| Item | Content |
|---|---|
| Rating | Cautiously Bullish |
| Target Price | RMB 11.6 – 13.8 (base-case fair value range, 11-12x × 2026E net profit attributable to parent of RMB 7.8–8.5 billion) |
| Current Price | RMB 11.69 (close on 2026-10-26, frozen anchor) |
| Total Market Cap | approx. RMB 86.16 billion (7.371 billion shares × RMB 11.69) |
| Margin of Safety | approx. -1% (current price slightly above the lower bound of the base-case range; positive expected return mainly comes from a right-skewed scenario distribution) |
| Probability-Weighted Expected Value | approx. RMB 14.4, +23% vs. current price (Bear 25% / Base 50% / Bull 25%) |
| Time Horizon | 6-12 months (Q3 report, monthly revenue rankings, and annual-report goodwill testing are the three key validation checkpoints) |
Century Huatong is an overseas expansion leader that ranks first in A-share gaming revenue and second (behind only Tencent) on Sensor Tower's 2025 annual ranking of Chinese mobile game publishers by global revenue: the dual-SLG matrix of Pointe Interactive + Century Games (Whiteout Survival, still at the top of global revenue rankings three years after launch, and Kingshot, which has taken over as No. 2 on the overseas charts) drove FY2025 revenue of RMB 37.90 billion (+67.6%) and net profit attributable to parent of RMB 5.61 billion (+362%), with 2026H1 net profit attributable to parent of RMB 4.50 billion (+69.5%). However, the stock has drawn down 42.8% from its 52-week high, and the current price of RMB 11.69 implies only 9.7x 2026E consensus PE—the market is pricing in a triple discount: RMB 11.7 billion in goodwill and a history of impairments, governance legacies including major shareholders' high pledge ratios, share reductions, and breach of performance compensation obligations, and thin revenue visibility from the user-acquisition model (deferred revenue as a share of revenue has fallen to 2.9%). Our base-case fair value is RMB 11.6-13.8: the current price sits near the lower bound of the range, mildly undervalued, with right-skewed odds (bear-case midpoint -29%, bull-case midpoint +105%), but traditional margin of safety is essentially zero—hence a "cautiously bullish" call: high quality, mildly undervalued, with the governance discount not yet fully cleared. The Q3 report on October 29 and the monthly Sensor Tower overseas rankings are the most密集 validation checkpoints over the coming quarter.
Upcoming changes: Three developments are most likely to reshape pricing. First, the ESOP assessment targets (Pointe + CG segment 2026 net profit target of RMB 7.0 billion, excluding share-based payment)—the segment's 2026H1 net profit was RMB 3.409 billion, 48.7% progress; hitting the target requires H2 sequential growth of +5.3%, while the company's 2025 H2/H1 net profit ratio was 1.11 (gaming is not seasonally weak in H2). Achieving the target, confirmed by the audited 2026 annual report (April 2027), would be a hard-constraint fulfillment of management's commitment to two years of high growth. Second, the gap between market pricing and consensus: at 12x (peer median), the current price reverse-engineers an implied 2026E net profit attributable to parent of only about RMB 7.2 billion—about 19% below the 14-analyst consensus of RMB 8.92 billion and about 20% below the annualized 2026H1 run rate of RMB 9.01 billion. But sell-side target prices have already been cut from a June 15-analyst average of RMB 25.77 to an October 5-analyst median of RMB 18.8, with essentially zero upward earnings revisions in the past 90 days—the expectation gap can only close through step-by-step earnings delivery, not through consensus rising on its own. Third, share supply: after Jiyunsheng, a concert party of the largest shareholder, reduced its stake by 0.71% in June 2026, the reduction plan was terminated early, clearing supply for now; however, Yaocuru and Yiqusheng still refuse to perform approximately 102 million shares of arbitrated, legally effective performance compensation—if executed via judicial auction, this would create concentrated supply.
Primary stock price driver: Revenue sustainability of core products—the decay slope of Whiteout Survival and the succession ramp-up of Kingshot and Tasty Travels will determine whether 2026E net profit attributable to parent lands at RMB 7.8-8.5 billion (our range) or slides toward the assessment trigger line of about RMB 5.5 billion (bear case). Leading indicators are the monthly Sensor Tower Chinese mobile game overseas revenue rankings released around the 20th of each month (in September 2026 the two SLGs swept the top two spots, and Tasty Travels rose 26% sequentially to No. 19).
Expectation gap: Characterized as "justified undervaluation" rather than pure mispricing—the discount targets (goodwill, governance, revenue visibility) all genuinely exist, but current pricing is already close to the pessimistic script of "segment barely hitting the assessment trigger value, with Shengqu and other segments' RMB 1.3-1.6 billion profit essentially unpriced." Evidence quality is moderate: financials and rankings are verifiable and sell-side consensus is available, but the company does not disclose total revenue flow (gross billings) or ARPPU (citing trade secrets), so the most critical operating data on the revenue side can only be indirectly verified through third-party rankings.
