Report date: 2026-11-16 | Scope: All-solid-state (ASSB) and semi-solid (hybrid solid-liquid) studied separately, covering process, materials, mass-production yield and validation progress | Horizon: 12–24 months | This report is a full re-run and re-baselining; the first section reconciles with the previous view (2026-11-15)
Industry view: cautiously bullish, medium confidence (~0.5). The establishment of the penetration direction rests on four types of hard evidence: the GB 38031-2025 mandatory safety standard (effective 2026-07-01, thermal runaway "no fire, no explosion") turns safety from a selling point into an entry threshold; dense commissioning of all-solid-state production lines in 2026-10 (Juwan GWh-scale, Yishengda 0.5GWh, Qingtao Kunshan Phase I); Gotion's 0.2GWh pilot line at 90% yield (2026-11-12 investor platform, one of the highest publicly verified all-solid-state figures); lithium sulfide prices down 73% over two years (4.8M→1.3M RMB/ton). But magnitude and timing remain highly uncertain: leading institutions' 2030 shipment forecasts differ by a factor of 6.4, and semi-solid power demand — which accounts for 60% of the increments in this report's demand bridge — is built on broad-caliber statistics that national standards are about to restate. The correct posture for this industry is to buy the validation cadence (observable delivery of equipment orders, lithium sulfide volume ramp, yield climb), not the endgame story (cell makers squeezed by automaker bundling, yields unproven, revenue growth without profit growth).
| Dimension | Previous (2026-11-15) | Current (2026-11-16) | Driver |
|---|---|---|---|
| Industry view/confidence | Cautiously bullish/medium | Cautiously bullish/medium (~0.5) | Midpoint after red-team attack: direction evidence strengthened (mandatory standard + yield proof), caliber and timeline risks加重 → aggravated |
| 2030E demand baseline | 410GWh | 332GWh | Demand bridge rebuilt bottom-up by end-market (more conservative robotics/low-altitude/storage assumptions), triangulated with EVTank/GGII (45% below EVTank) |
| All-solid 2030E | 84GWh | 80GWh, material precondition made explicit | Lithium sulfide conversion factor corrected (500→280-315 ton/GWh): 80GWh requires ~24,000 tons of lithium sulfide = ~280× current annualized output; delivery hinges on Gotion's 50,000-ton-scale rollout |
| Parity math | Lithium sulfide cost reduction covers 44% of the gap | ~27% (0.24/0.9 RMB/Wh) | Conversion factor correction (old caliber mistakenly counted electrolyte tonnage as lithium sulfide) |
| Lithium sulfide supply | ~600 tons built | ~830 tons effective capacity; new capacity-vs-output scissors gap: China's actual Jan–Aug output only 52.9 tons (annualized ≈0.26GWh equivalent) | Supply data sources updated (Sohu timeline/eefocus) |
| Patent caliber | "China cumulative applications 16,429" | Correction: 16,429 is the global total of solid-state lithium battery patents (as of 2025-11, Ziteng White Paper); China leads with 3,341 filings | Structural player re-audit of original report |
| NIO 150kWh | "Production halted 2025-11" | Reconciled caliber: Li Bin confirmed in 2025-11 that the pack was discontinued after only a few hundred vehicles were equipped (electrive interview, verified via Battery Design); but in 2026Q2 NIO×WeLan launched a new ET9 360Wh/kg pack, leasing continues | Reconciliation after conflicting demand- and supply-side searches |
| Yield evidence | Gotion 90% (single source) | Gotion 90% (reconfirmed 2026-11-12 on company investor platform) + Toyota pilot line 92% (unverified); all-solid pilot-line composite yield 60-70% | Supply re-audit added industry composite caliber |
| Valuation positioning | 0th percentile listed as bullish support | Downgraded: low-expectation starting point, not downside protection (denominator is earnings from the cyclical peak of liquid batteries — mismatched with the solid-state theme) | Red-team R4 upheld, internalized |
| 2027 demonstration vehicle probability | 60-70% (GWh-scale <30%) | ~55-60% (GWh-scale sellable ~20%) | Red-team R3 partially upheld |
| Scenario probabilities | Bear 33/Base 42/Bull 25 | Bear 35/Base 45/Bull 20 | Caliber squeeze-out + upward revision of material-bottleneck tail risk |
The definition has been quantitatively locked by national standards, and two standards form a dual squeeze of "classification + safety." The world's first national standard for automotive solid-state batteries, "Solid-State Batteries for Electric Vehicles — Part 1: Terminology and Classification" (GB/T 43568-2026, effective 2026-07-01; some sources cite GB/T 48093.1-2026, possibly a different sub-standard, numbering subject to the final text on the National Public Service Platform for Standards Information), draws the line by liquid electrolyte mass fraction: >20% = liquid battery; 5-20% = hybrid solid-liquid (i.e., this report's "semi-solid"; the national standard bans the marketing terms "semi-solid/quasi-solid"); <5% plus ≤0.5% weight loss after 6 hours of 120℃ vacuum drying qualifies as all-solid-state. Commercially available "semi-solid" batteries test at 1.68%-10.33% weight loss — all fail the all-solid threshold. Combined with the GB 38031-2025 mandatory power battery safety standard (effective 2026-07-01, legacy models transition by 2027-07) requiring "no fire, no explosion on thermal runaway," regulation turns the "safety premium" into an entry threshold — the most important exogenous variable on the demand side of this industry.
One-sentence value chain map: Upstream materials (lithium sulfide Li₂S, oxide LLZO/halide electrolytes, lithium metal/silicon-carbon anodes, high-nickel and lithium-rich manganese-based cathodes, zirconium feedstock) → Midstream equipment (dry mixing and fibrillation, dry film formation, stacking, isostatic pressing, ultra-low dew-point dry rooms; separator lines and electrolyte fillers replaced) → Cell manufacturing (semi-solid in mass production, all-solid in pilots) → Downstream applications (NEVs, eVTOL/low-altitude, humanoid robots, energy storage, consumer electronics). Sodium batteries and liquid lithium-ion are outside the boundary, serving only as price anchors and substitution references.
