Rating: Cautiously Bullish | Target Price: RMB 106-125 (base-case fair value range, midpoint ~RMB 115) | Current Price: RMB 98.35 (close, 2026-11-11) | Margin of Safety: ~7.8% (base-case fair value floor of RMB 106 vs. current price) | Time Horizon: 12 months
| Metadata | Value |
|---|---|
| Closing price (frozen anchor) | RMB 98.35 (2026-11-11, A-share) |
| Total shares / market cap | 472.73 million shares (426.73 million A-shares + 46 million H-shares) / ~RMB 46.49 billion (A-share price basis) |
| PE(TTM) / PE(2026E) / PE(2027E) | 26.1x / 22.2x (own estimate RMB 2.09 billion) / 15.8x (own estimate RMB 2.95 billion) · 11.3x (consensus RMB 4.1 billion) |
| PB (2026-09-30) | 5.79x |
| Three-scenario fair value (bear/base/bull) | RMB 55-68 / 106-125 / 155-190 (probabilities 25%/55%/20%) |
| Probability-weighted expectation | ~RMB 113 (roughly +15% vs. current price) |
Guanghe Technology is the A-share server-board specialist with the highest revenue purity in computing-power PCBs (computing scenarios accounted for 89.77% of revenue in 2026H1, with server-related products at roughly 90%). The volume-and-price uplift brought by the generational transition in AI server platforms has already been fully reflected in its financials: revenue for the first three quarters of 2026 was RMB 6.990 billion (+82.25%), with net profit attributable to parent at RMB 1.488 billion (+105.59%). This report's judgment is cautiously bullish: at the current price of RMB 98.35, the stock trades at only ~11.3x forward 2027 earnings on sell-side consensus, or ~15.8x on this report's conservative earnings basis — both no higher than peers. The Yunqing base (production starting end of November 2026) and the Thailand base (equipment coming online in 2026Q4) support revenue of RMB 13.5-16.0 billion once fully annualized in 2027. Two constraints stand out: first, from 2027H2, the scissors gap between nearly RMB 59 billion of industry capacity expansion and demand growth could trigger price rebalancing in high-end boards — this report and market consensus diverge by about 5 percentage points on 2027 net margin, and the valuation conclusion is highly sensitive to this (each 5pct decline in gross margin implies roughly -22% to 2027E attributable profit); second, ~272 million shares will be unlocked on 2027-04-02 (~176% of the current A-share float), while buybacks and share purchases amount to only ~2% of the unlock's market value, and the controlling shareholder's no-sale commitment expires less than a month after the unlock. We recommend phased accumulation and position control until clarity emerges from the January 2027 earnings preannouncement, cloud providers' capex guidance, and unlock arrangements.
What will change over the next 12 months: Three projects move from "under construction" to "in production" — Phase I of the Guangzhou Yunqing smart manufacturing base (18-78 layer ultra-high multilayer boards + 5-7 order HDI, production starting end of November 2026, ramping through 2027), new equipment for Thailand Phase I (successive production starts in 2026Q4, contributing capacity in 2027), and PCIe6.0 platform products (successive volume shipments in 2027Q1-Q2 at higher unit prices than the prior generation). At the same time, the countdown begins for the industry's supply side to shift from "shortage" to "rebalancing": 13 A-share peers disclosed nearly RMB 59 billion of capacity expansion in 2026, and the Top 13 computing-related PCB output value is projected to grow at a 2025-2027E CAGR of ~54%, significantly above mainstream demand-side forecasts. The company itself is a participant in this expansion wave (capex guidance of RMB 5-6 billion each for 2026/2027). The tension between "monetizing its own capacity" and "industry supply pressuring prices" plays out simultaneously in 2027 — the fundamental source of this stock's risk/reward ratio.
Primary share price driver: Cloud providers' 2027 capex guidance (concentrated disclosure during the January-February 2027 US earnings season). Third-party forecasts have already been revised up to +50%~60% (TrendForce, Morgan Stanley basis). If realized, order visibility for the computing PCB sector systematically improves for 2027, and the company, as the highest-purity play, offers above-average elasticity; if growth guidance falls below +20% or language about "optimizing investment pace" appears, the demand thesis is falsified.
Verifiable expectation gap: Back-solving from the current price of RMB 98.35 at a 20x steady-state P/E implies only ~RMB 2.3 billion of 2027 attributable profit (+12% vs. 2026E); even on this report's conservative basis (RMB 2.66-3.28 billion), the current price implies only 15.8x. Meanwhile, physical capacity deployment + share gains (estimated global server PCB share of ~3.9%→5.3%) + platform-level price jumps (NVIDIA GB200 PCB content of ~RMB 230,000-250,000 per rack → VR200 at ~RMB 590,000) all point to higher profits. The reverse also holds: sell-side consensus of RMB 4.1 billion for 2027E attributable profit implies a 25% net margin (continuing to rise), while this report assumes 19%-20.5%. The 2026 annual report (gross margin, depreciation, impairments) and 2027Q1 results will adjudicate — the disagreement itself is the source of the odds.