Validation and falsification: Validation rests on the Q3 report (2026-10-29) segment revenue and selling expense ratio, consecutive monthly leadership on overseas rankings, and the 2026 annual report's goodwill testing and audit opinion; falsification conditions are in the Chapter 12 tracking table (segment revenue negative sequential growth for two consecutive quarters, both SLGs dropping out of the top five on the overseas rankings, goodwill impairment ≥ RMB 1.0 billion, new large-scale share reductions).
Three points to note objectively: single-quarter revenue growth has already decelerated from +35.2% in 2026Q1 to +22.6% in Q2 (actual figures calculated from quarterly reports in this report); the net profit trigger value of RMB 5.5 billion is only 8.3% above 2025 segment net profit, so "hitting the trigger" itself carries limited information—the truly binding number is the RMB 7.0 billion target (a +5.3% H2 sequential increase gets there); the assessment metric excludes share-based payments, and segment definitions and expense allocations are set by the company—there is no verified bridge between segment targets being met and the consolidated attributable-profit consensus of RMB 8.9 billion. The 2026 ESOP's own share-based payment expense will hit the P&L in H2 but is excluded from the assessment.
The valuation conclusion must present multiple sensitivity rather than a single point: at 11-12x (lower end of peer median range) × our 2026E attributable net profit of RMB 7.8-8.5 billion, fair value is RMB 11.6-13.8 (only 8.8-9.8x on 2027E of RMB 8.8-9.8 billion); if the market insists on 9-10x for companies with user-acquisition + governance flaws, then RMB 10.6-11.5, and the current price is within a reasonable range; at 14x for a sector leader, the stock is clearly undervalued. The same applies to reverse use of multiples: current market cap RMB 86.16 billion ÷ 12x implies belief only in about RMB 7.2 billion of 2026E profit—but that is merely a function of the multiple, not an independently observable market belief. The multiple-independent floor is EPV: normalized FCFE of RMB 7.0 billion (discounted from actual 2025 FCF of RMB 7.7 billion, net of the inflation from expanding user-acquisition payables) ÷ 11.5% cost of equity = RMB 8.26/share, 71% of the current price—leaving only 29% (RMB 3.43) as growth-option premium in the zero-growth scenario.
The book net cash of about RMB 10.2 billion (12% of market cap) is real, but three contingencies must be deducted: restricted cash of about RMB 930 million, the Pulong syndicated loan guarantee exposure of about RMB 1.82 billion (already twice required to substitute-repay in 2026; the guaranteed party had zero 2026H1 revenue and a net loss of RMB 107 million), and approximately RMB 1.0 billion of unprovided WeMade ICC arbitration China exposure—adjusted usable safety cushion of about RMB 6.5 billion (7.5% of market cap). The marginal impact of deferred payment of marketing expenses on OCF is about RMB 400 million per half-year (less than 10% of OCF), and the ratio of payable promotion expenses to annualized ad spend has fallen from 26.4% in 2024 to 17.5% in 2026H1—this inflation is controllable. The more critical quality signal: gaming recharge deferred revenue as a share of gaming revenue has fallen for three consecutive years, 7.1%→5.5%→2.9%, and contract liabilities at end-2026H1 were equivalent to only about 11 days of revenue—there is no "grain reserve" buffer on the revenue side; once billings weaken, reported revenue will fall more than billings, and player lifetime value estimates remain a key audit matter.
One downside year for the Shengqu unit (stress-scenario recoverable amount -15% to -30%) implies an impairment exposure of about RMB 540 million to RMB 3.2 billion—equivalent to 10%-57% of 2025 attributable net profit. The Pointe unit's 15.5x recoverable-amount coverage means even a 30% decline in Whiteout Survival would not trigger its own impairment—but that coverage rests on extrapolating an exceptionally long prosperity cycle—against the backdrop of the company having a track record of cross-period impairment adjustments, the downward direction of the discount rate itself is eroding the credibility of assumptions. Combined with the chairman's high-pledge share reductions for debt repayment, refusal to perform performance compensation, and zero buybacks at current prices at the company level (2024-2025 buybacks were all for ESOPs, not cancellation), the governance discount is a persistent variable, not a one-time clearing—which is precisely why the base-case multiple is anchored at peer median (11-12x) rather than a leader premium.
Core Financial Data (Consolidated, RMB 100 million)
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | 2026Q1 | 2026H1 (latest period) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating revenue | 132.85 | 226.20 | 378.98 | 110.10 | 221.17 |
| Revenue YoY | +15.7% (restated) | +70.3% | +67.6% | +35.2% | +28.5% |
| Net profit attributable to parent | 5.24 | 12.13 | 56.05 | 20.27 | 45.03 |
| Attributable profit YoY | +131.5% | +131.5%→+362.0% | +362.0% | +50.2% | +69.5% |
| Non-GAAP (deducted) attributable net profit | 4.21 | 16.43 | 56.38 | 19.78 | 43.03 |
| Gross margin | 60.5% | 65.8% | 69.95% | 72.05% | 72.69% |
| Net margin (attributable basis) | 3.9% | 5.4% | 14.8% | 18.4% | 20.4% |
| Operating cash flow | 31.02 | 50.46 | 85.64 | 19.41 | 44.97 |
| Free cash flow (OCF - capex) | 21.15 | 44.69 | 77.17 | — | 39.86 |
| Cash + trading financial assets | — | — | 118.08+ | — | 143.06 |
| Interest-bearing debt | — | — | 26.95 | — | 28.18 |
| Debt-to-asset ratio | — | — | 29.7% | — | 26.3% |
| Goodwill | — | — | 118.37 | — | 117.07 |
Note: Cash and equivalents at end-2026H1 were RMB 13.038 billion; restricted funds approx. RMB 930 million; the gap between non-GAAP and attributable profit is minimal (2025 non-recurring loss of RMB 33 million; 2026H1 +RMB 199 million, mainly fair-value changes of RMB 212 million); FCF is this report's calculation (operating cash flow minus cash spent on long-term assets).
