistent (2023's rise attributed to scale effects, 2025's decline to new-product immaturity); ④ large swings in R&D expense of 553→995→773 million yuan—attributed to "R&D project cycle scheduling," consistent; ⑤ minority interests ballooning from 5.63→9.08→11.72 billion yuan—2025 attributed to state-exclusive equity, 2026 to the Tonghang Power capital injection; the two accretion paths differ but both dilute the attributable share, making the explanations inconsistent. The 2026-09-22 accounting policy change (Interpretation No. 20 of Chinese Accounting Standards) is not applied retrospectively and does not affect comparability across periods.
Current market data (closing price 2026-10-30): 37.05 yuan, market cap 98.76 billion yuan; PE(TTM) 145.4x (75th percentile over 5 years—earnings are at a trough due to pricing review and price-tax reform, so the percentile is for reference only); PB 2.46x (roughly 22nd percentile over 5 years, one of the primary anchors); PS(TTM) 1.87x, PS(FY2025) 2.13x (below the OEM median of 2.26); dividend yield 0.19%. Average daily turnover is about 1.1% of market cap; liquidity is normal.
Peer benchmarks (valuation multiples as of the 2026-10-30 close; financials from FY2025 annual reports):
| Company | PE(TTM) | PB | PS(FY25) | ROE(FY25) | Gross Margin (FY25) | Key Difference |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AECC Aviation Power | 145.4 | 2.46 | 2.13 | 1.58% | 9.12% | Sole complete-engine supplier, lowest net margin |
| AVIC Shenyang Aircraft | 42.7 | 5.64 | 3.02 | 17.32% | 13.70% | Fighter jet final assembly, benchmark for profit delivery |
| AVIC Xi'an Aircraft | 76.3 | 2.72 | 1.49 | 5.33% | 6.78% | Large/medium military aircraft final assembly, low-net-margin comparable |
| AECC Aero Engine Control | 135.2 | 1.80 | 4.38 | 2.70% | 23.13% | Sole control-system supplier, gross margin 2.5x higher |
| AVIC Heavy Machinery | 49.3 | 1.24 | 1.79 | 4.33% | 27.96% | Upstream forgings, profit-retention segment |
Market-implied expectations: market cap of 98.76 billion yuan ÷ a reasonable OEM PE of 40–55x (Shenyang/Xi'an static range) = implied normalized attributable profit of 1.80–2.47 billion yuan (net margin 3.6%–4.9%); even at a generous anchor of Xi'an's 76x, 1.30 billion yuan (2.6%) would be required. The current price requires the company to sustain a net margin at 0.8–1.5x its FY2023 peak (3.25%), whereas the reality is 1.29% TTM, 0.52% for 9M26, and the company's own 2026 plan of only 524 million yuan (21%–40% of the implied value). A low PS is not evidence of cheapness—the PS gap (about 17%) is far smaller than the net margin gap (peers are 3x+ higher); PS/PB can only serve as secondary anchors, with the primary anchor being "net margin path × revenue × exit multiple."
Three-layer value (EPV): ① Asset value of approximately 15.07 yuan/share (book attributable net assets of 40.161 billion yuan, PB=1; test stands and capacity built under the Two Engines program valued at book cost—replacement value should be higher but there is no quantitative basis)—the current price is +146% above this; ② EPV with zero growth of approximately 2.75 yuan/share (equity basis: normalized FCFE of 0.22 yuan/share ÷ 8% cost of equity; normalization basis = FY2023–2025 average recurring net margin of 1.69% × TTM revenue of 52.834 billion yuan ≈ attributable profit of 890 million yuan, bridged by a 65% cash conversion after normalizing collections; if the two receivables do not improve, normalized FCFE is negative and EPV approaches zero); ③ growth option = 37.05 − 2.75 ≈ 34.30 yuan/share, about 92.6% of market cap—the current price is almost entirely supported by "net margin repair + maintenance aftermarket + long-dated military trade/commercial engine/low-altitude options + strategic scarcity." It should be emphasized that a high growth-option share is not in itself a bearish conclusion (a sole-supply platform does have institutional expansion logic), but it means the protective layer of "the market paying only for zero growth" is extremely thin—any falsification of the net margin repair story would hit the price directly.