Route divergence: Sulfide (highest ionic conductivity, requires ≤-40℃ dew point dry rooms — main bet of Toyota/Idemitsu, Samsung SDI, CATL, BYD, Gotion); Oxide/LLZO (first to semi-solid mass production — Qingtao, WeLan, ProLogium, QuantumScape); Polymer (poor low-temperature performance, marginalized); Halide (emerging composite route, EVE's "sulfide + halide"). All-solid and semi-solid are two different industries: semi-solid retains ~90% of liquid processes — incremental retrofit; all-solid uses dry electrodes + isostatic pressing + ultra-dry environment, with ~90% of existing liquid lines unusable — a process paradigm reset. This report models the two separately throughout.
Global solid-state battery shipments in 2025 were 8GWh (+51.9%), all hybrid solid-liquid (EVTank "China Solid-State Battery Industry Development White Paper (2026)"); another broad caliber claims 2025 domestic hybrid solid-liquid vehicle installations of 31.7GWh (+272%), 4.1% penetration (=31.7/769.7GWh total power battery installations, battery alliance denominator). The two differ 4×: 8GWh is the strict caliber (true hybrid solid-liquid with 5-20% liquid), while the 31.7GWh installation caliber likely counts "marketing-oriented semi-solid" with >20% liquid. Note a previously misread supporting datapoint: Qingtao's 2025 revenue of RMB 943M ÷ ASP 0.31 RMB/Wh implies shipments of ~3.0GWh (same order of magnitude as the Frost & Sullivan 2.0GWh figure), which does not support the broad-caliber consistency of "Qingtao alone at 30GWh" — the composition of the broad caliber still awaits the 2026H2 national-standard restated data. Until calibers are unified, every "semi-solid surge" data point must carry a caliber label.
| End market | Status (2025-2026) | 2030E baseline estimate | Logic and sources |
|---|---|---|---|
| NEV — semi-solid | Main shipment driver (~70% of the strict 8GWh caliber); MG4 semi-solid Anxin edition at RMB 99.8K (2026 model from RMB 95.8K, batch rollout 2026-02-16) breaks into the RMB 100K tier, option rate undisclosed | China installation penetration 10% ≈150GWh, global ~200GWh | GB 38031 mandatory standard + price parity (Qingtao ASP 0.31 RMB/Wh now converging with liquid LFP cell prices) drive penetration climbing from 4.1% (China Auto News 2026-10-27; battery alliance) |
| NEV — all-solid | 2026 as vehicle validation year one; no global scale mass production, and as of 2026-04 no customer vehicle equipped with all-solid-state (Battery Design), still unrefuted as of 2026-11 | ~80GWh (≈1M vehicles × 80kWh; Zeng Yuqun's "million-vehicle scale hard before 2030" sets the cap; implies 5.3% penetration, within the industry's 4-9% range) | Premium vehicles first; specific energy gap of 400Wh/kg vs ~300Wh/kg liquid ternary |
| Energy storage | ~0.8GWh; Qingtao semi-solid LFP 12,000 cycles, won Wuhai 100MW-scale independent storage bid (system 0.55 RMB/Wh) | ~20GWh (global storage penetration 2.5%) | High-safety scenario premium acceptable (Battery.com.cn 2026-10-22) |
| Low-altitude/eVTOL | Xinjie "Falcon" lithium-metal solid-state 480Wh/kg supplying EHang EH216 series (endurance 25min→48min); EHang received the world's first passenger-carrying OC in 2025-03 | ~5GWh | Energy density and airworthiness safety are hard requirements; highest willingness to pay across all scenarios |
| Humanoid robots | XPeng IRON solid-state battery small-batch rollout 2026-10-28 (30% weight reduction, +30% capacity); GGII: total robot lithium battery shipments 2.2GWh in 2025 | Solid-state ~15GWh (5M units × 2.5kWh chain) | High-rate + lightweight hard requirements; GGII full-caliber >100GWh listed only in bull scenario |
| Consumer electronics and others | ~1GWh (mainly Sunwoda consumer semi-solid) | ~12GWh (assumption) | Pouch semi-solid compatible with existing lines |
Demand bridge (bottom-up, base case): 2025's 8GWh → 2030E 332GWh, net increase +324GWh, itemized: semi-solid power +194.5, all-solid power +80, storage +19.2, robots +14.6, low-altitude +4.7, consumer +11.0 (8+324=332, balanced ✓).
Two "within-bridge risks" that must be faced (red-team internalized): ① Semi-solid power +194.5GWh accounts for 60% of net increment, and its penetration base (4.1%) is the broad caliber — after the national standard takes effect in 2026-07, installation statistics will be restated; if the broad caliber contracts, the semi-solid bridge must be cut to +80-120GWh and the total bridge to 220-260GWh; ② The material precondition of all-solid +80GWh is lithium sulfide scaling from ~79 tons current annualized output to ~24,000 tons (~280×, implying ~400% CAGR capacity expansion, i.e., Gotion's 50,000-ton plan delivered) — if only kiloton-scale lands in 2027-2028, all-solid 2030 falls to 30-50GWh and the total bridge to 280-300GWh.
