Report date: November 12, 2026|Industry view: Divergence (severe disparity across the value chain)|Confidence level: Moderate (0.60)|Horizon: 12 months Research scope: Compute rental (intelligent computing centers/IDC), GPU cloud (public cloud GPU and independent GPU cloud), and telecom operators' intelligent computing businesses, with rack utilization rate, server utilization, and return on capital as the core observational variables. Chip design and manufacturing are outside the research boundary and discussed only as a supply constraint; this report is organized around a general value-chain framework, leading with competitive landscape and the profit pool. Where data depth is limited for specific tracks, caveats are flagged throughout the text.
This industry simultaneously exhibits "cards impossible to secure" and "roughly half of intelligent computing centers operating at a loss." On the demand side, inference token consumption is scaling at an annual rate of roughly 20x — Volcano Engine's daily tokens rose from 2 trillion at end-2024 to 63 trillion at end-2025, and surpassed 120 trillion in March 2026 (IDC, 2026 China AI Computing Power Development Assessment Report, as reported by People's Daily); IDC raised the 2025–2030 CAGR of China's intelligent computing scale from 46.2% to 50.3%, with 2026 projected at 2,576.5 EFLOPS (FP16, +87.9% YoY). On the supply side, China already has over 500 intelligent computing centers in operation and nearly 400 under construction or planned (National Data Administration); nominal intelligent computing capacity was approximately 2,592 EFLOPS by end-September 2026 (cited by Xinhua; official release pending verification), far exceeding beginning-of-year forecasts — nominal capacity is already oversupplied by roughly 12% (2026 nominal supply of ~2,892 vs. demand of 2,576.5 EFLOPS).
But prices only apply to "effective compute that passes the rack-utilization × server-utilization funnel": actual nationwide intelligent computing usage rate is about 36.8% (CAICT, 2025), nominal rack utilization about 71.4% (MIIT basis, end-June 2026, industry-cited, original source pending verification); the two combined imply an effective utilization of about 26.3%, cross-validated by Inspur AI Research Institute's independent estimate of "average compute utilization of roughly 30%" at intelligent computing centers — effective utilization of roughly 26%–30%, with over 2,100 EFLOPS of idle compute. The idle structure is highly asymmetric: high-end imported compute (NVIDIA-based) has occupancy above 90% with delivery queues extending to H1 2027; domestic mid-and-low-end compute has occupancy below 50%, and spot prices cover only about 58% of full cost (910B-class spot at ~CNY 4.3 per card-hour vs. ~CNY 7.4 full-investment breakeven price).
Hence the industry view is "divergence": what is diverging is not the cycle (aggregate demand is indeed growing rapidly), but returns. The bulk of the profit pool is captured by the chip segment (NVIDIA FY2027Q2 single-quarter net income of USD 59.7 billion, gross margin of 75.0%); within the domestic chain, real money accrues to leading AIDC operators with "scarce high-end facilities + large-client long-term contracts" (Runze Technology's mature parks have occupancy >90%, 9M26 operating cash flow of CNY 4.51 billion) and to operators' government-enterprise long-term contracts, while cross-sector compute lessors post net margins below 1% (Zhongbei Communications' 9M26 attributable net income of only CNY 0.18 billion, operating cash flow of -CNY 2.0 billion), and pure spot compute rental yields negative full-investment returns — an 8-card H800-class node at full occupancy takes ~13.6 years to recoup investment, while GPU accounting depreciation runs only 4 years and technology iteration cycles have shrunk to 12 months. The biggest single variable over the next 12 months is whether ~600,000 H200 units stranded in Hong Kong (FP16 equivalent of ~593 EFLOPS, about 13.7% of projected 2027 nominal supply) are released for import. Sector valuations already sit at historically elevated levels (SW Communications PB of 3.65x, ~78th percentile since 2014; IT services PE of 99.6x, ~81st percentile) — discerning return quality matters more than betting on aggregate demand.
