Rating: Cautiously Bullish | Target Price: RMB 4.7–5.2 (base-case fair value range) | Current Price: RMB 4.62 (close on 2026-10-27) | Margin of Safety: +2% (vs. lower bound of base-case fair value) | Time Horizon: 6–12 months
CGN Power is the largest of China's two nuclear power duopolists, with 31 nuclear units in operation and 19 under construction (under-construction capacity equals approx. 62% of operating capacity), accounting for approx. 44% of China's total nuclear capacity (operating + under construction) and approx. 52% of grid-connected generation. The 2026 Q3 report confirmed the earnings inflection point: net profit attributable to the parent for the first three quarters was RMB 9.603 billion (+12.75%), with Q3 alone up +36.08%, driven by the commissioning of three new units — Huizhou Units 1/2 and Cangnan Unit 1. Full-year net profit attributable to the parent is expected at RMB 10.7–11.2 billion (+10% to +15%). We believe the company's quality is excellent (license monopoly, utilization hours of 7,700+, annual operating cash flow of approx. RMB 30 billion, and the clearest growth pipeline from projects under construction among A-share utilities), but at the current price of RMB 4.62 the stock already sits at the 92–95% percentile of its own 5-year valuation range; the market has essentially priced in the 2027 consensus, with only thin valuation assigned to post-2027 capacity growth — measured against a zero-growth EPV of approx. RMB 4.29/share, the implied growth option is only about 7%. Base-case fair value is RMB 4.7–5.2 (approx. 19.5–21.6x FY2027E EPS), representing +2% to +13% versus the current price — judged as fairly valued, slightly cheap, not deeply undervalued. Key constraints: market-based power tariffs (65.9% of output) have yet to stabilize and await validation from Guangdong's 2027 annual long-term contract results in December 2026–January 2027; minority interests divert approx. 35% of net profit; FCF has turned negative alongside RMB 356.1 billion in interest-bearing debt. Cautiously bullish, with limited asymmetry in odds (+7.1% to base-case midpoint, -22.1% to bear-case midpoint).
Three units commenced commercial operation within the year — Huizhou Unit 1 (2026-04-19), Cangnan Unit 1 (2026-04-29), and Huizhou Unit 2 (2026-08-03) — bringing operating units to 31; net profit attributable to the parent for the first three quarters was RMB 9.603 billion, +12.75% YoY, with Q3 at RMB 3.498 billion, +36.08% YoY, and gross margin recovering to 43.54% (+3.01pp). Restated net profit attributable for 2025Q4 was only RMB 1.248 billion, and the three-year Q4 average is approx. RMB 1.04 billion (Q4 has structurally been the trough due to annual tariff settlements, refueling outages, and expense concentration). With 4 more refueling outages scheduled to start in Q4, full-year net profit attributable of RMB 10.7–11.2 billion implies a Q4 of RMB 1.1–1.6 billion — the lower bound approximates the historical average, the upper bound approximates 1.5x the historical average; Q3 growth should not be linearly extrapolated. Also note that approx. RMB 180 million of the 9M26 apparent increment came from non-recurring gains/losses (pre-consolidation net profit of Cangnan of RMB 419 million, fair-value difference on the second equity stake in Ningde of RMB 289 million, etc., totaling RMB 580 million).
Key evidence
Market tariff declines of approx. -8.8% in 2025 squeezed out an earnings trough (average grid tariff of RMB 0.3803/kWh, -8.6%); in 2026H1, market tariffs fell only -1.69% YoY, Guangdong's 2026 annual long-term contract settled at approx. RMB 372/MWh (touching the provincial annual trading price floor), 3Q26 Guangdong spot average price of RMB 389/MWh has already exceeded the long-term contract price, mechanism tariffs have been implemented ahead of schedule in Liaoning (Hongyanhe at RMB 0.3798/kWh with 80% of output covered by the mechanism) and Guangxi, and Fangchenggang's grid tariff rose +16.2% YoY in 2026H1. But tariff stabilization is not a fait accompli: the pass-through to net profit from assets covered by mechanism tariffs is limited (Hongyanhe is a 38.88%-owned associate; indirect ownership of Fangchenggang is approx. 36.6%); Guangdong/Fujian profit centers have no nuclear mechanism tariff, and Ningde units sell 100% of output into the market; Guangdong nuclear units actually operate under a government-authorized one-way contract-for-difference (anchored at an authorization price of approx. RMB 0.4153/kWh, covering approx. 90% of market-traded output, with ~85% of upside clawed back), which provides a floor but also caps upside gains, damping the marginal sensitivity of long-term contract outcomes to settlement prices in both directions. The base-case assumption (2027 blended tariff of -1% to 0%) needs validation from Guangdong's annual trading results in December 2026–January 2027.
