Report Date: 2026-11-15 | Industry View: Cautiously Bullish | Observation Horizon: 12 Months
This industry belongs to the service platform type, and the core theme of our view is quality of growth—whether the industry is shifting from "revenue growth without profit growth" to "growth in both revenue and profit," rather than mere volume-based prosperity. The conclusion up front: cautiously bullish. The structural growth from demand penetration is real; the pulse created by the 2025 subsidy war (roughly RMB 150 billion in industry-wide spending) is fading, and the industry is entering a repair channel of "subsidy withdrawal → retention validation → advertising taking over." However, evidence of monetization taking over has not yet materialized, rider social insurance is raising the cost floor, and the duopoly's ceasefire is not a final peace—the volume dividend belongs only to platforms that can close the loop between density-based fulfillment and advertising monetization.
The instant retail and on-demand delivery industry studied in this report refers to the retail and restaurant transactions and fulfillment system based on online platform ordering and local rider capacity delivering within 30 minutes to 1 hour, comprising four layers:
Excluded: In-store group buying and in-store travel (referenced only as traffic and profit pool background), next-day e-commerce express logistics, and autonomous delivery (cumulative order share negligible). One-sentence industry chain map: traffic entry (super apps/membership systems) → marketplace monetization (commissions + advertising + delivery fees) → fulfillment network (riders + warehouses/stores) → merchant supply.
Under the Ministry of Commerce Research Institute's methodology, instant retail GMV was RMB 781.0 billion in 2024 (+20.15%) → approximately RMB 971.4 billion in 2025 → exceeding RMB 1 trillion in 2026 → approximately RMB 2 trillion by 2030 (12.6% CAGR in the "15th Five-Year Plan" period). It must be stated plainly: growth decelerated sharply from +24% to about +3% in 2026. The official path of "exceeding RMB 1 trillion in 2026 → RMB 2 trillion by 2030" implies a 2027-2030 CAGR of about 18.9%, which is in obvious tension with current low retail sales growth (only +1.4% cumulative for January-May 2026). This report treats the official RMB 2 trillion figure as an optimistic policy vision; the base case is approximately RMB 1.26 trillion in 2028 (2025-2028 CAGR of about 9.2%).
(The upper band is the official path / bottom-up bull scenario of RMB 1.36-1.39 trillion; the lower band is the bear scenario; Sources: Ministry of Commerce Research Institute, this report's estimates)
Restaurant delivery accounts for about 73% of total orders (about 44 billion orders), non-restaurant about 27% (about 16.3 billion orders, weighted AOV about RMB 59); within non-restaurant, supermarket & convenience is about 50%, fruit & fresh groceries about 26% (Soochow Securities estimate, cross-referenced), pharmaceuticals, 3C accessories, beauty, alcohol, and mother & baby/pet products are the fastest-growing categories (iiMedia monitoring, cross-referenced)—high-AOV categories determine the advertising monetization ceiling for instant purchase, and in 2026 platform competition is shifting from restaurants to these categories (Huawei's 3,000+ stores connected to Taobao Instant Commerce covering 247 cities).
Bull scenario (bottom-up bridge): approximately RMB 1.36 trillion in 2028 (orders +36% × AOV +3%, cross-validated with the official top-down RMB 1.39 trillion with a -1.9% deviation).
Taobao Instant Commerce's daily order peak was 120 million in August 2025, falling back to about 48.25 million by September 2026 (retention about 40%); Meituan's July 2025 peak was 150 million orders, normalizing to about 62-65 million in 2026Q1, and about 80 million daily average in the June 2026 quarter (Goldman Sachs, including summer peak season). Industry daily average order volume was about 80 million before the war → about 110 million in February 2026 (UBS) → 162 million combined across the three platforms in the June 2026 quarter (Goldman Sachs). Interpretation: roughly half of the subsidy-bought pulse failed to retain, but the industry has net organic demand growth of about 30-50 million daily orders versus pre-war levels—pulse fading ≠ demand peaking. However, total industry order volume in 2026 (CFLP methodology) may be flat to slightly down YoY; this methodological difference (steadily growing GMV vs. volatile order volume) is a pitfall that must be flagged in all industry data citations.