Research objects: Infrastructure and cloud services using GPU/accelerator cards as compute carriers for AI training and inference, with three coexisting business models:
| Model | Content | Asset characteristics | Return characteristics |
|---|---|---|---|
| Facility rental (IDC/AIDC) | Racks, power, liquid cooling, operations, excludes GPUs | Asset-heavy, long-term wholesale contracts | EBITDA margin 45%–60%, infrastructure-like |
| Compute rental (with GPUs) | Full GPU server rentals, bare metal | Asset-heavy + technical depreciation | Widespread losses in spot mode; ~15% net margin in contract mode |
| GPU cloud/MaaS | Virtualized compute, token-based billing, orchestration platforms | Platform + operations | Head players improving profitability; most independent platforms trade negative gross margin for scale |
Value-chain map in one line: Chips (NVIDIA/Huawei Ascend/Cambricon, etc.) → Intelligent computing centers (operators/third-party IDC/local state-owned platform facilities and power) → Compute services layer (public cloud GPU/independent GPU cloud/compute orchestration platforms) → End users (major internet companies/LLM companies/government-enterprise and SOEs/developers). Telecom operators (China Mobile/China Telecom/China Unicom) straddle a triple identity — "landlord + cloud + government-enterprise channel" — making them the industry's most distinctive players.
IDC and Inspur Information's annual assessment published in September 2026 states: China's intelligent computing scale in 2026 at 2,576.5 EFLOPS (FP16, +87.9%), AI compute market size of USD 51.5 billion (+37%); 2030 at 10,524.3 EFLOPS and USD 150.1 billion; 2025–2030 CAGR of 50.3% (up from 46.2% in the prior edition). The demand engine has shifted from "one-time training procurement" to "inference × agents, continuous consumption": per NDRC, inference workloads now account for roughly 60% of compute load; IDC projects China's token consumption in 2026 at ~4 jing (40,000 trillion) tokens, roughly 20x 2025; active agents globally will grow from ~79.4 million in 2026 to ~2.216 billion by 2030 (CAGR ~129.8%). The inflection-point judgment is quantified: all three links have hard numbers — the driving trajectory (tokens 20x per year) × per-task usage (agents' multi-step tasks raise single-task token consumption by 1–2 orders of magnitude) × penetration ramp (85.8% of enterprises have just formed hybrid architectures; intelligent computing share still below 50% for the next two years).
A conversion constraint that must be stated explicitly: the token-to-card conversion density keeps declining — market estimates suggest end-2025 daily tokens of 60 trillion require ~550,000–600,000 cards, while 2026's 500–600 trillion tokens require ~3.3–3.5 million cards, i.e., tokens ×10 correspond to cards ×6 (inference optimization and MoE architectures dilute per-unit compute). The token explosion is a genuine demand amplifier, but linearly extrapolating "token multiple = compute multiple" will systematically overestimate demand.
The bottom-up 2027E estimate is ~2,741 EFLOPS (1,371+1,370, with line items balanced), about 11.5% below the top-down 3,098 EFLOPS interpolated from the IDC curve — cross-validation passes (marginally). Demand-basis sensitivity is the key to the 2027 balance judgment: extrapolating directly from the 2026 figure at IDC's 50.3% CAGR yields ~3,872 EFLOPS of 2027 demand — a gap of ~774 EFLOPS between the two bases, which directly determines whether 2027 nominal oversupply is +12% or +40% (see I4).
First, sustainability of major tech capex: Tencent's Q2 free cash flow turned negative and Alibaba's operating profit fell -57%; domestically there is no OpenAI-scale trillion-level contract underpinning — if profit constraints force capex deceleration in 2027, spot rental prices and willingness to rack domestic GPUs will be hit first. Second, lagging monetization conversion: IDC surveys show enterprise bottlenecks have shifted from "compute shortage" to "putting AI into business operations"; if agent monetization disappoints, both token growth and the compute CAGR will be revised down.
As of June 2026: over 500 intelligent computing centers in operation nationwide (National Data Administration), 15.56 million standard racks in use (CAICT basis; MIIT's other basis is 13.73 million racks — both figures coexist, pending verification), and 2,185 EFLOPS (FP16) of intelligent compute in use; Xinhua reported 2,592 EFLOPS by end-September 2026 (+146% YoY, official release pending verification). In the first 7 months of 2026, 158 data center projects of CNY 100 million-plus were awarded, totaling over CNY 113 billion (36Kr tally). Major pipelines: China Mobile's AIDC total signed capacity exceeds 7GW (its Hohhot 6.7 EFLOPS single facility is already in operation); GDS' GW-class Ulanqab campus plus 3GW nationwide pipeline; Runze Technology has delivered 750MW cumulative plus 500MW new; SenseTime joined nearly 20 partners to launch 5 ten-thousand-GPU-class domestic clusters; Shaoguan's 11,520-GPU cluster came online in July 2026.