Institutional divergence: EVTank top-down 2030 at 607.2GWh (all-solid nearly 20% ≈121GWh); GGII 2030 semi-solid >65GWh, all-solid breaking 1GWh only in 2028 (implied total ~95GWh) — head-to-tail gap of 6.4× (607.2/95). The divergence stems from semi-solid EV penetration assumptions (this bridge China 10% vs EVTank's implied 10%+ globalized extrapolation vs GGII ~4.3%) and all-solid timing (GGII 1-2 years later than EVTank, flatter slope). There is also a "CAAM: 2026 installations 82GWh / 2030 above 420GWh" figure seen only in media reposts, unverified first-hand, not cited as headline. This report's baseline takes the bottom-up 332GWh (45% below EVTank), with EVTank as bull scenario and GGII as bear scenario.
Counter-evidence (post-reconciliation): The world's only series-delivered semi-solid battery pack — NIO's 150kWh (WeLan-supplied, 360Wh/kg) — Li Bin confirmed in 2025-11 that mass rollout stopped after a few hundred vehicles were equipped (weak demand + excessive cost, electrive interview verified via Battery Design); but the partnership did not end: in 2026Q2 NIO×WeLan launched a new 360Wh/kg hybrid solid-liquid pack for the ET9, and the leasing model continues. Conclusion: the first commercial case of the C-end semi-solid "expensive big pack" route failed to scale; "high cost → lease-only → volume-constrained" holds true — semi-solid premium pressure is empirically confirmed. Positive test: The MG4 Anxin edition breaks into the mainstream price band at RMB 99.8K; its sales and option rate are the litmus test of true semi-solid demand (option rate undisclosed, observable from 2026-12); Qingtao's Wuhai storage bid and two-wheeler/small power are the second observation window; marginal easing of the liquid price war (storage cell prices rebounding from 0.26-0.31 RMB/Wh at end-2025 to 0.365 RMB/Wh in 2026-08, Cailian Press/SMM) slightly loosens the premium band.
Solid-state penetration is a structural technology switch (liquid energy density approaching the ~300Wh/kg ceiling + mandatory safety constraints + new end-market platforms: robots from 50K units in 2026 → 5M in 2030, eVTOL commercial operations starting), not an inventory cycle; the liquid price war (LFP power cells ~0.41 RMB/Wh) is the biggest swing variable — it both suppresses the spread of semi-solid premiums and forces cell makers to differentiate with solid-state; the net effect is delaying, not eliminating, penetration. The inflection-point math chain is quantified: total installations 888.7GWh (2026E, battery alliance) → 2030E ~1501GWh × semi-solid penetration 10% + all-solid million-vehicle cap 80GWh + new end-markets ~35GWh = 332GWh.
The core feedstock of the sulfide route is lithium sulfide: battery-grade market price from ~RMB 4.8M/ton in 2024-07 → ~RMB 2.0M in early 2026 → ~RMB 1.3M/ton in 2026-09 (cumulative -73%, dual-sourced TMTPost/Foresight Energy and eefocus); LPSC sulfide electrolyte average price ~RMB 3,400/kg (~RMB 3.4M/ton). The capacity-vs-output scissors gap is a tighter constraint than price: 2026 global effective lithium sulfide capacity ~830 tons (at 280-315 tons/GWh, supporting only 2.6-3.0GWh of cells), yet China's actual Jan-Aug battery-grade lithium sulfide output was only 52.9 tons (annualized ~79 tons ≈0.26GWh equivalent, eefocus 2026-10-26) — "downstream is chasing shipments while upstream is still doing experiments in gloveboxes" (TMTPost supplier interview). Scale-up echelon: Gotion kiloton-scale in 2026 ("gas-liquid-solid three-phase synthesis", planned 50,000 tons/year by 2030 + 100,000 tons electrolyte — the industry's largest single-point expansion), Guanghua Technology planning 3,000 tons, Hunan Enjie kiloton-scale 2026-27, Tinci's hundred-ton pilot already in use, Idemitsu's large Chiba facility to be completed within 2027 (JPY 21.3B, subsidy cap JPY 7.1B). The conversion factor must use a unified caliber: lithium sulfide 280-315 tons/GWh (= electrolyte 500-700 tons/GWh × ~40% lithium sulfide content) — this report uses the midpoint 300 tons/GWh throughout.
Other materials: lithium metal anodes (Ganfeng's ultra-thin lithium strip has mass-production capability, targeting >500Wh/kg; Chongqing Lide signed RMB 5.5B for 5,000 tons of composite lithium anode in 2025-09); oxide LLZO/halide in parallel (USTC's zirconium-based oxychloride broke lithium-metal compatibility in 2026-06); zirconium is China's own soft spot — reserves ~0.7% of global, import dependence ~90% (Australia/South Africa hold 80% of reserves); solid-state-grade high-purity nano zirconia has risen from RMB 320-350K/ton to RMB 480K/ton (2025-12→2026-02).
All-solid's disruption of liquid lines concentrates in four places: dry electrodes (sulfides decompose in polar solvents, eliminating NMP solvent/drying/recovery), dry film formation and stacking replacing separator + electrolyte filling, isostatic pressing densification (Yinghe's horizontal warm isostatic press RT-150℃/max 600MPa/temperature control ±2℃, cell density ≥95%; low isostatic pressing takt time is the whole-line throughput bottleneck), environmental engineering (dew point ≤-40℃, some processes -60℃, ultra-dry rooms + hydrogen sulfide treatment). Replaced segments: separator lines, electrolyte fillers. Two capex calibers must not be mixed: all-solid per-GWh equipment investment ~RMB 400-600M (2-3× liquid's ~150-250M; 500-600M at pilot stage, potentially falling to ~250M at scale); full-line caliber including ultra-low dew-point plant and environmental systems at RMB 1.5-1.8B/GWh (8-12× liquid). Semi-solid retains ~90% of liquid processes with small per-GWh incremental investment — this is the physical basis for semi-solid lines being able to "revert to liquid."