For the service platform archetype, "supply" = fulfillment delivery capability; the mining cost curve framework does not apply.
After the 2025 war's capacity draw, industry capacity grew about 50%: Taobao Instant Commerce's annual active riders rose from over 4 million to over 10 million; industry-wide registered/active riders of approximately 20 million correspond to about 110-160 million daily orders in 2026—the rider side has flipped from shortage to surplus (July 2026 media visits found crowdsourced riders struggling to get orders and declining hourly wages), which has lowered per-order fulfillment cost and is one reason for Meituan's 2026Q2 turnaround to profit. Meituan had 7.45 million riders with orders in 2023, with rider compensation exceeding RMB 80 billion (Meituan official); SF Intra-city covers more than 2,300 cities/counties and ranks first in independent third-party order volume (Frost & Sullivan, 2024).
| Model | Representative | Key Parameters | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Store-fulfilled / flash warehouses (3P pure online warehouses) | Meituan Flash Warehouse, Taobao Convenience Store | Meituan Flash Warehouses exceeded 50,000 (2025Q2) → 100,000 target by 2027, GTV target RMB 200 billion; Taobao Instant Commerce signed 700+ → 3,000 by fiscal year-end | Expansion mainforce |
| Front warehouse self-operated (1P) | Dingdong (merged into Meituan), Pupu, Xiaoxiang | Dingdong about 1,000 warehouses, ~1,000 daily orders per warehouse (Shanghai ~1,500)—1,000 orders per warehouse is the industry's empirical break-even line; Xiaoxiang over 800 warehouses | In M&A consolidation |
| Membership club mega warehouses / cloud warehouses | Sam's Club cloud warehouse | About 600 warehouses in 25 cities; 1,000 daily orders per warehouse × AOV RMB 230 = RMB 230,000 daily sales per warehouse; ~RMB 140 billion China sales in 2025 (+40%) | Best model |
Density is cost: the higher the order density (more pooled orders / along-the-route orders / higher daily orders per rider), the lower the per-order fulfillment cost. Verifiable anchors: Meituan's per-order delivery cost is about RMB 4.13 (2024 annual report basis, industry lowest), per-order delivery revenue RMB 3.68 (2026Q2 actual: RMB 26.821 billion ÷ 7.28 billion orders); SF Intra-city's 2025 orders +55% while revenue +47.6%, per-order revenue about -4.8% (deliberate margin concessions for volume); CICC estimates Taobao Instant Commerce's EBITA narrowed from about -RMB 36.7 billion in 2025Q3 to about -RMB 21.1 billion in Q4 (about 42% improvement at stable order volume)—the most direct quantitative evidence of density- and retention-driven UE improvement.
The direction of full implementation of rider social insurance / occupational injury insurance is certain: the occupational injury insurance pilot expanded to 17 provinces in July 2025 and to all 31 provinces nationwide in 2026, with enrollees exceeding 37 million by end of September 2026 (Xinhua/MOHRSS); Meituan's pension subsidy rolled out nationwide in October 2025, with institutional estimates of first-year incremental cost of about RMB 0.1-0.2 per order (RMB 2-3 billion); JD's full-time five insurances + housing fund cost about RMB 2,000 per person per month, annualized about RMB 3.6 billion—if policy converges to a full-time standard (equivalent to about RMB 2.2 per order), it would swallow the food delivery UE guidance of RMB 1 per order (tail scenario). Merchant supply is not the bottleneck (small/micro merchants account for over 80% of new merchants); the bottleneck has shifted to merchant survival rates amid insufficient orders after subsidy withdrawal.
Monetization has three layers: commissions (6-8%, constrained by fee transparency) + delivery fees (market-based, Meituan average RMB 3.68 per order) + advertising (bidding, dependent on traffic and ad load rate). Cost is determined by density; subsidies are a "negative price." UE = monetization - fulfillment - subsidy; in 2026 all three platforms enter the "subsidy withdrawal → retention validation → advertising taking over" channel simultaneously.