The funnel: nameplate compute × rack utilization (~71.4%) × compute-usage share (~36.8%) ≈ effective compute of 26.3%; Inspur AI Research Institute's independent estimate puts average compute utilization at ~30%. Taking the range of the two methods, effective utilization is roughly 26%–30% — over 2,100 EFLOPS of "nominal capacity" nationwide lacks market-based pricing power. Direct tiered measurement says more than averages:
| Entity type | Market share | Rack/server utilization | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Telecom operators | 28% | Ten-thousand-GPU centers generally 70%+ rack utilization; server utilization ranges 25%–40% | Profitable overall |
| Public cloud providers | 25% | High-end clusters "virtually not a single idle GPU" (Alibaba Cloud) | Approaching breakeven |
| Compute service providers | 22% | Highly polarized | Head players profitable on contracts; tail losing money |
| Local state-owned platforms | ~25% | Thousand-GPU-class projects at 25%–45% utilization | Idle, structurally loss-making |
| Cross-sector lessors | Long tail | Typical case rack utilization <50%, racked-machine utilization <30% | Being cleared out |
We estimate roughly 250–350 intelligent computing centers nationwide are losing money (cash-basis breakeven rack utilization line ~40%). Regional mismatch is equally sharp: Eastern China holds 55.9% of supply but 74% of demand; the West holds 32.6% of supply against 12% of demand, and Western compute beyond the >5ms latency ring struggles to take on inference workloads. Compare North America: data center vacancy of only ~1%, with 95% of capacity under construction pre-leased — China's "oversupply" is a structural and institutional problem, not a falsification of aggregate demand.
China shipped ~1.99 million data center AI chips in 2026H1 (IDC): NVIDIA 34% (678,000 units, -44%), Huawei Ascend 28% (572,000 units), T-Head 7%, Cambricon 5%, Kunlunxin 4%, Hygon 3%; non-GPU accelerator shipments of 1.016 million units (+80%) exceeded GPUs (991,000 units) for the first time. Three key facts: ① ~600,000 NVIDIA H200 units are stranded in Hong Kong awaiting Chinese import approval (Reuters, November 2026, cross-referenced via syndicated pages), nearly 90% of NVIDIA's China shipments in 2026H1 stuck at the border; ② NVIDIA's saleable ceiling for China = H200 (US case-by-case licenses + 25% revenue share + a whitelist of ~10 companies, first deliveries August 2026), but the actual chokepoint has shifted from US licensing to Chinese approval — NVIDIA has guided for multiple consecutive quarters on "China data center compute revenue near zero," with China's revenue share down from a peak of ~13% to ~9% (FY2026 10-K basis, third-party compilation); ③ Huawei's Ascend 2026 910C production plan is only ~600,000 units (Bloomberg), constrained by SMIC 7nm yield and HBM bottlenecks — "what constrains Ascend is not demand but supply capability" (Eric Xu). Morgan Stanley projects China's AI chip self-sufficiency at 35% in 2025 → 45% in 2026 → 68% in 2027 → 95% in 2030. GPU server delivery lead times have stretched to 12–15 months — supply elasticity is choked by chips, not facilities.