Yield ladder: liquid top-tier ≥94-95%, industry 80-95%; no semi-solid player has disclosed yields (QingTao's 2025 power battery gross margin of -111.6% indirectly confirms the pain of ramp-up); all-solid-state pilot-line composite yield 60-70%; best publicly disclosed single point: Gotion 0.2GWh pilot line 90% (company investor platform, 2026-11-12), Toyota trial production line 92% (aggregated figure, unverified); automotive-grade mass production threshold benchmark ≥90-95%. Pilot yield ≠ mass production yield — solid-solid interface impedance, uniformity of isostatic pressing pressure, and consistency of large-format cells are the three hardest problems; the empirical span from TRL4→9 is 5-8 years. As of 2026-04, no vehicle in customer hands worldwide carries all-solid-state cells (Battery Design), and as of 2026-11 this fact has not been overturned by any new vehicle announcement.
| Player | Route | Production Line Progress | Yield/Validation | Mass Production Timeline Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gotion High-tech | Sulfide "Gemstone" | 0.2GWh pilot line connected 2025-05 (100% domestically made core equipment); 2GWh mass production line detailed design completed 2026-03 | Pilot yield 90%, 400Wh/kg, vehicle road testing begun (highest publicly evidenced all-solid-state) | 2027 small batch + vehicle installation (Chery designation) |
| BYD | Sulfide (skipping semi-solid, going straight to all-solid-state) | Pingshan pilot line in production 2026-02 (60Ah); Chongqing Bishan 20GWh construction starting 2026 | 60Ah pilot rollout 2024; 480Wh/kg demo vehicle shown at 2026-04 auto show; "yield above 90%" is an aggregated media claim, unverified | 2027 demo vehicle installation, large scale after 2030 |
| CATL | Sulfide + condensed matter | Sulfide entered 20Ah trial production (Easy Interaction, 2026-10); pilot line location (Yibin/Hefei) unconfirmed by company, unverified | Zeng Yuqun 2026-06: all-solid-state maturity only TRL 4/9, million-vehicle scale before 2030 unlikely | 2027 small batch (reaffirmed repeatedly by company) |
| EVE Energy | Sulfide + halide composite | Chengdu Phase I 60Ah capability 2025-12; Phase II 100MWh/year delivered 2026-12; Longquan No.4 60Ah rolled out 2026-03 | Longquan No.3 2.0 anode-free 1045Wh/L | 2026-2028 ramp |
| QingTao Energy | Oxide semi-solid → all-solid-state | Five bases 6.8GWh (incl. under construction); Taizhou first 3.5GWh line in production 2026-03; Suzhou Phase I in production 2026-10 | 2025 shipments 2.0GWh, global share 33.6% No.1 (Frost & Sullivan basis, total market 6.0GWh); gross margin -111.6% | Semi-solid already in mass production; all-solid-state TBD |
| WeLion New Energy | Oxide semi-solid (in-situ solidification) | Mass production at Fangshan and other bases | 360Wh/kg packs supplied to several hundred NIO vehicles then volume halted; 2026Q2 resumed supply of ET9 new packs | All-solid-state large-scale production after 2030 (CTO basis) |
| Toyota-Idemitsu | Sulfide vertical integration | Idemitsu Chiba electrolyte plant groundbreaking 2026-01, completion within 2027 (several hundred tonnes/year) | Trial line yield 92% (unverified); vehicle milestone slipped three-plus times (2020→2023→2026→2027-28), battery plant construction postponed again 2025-11 | 2027-28 first batch, 9GWh/year after 2030 |
| Samsung SDI | Sulfide (>900Wh/L) | Suwon S-line (since 2022); Ulsan mass production site selected | 2026Q2 earnings call maintained 2027H2; first commercial samples delivered to automaker/robotics customers | 2027H2 mass production (most aggressive among Korean players) |
| ProLogium | Oxide lithium-ceramic | Taoyuan GWh-scale plant in production 2024, cumulative shipments over 2.4 million cells; Dunkirk Phase I 4GWh (site max 44GWh) | Gen3.5 LCB 185.4Ah, 381Wh/kg, 903Wh/L, commercial mass production announced 2026-09 | Dunkirk ramp 2027-2030 |
| QuantumScape | Oxide separator + lithium metal | San Jose Eagle Line activated 2026-02 (Cobra process) | B samples delivered to automakers (PowerCo first); 95%+ capacity retention after 1,000 cycles | No public vehicle date; licensing 40→80GWh/year + 5GWh |
| New entrant lines | — | Juwan GWh-scale all-solid-state line in production 2026-10 (self-described first compliant with national standard); Yishengda Shaoxing 0.5GWh; Sunwoda 0.2GWh all-solid-state pilot line connected | Small initial volumes, ramp-up to be observed | 2026 validation, 2027 demo |
Lithium sulfide engineering scale-up (830 tonnes capacity / 79 tonnes annualized output vs 2030 demand of 28,500 tonnes = 34x current capacity; only Gotion's 50,000-tonne target at 1.75x coverage matches the magnitude) > yield (pilot composite 60-70% vs automotive-grade 90%+) > capital discipline (QingTao lost ~RMB 3.15 billion over three years, debt ratio 165%; all-solid-state full line RMB 1.5-1.8 billion/GWh) > equipment delivery (isostatic press cycle-time bottleneck) > environmental engineering > zircon sand imports. From decision to GWh-scale effective output, new all-solid-state supply typically takes 2-4 years, and "line built" ≠ "yield ramp completed."