Catalysts for validation and falsification conditions (see tracking schedule at end of report): 2027-01 annual earnings preannouncement (validating Q4 shipment recovery), cloud providers' capex guidance in Jan-Feb 2027, confirmation of Yunqing production start, PCIe6.0 language shifting from "small batches" to "volume shipments"; falsification signals include quarterly gross margin declining more than 2pct QoQ for two consecutive quarters, cloud guidance stalling, or pre-disclosure of employee platform share sales ahead of the unlock.
Key evidence:
The structural evidence of volume-and-price gains is solid: 9M2026 gross margin 37.87% (FY2023: 33.42%), net margin 21.29% (FY2023: 15.48%); the company covers 8 of the world's top 10 server manufacturers, and some PCIe6.0 platforms have shipped in small volumes. Note that the "computing scenario" includes both AI and general-purpose servers (not broken out by the company), and that share is a 2026H1 figure; part of the reported surge was driven by industry-wide shortage pricing (high-end boards were "hard to obtain"), not entirely by share expansion. The quality of P&L realization also carries caveats — inventory up +178.85% from year-start, tax refunds accounting for ~30% of operating cash flow, and deeply negative FCF (see Section V). This thesis's confidence measure applies to "earnings realization" itself, not its sustainability.
Key evidence:
This report must honestly present the fragility of this thesis: the "cheap at current price" conclusion shifts with the earnings basis. If sell-side consensus is realized (2027E RMB 4.1 billion, implied 25% net margin), 11.3x is significantly undervalued; if this report's conservative basis is realized (RMB 2.66-3.28 billion, net margin 19%-20.5%), 15.8x is merely consistent with growth (PEG ~0.5-0.7); but if 2027 supply rebalancing pushes net margin toward 16% (bear case), a 16x exit multiple implies only RMB 55-68. In other words, the margin of safety at the current price rests on "no collapse in net margin of more than 4 percentage points" — precisely the direction the industry's expansion scissors gap points toward. Base-case fair value is RMB 106-125 (2027E own-basis midpoint of RMB 2.95 billion × 17-20x; exit multiple anchored to peers' current forward levels at a discount and a steady-state range for a penetration-peak year, not to the company's own current multiple); on sensitivity, each RMB 500 million downward revision to 2027E attributable profit vs. base lowers the fair-value midpoint by ~RMB 20.
Key evidence:
The quantified chain from capacity to revenue still has gaps: the company has not disclosed Yunqing Phase I's designed output value or ramp schedule. The RMB 13.5-16.0 billion 2027 revenue range (+37%~+62%) is indirectly derived from "construction-in-progress conversion timing × order visibility (industry orders generally booked through 2027) × platform unit prices," not directly from a capacity formula. Depreciation running ahead is the main hedge on this thesis: after ~RMB 2.5 billion of construction-in-progress and prepaid equipment converts to fixed assets, estimated incremental annual depreciation is RMB 200-300 million (~8%-10% of 2027E attributable profit), and this report's 2027E net margin of 19%-20.5% leaves only ~1-2 percentage points of buffer versus the actual 21.29% for 9M2026; if Yunqing ramps more slowly than expected, Q4-2026 through 2027H1 results will show margin erosion before revenue acceleration.
Key evidence:
The operational delivery record (Thailand profitable within a single month in 6 months, Huangshi's turnaround, preannouncements landing within range) occurred during an industry upcycle and contains industry-beta components, but the consistent, repeated delivery lends credibility. Two mismatches of scale and timing must be noted: total buyback ceiling of RMB 600 million is only ~2.2% of the unlock's market value; and the controlling shareholder's no-sale commitment runs to about 2027-04-29 while the unlock date is 2027-04-02 — the commitment ends exactly 27 days after the unlock, leaving a supply-constraint vacuum. On 2026-11-09 the company terminated the equity incentive plan launched in September but not yet granted (citing capital-market conditions and share price volatility), putting the binding mechanism between employee ownership platforms and the core team into a transition period; if no replacement scheme emerges within 3-6 months, expected selling pressure at the unlock window should be revised upward.
Key evidence:
Supply expansion is a disclosed fact, but the "2027H2 rebalancing" timing judgment faces real counterevidence: demand-side forecasts span an extremely wide range (Prismark long-term CAGR ~12.7% ↔ Goldman implied +124% for 2028); after Goldman's August upgrade, high-end order backlogs generally extend through 2027, and the supply-demand inflection could slip to 2028; the attribution of Q3's gross margin decline is also unresolved — Yunqing ramp costs front-loaded, FX distortion (9M financial expenses of RMB 172 million vs. -RMB 410,000 in the prior-year period), and competitive pressure could each explain it; if the primary causes are the former two, gross margin may actually recover in 2027 as yields improve. The correct reading of this thesis: the direction of supply risk is certain (expansion is a fait accompli), but the timing and severity are uncertain (2027H2 to 2028). This is why this report assigns the bear scenario a 25% probability rather than higher, and why the C2 valuation conclusion must retain sensitivity disclosure.