The quarterly trajectory of Meituan's core local commerce operating margin is the clearest dashboard for observing this war and its aftermath:
Pre-war (2024): core local commerce operating profit of RMB 52.4 billion, OPM above 20%; 2025 turned to a loss of RMB 6.95 billion (a swing of RMB 59.3 billion), with a single-quarter trough of -RMB 14.1 billion in 2025Q3; 2026Q2 returned to +RMB 5.67 billion with OPM of 7.9% (+11.1 pp QoQ), per-order operating contribution of about RMB 0.78 (RMB 5.67 billion ÷ 7.28 billion orders; includes in-store & travel profits, overstating the figure). On Alibaba's side: CICC estimates Taobao Instant Commerce's EBITA at about -RMB 36.7 billion in 2025Q3 → about -RMB 21.1 billion in 2025Q4 → about -RMB 17.0 to -19.0 billion in 2026Q1, with the company stating in the June 2026 quarter that "losses narrowed faster than expected"; JD's new business operating loss was RMB 46.6 billion for full-year 2025 (Q3 peak of RMB 15.74 billion) → RMB 9.85 billion in 2026Q2 (narrowed 33.4% YoY), with food delivery losses narrowing over 50% YoY. Management guidance anchor: Jiang Fan—Taobao Instant Commerce to reach positive monthly UE in FY2027, transaction scale exceeding RMB 1 trillion in FY2028, and full-segment profitability in FY2029 (Alibaba June 2026 quarter earnings call).
| Platform/Business | Revenue per Order | Fulfillment per Order | Subsidy per Order | Operating Result per Order | Basis Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Meituan Food Delivery (3P, 2026Q2) | ~7.7 (delivery 3.68 + commission ~3.0 + ads ~1.0) | ~4.0 (2024 annual report 4.13 is the industry-lowest anchor) | 0.5-1.0 (wartime peak 3-5) | Contribution ~+0.5~0.8 | Commission/ads are estimates; contribution includes in-store profits, overstated |
| Taobao Instant Commerce (mixed basis) | Segment ~8.9 per order (includes Freshippo 1P, not comparable) | Not separately disclosed | FY2026 wartime average ~3.8 (~90 billion ÷ 23.47 billion orders) | EBITA per order: 2025Q3 -5.7 → 2026Q1 ~-3.8 | CICC estimate |
| JD Food Delivery | Not separately disclosed | Delivery migrated to JD Logistics from 2026, charged externally | ~2-4 | 2026Q1 ~-4~-4.5 | Delivery loss ~5.5 billion ÷ 1.27 billion orders |
| Dingdong Maicai (1P front warehouse, 2026Q3) | Revenue 62.2 / GMV ~70 | ~15-16 (fulfillment expense ratio ~24-25%) | Marketing ~1.6 | Non-GAAP ~+2.6 | Gross margin ~29-30%, 16 consecutive profitable quarters |
| SF Intra-city (third-party) | Per-order revenue ~-11.8% YoY (revenue +14.7% vs. orders +30%+) | — | — | Net profit per order ~0.1-0.3 | 2026H1 adjusted net margin 2.27% |
Post-withdrawal subsidy levels (mid-2026, interval midpoints):
Retention (largely delivered): Taobao Instant Commerce's peak retention is about 40% (120 million → 48.25 million daily orders); Meituan's normalized order volume is back above pre-war levels; industry daily volume is up a net 30-50 million orders vs. pre-war; the mix is improving—non-tea-beverage orders at Taobao Instant Commerce exceed 75%, and actual-paid AOV rose double digits QoQ. Monetization (zero evidence): Meituan's 2026Q1 merchant services revenue under the new methodology (ads + commissions) was RMB 35.6 billion, up only +0.2% YoY; Alibaba's CMR in the June 2026 quarter was -7% as reported and only +1% on a comparable basis excluding the merchant support program. Current profit recovery is 100% from "spending less on subsidies"; merchant budget return has not yet occurred—if advertising monetization is still absent by 2027H1, the low valuation would not be a mispricing but a rational pricing of a "permanently lowered profit center."