Reasons for Metric Changes (company explanations for accounts with YoY ≥ ±20%): FY2025 revenue +67.6%—gaming revenue RMB 36.237 billion (+72.8%), mobile +88.1%; management cites "multiple hit products advancing in tandem." Selling expenses +87.4% to RMB 14.512 billion (expense ratio 38.3%)—official explanation "mainly increased marketing promotion expenses"; the company states ad spend is dynamically set by "return rate and payback period, with long-term ROI modeled by large models." Attributable profit +362%—high gaming growth plus the 2024 low base (Q4 concentrated impairments and non-operating expenses of RMB 598 million). Asset impairment losses -72%—"mainly goodwill and other long-term asset impairments related to the Shenzhen IDC project." Employee compensation payable +83.7%—IR official reply "explosive profit growth drove corresponding employee performance incentives." 2026H1 administrative expenses -37.4%—"optimized incentive mechanisms, adjusted staffing structure to reduce labor costs." Financial expenses turned negative—"increased FX gains and reduced interest expense from loan repayments."
2026H1 revenue of RMB 22.117 billion (+28.5%), attributable net profit of RMB 4.503 billion (+69.5%), non-GAAP of RMB 4.303 billion (+66.4%)—the strongest half-year since listing. By quarter, Q1/Q2 revenue was 11.010/11.107 billion (+35.2%/+22.6% YoY), Q2 attributable net profit RMB 2.476 billion (+89.6% YoY, +22.1% QoQ)—profit growth continuing to outpace revenue, driven by further gross margin expansion (72.7%; software and services 74.9%), administrative expenses -37.4%, and financial expenses turning negative, though the selling expense ratio rose to 42.2% (marketing promotion expenses RMB 9.169 billion, +43.3%), absorbing part of the scale effect. Operating cash flow of RMB 4.497 billion (+14.8%) lagged net profit growth notably; OCF/attributable profit fell from 1.53 in 2025 to 1.0—cash conversion normalizing off a high base rather than deteriorating, but worth continuous tracking. The interim dividend of RMB 0.8 per 10 shares (RMB 587 million) was implemented in October; payout ratio remains low (~6.5%, H1 basis). Against market expectations: for the Q3 report (released 10-29), sell-side consensus was Q3 EPS of approx. RMB 0.34 (net profit approx. RMB 2.51 billion, +47.8%) on revenue of approx. RMB 11.3 billion (+13%)—if Q2's revenue deceleration (+22.6%) extends into Q3 around +13%, that is within expectations; the key to beating or missing lies in whether the selling expense ratio flattens sequentially and in the full-year revenue contribution from Kingshot.
Model in brief: An asset-light integrated game developer-publisher — revenue is mainly from in-app purchases of virtual items, recognized on a deferred basis over the player consumption cycle (2025 self-operated revenue of RMB 34.985 billion, 92.9% of main business revenue). There is no subscription-based recurring revenue, but the 20+ year Legend (传奇) IP franchise and long-cycle SLG titles form a "quasi-recurring" revenue base. User acquisition relies heavily on paid traffic (selling expense ratio 42.2%), with weak bargaining power over downstream channels (Apple/Google take roughly 30% commissions) and traffic-buying platforms. Consolidated Shenzhen IDC (loss-making) and an off-balance-sheet LP stake in the Songjiang data center constitute a second narrative, contributing less than 0.1% of revenue.
Cash content of earnings: OCF/net profit attributable to parent for 2023–2025 was 5.92 → 4.16 → 1.53 (the high ratios in the first two years included large non-cash impairments), falling back to 1.0 in 2026H1; FCF/net profit for 2023–2025 was 4.04 → 3.68 → 1.38, and 0.89 in 2026H1. The company is currently in the high cash-generation phase of a hit cycle — 2025 FCF of RMB 7.72 billion is genuine cash, but it includes contributions from expanded payables for traffic acquisition (about RMB 400 million per half-year) and low maintenance capex (CapEx/depreciation about 0.83; the gaming core is asset-light, and IDC's heavy spending is mainly borne by the off-balance-sheet fund and a syndicated loan). One must distinguish cyclical from structural factors: once revenue enters a downturn, the reversal of traffic-acquisition payables and the draining of the deferred revenue reservoir (see C3) will amplify the cash flow decline.