Key evidence
Of the 19 units under construction, 12 have clear commissioning schedules (Lufeng Unit 5/Cangnan Unit 2 in 2027, Lufeng Unit 6 in 2028, Ningde Unit 5 in 2029, Ningde Unit 6/Lufeng Units 1–2/Huizhou Unit 3/Cangnan Unit 3 in 2030, Huizhou Unit 4/Zhaoyuan Unit 1 in 2031, Zhaoyuan Unit 2 in 2032), while 7 units including Taishan Units 3/4 (EPR) have no timetable yet. Measured against this report's zero-growth EPV of approx. RMB 4.29/share (7% cost of equity, normalized FCFE of approx. RMB 0.30/share), the current price implies a growth option of approx. 7%; at an 8% discount rate, EPV falls to RMB 3.75 and the option share rises to approx. 19% — the conclusion is discount-rate-sensitive, and the "growth is nearly free" characterization holds only under the low-discount-rate assumption. Each gigawatt-class unit requires approx. RMB 20 billion of investment, delivers approx. 9 billion kWh of grid-connected generation per year at full output, and contributes approx. RMB 400 million–1 billion/year of steady-state net profit attributable (depending on ownership of 46%–100%). If the 12-unit schedule is delivered and tariffs stabilize, post-2027 incremental earnings have room for repricing.
Key evidence
Of 9M26 net profit of RMB 14.854 billion, minority interests accounted for RMB 5.250 billion, or 35.3% — equivalent to 54.7% of net profit attributable to the parent. On an incremental basis, the minority share has fallen from approx. 68% in 2026H1 to approx. 46% for the first three quarters (the ramp-up at Huizhou Nuclear, 82%-owned, offset the leakage from 46%-owned Cangnan), but newly commissioned assets are precisely the batch with the highest minority ownership, so the conversion rate from "volume growth" to "attributable profit growth" is systematically low. Meanwhile, FCF has been persistently negative (RMB -4.09 billion in 2025; approx. RMB -11.16 billion in 9M26), interest-bearing debt stands at RMB 356.1 billion (short-term borrowings of RMB 60.05 billion, long-term borrowings of RMB 249.54 billion, etc.), debt-to-asset ratio is 68.07% (65.15% at the start of the year), capex on fixed asset construction reached RMB 37.72 billion in 9M26, and the capex peak is expected to extend through 2029–2030 — constraining upside in the payout ratio (44.5%); FY2025 DPS has already fallen from RMB 0.095 to RMB 0.086; if CGN's convertible bonds (outstanding balance RMB 4.899 billion, conversion price RMB 3.58) trigger forced redemption and fully convert, share count would be diluted by approx. 2.7%.