Assuming steady-state per-order contribution of RMB 1.5 per order (itself an optimistic assumption—Meituan's long-term UE guidance is only RMB 1 per order):
| Retention Tier | Static Payback Period | After Deducting 50% Substitutive Volume |
|---|---|---|
| 50% (60 million daily orders) | ~2.7 years | ~5.5 years |
| 40% (48.25 million daily orders, current) | ~3.4 years | ~6.9 years |
| 30% (36 million daily orders) | ~4.6 years | ~9.1 years |
Of the ~RMB 90 billion invested, assuming 40-60% substitutive order volume (captured from Meituan rather than incremental), about RMB 36-54 billion is effectively "defensive attrition spend" rather than a "user asset purchase." Conclusion: Taobao Instant Commerce is currently LTV<CAC; the subsidy-period ledger is not balanced; "the second pole's position is established" is a conditional proposition—conditional on retention ≥40% sustained for two-plus quarters and comparable-basis CMR recovering above +3%. Meituan's defensive subsidies (RMB 59.3 billion profit swing) preserved share and normalized order volume; the option value exceeds the cash-flow loss.
Social security cost sensitivity (erosion of the RMB 1/order UE guidance): RMB 0.1 tier -10% (current flexible employment subsidy basis), RMB 0.5 tier -50% (nationwide occupational injury insurance + pension coverage expansion), RMB 2.2 tier directly breaks through (full-time five-insurance basis, tail scenario).
Basis note: On a GTV basis (Analysys, 2025Q4), Taobao Shangou 45.2% vs Meituan 45.0% — conclusions differ significantly between order-based and transaction-value-based measures (Taobao Shangou has low average order value); citations must specify the basis. Pre-war, Meituan held 75-80% exclusively (Goldman Sachs); after the war, the industry shifted from single dominance to a duopoly standoff + JD as the third pole (6-7% and shrinking), CR3 ≈ 100%, Douyin hourly delivery at about 1.5% with no advantage.
The main battleground in 2026 shifted from subsidies to assets: Dada privatized and merged into JD (USD 520 million); Meituan acquired Dingdong's China business for USD 717 million (approx. RMB 4.98 billion, announced February 2026); Alibaba/JD/Meituan bidding for Pupu (asking price USD 2-5 billion); Hema NB/Xiaoxiang/Sam's Club cloud warehouse arms race — front warehouses and flash warehouses have become the focal point of contesting the new profit pool, with the presence of independent third-party fulfillment being squeezed out by platform vertical integration.
① Local supply network density (50,000+ flash warehouses, coverage of 2,800 counties and cities) — density means speed, speed means conversion; ② scale effects of rider network + dispatch algorithms (million-level riders, real-time matching); ③ two-sided network effects + high-frequency beating low-frequency user habit lock-in; ④ membership ecosystem (88VIP connecting e-commerce and Shangou, Shen membership binding high-frequency food delivery); ⑤ capital barrier (RMB 150 billion annual threshold); ⑥ regulatory barriers (subsidy red lines + qualification checks + social security compliance) systematically lock out latecomers. Douyin and Pinduoduo can bypass food delivery (content/low price + next-day delivery), but cannot bypass the fulfillment density of 30-minute delivery.
Current: Meituan's local commerce take-end is the only large-scale profit pool (2024 RMB 52.4 billion → 2025 -RMB 6.95 billion → under repair in 2026; long-term food delivery UE guidance of RMB 1/order); membership retail price spread (Sam's Club per-store annual sales over RMB 2.2 billion, Dingdong net margin approx. 1%) slightly positive; approx. RMB 150 billion in subsidies in 2025 was temporarily captured by consumers; third-party fulfillment net margin only 1-2.3%, mere porters. Migration direction (next 2-3 years): ① Profit flows back from consumers to platforms (UE discipline + subsidy regulation), but the post-recovery center will be below pre-war levels; ② the profit pool migrates from food delivery commissions to non-food merchandise price spread + advertising + membership fees (Taobao Shangou non-food order share 75%+, flash warehouse target of 100,000 stores, platforms competing to acquire front warehouse assets — merchandise gross margin approx. 29%, far thicker than delivery take); ③ yielders: merchants (advertising and commission clawback), independent third-party delivery, non-participating vertical players. Capturers: the duopoly players with a closed loop of "high-frequency traffic + dense fulfillment + advertising monetization."