Taking a self-built 8-card H800-class node (2024 purchase price ~CNY 2.5 million) as an example (Eastern power price CNY 0.65/kWh, PUE 1.3): full monthly cost is ~CNY 72,500, of which GPU depreciation accounts for 72%, facility O&M and network 20%, and electricity only 8% — power-price concessions cannot close the rent gap; depreciation is the dominant cost. From this we derive:
| Year | Demand (IDC basis) | Nominal supply | Nominal surplus | Effective supply (at 26.3%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | ≈725 | ≈725 | ≈0 (same-source installed basis) | ≈191 |
| 2025 | ≈1,371 | ≈1,371 | ≈0 | ≈361 |
| 2026E | 2,576.5 | ≈2,892 (2,592 + Q4 additions) | +315.5 (+12.3%) | ≈761 |
| 2027E | 3,098 (top-down)/2,741 (bottom-up) | ≈4,338 (assumed +50% growth) | +1,240 (+40.0%)/+1,597 | ≈1,141 |
Basis sensitivity must be given prominence: if 2027 demand is extrapolated directly at IDC's 50.3% CAGR, it reaches ~3,872 EFLOPS and the nominal surplus narrows to ~+12.0%; using the top-down interpolated 3,098 EFLOPS, it is +40.0%. This report presents a range of "roughly +12% to +40%" and does not adopt a single number — the direction of oversupply is certain, but the magnitude depends heavily on the demand basis; furthermore, the 2026 supply of 2,892 and 2027 supply of 4,338 are both estimated projections. The real pricing fact lies not in the nominal table but at the effective layer:
Pricing framework: cash cost floor of RMB 1.7/card-hour < spot < incentive price cap of RMB 12.4 (H800-class) / 7.4 (910B-class); the two-track supply-demand direction sets the slope, and effective utilization positions (overall ~26%-30% vs. 90%+ at the high end) maintain a 2-3x price spread between the two tracks. Baseline scenario = Beijing approval controls maintained, slow case-by-case release of stranded cards, demand growth of +40%-50% realized:
| Time Point | H800-class (RMB/card-hour) | 910B-class (RMB/card-hour) | Logic |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026Q4 | 6.5 (6.3-6.8) | 4.2 | Stranded cards not released + training peak season; high-end fully leased, continued rise then stabilization |
| 2027Q1 | 6.4 | 4.1 | Rising release expectations weigh on far months; spot stays firm |
| 2027Q2 | 6.2 | 4.0 | Case-by-case releases + domestic 10,000-card clusters coming online; gradual decline |
| 2027Q3 | 6.1 | 3.9 | New full-investment additions stall under incentive price constraints; volatility converges |
| 2027Q4 | 6.0 | 3.8 | High-level gradual decline of ~-8%; domestic track -10% (inference demand preferentially supported by domestic chips) |
Three-tier range: Bear (release wave + demand stall) H800-class RMB 3.5-4.5, 910B-class RMB 2.2-3.0; Baseline RMB 5.8-6.5 / 3.8-4.2; Bull (continued non-release + demand above expectations) RMB 7.5-9.0 / 5.0-6.0. Switch that triggers a scenario change: customs release documents or any major customer's H200 procurement exceeding 100,000 units → immediately switch to the bear path.
The computing services market is split four ways by operator type (CAICT 2025 classification): telecom operators 28%, public cloud vendors 25%, local state-owned platforms ~25%, computing service providers 22% (sums to 100%). The AI cloud market is more concentrated: 2025H1 Alibaba Cloud 35.8% + Volcengine 14.8% + Huawei Cloud 13.1%, CR3 ~63.7% (IDC; AI cloud = AI IaaS + MaaS, measured by vendor revenue; this is a different statistical basis from the four-way split of the computing services market by operator type above and not directly comparable); in the GenAI IaaS sub-segment, Alibaba Cloud ranked first again in 2025H2 with 30.3%; Volcengine accounted for ~49.2% of China's MaaS public cloud by token call volume (2025H1). In the IDC data center market (excluding computing services), operators accounted for ~48% combined (2022 CAICT basis), with the third-party segment internally consolidating toward leaders such as GDS/VNET/Runze Technology. The competitive focus has shifted from "who has GPUs" (resource moats) to "10,000-card interconnection, inference optimization, and mixed-workload scheduling" (engineering moats).
Profit pool estimate (representative margin per segment × revenue pool; not an authoritative statistic): The chip segment captures 60%-70% of total chain profits — NVIDIA's FY2027Q2 single-quarter revenue of USD 96.2 billion (data center USD 89.0 billion), net income USD 59.7 billion, gross margin 75.0%; cloud vendors' AI services ~15%-20% (China AI IaaS revenue pool of RMB 48.67 billion × adjusted EBITDA margin 30%-40%, annual profit pool of ~RMB 15-19 billion, estimated); IDC data centers ~10%-15%; independent GPU clouds and cross-over lessors combined less than 10% (independent GPU clouds are negative on a net profit basis).