① Semi-solid = competitive pricing: anchored to liquid cells plus a premium band. Ternary semi-solid cells at RMB 0.8-1.1/Wh, a premium of roughly 2.0-2.7x over liquid LFP (~RMB 0.41/Wh); yet QingTao's blended shipment ASP halved from 0.6 to 0.31 RMB/Wh in one year (-48%, now on par with average liquid LFP cell pricing) — indicating that a large share of its shipment structure is low-priced solid-liquid hybrid LFP products close to liquid, and independent pricing power for "semi-solid" has not yet been established. ② All-solid-state = cost-plus + scarcity premium: lithium sulfide at 300 tonnes/GWh, RMB 1.3 million/tonne = RMB 0.39/Wh, about 20% of the RMB 1.9/Wh mid-point cost; purchased LPSC electrolyte (RMB 3.4 million/tonne × 500-700 tonnes/GWh = RMB 1.7-2.38/Wh) exceeds the total cost range of integrated producers — those buying electrolyte externally face a higher cost floor; small-batch selling prices ≥RMB 3/Wh represent a scarcity premium for automotive-qualifiable supply. ③ Policy wedge: solid-state exempt from consumption tax until 2028-12-31 vs liquid at 2% from 2026-09 and 4% from 2027-09, tax differential ~RMB 0.016-0.025/Wh — marginal positive that does not change the ranking.
At 300 tonnes/GWh: lithium sulfide falling from 1.3 to 0.5 million RMB/tonne contributes -RMB 0.24/Wh to cell cost, covering ~27% of the all-solid-state gap from 1.9 to 1.0 RMB/Wh (0.9 RMB/Wh) (the old report's 44% figure was based on 500 tonnes/GWh due to conflating electrolyte/lithium sulfide tonnages; now corrected); the remaining ~RMB 0.66/Wh must come from yield improving 60-70%→90%+ (amortizing equipment RMB 400-600 million → 250 million/GWh), scale, and anode cost reduction. More critically, the parity target is moving: liquid LFP cells at ~RMB 0.31-0.41/Wh, with InfoLink judging 2026 will stay above 0.3 RMB/Wh and a 2027 lithium carbonate pullback scenario at ~0.32 — even if all-solid-state falls to 1.0 RMB/Wh, it is still ~3x LFP. The correct framing is therefore: RMB 1/Wh is merely the entry price for all-solid-state into high-willingness-to-pay scenarios such as premium vehicles/eVTOL/robotics; true parity with the mass market (parity line RMB 0.4-0.5/Wh) arrives in 2031-2033 or later, and before 2030 economics hold only in niche scenarios.
Semi-solid (global, GWh): demand 8 (2025) →18→35→65→120→237 (2030E); nominal built capacity 28.3 (early 2025, Minmetals Securities) →42→65→100→155→283 (2030 = planned 565.7×50% realization assumption). All-solid-state (automotive-grade sellable basis): demand 0→0.2→1.5→5→25→95; effective supply 0→0.8→3→7→30→110 (nominal pilot lines ~5GWh@2026 → planned 150-180GWh@2030 × yield and certification haircuts).
Conclusion: nominal semi-solid oversupply holds (built/demand 3.5x→1.2x, utilization 28%→84%), but ~90% of line processes are compatible with liquid and can be retooled or deferred, so the excess releases as "grinding deflation" (annual ASP declines and utilization discounts) rather than collapse; under the GB 38031 mandatory standard, liquid safety retrofit demand partially directs to semi-solid lines. All-solid-state in 2026-2028: tight effective supply balance + material bottlenecks (nominal book overload, automotive-grade sellable scarcity, ≥RMB 3/Wh premium sustained); material constraints rise to 9.3-11GWh equivalent in 2027 (thousand-tonne scale + Idemitsu start-up), "eased but not resolved" before 2028; 2030 demand of 95GWh requires 28,500 tonnes of lithium sulfide = 34x current capacity — true resolution depends on Gotion delivering at the ten-thousand-tonne scale, with abundance possible only in 2029-2030. This industry has no futures market or visible inventory cycle; supply-demand tightness is proxied by capacity utilization (QingTao nominal 19.6%/effective 53%) and equipment orders.
| Time Point | Semi-Solid Blended ASP (RMB/Wh) | All-Solid-State Effective Cost (RMB/Wh; small-batch price) | Lithium Sulfide (RMB 10k/tonne) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026Q4 | 0.28-0.31 | 1.7-2.1 (2.8-3.2) | 110-125 |
| 2027Q1 | 0.26-0.29 | 1.6-1.9 (2.5-3.0) | 95-115 |
| 2027Q2 | 0.25-0.27 | 1.5-1.8 (2.4-2.8) | 85-100 |
| 2027Q3 | 0.24-0.26 | 1.4-1.7 (2.2-2.6) | 75-95 |
Pricing framework: semi-solid floor = liquid LFP cell RMB 0.365-0.41/Wh × 1.1 premium band + continued compression from automaker bidding; all-solid-state = lithium sulfide cost floor (incentive price RMB 500k/tonne + yield ≥90% = substitution threshold vs premium liquid, contributing an equivalent RMB 0.24/Wh) + scarcity premium fading with vehicle validation pace. Cycle position: equipment orders in early upcycle (Wuxi Lead's solid-state orders ~RMB 1.0 → 2.0 billion, <5% of new signings) + rapidly falling materials prices (lithium sulfide -73%) + deep cell losses (QingTao gross margin -111.6%) — this three-signal combination = introduction phase + capacity overhang absorption phase, comparable to liquid lithium-ion in 2015-2018 (policy-driven volume → oversupply → price war → industry-wide losses); semi-solid is at "the eve of price-war digestion/clearing," all-solid-state at "the 0-1 introduction starting point." ASP for both generations declines one-way (semi-solid 15-30% annually, all-solid-state 20-30% annually) — "good deflation" driven by yield/scale/materials.