| Player | Position/Share | Key Metrics | One-Line Take |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meituan-W (03690.HK) | Full chain of platform + fulfillment + self-operated; approx. 52% order share | 2025 revenue RMB 364.9 billion (+8.1%), net loss attributable to parent RMB 23.4 billion; 2026Q2 OPM back to 7.9%; PB 2.21 (0% 5-year percentile) | Defending its duopoly position at minimal cost; profit center permanently lowered but still the only large-scale profitable platform; Dingdong acquisition fills the self-operated gap |
| Alibaba-W (09988.HK) | Taobao Shangou + Ele.me + Fengniao + Hema; 41% orders / 45.2% GTV | FY2026 instant retail investment approx. RMB 90 billion (HSBC basis RMB 87 billion); CMR like-for-like +1%; PE(TTM) 21.4x (76% 3-year percentile) | Billions spent to buy the second pole; a profit bleeding point for the group until UE turns positive; the "e-commerce + instant retail" integration is its biggest strategic gamble |
| JD.com-SW (09618.HK) | Miaosong + Dada + JD Logistics; share 6-7% | 2025 new business loss RMB 46.6 billion, narrowed 33.4% in 2026Q2; PB 1.14 (6% 5-year percentile) | Defensively joined the war for a third-pole ticket; ROI questionable in the duopoly's squeeze; solid group cash flow and low valuation provide a buffer |
| Douyin (unlisted) | Hourly delivery <5%, focus on in-store | Lifestyle services GMV over RMB 850 billion (2025) | The threat lies in in-store services and user time, not delivery; an opportunist on the instant retail side |
| Dingdong Maicai (merged into Meituan) | Front warehouse leader | 2025 revenue RMB 24.36 billion, 16 consecutive quarters of Non-GAAP profit, gross margin 29.2% | Front warehouse UE proven first but ceiling constrained by traffic; sold to Meituan for RMB 4.98 billion |
| Dada (merged into JD) | Crowdsourced instant delivery + supermarket KA | 2024 revenue RMB 9.66 billion | A landmark case marking the end of the independent third-party era |
| SF Intra-city (09699.HK) | No.1 in neutral third-party order volume | 2025 revenue RMB 22.9 billion (+45.4%), net margin 1.21%; 2026H1 adjusted net margin 2.27%, per-order revenue -11.8%; PE(TTM) 12.7x (1% 3-year percentile) | A porter with rising volume and falling prices: order dividends are real but pricing power is absent; the low percentile is a structural discount for lacking pricing power |
| Shansong (FLX.US) | One-to-one dedicated direct delivery | 2025 revenue RMB 3.99 billion (-10.7%), net profit RMB 109 million (70% from investment income), loss in 2026Q2 | A niche player marginalized by the war; avoid |
Return quality: Pre-war "good" (Meituan food delivery RMB 50 billion+ profit pool) → 2025 "poor" (burning RMB 150 billion) → repaired to "medium" in 2026. Segments making real money: Meituan food delivery + in-store advertising (one of the highest-quality local cash flows in Chinese internet), membership warehouse retail (Sam's Club/Hema NB, merchandise price spread + membership fees), Dingdong-style front warehouses (thin margins but real). Boom illusions: Taobao Shangou's 45% share (bought with annual losses of approx. RMB 87-90 billion), JD food delivery (RMB 46.6 billion for 6-7%), independent third-party instant delivery (SF Intra-city growing revenue without profit, Shansong orders -10%). Demand-side volume (orders +25%, GMV near RMB 1 trillion) and return quality severely diverged in 2025; the convergence direction is clear from 2026 but incomplete.