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | 2026Q1-3 (latest) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (RMB 100M) | 26.78 | 37.34 | 54.85 | 69.90 (+82.25%) |
| Net profit attributable to parent (RMB 100M) | 4.15 | 6.76 | 10.16 | 14.88 (+105.59%) |
| Non-recurring-adjusted attributable net profit (RMB 100M) | 4.35 | 6.78 | 9.88 | 14.65 (+108.20%) |
| Gross margin (%) | 33.42 | 33.38 | 34.43 | 37.87 |
| Net margin (%) | 15.48 | 18.11 | 18.52 | 21.29 |
| Operating cash flow (RMB 100M) | 5.28 | 7.96 | 10.32 | 14.79 (+94.78%) |
| Free cash flow (RMB 100M) | 1.23 | -0.31 | -2.78 | -15.14 |
| Capex on PP&E and similar (RMB 100M) | 4.04 | 8.28 | 13.09 | 29.94 |
| Cash and equivalents (RMB 100M, period-end) | — | 5.20 | 5.20* | 24.27 (2026-09-30) |
| Interest-bearing debt (RMB 100M, period-end) | — | 6.86 | 6.86* | 11.52 (2026-09-30) |
| Debt-to-asset ratio (%, period-end) | 51.99 | 45.94 | 47.25 | 47.33 |
| Weighted ROE (%) | 25.60 | 25.87 | 29.24 | 22.52 (9M cumulative) |
*The FY2024-2025 period-end cash/interest-bearing debt figures are annual-report basis (end-2025 cash of RMB 520 million + trading financial assets of RMB 190 million); balance-sheet stock data should reference the latest period, 2026-09-30: cash and equivalents RMB 2.427 billion (including RMB 2.865 billion of H-share offering proceeds actually received), interest-bearing debt RMB 1.152 billion (short-term borrowings 416 million + current portion of long-term debt 316 million + long-term borrowings 415 million + leases and long-term payables 44 million), net cash ~RMB 1.28 billion.
Reasons for metric changes (items with YoY ≥ ±20%, with company explanations):
Q3 standalone revenue was RMB 2.601 billion (+84.44%), net profit attributable to parent RMB 533 million (+129.29%), and adjusted net profit (ex non-recurring items) RMB 525 million (+132.48%) — YoY growth continued to accelerate, but sequential momentum weakened for the first time: standalone Q3 net profit attributable fell about 5% from Q2's RMB 563 million, and standalone gross margin of 35.51% was down 3.76 percentage points from H1's 39.27%. At the mid-October earnings briefing, management characterized the Q3 disruption as delayed customer pickups caused by temporary shortages of CPU/memory chips, stating "this is not a change in industry demand, and our expectations and confidence for full-year results remain unchanged," and noted production lines ran at full capacity during the National Day holiday. This report takes a reserved view of that explanation: inventory up +179% from the beginning of the year corroborates the "delayed pickup" narrative, but "the shortage is temporary" is currently only the company's unilateral account; whether Q4 can deliver the promised ~+10% sequential revenue recovery (implying roughly RMB 9.8–10.1 billion for the full year) is the most critical verification point for the January 2027 earnings preannouncement. On valuation, Q3 results landed within the guidance range (RMB 1.488 billion vs. the guided RMB 1.45–1.50 billion), neither beating nor missing expectations, and the market reaction that day was mild (October 30 close +4.46%).
Business model in brief: Asset-heavy customized manufacturing (JDM/direct sales account for 97.6%), order-based with no subscription attributes; products are high-multilayer boards for servers (the Yunqing project under construction reaches 18–78 layers plus 5–7th-order HDI), serving server OEM/ODM and cloud vendor supply chains. Revenue is non-recurring, but customer certification stickiness is strong (server platforms iterate every 2–3 years with long certification cycles), and 8 of the world's top 10 server manufacturers are its customers. Pricing power stems from technology generations rather than brand: the PCIe 5.0→6.0 upgrade brings higher layer counts and material grades (M8/M9-grade CCL), driving unit prices upward — essentially a "technology-generation dividend," not independent pricing power.
Cash content of earnings: OCF/net profit attributable for FY2023–9M2026 was 1.27 / 1.18 / 1.02 / 0.99 — book profits were almost fully converted into operating cash, and collections were healthy (though 9M2026 operating cash flow of RMB 1.479 billion included roughly RMB 470 million of tax refunds; excluding this, the ratio drops to about 0.68); FCF/net profit attributable was 0.30 / -0.05 / -0.27 / -1.02 — free cash flow has deteriorated for a third consecutive year with an accelerating deficit (9M2026 FCF of -RMB 1.514 billion versus net profit attributable of RMB 1.488 billion over the same period), with capex of RMB 2.994 billion consuming all operating cash. This is not a "book profit fabrication" type red flag but the typical expansion-phase profile of "growth entirely funded by capex": 2026/2027 capex guidance is RMB 5.0–6.0 billion each (about 1.1x FY2025 revenue), with funding reliant on the H-share offering (RMB 2.865 billion already received) + a planned convertible bond issuance (≤RMB 3.6 billion) + upstream supplier financing (notes and accounts payable up RMB 2.923 billion from the start of the year, covering the increase in receivables plus inventory). On recurring earnings, the gap between adjusted and attributable profit is tiny (only RMB 23 million for 9M2026), so non-recurring cosmetics can be ruled out.
Return on capital: Estimated FY2025 ROIC of about 22% (NOPAT RMB 1.031 billion / invested capital of about RMB 4.66 billion), annualized to about 21.6% for 9M2026 — sustaining above 20% despite capital occupation surging with capacity expansion, significantly above the estimated WACC (about 11%), indicating that expansion delivers positive marginal returns at current demand levels. This is the watershed metric between "real growth" and "pseudo-growth," and it currently sits on the real-growth side — but the precondition is maintaining utilization of new capacity, and the metric will come under pressure once supply is released in 2027.