Three scenarios and odds (12 months):
| Scenario | Probability | Fair Range | vs. Current Price | Key Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 30% | 22–26 yuan | -41% to -30% (midpoint 24 yuan, -35.2%) | Prolonged order transition + further margin decline (the complete-engine chain has collectively slowed in 9M26); 2028 revenue falls back to ~44.0 billion yuan, net margin ~1% (attributable profit 400–450 million yuan); exit PS 1.4x / PB 1.7x |
| Base | 45% | 39–44 yuan | +5.3% to +18.8% | First step of net margin repair to 1.8–2.2%: 2026 revenue achieves plan (50.5–54.5 billion yuan), 2027–28 CAGR 6–7%, 2028 attributable profit 1.1–1.3 billion yuan; exit PS 1.9x (anchor: below the OEM FY25 PS median of 2.26 and its own recent center of ~2.2—its net margin is only 1/5–1/4 of Shenyang's with decelerating growth) / PB 2.5x (below its own 5-year median of 2.72 and Xi'an's 2.72), dual-anchor cross-check |
| Bull | 25% | 48–62 yuan | +29.6% to +67.3% (midpoint 55 yuan, +48.4%) | Net margin repaired to 3.0–3.5% (above the FY2023 peak: pricing review cleanup + higher share of high-margin maintenance/military trade/AES100) + substantive military trade landing; 2028 revenue ~67.0 billion yuan, attributable profit 2.0–2.3 billion yuan; exit PS 2.55x (anchor: lower end of Shenyang's 3.02x PS at a 7.93% net margin) / PB 3.2x |
Probability-weighted value is approximately 39.6 yuan (+7.0%), with a margin of safety (base-case fair-value floor) of only +5.3%—the odds are nearly symmetric, slightly positive. The bear-case probability is set at 30% (higher than the model's 25%), based on three realities: the forward indicator of contract liabilities at -27.8% YoY is weakening, the company's revenue budget has fallen short at 96–97% for two consecutive years, and the complete-engine chain collectively slowed in Q3; offsetting constraints are H1 deliveries +47%, recurring profit +209.79%, and the institutional support of stockpiling ahead of the armed forces centenary (2027-08-01). External reference points: the most pessimistic credible external forecast is the sell-side consensus itself (2026E of 613 million yuan, -4.2% YoY; no independent bearish reports); on the optimistic side, Essence Securities at 46.38 yuan (3x 2026E PB), AVIC Securities at 55 yuan, Huatai at 52.76 yuan (2.8x PS)—this report's bull case covers these, while the base case is below them.
Own forecasts vs. guidance vs. consensus:
| Period | This Report's Forecast | Company Plan | Sell-Side Consensus |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY2026E | Revenue 50.5–54.5 billion yuan; attributable profit 550–750 million yuan | 49.949 billion yuan; 524 million yuan | Attributable profit ~613 million yuan (EPS 0.23) |
| FY2027E | Revenue 54.5–59.0 billion yuan; attributable profit 750 million–1.1 billion yuan | Not disclosed | Attributable profit ~826 million yuan (EPS 0.31) |
Forecast assumptions: Q4 2026 single-quarter revenue of 21.1–25.1 billion yuan (-10% to +7% YoY, share declining to 42–46% under balanced production), attributable profit 400–600 million yuan (2025Q4's 526 million yuan single quarter has demonstrated the capability); risks are the single-quarter volatility of Q4 accounting for ~80% of full-year profit, impairments, and profit diversion during the capital-injection transition period (350 million–1.2 billion yuan).
Conclusion: Reasonably but somewhat overvalued—quality and price must be assessed separately: strategic quality is extremely hard (sole-supply platform + Two Engines program capacity + long-dated maintenance aftermarket rights), while financial quality is extremely poor (ROIC 1.6%, net cash -30.7 billion yuan, OCF negative for consecutive years); on price, PB/PS are at low levels but already imply a net margin repair exceeding the historical peak; the target range is 39–44 yuan (base-case fair value), which does not constitute a purchase with a margin of safety, yet there is also insufficient evidence to short this scarce asset.
Market size: The global military aero-engine market is roughly USD 34.3 billion per year (2025, aggregated from institutional citations, to be verified; cross-reference: GMI puts the global aviation engine market at USD 86.7 billion in 2025 with a CR5 of ~40%). China market: broker estimates have put annual military aero-engine demand at over RMB 30 billion, ~RMB 450 billion over ten years (including complete engines + maintenance + spare engines, 2016/2018 methodology); the "Two Engines Special Program" carries state funding of ~RMB 100 billion (officially announced 2015) plus an expected RMB 300 billion in social/ancillary investment; for the maintenance aftermarket, reference global civil aviation MRO of USD 136 billion in 2025 (Oliver Wyman, with engine MRO the largest sub-segment at ~36%). The master gatekeeper of demand is China's defense budget: ~RMB 1.9096 trillion in 2026, +7% YoY (Xinhua/Global Times), the 11th consecutive year of single-digit growth; the company's 2026 operating plan targets revenue of RMB 49.949 billion (+7.81%), essentially in line with defense budget growth. Industry growth center: defense budget +7% plus new-model mass production and maintenance ramp-up; broker consensus for the aero-engine value chain growth over 2026–2030 is ~10–15% (during military aircraft production ramps, the aero-engine segment has historically outgrown the defense budget by 3–5 percentage points).