CoreWeave is the mirror of the global independent GPU cloud economics: 3Q26 revenue USD 3.661 billion (+168%), adjusted EBITDA margin 62% (highest in five quarters), but GAAP operating profit only USD 207 million (5.7% margin) and net loss USD 709 million — D&A at 51.6% of revenue and net interest at 23.1% consume the entire EBITDA; leverage ratio 93.5%, single-quarter capex USD 14.5 billion. This is not an unprofitable business but a highly leveraged growth machine where "profit is deferred into depreciation and interest"; its USD 132.5 billion backlog (39% with terms over 48 months) shows that long-term contract lock-in is the true volatility-resistant moat — precisely what Chinese peers lack most. Chinese samples are harsher: cross-over lessor Zhongbei Communications' 9M26 net margin ~0.8%, operating cash flow -RMB 200 million; Hongbo Co.'s 2026H1 computing revenue -91%, swinging to a loss of RMB 51.48 million; token platform SiliconFlow's 2025 revenue +653% but blended gross margin -24%.
Direction of profit migration (next 2-3 years): From "selling GPUs + raw compute" toward both ends — ① on the demand side, from training to inference, with the pricing anchor shifting from resources to business outcomes; leading cloud vendors (Alibaba/ByteDance/Baidu) with inference optimization and scheduling engineering capture incremental profits; ② on the supply side, high-end AIDC facilities (high power + liquid cooling + core locations) retain scarcity premiums, while local intelligent computing centers clear out on oversupply. The pure-arbitrage "second landlord" segment's profit pool will keep shrinking toward zero.
Extremely weak vs. upstream chipmakers: NVIDIA sets quotas, demands prepayments, and even binds major customers with repurchase commitments (CoreWeave was required to take on up to USD 6.3 billion of capacity); the rise of domestic chipmakers (Ascend/Cambricon) is the only variable that could improve lessors' bargaining power. Polarized vs. downstream: hyperscale customers (OpenAI/Meta/Microsoft; domestically Alibaba/ByteDance/operators) self-build and squeeze prices on long contracts with overwhelming bargaining power — big-tech self-builds (Alibaba's RMB 380 billion over three years) are the most direct substitution threat to independent computing service providers; the long tail compares prices across platforms, with fierce price wars. In 2026, the data center segment's bargaining power vs. large customers improved phase-wise due to high-end AIDC scarcity (industry-wide price hikes), but low-end data centers are already oversupplied.
Return quality tiers: Chip segment = good (true ROIC); AIDC facilities = upper-middle (solid EBITDA margins of 45%-60%, but ROE generally single-digit, heavy assets + interest erosion; return realization depends on utilization rates); independent GPU cloud/cross-over leasing = poor (EBITDA illusion alongside net margins <1%); token platforms = poor (negative gross margins in exchange for scale).
| Company | Segment Positioning | Revenue & Growth | Profit Quality | One-line Read |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Runze Technology 300442 | Third-party wholesale AIDC | 9M26 revenue RMB 5.666 billion (+42.5%) | Gross margin 46.3%, non-recurring +33.0%, ROE 12.8% (highest in sector), operating cash flow RMB 4.51 billion (79.6% of revenue); net profit attributable -61.7% due to one-off gains base in 2025; Q3 non-recurring growth slowed to ~24.9%, watch FCF | One of the few in the chain growing revenue and profit; highest-quality A-share name |
| GDS | Third-party IDC/AIDC leader | 2025 revenue RMB 11.432 billion (+10.8%) | Adjusted EBITDA margin 45.5%; GAAP net profit eroded by interest and one-off items | Most solid EBITDA, but single-digit revenue growth shows traditional wholesale is peaking; all upside bets on AIDC |
| China Mobile 600941 | Operator intelligent computing | 2025 intelligent computing 92.5 EFLOPS, 1.5 million+ external IDC racks; 2026 computing investment RMB 37.8 billion (+62.4%) | 2026H1 net profit attributable RMB 78.9 billion (-6.3%), government-enterprise long contracts + domestic procurement dividend | Computing national team: steady growth, mediocre ROIC; exerts "floor supply" pressure on third parties |