Capex quality: capex/depreciation was 5.46x in FY2024 and 6.25x in FY2025, all growth-oriented investment (Thailand Phase I cumulative investment of RMB 889 million, 97.94% complete; Yunqing Phase I total investment about RMB 2.6 billion). The company does not disclose a split of maintenance capex, so this report assumes "maintenance capex ≈ depreciation"; the risk is that if demand downshifts in 2027, the committed RMB 5–6 billion/year of spending plus depreciation from transferred-in-construction assets (an annual increase of RMB 200–300 million) will become rigid costs.
Moat and red flags: The moat rests on certification barriers (customers among 8 of the top 10 server makers, single-champion product) and process generations (46-layer volume production, 7th-order HDI validation completed). Three red flags, all quantified: ① FCF persistently negative and reliant on external financing infusions (see above); ② revenue highly concentrated in a single track — compute scenarios at 89.77%, top five customers at 60.74%, largest customer at 20.20%; a pivot in AI capex would mean a double hit to volume and price; ③ inventory of RMB 2.132 billion is roughly 0.8x quarterly revenue; if "customer delayed pickups" evolve into order cancellations, impairment provisions would directly hit profits.
Words-versus-deeds consistency: pragmatic. Four verifiable commitment-versus-delivery comparisons: ① FY2024 annual report pledged "Thailand plant to start production on schedule" → production started June 2025 and turned profitable in the single month of December (delivered); ② FY2024 annual report pledged "Huangshi to strive for turnaround" → FY2025 Huangshi Guanghe net profit of RMB 96.69 million (delivered); ③ the 2026-10-10 earnings preannouncement range of RMB 1.45–1.50 billion → actual RMB 1.488 billion landed within the range (delivered, though the preannouncement itself is an exchange-compliance action, a baseline rather than a plus); ④ Yunqing Phase I, stated in the FY2025 annual report as "full production by end-2026" → updated in the semiannual report to "production start by end of November 2026" (in progress, timeline moved up). No record of broken promises over three years, and its framing of capex and ramp-up pace has been consistent across two consecutive reporting periods. Reservations: on key questions such as NVQual certification, Dell cooperation, and share of 44-layer mid-boards, the company consistently declines to comment citing commercial confidentiality — a relatively conservative disclosure strategy.
Shareholder friendliness: neutral-leaning-friendly, but with dilution offsets. Payout ratios for FY2023/2024/2025 were 25.46%/30.19%/27.07% (RMB 2.5→4.8→6.46 per 10 shares) — persistent but under one-third of earnings; two buyback tranches totaling RMB 300–600 million (the first completed swiftly) plus ongoing share purchases by the controlling shareholder. On the other side is continuous dilution: April 2024 A-share IPO, March 2026 H-share issuance of 46 million shares (about 10.8% dilution of pre-issuance share capital), and a planned convertible bond of ≤RMB 3.6 billion (full conversion at the assumed conversion price of RMB 173.24 would dilute about 4.4%; if a downward revision is triggered, about 7.7% at RMB 100). Under an expansion model that trades equity issuance for capacity, minority shareholder returns depend on growth delivery.
Risk signals: ① On 2026-11-09, termination of the equity incentive plan launched in September but not yet granted (citing capital market conditions, operating conditions, and share price volatility) — leaving a gap in the alignment mechanism, which combines unfavorably with the 2027-04-02 unlock of the employee platform; ② Q3 saw a sudden addition of RMB 48.06 million in goodwill from an unnamed acquisition target, with unpaid purchase consideration still parked in other payables (RMB 266 million, +314.79%) — pricing fairness and subsequent disclosure need tracking; ③ no record of controlling-shareholder pledges, and directors/senior management have recently been net buyers (the board secretary and CFO each bought shares on 11-02); overall governance is clean.
The company has a single main business and does not disclose separate segments by product line; below is a cross-section of revenue structure (FY2025 annual report basis):
| Cross-section | Revenue share | Gross margin | YoY | One-line business logic |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Printed circuit boards (single main business) | 93.01% | 29.88% (+0.96pct) | +46.63% | High-multilayer customized boards for servers; generation dividend underpinned by certification barriers |
| Of which: overseas sales | 66.64% | 39.03% (+1.55pct) | +36.26% | USD-denominated, serving overseas server brands and EMS; the high-margin core |
| Of which: domestic sales | 26.37% | 6.75% (+6.66pct) | +81.56% | Includes domestic customers during the Huangshi ramp; low margin but rapidly recovering |
The profit engine is clear: overseas sales, with roughly two-thirds of revenue, contributed the vast majority of gross profit (overseas gross margin 39.03% vs. domestic 6.75%, a 32-percentage-point gap) — overseas orders plug directly into North American compute-chain generational upgrades (layer counts, material grades, HDI order counts), with bargaining and profitability power far above domestic general-purpose orders; the low domestic margin mainly reflects the Huangshi site ramp-up and price competition among domestic customers. This structure implies: the company's earnings elasticity is essentially a function of North American AI capex. The domestic recovery (gross margin up 6.66pct in one year) is a marginal improvement item, not the main engine. By end market, compute scenarios accounted for 89.77% in 2026H1 and server-related roughly 90%, with consumer electronics/industrial control/security as secondary and not separately quantified — the "three singles" structure of a single business, a single track, and concentrated top customers cuts both ways.