Semi-solid: per EVTank, WeLion + QingTao combined share nearly half (individual ~25% each is an estimate, unverified); per QingTao's prospectus/Frost & Sullivan, 2025 global solid-liquid hybrid + all-solid-state total market 6.0GWh, QingTao 2.0GWh at 33.6% No.1 — two sets of figures coexist; citations must be labeled. EVTank also explicitly notes liquid leaders, leveraging supply chains and scale, "have the opportunity to capture higher market positions." All-solid-state has no calculable share yet; the landscape is determined by patent land grabs + vertical automaker lock-ins:
Patent panorama (Ziteng IP white paper, 2026-04): as of 2025-11, global solid-state lithium battery patent total 16,429 filings (6,321 merged families); receiving office distribution: China 3,341, Japan 3,225, US 2,355, Korea 1,544 — China leads in application volume but high-value sulfide patents remain concentrated in Japan/Korea (Toyota's 1,331 filings ~3x second-place Panasonic's 445; Samsung SDI claims ~1,100 filings and has intensively published mass-production process patents since 2026-09); China added over 2,250 new applications in 2026Q2, catching up fast, but going global will face a triple barrier: Japanese/Korean filings in China plus gaps in core markets. Four automaker lock-in examples: SAIC holding 16.5% of QingTao in aggregate + 80% Huayu JV plant sole supply; NIO × WeLion joint R&D; Toyota × Idemitsu 13-year tie-up; VW PowerCo × QuantumScape licensing — concentrated customers + equity ties are the bedrock of this industry's bargaining-power structure.
| Player | Positioning | Light Metrics (first three quarters 2026, Eastmoney basis) | One-Line Read |
|---|---|---|---|
| CATL | Dual route: sulfide + condensed matter, 20Ah trial production | Revenue RMB 442.137 billion (+56.2%), net profit attributable RMB 64.53 billion (+31.6%), gross margin 22.72%, operating cash flow RMB 61.6 billion; PE TTM 12.69x (~1st percentile of 10 years), market cap RMB 1.11 trillion | Structural winner whose liquid cash flows fund solid-state R&D; the solid-state option is nearly free, but its benefit case requires "slow in tempo" (see 8.2) |
| BYD | Sulfide straight to all-solid-state, self-developed self-use closed loop | Battery segment not separately disclosed | If Bishan 20GWh + 2027 demo vehicles materialize, it is the fastest candidate to scale all-solid-state; skipping semi-solid means no transition baggage |
| Wuxi Lead Intelligent | One of the few globally with full all-solid-state line equipment (dry process + 600MPa warm isostatic press) | Revenue RMB 12.87 billion (+23.3%), net profit RMB 1.588 billion (+33.9%), gross margin 31.07%, operating cash flow RMB 5.86 billion; PB 2.68x (8th percentile of 10 years) | The only currently cashing-in solid-state profit node, but solid-state orders of ~RMB 1.0 → 2.0 billion are <5% of new signings — buying it is liquid capex recovery beta + a solid-state option, not solid-state itself |
| Gotion High-tech | Gemstone pilot yield 90%, 2GWh line under construction, 50k-tonne lithium sulfide planned | Revenue RMB 45.437 billion (+54.0%), net profit attributable RMB 849 million (-66.5%), ex-non-recurring only RMB 252 million, Q3 single-quarter loss RMB 537 million, net margin 1.81% | Textbook case of "boom ≠ returns": real solid-state positioning, distant payoff |
| QingTao Energy | Semi-solid share No.1 (Frost & Sullivan 33.6%), bleeding IPO in progress | 2025 revenue RMB 943 million, net loss RMB 1.302 billion, ~RMB 3.15 billion lost over three years, debt ratio 165%, power battery gross margin -111.6%; ASP 0.6→0.31 RMB/Wh | Template of trading losses for SAIC orders: the semi-solid cell layer currently has no profit pool |
| WeLion New Energy | One of the semi-solid duopoly, only gross-margin-positive startup | Semi-solid gross margin 20-25% (per TMTPost); ChiNext IPO tutoring started 2025-12 | Sells well and earns gross margin, but small scale and deep single-customer lock-in |
| Toyota-Idemitsu | Thickest patent wall + vertically integrated materials self-supply | Idemitsu Chiba RMB 21.3 billion (¥21.3bn) pilot plant completing 2027 | Strongest technical lead but a "slow variable" with milestones slipped three times; its delivery determines global pace |
| Samsung SDI | Ulsan 2027H2, most aggressive among Korean players | Claims ~1,100 all-solid-state patents | Shrinking liquid base in China leaves less margin for error than Chinese/Japanese rivals |
| QuantumScape | Licensing model: PowerCo 40→80GWh + 5GWh | Share price USD 3.68 (2026-11-13), YTD -42%; pre-revenue | The only "asset-light royalty" template proving technology can be monetized, but still burning cash before payoff |
| Easpring Material | Solid-state cathode/electrolyte materials first mover | Revenue RMB 17.455 billion (+135.9%), net profit RMB 643 million (+27.9%), gross margin 10.94%, operating cash flow -RMB 150 million | Materials-side snapshot of "revenue up, profit not": revenue doubled but gross margin squeezed to single digits |
Current profits are almost entirely outside solid-state cell operations proper: the 2025 semi-solid revenue pool is only ~RMB 2.5-5.6 billion (8GWh × ASP RMB 0.31-0.7/Wh), all-solid-state commercial shipments are zero; cell startups lose more the more they sell (QingTao net loss RMB 1.3 billion, gross margin -111.6%). Profits actually accumulate in three places: ① equipment (Wuxi Lead net profit RMB 1.588 billion/+33.9%, but mainly due to liquid recovery + AIDC); ② liquid cash-flow giants (CATL's RMB 64.5 billion net profit transfusing solid-state R&D); ③ technology licensors (QS-PowerCo royalty model). Migration path: equipment (2026-27) → sulfide electrolyte + lithium metal anode (2027-29) → cells (2028-30), but cell-layer winners will most likely be giants that completed positioning with liquid profits rather than independent startups, with part of the profits internalized via automaker equity stakes + in-house R&D.