Return on capital: All-in ROIC is about 16.9% (2025 net profit RMB 5.72 billion / (interest-bearing debt RMB 2.70 billion + equity RMB 31.22 billion)); excluding net cash, operating ROIC is about 38.8% — significantly above WACC (10–12%), a genuine moat signal. FY2025 weighted ROE was 20.27%, completing a re-rating from the ruins of 2.2% in 2023.
Recurring earnings test: 2025 adjusted (ex-non-recurring) net profit of RMB 5.638 billion ≈ attributable net profit of RMB 5.605 billion (non-recurring items -RMB 33 million); the 2026H1 gap was +RMB 199 million (mainly fair value changes) — no one-off window-dressing of book profits; nor any aggressive add-backs in the reverse direction (no large SBC add-back style Non-GAAP). The real variable in earnings quality lies not in accounting treatment but in revenue structure: 79% of revenue comes from a single segment, the single largest customer (a channel) accounts for 35.19% of revenue, and top-five customer concentration has risen for three consecutive years from 53.9% → 68.3% → 70.8% — channel concentration is an inherent cost of the paid-traffic model; the company has not explained it, and it requires ongoing monitoring.
Red flags: Goodwill/net assets 34% (above the 30% warning threshold); IDC segment consolidated losses (2025 segment net loss RMB 733 million) plus repayment of guarantees on behalf of an associate; accrued traffic-acquisition payables of RMB 3.202 billion (roughly 71% of H1 attributable net profit).
Consistency between words and actions: partially delivered. ① The 2024 annual report pledged that the IDC business would "strive to reach operational break-even by 2026" — yet in 2025 the cloud data segment posted a net loss of RMB 733 million (including goodwill impairment of RMB 82 million), with no signs of delivery on a consolidated basis; IR's claim that "the Songjiang project is already profitable" reflects an off-balance-sheet LP perspective — judged not delivered. ② The employee stock ownership plan set in August 2026 a segment net profit target of RMB 7 billion for 2026 (trigger at RMB 5.5 billion) — H1 progress is 48.7%; the trigger is highly likely to be met and the target is attainable, but note the draft explicitly states it "does not constitute a performance forecast or substantive commitment." ③ The 2025 annual report pledged an interim dividend — implemented in September 2026 (RMB 0.8 per 10 shares), delivered.
Shareholder friendliness: neutral to weak. No dividends for FY2023 or FY2024 (the company explained "the parent company's distributable profit on its standalone statements was low"); FY2025 dividend of RMB 0.6 per 10 shares (RMB 441 million, 7.9% payout ratio) plus RMB 587 million for 2026 interim — still less than half a single quarter's profit. On buybacks, roughly RMB 1.53 billion was spent in 2024–2025 combined, but all went to employee stock ownership plans rather than cancellation; moreover, the 2026 ESOP shares were transferred at RMB 6.85/share (about RMB 163 million concession versus the buyback cost of about RMB 12.78/share, an approximately 41% discount to market price) — generous to employees, neutral to existing shareholders. Investors repeatedly pressed the company on the interactive platform about low dividends and zero buyback-and-cancellation; the company's replies were formulaic, with no quantitative commitments.
Risk signals: Falsified records in 2018–2022 annual reports penalized by the CSRC (Nov 2024); previously subject to ST designation; ST cap removed in November 2025; Chairman Wang Ji has pledged 98.77% of his holdings and reduced his stake in 2026 (claiming it was to resolve personal debts and facilitate delivery of performance compensation); parties obligated to pay performance compensation were ordered to rectify but still refuse to comply; no controlling shareholder structure. Credit rebuilding requires time and real money (buyback-and-cancellation / share purchases by insiders / compensation transfers) — none has appeared yet.
FY2025 segment structure (per annual report segment disclosures)
| Segment | Revenue share | Gross margin | YoY | Business logic in one line |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Point Interactive + Century Games | 79.1% | 74.78% | Segment revenue RMB 29.97 billion (about RMB 15 billion in 2024), net profit RMB 5.078 billion | Overseas SLG + casual portfolio, paid-traffic driven, global self-publishing |
| Internet games — others (Shanda Games/Actoz etc.) | 16.5% | 61.78% | Revenue RMB 6.271 billion, net profit RMB 1.196 billion | Legend/Dragon Nest 20+ year IP "ballast," legacy IP revival and multi-platform interconnectivity |
| Auto parts | 4.28% | 13.67% | -0.4%, net loss RMB 1.8 million | Tier-2 supplier, thin but stable margins |
| AI cloud data (IDC) | 0.09% | Negative gross margin | Segment net loss RMB 733 million (incl. impairment of RMB 82 million) | Consolidated Shenzhen project loss-making; Songjiang project held off-balance-sheet |
Profit driver identification: Point + CG contributed segment net profit of RMB 5.078 billion, about 89% of consolidated net profit (both revenue share of 79% and gross margin of 74.8% are high) — both valuation and risk are concentrated in this segment. The Shanda segment's net profit of RMB 1.196 billion is a stabilizer, but it is precisely where the goodwill safety margin of its asset group is thinnest (13.6%, see C4). Gross margin structure ranges 74.8% vs 13.7% (a 61pp gap between highest and lowest): global pricing and operating leverage of self-published overseas SLGs versus the contract-manufacturing nature of auto parts — two entirely different businesses; the IDC segment's negative gross margin stems from the consolidated project being in ramp-up with high depreciation. Overseas revenue share rose from 46.0% (2023) → 50.3% (2024) → 58.6% (2025) → 64.7% (2026H1), with the US (32.3%), Japan (14.1%), and South Korea (7.5%) as the top three markets.