Valuation position: SW Internet E-commerce Index PE 30.3x (26% percentile since 2014), PB 2.31x (45% percentile); individual stocks: Meituan PB 2.21 (0% 5-year percentile, historic low), JD PB 1.14 (6% 5-year percentile), SF Intra-city PE(TTM) 12.7 (1% 3-year percentile) — leaders collectively in historically low valuation zones; Alibaba PE(TTM) 21.4 (76% 3-year percentile) relatively expensive. Interpretation: the low percentile is the market pricing in a "permanently impaired profit pool," not an unconditional mispricing; the odds structure of "low valuation + profit inflection" holds precisely on the advertising handover materializing as described in Section 4.4.
2025-05-13 five ministries jointly summoned JD/Meituan/Ele.me → 2025-07-18 SAMR summoned separately → 2026-03 SAMR stationed investigators at platforms on-site + Beijing market regulator exposed platforms for infringements such as "altering merchant prices" and launched special governance of agency operations → 2026-06-17 "Ten Rules for Regulating Food Delivery Platform Subsidy Practices (Draft for Comment)" (prohibiting long-term large subsidies that exclude competition, selling below cost, restricting merchants from operating on multiple platforms; original text at MOFCOM policy library). At the central level, "rectifying involutionary competition" has been written into the 2025/2026 economic work deployments consecutively. Note: the Ten Rules are still a draft for comment with penalties undetermined; and regulation blocks "openly declared money-burning," not competition intensity itself.
Occupational injury protection nationwide in 2026 (over 37 million insured), Meituan pension subsidies rolled out nationwide, JD full-time five insurances and one fund — institutional estimates put Meituan's first-year increment at RMB 0.1-0.2/order, JD at approx. RMB 3.6 billion annualized; "algorithm moderation" and the Qinglang algorithm special campaign constrain order-dispatch efficiency exploitation. Direction is certain, magnitude is moderate, but the full-time basis is a tail risk (see Section 4.6 sensitivity).
Regulatory firepower is also aimed at the monetization side: SAMR publicly cautioned food delivery platforms in February 2026 that "you cannot only collect commissions without bearing responsibility"; Beijing's notification directly cited infringements of merchants' independent operational rights. If commission/advertising regulation substantively lands, a scenario shaving 0.2-0.5 percentage points off each leading platform's take rate would directly erode 1-3 percentage points off the OPM repair path in Section 4.6 — regulation for the industry is a combination of "limiting subsidy intensity while symmetrically constraining monetization," not a one-way boon to the leaders.
SAMR Order No. 123 (effective 2026-06-01) requires platforms to verify merchant qualifications with on-site checks, mandatory labeling for dine-in-free merchants, and transparent kitchens (gov.cn) — ghost kitchens cleared out, compliant merchants and platforms benefit, supply-side thresholds rise. Data and algorithm regulation is already routine, with no significant new costs. Geopolitical impact is weak: overseas labor regulation such as the EU Platform Work Directive mainly affects the overseas UE of going-global platforms (Meituan Keeta).
Neutral-to-positive, but symmetric: Subsidy red lines + compliance thresholds favor the incumbent duopoly and lock out money-burning new entrants (landscape solidification); meanwhile commission/responsibility regulation constrains the monetization ceiling and social security raises the cost floor — the net effect of "favoring the leaders" depends on the difference in enforcement intensity between the two blades.