Value chain and profit distribution: Superalloys (BIAM Gaona/Fushun Special Steel/Topnew) → forgings (AVIC Heavy Machinery/Hangyu Technology/Trigon Defense) → blade precision casting/components (AECC Aero Science & Technology) → control systems (AECC Aero Engine Controls, sole player) → component module assemblies → complete engine final assembly and testing (this company, the four OEM plants) → the military (single buyer) + maintenance support. The brutal fact of profit distribution: OEM assembly gross margin of 8.5–9% is significantly below upstream — superalloys/forgings at 25–40%, control systems at 23.13% (AECC Aero Engine Controls FY2025), versus AECC Aviation Power at 9.12%; value (margin) is retained at both ends; returns in the OEM segment come from monopoly position and scale, not unit profitability. Versus upstream, the OEM plants extract强势 settlement leverage via accounts payable (2026Q3 +36.72%) and sole-source procurement within the system; versus downstream (the military), price-audit-based pricing plus long collection cycles (receivables/attributable net profit ratio of ~78x) leave weak bargaining power.
Supply-demand and competitive landscape: Demand side has three stacked drivers — ① military aircraft fielding and replacement (China: 1,814 combat aircraft, FlightGlobal WAF 2026; 300+ J-20s, expected near 500 by mid-2026; Chengdu/Shenyang capacity expansions reported significant by FlightGlobal in 2026-03), with twin-engine models (J-20/16/15/11) rising in mix, doubling engines per aircraft, and WS-15 (confirmed in production in 2023) carrying 15–20% higher unit value than the WS-10 series; ② existing-fleet re-engining and maintenance: engines are consumables (roughly 2–3 re-engines over service life), overhaul peaks lag new aircraft delivery by 5–8 years, the "14th Five-Year Plan" delivery peak maps to a 2026–2030 maintenance peak, and the company's headquarters repair capacity project was 100% completed in 2023 awaiting volume; ③ military trade exports: 24 J-10CEs delivered/fielded to Pakistan, 42 to Indonesia (Air Force Chief of Staff said on 2026-10-05 the first batch will arrive around April 2027), 20 to Bangladesh in progress; if hundred-unit-scale orders land with domestic turbofans, that implies roughly 200–300 engines over a 10-year horizon (extrapolated at a 2–3x re-engine factor; unit value undisclosed — directional estimate only). Supply side: domestic military aero-engine OEM production is exclusively borne by the AECC system with no second supplier; the company's complete-engine share ≈ 100%. Overseas, GE/Pratt & Whitney/Rolls-Royce/Safran — four majors — monopolize high-thrust military engines. Entry barriers: model-specific licensing and the sole-source procurement regime, 20–30-year development cycles per engine generation, hundred-billion-RMB-scale test facility capital, and systemic know-how — effectively no new entrants. Substitution threat: none — Russian AL-31F/RD-93 engines are the ones being replaced (localization rate on newly built military aircraft is near 100%); electric/hybrid is only applicable to small low-altitude platforms.
Cycle and regulation: Position in the cycle — the 2021–2022 order flood peak (contract liabilities peaked at ~RMB 24.8 billion in 2021H1) → 2024–2025 "minor lull" during old-to-new model transition (defense budget growth 7.2%→7%, experts describe an "equipment consolidation phase," company 2025 revenue -3.2%) → 2026 marks the start of the 15th Five-Year Plan with the order cycle restarting but pace yet to be verified (H1 revenue +47.2% vs Q3 single quarter -1.7%). Leading indicators: contract liabilities (2026Q3 RMB 6.003 billion, -27.8% YoY — new round of prepayments not yet confirmed), inventory buildup (RMB 40.581 billion), official disclosure of military trade contracts, and advance receipts at same-chain companies such as AECC Aero Engine Controls. Regulation and policy: ① the Two Engines Special Program (launched 2016) continues to underpin R&D investment; ② military pricing mechanism reform — shifting from "cost-plus 5%" to target price plus incentive/constraint pricing; a new round of "product price and tax reform" landed in 2024–2025, with AECC Aviation Power and AECC Aero Engine Controls' 2025 annual reports both confirming it as a key driver of profit decline, and a 2026Q3 change in VAT super-deduction policy further compressed other income — "volume growth, prices stable-to-pressured" is the policy keynote, and OEM margins are hard to release before price reform is fully digested; ③ expiry and adjustment of the VAT exemption for military products (turnover taxes rose from 2022; the company's taxes and surcharges rose +71.3% in 2022 and +120.7% in 2023); ④ the US DoD list of Chinese military-linked companies (AECC added in 2020-11) restricts offshore financing and parts of the supply chain.