Accounting red flags (with evidence):
Cross-period consistency: ① Top-five customer concentration rising three years straight, 53.9% → 68.3% → 70.8%, unexplained by the company; ② deferred game revenue/game revenue falling continuously, 7.1% → 5.5% → 2.9% — revenue growing rapidly while the deferred pool shrinks, unexplained by the company — this is the single most questionable item on revenue quality; ③ selling expense ratio rising, 34.2% → 38.3% → 42.2%; the company's explanation (dynamic ROI-based ad spending) is consistent with the trend; ④ the violent swing in attributable net profit from -RMB 6.75 billion → 520 million → 1.21 billion → 5.61 billion was driven by impairment timing, which is inconsistent with management's explanation (the CSRC's findings conflict with the originally disclosed figures). Overall: internal consistency of the statements over the past three years is acceptable, but the historical record plus pro-cyclical adjustments to key assumptions demand a persistent discount on goodwill and deferred revenue items.
Current market data and percentiles: Closing price RMB 11.69 (2026-10-26), market cap RMB 86.16 billion, TTM revenue RMB 42.81 billion, TTM attributable net profit RMB 7.452 billion. PE(TTM) of 11.56x — at an all-time low since listing (historical percentile is distorted: 2022–2024 earnings were flattened by RMB 6.68 billion of goodwill impairment and the regulatory penalty, while the current period sits at a hit-cycle high — distorted at both ends; the percentile is for reference only); PE (2025 static) 15.37x (23rd percentile over 5 years); PB 2.52x (72nd percentile over 5 years) must be read alongside ROE rising from 2.2% to 20.3%; PB/ROE is the lowest among the five listed gaming peers; PS(TTM) 2.01x. Forward multiples are the real signal: 2026E consensus PE 9.7x, 2027E 8.0x, PEG about 0.26 (even cutting sustainable growth to 15%, PEG would be only 0.65).
(Note: Sunward Telecom's 24.26x is passively inflated by legacy-product decline and shrinking profits; it is excluded from the valuation comparison.)
Market-implied expectations: In one sentence — at today's price, if priced in reverse at a 12x peer median, the company would need to deliver only about RMB 7.2 billion of attributable net profit in 2026, whereas H1 already earned RMB 4.5 billion, sell-side consensus is RMB 8.92 billion, and the H1 annualized run-rate is RMB 9.01 billion. But the reverse also holds: if the market is only willing to pay 9–10x for a paid-traffic company with governance blemishes, the current price roughly reflects consensus. Judgment of implied expectations must be tied to multiple sensitivity: the undervaluation thesis holds in the 11–14x range, and fails in the 9–10x range.
Three-layer value (EPV): Asset value RMB 3.05/share (net assets excluding RMB 11.7 billion of goodwill; RMB 4.64 including goodwill) — a floor, not support; EPV zero growth RMB 8.26/share (normalized FCFE of RMB 7.0 billion ÷ 11.5% cost of equity; normalization already discounts 2025 FCF of RMB 7.7 billion and strips out the inflated portion from expanding traffic-acquisition payables, without taking the peak H1 annualized run-rate of RMB 9.0 billion), 71% of the current price; growth option residual RMB 3.43, 29.3% of the current price — the premium the market pays for Kingshot succession, a pipeline of 2–3 new titles per year, and IDC compute asset injection is less than 30%; measured against the increment of 2027E consensus relative to normalized earnings (about RMB 3.8 billion/year), this pricing is not demanding, provided 2027 delivers. Note also: book net cash of about RMB 10.2 billion (RMB 1.39/share) is not double-counted in the equity framework, noted as an extra safety cushion (about RMB 6.5 billion after contingent items).