| Scenario | Probability | Narrative | Key Numbers |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 30% | Alibaba restarts high-intensity subsidies or social security lands on a full-time basis: ceasefire breaks, back to war of attrition | Per-order subsidy rebounds to RMB 2-3; Meituan OPM falls back below 5%; Taobao Shangou UE breakeven delayed to FY2028 |
| Base | 55% | Ceasefire holds: retention stable at 40%, subsidies RMB 0.3-1/order, monetization slowly takes over | Meituan 2027 OPM 12-15% (10-13% if monetization absent); Taobao Shangou monthly UE breakeven in FY2027; GMV 2028E approx. RMB 1.26 trillion |
| Bull | 15% | High-AOV categories scale + ad load rises, monetization rate repairs faster than expected | Meituan end-2027 OPM 18-20%; Taobao Shangou segment EBITA positive within 2027; GMV converges toward the official path |
| Date/Window | Event | Directional Impact | Related Debate |
|---|---|---|---|
| Late Nov 2026 | Meituan 2026Q3 results (first test of peak-season OPM) | Positive/negative both ways | D2 |
| Late Nov 2026 | Alibaba September quarter results (Taobao Shangou loss reduction + CMR) | Positive/negative both ways | D1 |
| Dec 2026 | Central Economic Work Conference (anti-involution tone continues) | Slightly positive | D2 |
| 2026Q4-2027H1 | Pupu bidding outcome | Landscape variable | D1 |
| Jan-Feb 2027 | Meituan/JD 2026 annual reports + Alibaba FY2027Q3 (social security cost disclosure) | Cost disturbance | D2 |
| Within 2027 | Final version of the "Ten Subsidy Rules" (penalty strength) | Slightly positive (if strictly enforced) | D1/D2 |
| Within FY2027 (through Mar 2027) | Taobao Shangou monthly UE breakeven validation (Jiang Fan guidance) | Key validation point for industry-wide competition intensity | D1 |
| Apr-May 2027 | 2027Q1 earnings season (second retention validation) | Positive/negative both ways | D1/D2 |
| Mid-2027 | First interim report after nationwide occupational injury protection | Cost disturbance | D2 |
A bullish boom ≠ worth buying: the lower-right quadrant is this industry's value trap zone — Taobao Shangou's share boom (orders 2.7x the same period last year) is piled up with losses; before UE turns positive, every additional order deepens value destruction; SF Intra-city sits at the edge of the lower right (a porter with rising volume and falling prices, improving but lacking pricing power) — an odds-based watchlist name rather than a value trap itself; JD Delivery and Shansong sit in the lower left (boom down × poor returns), an avoid zone.
| Scenario | Relative Biggest Beneficiary | Relative Biggest Loser |
|---|---|---|
| Bear (30%): ceasefire breaks | Sam's Club cloud warehouse/Hema NB (self-operated models far from the subsidy war) | Meituan-W (defensive costs reignite, OPM<5%), JD (three-front attrition intensifies) |
| Base (55%): ceasefire holds | Meituan-W, SF Intra-city (odds of rising volume + margin repair) | Shansong (continued order loss), Alibaba (continued bleeding until Shangou turns positive) |
| Bull (15%): monetization takes over | Meituan-W (OPM 18-20%), Alibaba (Taobao Shangou breakeven + CMR recovery, double valuation boost) | Shansong |
① Reversible ceasefire: Alibaba's "absolute first place" goal + RMB 570 billion cash in hand — every 1 percentage point of Meituan OPM repair is an invitation to reignite the war; ② Absent advertising handover: if merchant budget return remains at zero, "low valuation" shifts from mispricing to correct pricing; ③ Social security full-timing: the RMB 2.2/order tail scenario breaks the entire industry's UE repair path; ④ The regulator's second blade: commission/advertising monetization substantively constrained, take rate shaved 0.2-0.5 percentage points; ⑤ Demand quality: if 2026 total orders decline more than expected YoY, the "structural growth" narrative must be rewritten.
Data and Basis Notes: Instant retail GMV uses the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation's non-food retail merchandise basis; order volume uses the CFLP instant delivery basis (including food & beverage); food delivery GTV of approx. RMB 1.5 trillion is an industry consensus estimate (to be verified); platform shares exist in three bases — orders/GTV/transaction value, each labeled in the text; Alibaba's instant retail investment of approx. RMB 90 billion is a media/investment bank estimate basis (HSBC: RMB 87 billion). Main sources: Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, CFLP, SAMR, Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, Meituan/Alibaba/JD/SF Intra-city/Dingdong/Shansong financial reports and earnings calls, Goldman Sachs/UBS/CICC/HSBC/Analysys/QuestMobile estimates.