Accounting red flags (based on the extracted FY2023–FY2025 annual reports and the 2026 Q3 report):
Cross-period consistency:
Overall judgment: based on the financial statements extracted here, no obvious traces of profit smoothing or cross-period mismatch were found; the main reservations are follow-up verification of the inventory surge and disclosure completeness of the unnamed acquisition. The company's disclosure history now covers 4 full fiscal years plus 3 quarterly reports, making cross-period consistency assessable.
Current market data and multiples: Closing price RMB 98.35 (2026-11-11); market cap on the A-share price basis about RMB 46.49 billion (on an A/H split basis — H shares at HKD 63.75 × FX ≈ RMB 54.2 — total market cap about RMB 44.46 billion, roughly 4.6% lower than the A-price basis; this report values uniformly at the A-share price). PE(TTM) 26.1x, PB 5.79x (net assets of RMB 8.12 billion at 2026-09-30); the company listed in August 2023 with a history of only about 3.3 years, so PE/PB sit at roughly the 5th percentile since listing — this percentile is for reference only and not a cheapness/richness signal: first, earnings are in a high-growth investment phase (TTM net profit +106% YoY cannot be linearly extrapolated); second, the sample period happens to cover a complete demand cycle, so the percentile is naturally low. A more meaningful comparison is the forward basis: 2026E PE about 22.2x (in-house)/20.4x (consensus), 2027E about 15.8x (in-house)/11.3x (consensus), PEG about 0.5–0.7.
Peer benchmarking (2026-11-12 close):
| Company | PE(TTM) | PB | 9M2026 revenue growth | 9M2026 net profit growth | 9M ROE | Key difference |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WUS Printed Circuit | 26.3x | 8.61x | +71.9% (RMB 23.2bn) | +106.9% | 31.5% | 3.3x larger scale, deeper in switches/networking |
| Shennan Circuits | 31.0x | 7.86x | +53.8% (RMB 25.8bn) | +77.5% | 22.2% | PCB + substrates + assembly diversification, lower purity |
| Victory Giant Technology | 30.4x | 3.53x | +30.8% (RMB 18.5bn) | +4.3% (Q3 standalone -52%) | 12.3% | Greatest NVIDIA-chain elasticity, also greatest volatility |
| Shengyi Technology (Electronics) | 26.7x | 6.16x | +39.8% (RMB 9.5bn) | +71.5% | 24.5% | Group CCL supply synergies |
| Guanghe Technology (FASTPRINT) | 26.1x | 5.79x | +82.25% (RMB 7.0bn) | +105.6% | 22.5% (weighted) | Highest server purity, fastest growth, smallest size |
What expectations the market has already priced in: This is the crux of this section. Back-solving from the current price of RMB 98.35 at 20x steady-state PE requires only about RMB 2.3 billion of 2027 net profit attributable (+12% vs. 2026E); back-solving at the peer median PE(TTM) of 28.6x implies only about RMB 1.6 billion (negative growth). The reality: 9M2026 net profit attributable is already RMB 1.488 billion, and Q3 standalone annualizes to about RMB 2.1 billion; capacity deployment (Yunqing + Thailand fully annualized in 2027) + rising share + PCIe 6.0 unit price step-up support, on this report's conservative basis, RMB 2.66–3.28 billion (+27% to +57%). The market has effectively prepaid a 20%–30% earnings discount for 2027 supply rebalancing. Cross-check: anchored on the sell-side consensus of RMB 4.1 billion, the current price is only 11.3x — "cheap" holds on both bases, but the magnitudes differ hugely, which is precisely the essence of the expectation gap in this name: the odds ride on the divergence between a 2027 net margin of 19%–20.5% versus 25%. A demand-side math check on the implied expectations: cloud vendors' 2026 capex of USD 600–805 billion (+36%–50%), the China-basis AI server PCB market growing +82% from 2025→2026 (RMB 37.9bn→68.9bn), and a 2.4x jump in per-rack PCB value on NVIDIA platforms — the +12% growth implied by the current price sits well below the lower bound of any demand math, so the directional conclusion of "it can support this" is robust.
Three-layer value (EPV): Asset value about RMB 17.2/share (book value per share, including H-share proceeds cash) — only 18% of the current price; book value significantly understates replacement cost (fixed assets RMB 4.27bn + construction in progress RMB 1.48bn + prepaid equipment RMB 1.03bn still ramping); zero-growth EPV about RMB 40/share (41% of current price): 2026E normalized FCFE of about RMB 4.4/share (2026E net profit attributable RMB 2.08bn, bridged by +depreciation of about RMB 450 million, -maintenance capex ≈ depreciation, with working capital growth already absorbed by operating cash generation) divided by an 11% cost of equity; growth optionality about RMB 58/share, about 59% of the current price. Under this report's base-case earnings path (2027E RMB 2.95bn → 2028E about RMB 3.8bn), that option pricing is not aggressive; but it must be noted that growth optionality accounting for nearly 60% means the main support of the current price is delivery of "continued high growth through 2027–2028," not current assets and realized earnings — once demand turns, the downside hits the option layer first.