| VNET | Campus-type AIDC ramp-up | 2025 revenue RMB 9.949 billion (+20.5%), campus-type Q1'26 +58.1% | EBITDA margin 33.1%, leverage ratio 79.8% (highest in sector), still GAAP loss | Betting on AIDC ramp with 80% leverage; interest is the biggest enemy |
| Aofei Data 300738 | Third-party IDC expansion | 9M26 revenue RMB 2.281 billion (+25.1%) | Gross margin 33.5%, net profit attributable +54.5% but Q3 single quarter -51.2%, ROE 5.5% | Land-grab phase: growing revenue and profit but ROE below 6%; validation at the 2027 depreciation peak |
| Sinnet Data 603881 | Wholesale IDC tied to Alibaba | 9M26 revenue RMB 1.212 billion (-2.3%) | Gross margin 28.8% (-10pct), ROE 3.6% | Two years of AI boom with zero revenue growth — being tied to a big customer ≠ winning AI orders |
| GDS Hilvision... 光环新网 300383 | Beijing IDC + hybrid business | 9M26 revenue RMB 5.077 billion (-7.3%) | 2025 swung from profit to a loss of RMB 759 million, ROE 0.5% | Holds scarce resources but slow to transform; avoid within the sector |
| Zhongbei Communications 603220 | Cross-over computing rental | 9M26 revenue RMB 2.248 billion (-3.0%) | Net margin 0.8%, operating cash flow -RMB 200 million | The standard ending for cross-over "second landlords": no pricing power, squeezed from both sides |
| CoreWeave CRWV | World's largest independent GPU cloud | 3Q26 revenue USD 3.661 billion (+168%) | Adjusted EBITDA margin 62% vs. GAAP net loss -19%, leverage ratio 93.5% | Growth machine + leverage machine; its debt chain is the most sensitive risk gauge for the global intelligent computing boom |
Shenwan has no standalone IDC/cloud computing index; proxy observations: Shenwan Communications (801770) PE 30.37x (~15th percentile since July 2014), PB 3.65x (~78th percentile, median 2.76); Shenwan IT Services II PE 99.63x (~81st percentile), PB 3.04x (~39th percentile) (2026-11-12). The "high PB percentile + low PE percentile" combination implies: heavy-asset depreciation suppresses reported profits, and the market has already priced AIDC on asset value and 2027-28 high growth — the sector boom conclusion must be reconciled with valuation: industry upcycle (with divergence) × 78-81 percentile valuation leaves little room for error; returns depend more on individual stocks' utilization rates and cash flow realization than on sector beta.
US control timeline (anchored on primary documents): October 2022 A100/H100 license controls → October 2023 "performance density" rules blocking down-spec cards → December 2024 HBM controls and expanded FDPR → April 2025 H20 suspension (NVIDIA charge of ~USD 4.5-5.5 billion) → July resumption → November 2025 White House explicitly barred B30A/Blackwell from China → December 8, 2025 announced H200 saleable (US government takes 25% cut), January 13, 2026 BIS implemented case-by-case review licenses → May 2026 approved 10 Chinese buyers, August first shipments arrived. As of now (November 2026), the actual bottleneck has shifted from US licensing to Chinese approval: Beijing has tightened imports since January 2026, with ~600,000 H200 units stranded in port; NVIDIA has consistently guided on "China data center compute revenue near zero."
China's policy stack (demand backstop + supply replacement): 2023 Action Plan for High-Quality Development of Computing Infrastructure (300 EFLOPS target by 2025) → East-Data-West-Computing (hubs account for 60%+ of new national capacity, new PUE ≤1.25, green power >80%) → May 2025 MIIT Computing Interconnection Action Plan (built by 2026, nationwide standardized interconnection of public computing by 2028 — the institutional foundation for grid-connected circulation of idle compute) → August 2025 State Council "AI+" action opinion → October 2025 Fourth Plenary "15th Five-Year Plan" recommendations explicitly "strengthen efficient supply of computing, algorithms, and data"; March 2026 outline requires computing to be "coordinated in layout, orderly in construction, scaled, intensive, green, and inclusive"; "compute-power coordination" enters the 2026 Government Work Report for the first time. Three hard levers of localization: from November 2025, state-funded intelligent computing centers guided to use only domestic AI chips (Reuters); Cyberspace Administration window guidance for leading platforms to pause NVIDIA purchases; operator procurement domestication rate already at 67.5% (Telecom 2024-25 server procurement) - 70% (Mobile CANN ecosystem by value).