On the equipment side, the 0→1 transition is complete (Gotion's pilot line runs on 100% domestically made core equipment; Wuxi Lead has commissioned full all-solid-state process equipment and secured repeat orders); lithium sulfide prices have fallen from high-priced imports to RMB 1.3 million/ton, with domestic kiloton-scale output launching in 2026-2027, but Idemitsu's Chiba plant (completion in 2027) remains the world's first large-scale electrolyte plant—mass-production-grade material substitution is underway; on standards, GB/T 43568 leads globally, plus the first solid-state IEC international standard led by China (initiated 2026-08, expected publication 2028-29), upgrading "product export" to "standards export." Weaknesses lie in discourse power over high-value sulfide foundational patents and zircon sand resources. Reverse risk: Chinese manufacturers going overseas will face Toyota/Idemitsu's patent wall in the form of licensing fees and litigation (MOFCOM Announcement No. 58's export controls on ≥300Wh/kg batteries and related equipment technology add further friction to going global).
Money is currently hard to make in this business: The solid-state cell core business is a textbook case of "high growth, negative returns"—the revenue pool grows 50%+ annually but is eaten up by ramp-up costs and automaker price pressure; real money is made by equipment leaders (orders land before mass production, but beware of solid-state share <5%), giants with liquid-battery cash flows (solid state is a nearly free option), and licensors collecting rent. Valuation position: The SW Battery Index trades at a PE of 16.46x (0th percentile since 2014-07-14) and PB of 2.29x (3rd percentile, as of 2026-11-16); CATL at a PE TTM of 12.69x (~1st percentile over 10 years), Wuxi Lead at PB 2.68x (8th percentile over 10 years). Be clear-eyed: the 0th percentile mirrors the 2023-2025 capacity-glut valuation reset; the index's earnings denominator reflects cyclical highs in liquid battery, energy storage, and AIDC; and the index constituents are mismatched with solid-state thematic stocks—low valuation provides a low-expectation starting point, not downside protection; industry-wide planned capacity (semi-solid 565.7GWh+; industry-wide lithium battery plans exceed 2.6TWh vs demand of ~1TWh, per BCG) means that if solid-state timelines slip again, low valuations may persist for a long time.
China (most systematic): ~RMB 6 billion dedicated all-solid-state R&D program (six companies—CATL/BYD/FAW/SAIC/Geely/WeLion—across seven projects, disbursed 2024-12, with a 2027 vehicle-validation milestone; no public acceptance results as of 2026-11); the seven ministries' "15th Five-Year Plan for New Battery Industry Development" (MIIT Joint Regulation 〔2026〕 No. 220, 2026-09-28, the first national-level battery-specific plan) targets preliminary scale-up of all-solid-state by 2030; tax wedge (solid-state batteries exempt from consumption tax through 2028-12-31; liquid batteries taxed at 2% from 2026-09 and 4% from 2027-09); GB/T 43568 plus 10 industry standards under consultation plus IEC project initiation; MOFCOM Announcement No. 58 (effective 2025-11-08) imposes export licensing on ≥300Wh/kg lithium batteries, artificial graphite anodes, and related equipment technology—the threshold squarely covers solid state, serving as both a Chinese bargaining chip and a friction for going global. Japan: NEDO Green Innovation Fund with a budget cap of ¥151 billion + Toyota subsidy of ~¥120 billion + Idemitsu's "supply security program" designation (¥21.3 billion, subsidy cap ¥7.1 billion). South Korea: roadmap of 2026-09-22 (2027 prototype / 2030 commercialization) + ~KRW 400 billion in new government funding for 2027-2031 + ~KRW 8 trillion from companies. EU: Battery Booster of ~€1.8 billion + two IPCEI waves totaling ~€6.1 billion in state aid. US (weakest): after OBBBA, the 30D vehicle credit ended 2025-09-30; 45X retained but subject to FEOC restrictions; no solid-state-specific program.
Three geopolitical fronts: ① Bidirectional export controls (China restricting technology outflow vs US/EU FEOC/local-content rules); ② Patent geopolitics (Toyota's patent wall vs China's #1 filing volume but weak high-value sulfide patents); ③ Materials geopolitics (zircon sand 90% dependent on Australia/South Africa, with zirconia prices already rising; lithium sulfide being localized separately in China and Japan). ESG/Carbon: MIIT launched power battery carbon footprint reporting on 2025-12-30 (routine from 2027-01-01), paving the way for EU mutual recognition/countermeasures; all-solid-state's intrinsic safety fits the decarbonization narrative, but the carbon footprint and import dependence of zirconium and lithium mining are marginal cost items.
Net direction: acceleration, but bounded. Total direct government funding for solid state globally is on the order of ~$3 billion (China ~$0.85 billion + Toyota ~$0.8 billion + NEDO ~$1 billion + Korea ~$0.3 billion; ~$5 billion if EU broad battery programs are included), while Chinese solid-state capacity expansion investment planned in the first four months of 2026 alone exceeds RMB 30 billion (~$4.2 billion) and Korean companies ~KRW 8 trillion (~$5.9 billion)—governments are R&D catalysts, not the main funders of industrialization. The technology slope is unchanged: Robin Zeng reiterated in June 2026 that all-solid-state maturity is only level 4/9, with million-vehicle-scale deployment unlikely before 2030.