Three scenarios and odds (12-month horizon; fair-value ranges and probabilities are this report's judgment):
| Scenario | Probability | Fair range | Core assumptions | vs. current price |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 25% | RMB 55–68 | 2027 cloud capex stalls or supply rebalancing arrives early: 2027 revenue about RMB 11.8bn (+19%), gross margin down 5–6pct to about 32%, net profit attributable about RMB 1.83bn (-11%), exit at 16x | Midpoint -37% |
| Base | 55% | RMB 106–125 | VR200 ramp + Yunqing/Thailand full-year ramp + PCIe 6.0 shipments: 2027 revenue about RMB 14.8bn (+50%), net margin 19.9%, net profit attributable about RMB 2.9bn, exit at 17–20x (anchor: discounted peer current forward levels + steady-state range in the peak-penetration year; the company's own current multiples were not used as the anchor) | Midpoint +17% |
| Bull | 20% | RMB 155–190 | 44-layer M9 mid-board share delivery (upgrade to lead supplier) + Kyber orthogonal backplane adoption + PCIe 6.0 price increases: 2027 revenue about RMB 16.5bn (+68%), net profit attributable about RMB 3.38bn, exit at 24x | Midpoint +75% |
Ramp-up math and scenario consistency: The base-case derivation chain is — 2026E revenue RMB 9.9bn (Q4 standalone RMB 2.86–3.12bn, +10%–20% sequentially) → 2027E RMB 14.8bn (Yunqing Phase I annualized + Thailand new capacity annualized + PCIe 6.0 ramp, +50%) → 2028E about RMB 19.5bn (+32%, Yunqing Phase II/high-multilayer project contributing post-2028) → 2027E net profit attributable RMB 2.95bn (net margin 19.9%, already including erosion from a RMB 200–300 million annual increase in transferred-asset depreciation) → exit at 17–20x yields RMB 106–125, consistent with the scenario table. Sensitivity to the multiple choice: if the market prices 2027 as a cyclical downturn (12–15x), even with earnings delivered at RMB 2.95bn, fair value would be only RMB 75–94 (below the current price) — multiple risk and earnings risk are not independent; supply rebalancing hits both at once, which is why the bear scenario is so deep (-37%).
Conclusion: undervalued, but not at a deep discount. Assess quality (ROE 29%, ROIC 22%, cash conversion of about 1, certification barriers) separately from price (forward multiples below peers, implied growth below demand math): quality is solid, price is on the low side, with base-case fair value of RMB 106–125, about 7.8% margin of safety to the base-case lower bound, and a probability-weighted expectation of about RMB 113 (+15%). In this report's view, the main disagreement with the market and sell-side (consensus target price median RMB 245, CLSA RMB 250) is not direction but magnitude — this report's 2027 net margin assumption is about 5 percentage points below consensus, and the target price correspondingly about half; if the 2026 annual report validates a net margin sustained above 21%, there is room to raise this report's range. One structural valuation overhang should also be noted: H shares trade at roughly a 45% discount to A shares (actual dual-close calculation on 2026-11-12); the same asset's internationally-set price is about 55% of the A-share price, exerting long-term convergence pressure on the A-share valuation center — unlock events and Stock Connect fund flows will amplify this effect.
The global PCB market is a traditionally manufacturing industry growing at a moderate pace: 2025 output value of approximately USD 84.89 billion (+15.4%), with Prismark (2025Q4, as cited in the company's 2025 annual report) forecasting USD 95.78 billion in 2026 (+12.5%) and USD 109.16 billion in 2029, implying a 2024-2029 CAGR of approximately 8.2%; China's output value in 2025 is approximately USD 49.35 billion, more than half of the global total. The real explosion is concentrated in the server/computing sub-segment: server and data storage PCBs grew from USD 10.92 billion in 2024 (+33.1%) → USD 15.98 billion forecast for 2025 (+46.3%, the fastest growth across all applications) → USD 25.73 billion in 2029 (2024-2029 CAGR 18.7%, Prismark); on a China basis, Guosen Securities estimates the AI server PCB market at RMB 37.9 billion in 2025 → RMB 68.9 billion in 2026 (+82%). On product structure, Prismark expects output value of high-multilayer boards with 18+ layers to grow 79% in 2026 and HDI to grow 23%, while ordinary 4-6 layer boards grow only +3.1% — within the same industry, the growth-rate gap between high-end and low-end products exceeds 70 percentage points. This is the key to understanding the divergence in fate between Guanghe (purely high-end compute boards) and ordinary PCB makers.