Net directional judgment: top-level policy backstop on demand (clearly bullish) + "dual-track supply replacement" (structural reshaping). Policy is simultaneously doing "demand addition" and "supply replacement": operators/state cloud (with domestic chip procurement, hub green power, government-enterprise channels) are policy winners; import-dependent third-party GPU clouds sit on the double edge — existing cards enjoy scarcity premiums (card prices ~3x a year ago), but the near-closed new-card channel means a growth ceiling; the most certain beneficiaries are the domestic chip and full-system ecosystem (Huawei chain), followed by computing operators able to absorb domestic cards.
D1: Whether the 600,000 stranded H200 units are released (largest single variable) Bulls: Beijing's approval controls persist (no bulk releases since January 2026), keeping the high-end track tight and rents firm through 2027, expanding repricing gains for existing card holders. Bears: under industrial demand and diplomatic pressure, customs clearance (593 EFLOPS-equivalent ≈ 13.7% of 2027 nominal supply), plus domestic card ramp, creates simultaneous oversupply on both tracks with price wars burning into the high end. Tracking indicators: customs clearance and whitelist expansion developments; whether any of ByteDance/Alibaba/Tencent lands H200 purchases exceeding 100,000 units.
D2: Demand slope vs. capex sustainability Bulls: tokens growing 20x annually, IDC CAGR of 50.3% realized (2027 demand ~3,872 EFLOPS, nominal oversupply only ~+12%, absorbed by demand). Bears: big-tech earnings pressure (Tencent FCF turning negative, Alibaba operating profit -57%) triggers 2027 capex cuts; demand growth falls below 40%, oversupply worsens, and spot rents and domestic card utilization come under pressure before long contracts. Tracking indicators: Volcengine daily token consumption, Alibaba/Tencent quarterly capex, direction of IDC annual report revisions to 2027 forecasts.
D3: Real vs. fake returns — utilization rates, cash flow, and the depreciation peak as falsification tests Bulls: leading AIDC long-contract models have real cash flow (Runze operating cash flow RMB 4.51 billion, utilization >90%); 2026-27 is the period when China's AI IaaS profit pool expands from RMB 15-19 billion. Bears: the industry-wide depreciation peak + interest peak has not topped; Runze's Q3 non-recurring growth has already slowed, capex may consume FCF; cross-over leasing clear-out is just beginning; a CoreWeave-style high-leverage refinancing failure would transmit through the global AI infrastructure chain. Tracking indicators: Runze/GDS FCF measured as "operating cash flow minus capex"; whether 910B spot falls below RMB 3/card-hour; progress of Zhongbei/Hongbo exits.
| Scenario | Probability | Narrative | Price & Sector Implications |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 0.30 | Bulk release of stranded H200 (>300,000 cleared) + big-tech capex stall, simultaneous oversupply on both tracks | H800-class falls to RMB 3.5-4.5, 910B-class to RMB 2.2-3.0; cross-over players and low-utilization state centers clear out faster; high-valuation Davis double-kill for the sector |
| Baseline | 0.45 | Beijing maintains approval controls, slow case-by-case releases, demand +40%-50% realized | High-end track tight, rents drift lower from highs (H800-class RMB 6.5→6.0); leading AIDC long-contract models earn steadily, spot models keep bleeding, domestic track utilization slowly recovers |
| Bull | 0.25 | Continued non-release + Agent demand above expectations + Ascend capacity falling short of plan | High-end rents rise toward RMB 7.5-9.0 (85% of incentive price); existing low-cost cards gain repricing returns; leading AIDC and high-end domestic ecosystem see volume and price both rise |
| Time | Event | Directional Impact | Related Debate |
|---|---|---|---|
| Late November 2026 | Alibaba FY27Q2, Tencent Q3 earnings (capex guidance) | Capex slowdown → D2 balance tips to bears | D2 |
| December 2026 | Central Economic Work Conference; CoreWeave Q4 earnings | Policy tone-setting; overseas high-leverage chain risk signal | D2/D3 |
| 2026Q4-2027H1 | Stranded H200 clearance and whitelist developments (continuous tracking) | Release >300,000 units → switch to bear scenario | D1 |
| January 2027 | IDC × Inspur annual computing assessment report | Resolution of the 2027 EFLOPS basis debate | D2 |