| Scenario | Probability | 2030 Shipments | Narrative | Implication |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 35% | 65-100GWh (GGII path) | National-standard scope squeeze exceeds expectations + further all-solid-state delays + worsening liquid price war | Equipment order gap, thematic stocks go to zero, 0th-percentile valuation never recovers |
| Base | 45% | ~332GWh (demand bridge; 80GWh all-solid-state premised on kiloton-scale lithium sulfide supply) | 2027 demonstration deployment delivered, lithium sulfide at RMB 750k-950k/ton by end-2027, semi-solid ASP declining 15-30% annually | Equipment and sulfide materials deliver profits; cell losses narrow but do not turn positive |
| Bull | 20% | ~607GWh (EVTank path) | BYD's 20GWh line ahead of schedule + robot/eVTOL volume + Toyota/Samsung no delays | All-solid-state scarcity drives price and volume up; sector valuation recovery + new materials chain surge |
| Timing | Event | Directional Impact | Dispute |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-12 | MG4 semi-solid version's first full quarter of deliveries and option rate; EVE Chengdu Phase II (100MWh) deliveries; Qingtao HK IPO progress | Semi-solid demand litmus test / primary-market valuation anchor | D2/D3 |
| 2027-01 | First annual installation data after national-standard restatement (scope squeeze revealed) | Contraction ≥30% falsifies the penetration narrative | D2 |
| 2027-03 | Progress on Gotion Jinshi 2GWh mass-production line | All-solid-state supply delivery | D1 |
| 2027-06 | Lithium sulfide spot price and monthly output verification (base case RMB 750k-950k/ton; monthly output <20 tons is an alarm) | Cost decisive factor | D1 |
| 2027-09 | CATL small batch / BYD demonstration deployment / Samsung Ulsan—three milestones converge; liquid consumption tax rises to 4% | Concentrated validation of all-solid-state milestones | D1/D2 |
| 2027-12 | Idemitsu Chiba electrolyte plant completion (supplying Toyota) | Japanese supply chain loop closes | D1/D3 |
| 2028-06 | Verification window for GGII-scope all-solid-state shipments exceeding 1GWh | Final review of inflection-point quality | D1 |
| 2028-12 | Solid-state consumption tax exemption expires | Policy wedge disappears | D2 |
Falsification triggers (when to downgrade views): ① Hybrid solid-liquid installation/penetration contraction ≥30% after national-standard restatement; ② lithium sulfide monthly output <20 tons for two consecutive quarters or price stops falling and rebounds from RMB 1.3 million/ton; ③ any leader (Toyota/CATL/BYD) delaying demonstration deployment to 2028+ in 2027H1; ④ Wuxi Lead's solid-state order share still <5% in its 2027 interim report with no GWh-scale full-line tender. One must also accept the path reality: the 12-24 month window is precisely a vacuum period of "strongest narrative, thinnest earnings delivery," and a 20-40% thematic drawdown reflects the path, not falsification of the logic (SMM: all-solid-state planned capacity operates at only 1-15% utilization through 2026-2030, with volume only after 2032).
Puncturing the value trap: The lower-right quadrant of Gotion/Qingtao/WeLion/Easpring is a "momentum up × poor returns" combination—the solid-state momentum is real, but profits are eaten by yield ramp-up costs and automaker price pressure (Qingtao gross margin -111.6%, Gotion net profit -66.5%, Easpring gross margin compressed to 10.9%); buying their solid-state exposure is essentially paying tuition for someone else's option. Bullish on momentum ≠ worth buying. Genuinely "upper-right" are the giants funding solid state with liquid profits (CATL—though its benefit is conditional, see below) and vertically integrated BYD; Wuxi Lead's solid-state content is currently below 5%, with half of its "upper-right" position coming from recovering liquid-battery capex. The upper-left Toyota-Idemitsu is a slow variable with thick patent and integration moats but milestones slipped three times; the lower-left cross-sector thematic stocks (position-jumpers with no designations, no production lines, or no verified patent families) and QuantumScape, still hard to prove itself, fall into the avoid/watch zone.
Beneficiaries:
Avoid:
(For specific names, separate files with target prices and in-depth research are available on request.)
| Scenario | Most Benefited | Most Hurt |
|---|---|---|
| Bear (35%) | CATL (liquid core + small solid-state loss exposure, valuation already at 0th percentile) | Wuxi Lead (double hit from pilot order gap + liquid capex decline); Qingtao/WeLion (primary valuation reset); cross-sector thematic stocks |
| Base (45%) | Wuxi Lead (orders doubling, delivered), CATL | Pure liquid second-tier capacity (technology discount) |
| Bull (20%) | Wuxi Lead (GWh-scale full-line win), lithium sulfide localization chain, Qingtao/WeLion (primary re-rating) | Pure liquid capacity without solid-state reserves (impairments); Japanese slow-pacers' passive share loss |
① Systemic delay of the all-solid-state 2027 milestone (Toyota's three slips are the cautionary precedent; Idemitsu's supply chain only closes in 2027); ② semi-solid demand falsified by both national-standard scope squeeze and the liquid price war (NIO's pack stopping its ramp is precedent); ③ lithium sulfide scale-up falling short (scissors gap between 830-ton capacity and 79-ton annualized output), pushing cost parity beyond 2030; ④ semi-solid planned capacity of 565.7GWh+ and industry-wide lithium battery glut keep the 0th-percentile valuation from recovering for a long time (value trap realized); ⑤ patent litigation and export controls reshape the supply chain (bidirectionally); ⑥ if the scope contracts, this report's demand baseline would require a 30-60% downward revision to industry size and profit pool.
Methodology note: This report defines and models all-solid-state and semi-solid-state separately; the demand bridge is built bottom-up and triangulated against EVTank/GGII/Frost & Sullivan; price scopes are cell prices/costs (RMB/Wh) and lithium sulfide market prices (RMB 10k/ton), not exchange futures; all yield evidence is labeled by scope (pilot/trial production/mass production). Key data sources are listed in the citation list (industry_view.key_sources).