This report judges the company to be at an exogenous demand inflection point, with every link in the chain quantifiable: Driver variables — the five hyperscale cloud vendors' 2026 capex of USD 600-805 billion (+36%~50% YoY, range across Introl/Morgan Stanley/Bank of America/Goldman Sachs), and in the earnings season of late October 2026, four managements consistently pointed to "continued acceleration" for 2027 (TrendForce has raised its 2027 capex growth forecast for nine major vendors to +60%); Leap in unit consumption — Nvidia platform generational transition lifts per-rack PCB value from approximately RMB 230-250 thousand for GB200 to approximately RMB 590 thousand for VR200 NVL144 (about 2.4x, Guosen Securities based on SemiAnalysis estimates), including the first introduction of 44-layer M9-grade midplane in compute trays (value of RMB 60-65 thousand per rack), layer count rising from 20-30 layers to 44 layers, CCL materials advancing from M7/M8 to M9, and the VR cable-free architecture adding 54 new PCBs per rack versus GB300; the Kyber orthogonal rack (2027) will replace copper-cable backplanes entirely with PCB backplanes, pushing value another step up; Penetration ramp — AI server PCBs' share of wired-communication PCBs rising from 26.4% in 2025 → 38.0% in 2026, an increase of about 11.5 percentage points in one year; Company addressable share — 2025 server-related revenue of approximately RMB 4.4 billion / global server-storage PCB market of approximately RMB 114.2 billion ≈ 3.9%, approximately 5.3% in 2026E (estimated basis, trending up), with customers covering 8 of the world's top 10 server manufacturers, and brokerage industry-chain tracking listing it as one of the VR200 44-layer M9 midplane suppliers (alongside Victory Giant; the company has not confirmed, citing commercial confidentiality). In August 2026, Goldman Sachs raised its 2027 global AI server PCB forecast by 38% to USD 37.5 billion, and USD 84.0 billion for 2028 — while the demand-side forecast spectrum is wide (Prismark long-term CAGR of ~12.7% ↔ Goldman's implied +124% for 2028), the growth rate of the high-end sub-segment under every estimate is multiple times the +12% implied by the company's current price.
Upstream (CCL and its raw materials: copper foil ~50%, resin ~26%, glass fabric ~19%) — supply of M8/M9-grade high-speed CCL (Shengyi Technology, TUC, etc.), HVLP3/4 low-roughness copper foil (dominated by Japanese and Korean players such as Mitsui, Furukawa, Doosan), and low-dielectric glass fabric (Nittobo, AGC monopolizing third-generation Q fabric) along the AI high-end chain is tight and prices are rising; upstream profits exploded in 2026Q3: Shengyi Technology Q3 net profit RMB 3.44 billion (+238%), Huazheng New Material +3045%, Jiayuan Technology +4264%, Honghe Technology +608% — average profit growth of the top 10 upstream players about 1196% vs about 167% for the top 10 midstream board makers (China Electronics News basis). Profits are clearly migrating upstream to base materials; midstream board makers' average purchase prices rose 10%-70% YoY, and the company judges that the CCL supply-demand tension will not be fully resolved before H2 2027 (October 2026 investor relations record). Midstream (high-multilayer/HDI board manufacturing, where the company sits) — core barriers lie in mSAP fine-line circuitry (10-15μm), 30:1 high aspect-ratio plating, back-drilling and advanced lamination, with value rising nonlinearly with layer count and build-up steps. Downstream (server OEM/ODM/EMS and cloud vendors) — ultimately paid for by cloud vendors' capex. The company's bargaining power over downstream customers is temporarily advantaged during the shortage period (gross margin rising despite upstream price hikes), while its bargaining power over upstream suppliers (especially tight high-speed CCL) is weaker, with cost pass-through lagging by 1-2 quarters.
On the demand side, see the inflection chain above; on the supply side — the biggest current medium-term variable in this industry: Within 2026, 13 A-share PCB companies disclosed capacity expansion with total investment of nearly RMB 59 billion (Wind/OFweek statistics, as of mid-June 2026); Guosen estimates Top13 + 3 overseas compute PCB players' output value at approximately RMB 78/132/186 billion for 2025/2026/2027E — supply CAGR of ~54% vs mainstream demand forecasts of ~20%; the ~RMB 20 billion gap in 2026 is expected to narrow sharply in 2027. Key capacity milestones: Shanghai Electric's Kunshan RMB 4.3 billion AI board base in 2026H2, Victory Giant's Thailand Phase 2 and Vietnam plants in 2026, Shennan's Nantong Phase 4 (end of 2025) and Thailand (2025Q4), Shengyi Electronics' Dongguan Plant 5 adding 150,000 square meters in 2026H1, Eastson Multek USD 1 billion in 2026H1, and Avary's Huai'an additional RMB 8 billion (2025H2-2028). The competitive landscape is highly concentrated: core boards in Nvidia's GB/VR chain are shared by only 8-10 players (Bianca board: Unimicron/Victory Giant/Elevate; NVSwitch tray: Victory Giant/WUS/TTM; 44-layer M9 midplane: Victory Giant/Guanghe — all per brokerage industry-chain tracking); the server PCB sub-market has no public authoritative CR figure, but based on revenue estimates the top players (WUS/Shennan/Victory Giant/Guanghe/Unimicron/Gold Circuit, etc.) together hold more than half the share (estimated, to be verified). Entry barriers: customer qualification (2-3 year platform iteration cycles), process technology (8-step HDI, 44+ layer midplanes), material lock-in (M8/M9 CCL quotas), capital (RMB 1-4.3 billion per base), and geopolitics (overseas bases have become the "entry ticket"). The substitution threat runs in two directions: orthogonal/cable-free architecture displacing copper cables (a PCB incremental) and, longer term, CoWoP (chip-direct attach) redistributing the value chain — an opportunity rather than a threat for leading board makers with substrate-like PCB (SLP) capabilities.