Three scenarios and odds (current price RMB 11.69, 2026-10-26 close):
| Scenario | Probability | Fair value range | vs. current price | Decisive factors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 25% | RMB 7.3 – 9.2 | Median -29% | Whiteout Survival decaying at double digits while Kingshot succession falls short + traffic-cost inflation squeezing margins + RMB 2–4 billion goodwill impairment on Shanda/CG asset groups; 8–10x × 2026E of about RMB 6.7 billion |
| Base | 50% | RMB 11.6 – 13.8 | Median +8.6% (range -0.8% to +18.0%) | Kingshot succession delivers, Whiteout Survival decays at a shallow single-digit slope; 2026E attributable net profit of RMB 7.8–8.5 billion lands; exit multiple 11–12x (anchor: lower end of peer TTM range median — 37 Interactive 11.24 / G-bits 11.05 / Kingnet 13.97; versus the company's static PE of 15.37x and a distorted 5-year median of about 25x, no leader premium is given due to the governance discount) |
| Bull | 25% | RMB 21.4 – 26.5 | Median +105% | One more Kingshot-scale hit among 2–3 new titles + IDC compute injection re-rating; 15–17x × 2027E of RMB 10.5–11.5 billion (anchor: Huatai's June 2026 target of RMB 24.52; 15 institutions' June range RMB 24.52–27.06 — the bull case is simply a return to the sell side's June pricing, not an extrapolation beyond existing views) |
Probability-weighted expectation of about RMB 14.4, +23% vs. current price — the odds are right-skewed: current price is -29% from the bear-case median and +105% from the bull-case median, with upside about 3.6x downside; the cost is that the base case itself offers only about +9% median upside — the "margin of safety" in the traditional sense does not exist (current price is about 0.8% above the base-case floor). External anchors: median sell-side target price of RMB 18.8 (5 firms, 2026-10-26), down about 27% from the June 15-firm average of RMB 25.77 (including sample and methodology differences); the most pessimistic anchor is not the sell side but price action itself — a two-day drop of over 10% against the backdrop of an H1 profit-growth preannouncement in July (share reduction + guarantee repayment + compensation default exposed simultaneously). Our bear case does not adopt the sell-side floor (a sample of 27 buy / 6 hold / 0 sell is systematically biased positive) and is instead constructed on independent stress assumptions.
Our own earnings forecast (anchor for next reconciliation with results):
| Period | Revenue | Attributable net profit | Key assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY2026E | RMB 42.8 – 45.5 billion | RMB 7.8 – 8.5 billion (+39% to +52%) | H2 revenue RMB 20.7–23.4 billion (0% to +13% YoY, a marked slowdown from H1's +28.5%); selling expense ratio stabilizing at elevated levels; Shanda RMB 1.3–1.6 billion; ESOP share-based payment expense recognized |
| FY2027E | RMB 46.0 – 51.0 billion | RMB 8.8 – 9.8 billion (+10% to +16%) | Kingshot's mature phase partially offsets Whiteout Survival's natural decay; 2–3 new titles contribute routinely; IDC losses narrow |
Triangulating against management guidance (ESOP KPI of RMB 7 billion segment net profit / RMB 5.5 billion trigger, excluding share-based payments) and sell-side consensus (2026E RMB 8.92 billion, 2027E RMB 10.76 billion): our 2026E is 4–12% below consensus; the rationale for the deviation is that we are more conservative on Whiteout Survival's decay slope and traffic-acquisition costs, the deferred revenue reservoir is already thin, and there is no H2 reserve to release.
Conclusion: reasonably cheap, target price RMB 11.6–13.8. Assess quality and price separately. Quality — the A-share leader in overseas gaming, ROIC about 17%, genuinely positive cash flow within a hit cycle, with three real blemishes (RMB 11.7 billion of goodwill, thin revenue visibility, governance legacy). Price — forward PE at the low end of peers, EPV floor -29% below, right-skewed odds, but the base-case median offers only about +9% upside; this is a "small position, add only after validating with the Q3 report and monthly revenue data" opportunity structure, not a deep-value, heavy-position structure.
Market Size: China's gaming market generated actual sales revenue of RMB 3507.89 billion in 2025 (+7.68%, an all-time high, per the Games Publishing Committee's 2025 China Gaming Industry Report), of which mobile games accounted for RMB 2570.76 billion (73.29% share) and mini-program games RMB 535.35 billion (+34.39%, 15% of the total, the fastest-growing segment); overseas revenue from self-developed games reached USD 204.55 hundred million (+10.23%, exceeding RMB 1,000 hundred million for six consecutive years), including USD 184.78 hundred million from self-developed mobile games (+13.16%). The first half of 2026 showed structural acceleration: domestic revenue +12.17%, self-developed games overseas +30.22% (USD 123.72 hundred million), and PC games +27.92% (per Xinhua's China Gaming Industry Report January-June 2026). Forward-looking view: Niko Partners projects the Chinese market to grow +4.0% to USD 53.9 billion in 2026 and USD 59.8 billion by 2030 (roughly 2.9% five-year CAGR in USD terms); combined with double-digit overseas growth, the addressable market for Chinese gaming companies should sustain high-single-digit to double-digit growth over the next three years. The global mobile game market stands at RMB 666.895 billion (+4.93%, Gamma Data, 2026-04).
Value Chain and Value Distribution: Upstream (IP, engines and AI production tools, cloud/computing power) — Century Huatong owns the Legend IP (20+ years, category-defining), Dragon's Nest and other IP, and has licensed Final Fantasy XIV and MapleStory, with an in-house AI art pipeline (official figures: 60%-80% improvement in batch production efficiency), giving it strong bargaining power upstream; the midstream (integrated R&D-publishing-operations) is the value core, with gross profit mainly retained in R&D and operations; downstream consists of channels and user-acquisition platforms — Apple/Google take roughly 30% of gross billings, booked as operating costs (platform revenue shares drove operating costs up +56.5% in 2026H1), while auction-based user acquisition on Juliang Engine/Meta/Google is booked in selling expenses (H1 marketing expenses of RMB 9.169 billion). The company sits in the midstream "integrated R&D-operations + global self-publishing" segment: Point Interactive's domestic net margin was 44.7% vs. Century Games' overseas 8.2% (2025H1 segment-based estimate) — two economic models within the same company confirm the industry reality of "overseas user acquisition prioritizing gross billings over margins." This is the key to understanding why the company's gross margin (72.7%) is 22 percentage points below Gigabit's (93.9%): the gap is channel revenue shares and user-acquisition costs, not a product-strength gap.