| March 2027 | Two Sessions: compute-power coordination and 15th Five-Year computing targets | Strength of policy backstop | D2 |
| 2027Q1 | H200/H100 delivery schedule expiration points | Non-release → high-end price hikes realized (bull catalyst) | D1 |
| 2027Q2 | Shaoguan/Telecom 10,000-card domestic clusters fully online | Domestic track supply stress test | D1/D3 |
| April 2027 | A-share AIDC annual + Q1 reports (depreciation and FCF validation) | Return quality falsified or confirmed | D3 |
| 2027H1 | 910B spot price and domestic track utilization | Below RMB 3 → deepening oversupply | D3 |
| August 2027 | Interim reporting season: cross-over leasing clear-out progress | Rental segment confirmed as value trap | D3 |
Upper right (core allocation): Runze Technology (high quality + prosperity materializing), GDS (solid EBITDA + domestic AIDC ramping), China Mobile (stable government-enterprise long-term contracts + domestication dividend, low elasticity). Middle right (improvement watch): VNET and Aofei Data — genuine prosperity but returns diluted by leverage and depreciation. Lower right (value trap zone, caution): CoreWeave (revenue +168% but GAAP loss, 93.5% debt ratio), SiliconFlow-like Token platforms (negative gross margin in exchange for scale), Zhongbei Telecom-type cross-border leasing (no pricing power over GPU supply, net margin 0.8%) — "prosperity up ≠ worth buying" is most fully embodied in these three positions: demand is real, but the money doesn't accrue to them. Lower left (avoid): Sinnet Technology (transformation lag, already loss-making), Sinnet Data (AI orders not landed, zero revenue growth, prosperity not yet materializing for itself).
Beneficiaries (base case):
Names to avoid: Zhongbei Telecom/Hongbo shares (the cross-border "sub-landlord" model has been disproven by two years of financial data), Sinnet Technology (declining revenue and profit), Sinnet Data (tied to major clients but no AI orders; watch conversion of Alibaba capex), and all "no long-term contracts, no GPU supply, spot-based" compute leasing and negative-gross-margin Token platform names.
Scenario × Name Quick Reference:
| Scenario | Biggest Winners | Biggest Losers |
|---|---|---|
| Bear (approval wave + capex stall) | Cash is king: China Mobile (long-term contracts + SOE funding costs, least hurt) | VNET (high leverage), Zhongbei/Hongbo (washed out), CoreWeave (refinancing chain) |
| Base (approval control + demand materialization) | Runze Technology, GDS | Zhongbei Telecom, Sinnet Technology, pure spot lessors |
| Bull (no approvals + demand beats expectations) | Runze Technology (repricing of legacy low-cost GPUs + data center double boost), holders of legacy imported GPUs | New entrants with no GPUs to buy, hyperscalers forced to lease externally at high prices |
Key Risks: ① Abrupt policy shifts on either the US or China side (approval/embargo/"Remote Access Security Act"-type legislation extending controls to overseas compute leasing); ② Cyclical capex pullback by hyperscalers transmitting to spot rental rates and domestic GPU deployment; ③ GPU generational acceleration (12-month iteration cycles) causing impairment of legacy assets beyond expectations; ④ Chain-reaction transmission from refinancing difficulties of high-leverage players (VNET/CoreWeave model); ⑤ Several key data points in this report are industry-cited or estimated parameters (71.4% utilization pending verification against original source, dual-track breakdown is an estimate, 2027 supply is a projection) — each is flagged; please defer to disclosures by listed companies and official primary sources.
Key Data Sources: IDC × Inspur "2026 China AI Computing Power Development Assessment Report" (People's Daily coverage); CAICT/Yicai·Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences intelligent computing center survey; NVIDIA FY2027Q2 earnings; CoreWeave 3Q26 earnings presentation; Reuters (domestic chip requirement for state-funded intelligent computing centers, H200 port delays, reposted pages used for cross-reference only); US Commerce Department BIS January 13, 2026 license review policy revision; MIIT "Computing Power Interconnection Action Plan"; SemiAnalysis H100 rental contract index; Silicon Data GPU spot index; Runze Technology 2026 Q3 report; company filings and exchange disclosures.