The PCB industry is currently in the "high-boom segment of the AI structural upcycle," with extreme internal divergence: in 2026Q3, 33 A-share PCB companies posted single-quarter net profit growth of +215%, yet Victory Giant fell -52%, Avary -0.9%, and Shiyun -2% (consumer/automotive boards showing "revenue growth without profit growth") — within the same track, AI exposure determines fate. An honest assessment of cycle position: the shortage in high-end compute boards is real and ongoing (order book extends into 2027), but the capex race has made a 2027-2028 rebalancing the base case, and the secondary market has already corrected ahead of the industry (PCB sector down 21%-31% over 30 days; the stock down ~58% from its 52-week high of RMB 237.25). Leading indicators: cloud capex guidance language, Nvidia platform transition cadence (VR200 ramp → Rubin CPX end-2026 → Kyber 2027), CCL/low-dielectric fabric prices, peers' capacity expansion and commissioning timelines, and the company's quarter-over-quarter profit trajectory (Q3 already showed the first slowdown signal). Regulation and geopolitics: US-China trade friction and export controls are the top industry challenges explicitly listed in the company's annual report; tariffs and rules of origin are driving capacity localization into Southeast Asia — Thai capacity is a precondition for winning overseas compute orders (the company's Thai plant turned monthly profitable within 6 months of commencement, ahead of most peers); export controls have spawned domestic compute supernodes (e.g., Alibaba Panjiu 128), forming a second domestic demand pool; the company's "PCB for server mainboards" was designated a national-level Manufacturing Single Champion in 2022.
(For the peer financial benchmarking table, see Section 9.) In scale, the company is approximately 27% of WUS/Shennan and 37% of Victory Giant (9M2026 revenue basis), but its growth rate (+82.25%) and net margin (21.29%) both rank in the top tier; versus the fastest-growing peer WUS (+71.9%), the company is smaller, more elastic, and more concentrated in the single server track. Positioning: the A-share "server specialist" with the highest compute purity — a niche-challenger within the global top tier of compute PCB makers. Its share is trending up (3.9%→5.3%E), with a moat built on 20+ years of server board qualification/process accumulation, first-mover Thai capacity, and profit quality under a focused strategy. Market position claims require side-by-side clarification: the company's own framing is "customers among 8 of the global top 10 server manufacturers" (H-share prospectus/earnings briefing); under N.T. Information's 2025 global Top 100 ranking, the company did not make the top ten (the ranking is by total revenue, and the company is small in scale). The two framings answer different questions (customer coverage vs scale ranking) — not contradictory, but must be distinguished when cited.
Overall verdict: cautious overweight, 12-month target price RMB 106-125 (fair on the base case), probability-weighted expectation approximately RMB 113 (+15%); current price offers a safety margin of about 7.8% over the base-case floor. Confidence 0.55 — conviction in the directional call is constrained by two factors: the valuation conclusion is highly sensitive to 2027 net margin assumptions (every -5pct of gross margin ≈ -22% to 2027E net profit attributable to parent), and the supply shock of the 2027-04-02 share unlock falls squarely in the middle of the observation window. Strategically, this report does not recommend building a full position at once: the odds structure at current levels is "upside +17% (base-case mid-point) / +75% (bull) / downside -37% (bear)" — skewed positive but not deeply so. Better add triggers are when at least two of the following three variables become clear: January 2027 earnings pre-announcement confirming Q4 catch-up, cloud vendors' capex guidance landing, and unlock arrangements (whether employee platform sell-downs are pre-disclosed).
Key Risk Disclosures (ranked by importance): ① Industry supply rebalancing in 2027H2-2028 triggering a double hit to high-end board prices and margins (13 peers expanding by RMB 59 billion vs demand at 20%, with the company itself part of the expansion wave); ② Unlock of approximately 272 million shares on 2027-04-02 (176% of A-share free float), with buyback+insider purchase scale of only ~2% and the controlling shareholder's no-sell pledge expiring just 27 days after the unlock, plus a gap in team alignment mechanisms following termination of the equity incentive plan; ③ Impairment exposure from inventory of RMB 2.13 billion + receivables of RMB 3.14 billion (9M credit + asset impairments already RMB 128 million); ④ Upstream CCL price-hike squeeze (gross margin compression on the order of 1.5-2pct) and RMB appreciation (each 10% appreciation impacts net profit by approximately RMB 130 million, per the 2025 annual report basis, with exposure essentially unhedged); ⑤ Convertible bond issuance dilution (~4.4%-7.7% if fully issued) and financing dependence amid persistently negative FCF.
Monitoring Plan (Key Milestones Over the Next 12 Months):
Data and basis notes: The price anchor of this report is the 2026-11-11 A-share closing price of RMB 98.35 (frozen basis); subsequent market movements do not alter the valuation base; financial data as of the 2026 Q3 report (2026-09-30); market capitalization on the basis of A-share price × total share capital of 472.73 million shares (if H-shares are valued separately at market price, total market cap would be ~4.6% lower); external institutional views (Goldman Sachs industry forecast of 2026-08-06, CLSA initiation of 2026-06-29, etc.) all carry noted dates and sources. This report was generated by Loyan AI, for research reference only, and does not constitute investment advice.