Supply-Demand and Competitive Landscape: On the demand side, the user base of 683 hundred million (+1.35%) is approaching its ceiling, with growth engines shifting to ARPU (industry ARPU of roughly RMB 513.6 per user per year in 2025, calculated from official data in this report) and payment depth. On the supply side, license approvals act as the gate — 1,771 licenses issued in 2025 (1,676 domestic + 95 imported, a seven-year high); 209 titles in September 2026 alone, exceeding 200 for two consecutive months, indicating ample normalized supply. Competition shows a "Tencent-NetEase duopoly + second tier" structure: in Sensor Tower's 2025 annual ranking of Chinese mobile game publishers by global revenue, Century Huatong (Point Interactive/Century Games) jumped to No. 2, surpassing NetEase (company figures consistent with media reports; the ranking is based on estimated channel billings and cannot be directly converted to reported revenue). In the overseas SLG single category: SLG accounted for 49.96% of Top 100 overseas revenue (No. 1 for five consecutive years); Whiteout Survival has held the No. 1 spot on the Chinese mobile games overseas revenue chart for 15 consecutive months, topped the all-category global mobile revenue chart twice (March 2025 and June 2026), and surpassed USD 4 billion in cumulative overseas revenue as of December 2025 (Sensor Tower basis). Entry barriers: license qualifications, user-acquisition capital thresholds (2025H1 user-acquisition costs for the Top 100 grossing titles rose +86.6% YoY, Gamma Data), hit-title uncertainty (2-4 year R&D cycles), 5+ year long-term LiveOps capabilities, and global localization organizations.
Cycle and Regulation: The industry is in an "upswing within maturity" — user numbers have peaked, but ARPU, overseas expansion, and category innovation (SLG+X, mini-game conversion) are driving structural acceleration; leading indicators include monthly license issuance, quarterly actual sales revenue from the Games Publishing Committee/Gamma Data, Sensor Tower monthly charts, and first-month revenue of new titles. Regulatory direction has shifted from the tightening of 2021-2022 to "support within regulation": in March 2025, the Special Action Plan to Boost Consumption included gaming in policy support for the first time; in April, the Ministry of Commerce explicitly supported the full gaming export value chain; and the "15th Five-Year Plan" recommendations first proposed "guiding the healthy development of online games." Constraints remain normalized minor protection and content compliance. The company's 2024 disclosure penalty was a company-specific governance event and does not change the industry's regulatory direction.
Peer Comparison Table (FY2025, RMB 100 millions; valuations as of 2026-10-26 TTM):
| Company | Revenue | Revenue Growth | Net Profit Attrib. / Growth | Gross Margin | ROE | PE (TTM) | Key Differentiator |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Century Huatong | 378.98 | +67.6% | 56.05 / +362% | 69.95% (overall) | 20.27% | 11.56 | Global SLG export leader + Legend IP base + mini-game portfolio |
| 37 Interactive Entertainment | 159.66 | -8.5% | 29.00 / +8.5% | 75.86% | 21.9% | 11.24 | Also uses heavy user acquisition + overseas SLG, but no single-title dominance; shrinking revenue, growing profit |
| Kaiying Network | 53.25 | +4.0% | 19.04 / +16.9% | 80.75% | ~23.1% | 13.97 | Legend/Mir IP operator (Century Huatong is the IP source); overseas scale less than 1/10 of Century Huatong's |
| Digital China | 58.21 | -9.8% | 8.02 / -43.9% | N/A | 10.9% | 24.26 | Sample of aging overseas SLG (post-peak Age of Origins); the bear-case benchmark |
| Gigabit | 62.05 | +67.9% | 17.94 / +89.8% | 94.30% (gaming business) | ~28% | 11.05 | Light user acquisition, high-margin self-developed self-published — a mirror image of this company's "heavy acquisition, global, thick billings" model |
Industry Position: No. 1 in revenue among A-share gaming companies (roughly 2.4x second-place 37 Interactive Entertainment), a first-tier global mobile publisher; share trend clearly upward (gaming revenue +72.8% vs. industry +7.7%). The moat has three sources: the category-defining Legend IP at its source (licensing fees collected from external licensees; Kaiying and others operate within its IP ecosystem), Century Games' decade-plus overseas user-acquisition and localization operations system (Kingshot's rapid replication validates industrialized SLG capability), and mini-game/multi-platform interoperability (Whiteout Survival with domestic and international versions plus a mini-game version). Basis note: Sensor Tower estimates (billings), media-aggregated "cumulative billings exceeding RMB 30 billion," and the company's reported recognized revenue (RMB 36.237 billion in gaming revenue for 2025) are three different bases and must not be mixed when cited.