Company positioning in the industry: Absolute monopoly with stable share — the sole listed platform for domestic military aero-engine OEM production, with a full turbojet/turbofan/turboprop/turboshaft spectrum (Liming: high-thrust turbofans; Xi'an: medium/large engines plus gas turbines; South: turboprops/turboshafts; Liyang: small/medium thrust). Moat sources: model-specific licensing (each engine type is tied to a specific aircraft model), Two Engines Program test and validation assets, and integrated OEM + maintenance positioning. The weakness lies in the profit model (price-audit margin lock-in); medium-term variables: maintenance aftermarket ramp-up, military trade supporting packages (selling prices above domestic demand pricing), the AES100 low-altitude powerplant (already holds both TC and PC certificates, first deliveries underway; South Company's 2026H1 net profit of RMB 356 million was 19.3x full-year FY2025), and CJ-1000A commercial engine support (final review in May 2026; all ground verification items completed in September, entering final TC audit; multi-source expectations of certification in 2026Q4–2027H1; the company is responsible for certain module assemblies and components) — these four are structural variables that could break the "price-audit margin ceiling" narrative, but none has an independently observable revenue line item in the near term.
The financial-statement language of military order-driven businesses (industry-specific chapter): Military enterprises do not disclose order books or book-to-bill ratios; investors can only translate order signals from the balance sheet — ① contract liabilities = customer prepayments: ~RMB 24.8 billion peak in 2021H1 → RMB 4.486 billion at end-2024 (-62.2%, "changes in contract settlement terms" i.e., the prepayment model winding down) → RMB 6.003 billion in 2026Q3 (-27.8% YoY): the previous round's order prepayments have been consumed and the new round has not yet arrived — this is the single most contested number between bulls and bears; ② inventory (especially RMB 18.58 billion in WIP + goods dispatched) = production scheduling signal; RMB 40.581 billion at end-2026Q3 (+26.04%) indicates a full production workload; ③ accounts receivable = delivered but unsettled: RMB 53.65 billion, over 100% of revenue, with collections extremely concentrated in Q4 (2025Q4 single-quarter operating cash flow +RMB 4.05 billion vs 9M cumulative -RMB 8.47 billion); ④ related-party transactions (sales to AECC 2.99%/purchases 34.33%/deposits and loans with the finance company) are channels for resource allocation within the system; ⑤ Q4 concentration of revenue recognition (50%+ of the full year) means no single quarterly report can be linearly extrapolated. Understanding these five points matters more than tracking the income statement.
Rating: Neutral; confidence 0.50; horizon 12 months. AECC Aviation Power's investment story is "paying a 92.6% option premium to buy a net-margin recovery on a sole national-supply platform" — we do not doubt the monopoly position or the long-term value of the maintenance aftermarket, but the current price of RMB 37.05 already prices in a medium-probability recovery quite fully (implied net margin 2.6%–4.9% vs actual 1.29%), probability-weighted expected return is roughly +7%, downside protection (EPV RMB 2.75 / asset value RMB 15.07) is extremely thin, and the odds are near symmetric. Strategy: holders of no position should wait for confirmation signals (the 11-04 results briefing, Q4 single-quarter gross margin and deliveries, annual report contract liabilities ≥ RMB 7.5 billion) before re-evaluating; existing holders should treat above RMB 44 (base-case fair value upper bound, +18.8%) as the profit-taking evaluation level and below RMB 32 (below the 52-week low) as the thesis re-assessment line.
Key monitoring variables: ① whether single-quarter gross margin can stay ≥11% for two consecutive quarters (the most direct reading on net-margin recovery); ② direction of contract liabilities (balance-sheet evidence of a new order round); ③ receivables collection and impairments (whether the Q4 collection pattern recurs, and whether full-year impairments stay ≤ RMB 200 million); ④ the mechanical impact of profit diversion during the capital-increase transition period (RMB 35–120 million) on annual attributable profit; ⑤ whether military price and tax policy sees a second-phase adjustment (the institutional variable for the long-term margin center); ⑥ first disclosure of revenue line items for military trade/commercial engines/low-altitude. Key risks: a prolonged order transition period (the OEM chain's collective Q3 slowdown persisting), further gross margin decline (each 1pp decline erodes total profit by ~RMB 500 million, ~80% of the 2026 planned attributable profit), financial expense erosion from cash flow and short-term borrowing rollovers, and replication of the minority-interest dilution template.
Data and methodology notes: Financial data are taken from the company's 2023–2025 annual reports, 2026 Q1/H1/Q3 reports, and same-day announcements (all disclosed on the SSE/Juchao Information platform); prices and valuation multiples are frozen as of the 2026-10-30 close (computed in this report using closing prices); sell-side consensus is the aggregated iFinD (THS) figure as of 2026-10-30 (n=7); military orders, pricing, and capacity are exempt from disclosure under confidentiality rules, and all related inferences have had their methodology and uncertainty flagged in the text. This report does not constitute investment advice.