Buy-side analysts tracking gaming companies must look past accounting bases to three industry-specific dimensions, where generic financial frameworks systematically fail:
First, billings vs. recognized revenue. Player recharge billings are recognized as revenue on a deferred basis according to item consumption cycles, after deducting VAT and channel revenue shares — per the company's official IR statement: "the gap between revenue and billings mainly reflects VAT and deferred amortization of in-game items" (2026-05-11 investor meeting). The company does not disclose total billings or ARPPU/payment rates (citing trade secrets); third-party Sensor Tower rankings (estimated channel billings) are the only public leading indicator: in September 2026, Whiteout Survival and Kingshot took the top two spots on the Chinese overseas revenue chart. Billings are a leading indicator of revenue, but a triple leakage of VAT, revenue shares, and deferral exists between the two, with magnitude varying by category mix.
Second, the depth of the deferred revenue pool is revenue's "grain reserve." Deferred gaming recharge revenue (contract liabilities) represents amounts paid but not yet consumed by players — a natural buffer for future revenue. Century Huatong's ratio of this metric to gaming revenue fell for three consecutive years: 7.1% (2023) → 5.5% (2024) → 2.9% (2025); contract liabilities of RMB 1.374 billion at end-2026H1 equated to roughly 11 days of revenue — a nearly emptied reserve during a high-growth period means revenue recognition is highly synchronized with current billings: greater report elasticity on the upside, but no cushion on the downside, so weakening billings will transmit to reported results faster. Estimation of player lifecycles remains a key audit matter — this is the core variable for assessing the company's revenue quality.
Third, the SLG lifecycle shape determines valuation duration. The SLG category relies on long-term LiveOps, with lifecycles generally exceeding 5 years (Rise of Kingdoms, launched in 2018, still ranks near the top of overseas charts), showing a "long ramp-up, long-lived" curve rather than the pulse-style decay of item-payment games. Comparative sample: Digital China's Age of Origins entered post-peak decline with double-digit billings drops and company profit -43.9% — valuations of single-title-dependent SLG companies must embed decay assumptions. Whiteout Survival launched overseas in 2023 and was still the global mobile revenue champion in June 2026 (its third year), with no empirical decay to date; however, the No. 1 chart position changed hands multiple times within 2026 (lost in January, regained in June), so "longevity" must be verified month by month via charts rather than accepted once from annual-report narratives. A relay pipeline has formed: Kingshot (second year, No. 2 on overseas chart), Tasty Travels (No. 5 in the merge category), and domestic Benben Kingdom ramping up, with management targeting 2-3 new titles per year — industrialized iteration capability is what distinguishes this company from the Digital China sample, but the survival rate of each title remains unpredictable. Also worth noting: the company's AI/computing/IDC investments (Tencent Yangtze Delta hub with over ten thousand racks delivered; the Songjiang project reportedly profitable per IR) were quantitatively assessed as not constituting a verifiable second growth curve — consolidated IDC revenue accounts for less than 0.1% of total, and neither rack utilization rates nor order backlog are disclosed; the "share × revenue" mapping chain is broken, so no value should be paid for it in valuation — treat it only as an option-like event in the bull scenario.
Overall judgment: cautiously bullish, confidence 0.58, time horizon 6-12 months. A good business (ROIC 17%, real cash flow from the hit cycle, dual global SLG hits) + a mildly undervalued price (forward PE at the low end of peers, EPV floor at -29%, expected return +23% and right-skewed) + an ungoverned governance discount (goodwill history, share reductions and compensation defaults, zero buyback cancellations) — the combination of the three determines the approach to participation: with the current price at the lower edge of the base-case range and a traditional margin of safety of only about -1%, we recommend step-by-step confirmation using the Q3 report and monthly billings charts as validation points, rather than a single lump-sum position. Upside triggers: Q3 expense ratios flattening + segment targets met, continued monthly chart dominance, buyback cancellation or compensation transfer executed. Downside triggers: segment revenue negative QoQ for two consecutive quarters, both SLGs falling out of the overseas chart top five, goodwill impairment ≥ RMB 1 billion, or new large-scale share reductions.
Risk Warnings: Billings decay of Whiteout Survival and Kingshot faster than expected; sustained user-acquisition cost inflation squeezing selling expense ratios; Shengqu asset group goodwill impairment (safety margin only 13.6%); securities misrepresentation investor lawsuits (currently essentially off-balance-sheet); enforcement of the Webzen Legend arbitration in the China phase; rolling occurrence of Pulong guarantee repayments; major shareholder pledges and share reductions; continued IDC segment losses and contingent liabilities.
Monitoring Checklist: Q3 report segment revenue and selling expense ratio (2026-10-29); monthly Sensor Tower overseas chart rankings of the dual SLGs; ESOP target achievement progress (2026 annual report); launch and first-month performance of 2-3 new titles; domestic license for AION 2; buyback/dividend escalation resolutions; Wang Ji-related pledge and share reduction announcements; performance compensation execution path; discount rate and audit opinion in the 2026 annual report goodwill impairment test.
This report is based on public information and company announcements, with data as of the market close on 2026-10-26. All target prices and scenario fair-value ranges are research estimates and do not constitute investment advice.