Key evidence
| Metric | FY2023 (as originally reported) | FY2024 (restated) | FY2025 | 2026Q1–Q3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (RMB 100M) | 825.49 | 789.45 | 756.97 | 510.98 (+3.98%) |
| Net profit attributable to parent (RMB 100M) | 107.25 | 108.38 | 97.65 | 96.03 (+12.75%) |
| Recurring net profit attributable (RMB 100M) | 105.51 (restated) | 107.37 | 91.13 | 90.23 (+11.10%) |
| Gross margin | 35.97% | 37.43% | 31.99% | 43.54% |
| Net margin attributable to parent | 13.0% | 13.7% | 12.9% | 18.8% |
| Operating cash flow (RMB 100M) | 331.20 | 375.06 | 299.71 | 265.67 (+19.0%) |
| Free cash flow (RMB 100M) | 188.74 (not comparable basis) | 55.73 | -40.86 | -111.56 |
| Cash and equivalents (RMB 100M) | — | — | 208.27 | 242.88 |
| Interest-bearing debt (RMB 100M) | — | — | 2,737.6 | 3,561.4 |
| Debt-to-asset ratio | 60.19% | 61.2% | 65.15% | 68.07% |
| Net debt/EBITDA | — | — | approx. 6.8x | — |
| Payout ratio (annual) | 44.26% | 44.26% | 44.47% | No interim dividend paid |
Note: FY2024 reflects restatement for a business combination under common control (originally disclosed revenue of RMB 86.804 billion); FY2023 was not restated accordingly, so cross-year comparisons should be stitched cautiously; the latest balance sheet date is 2026-09-30.
Reasons for metric changes (excerpted for YoY ≥ ±20%): ① FY2025 recurring net profit -15.13%, gross margin -5.44pp — the company attributed this to a rising share of market-traded electricity (56.2%, +5.3pp) combined with a market tariff decline of approx. -8.8% YoY, and Guangxi region revenue -19.23%; ② FY2025 operating cash flow -20.09% — no specific company explanation; at the statement level, inventory +RMB 2.08 billion and operating receivables +RMB 2.19 billion increased cash occupation; ③ FY2025 short-term borrowings +137.6% — the company explained this as "optimizing debt structure and lowering financing costs"; ④ FY2025 construction in progress +33.9% to RMB 113.931 billion — increased investment in nuclear projects under construction; ⑤ 9M26 selling expenses +884.62% (RMB 190 million, small base) — increased marketing expenses for market-based power trading; ⑥ 9M26 Taishan grid-connected generation -39.23% — total refueling outage time exceeded the prior-year period, and Taishan Unit 1 was temporarily shut down for maintenance from late April.
Revenue for the first three quarters was RMB 51.098 billion (+3.98%), net profit attributable to the parent RMB 9.603 billion (+12.75%), recurring profit RMB 9.023 billion (+11.10%); Q3 alone: revenue RMB 19.615 billion (approx. +17%), net profit attributable RMB 3.498 billion (+36.08%), quarterly gross margin 43.54%, +3.01pp YoY. Growth drivers decomposed: Volume — commissioning of Huizhou Units 1/2 and Cangnan Unit 1 contributed incremental generation (total grid-connected generation for the first three quarters of 176.749 billion kWh, +2.65%, of which subsidiary-basis +4.23%), offsetting the -39.23% Taishan outage drag; Price — new units operate at the approved tariff of RMB 0.4153/kWh (not yet in the market), structurally lifting the average tariff, while the decline in legacy market tariffs narrowed to approx. -1.7%; Timing — outage schedule was relatively heavy in H1 (total outage days +101 YoY), with some maintenance volume deferred to Q3, so Q3's strong growth includes a timing mismatch contribution — with 4 more outages scheduled to start in Q4, the sequential run-rate will decline. Compared with 2026H1 (net profit attributable +2.66%), Q3 lifted the cumulative growth rate from mid-single digits to double digits, meaning delivery of the volume-growth thesis exceeded expectations at the interim report stage; versus peer CNNP (net profit attributable -24.2% for the first three quarters, +3.8% in Q3), the company's pure nuclear structure and commissioning cadence show a clear relative advantage. Judging whether results "beat expectations" must be anchored to sell-side consensus: consensus FY2026E is approx. RMB 10.6 billion, and this quarter's reading supports a full-year outcome of RMB 10.7–11.2 billion, i.e., 1%–6% above consensus — a modest beat rather than a major upward revision; sell-side earnings revisions have been flat over the past 90 days, with no concentrated upward revisions yet.
Business model in brief: An asset-heavy, heavily regulated, quasi-monopolistic nuclear power operator—electricity sales account for about 96% of revenue (2026H1); revenue is determined by "installed capacity × utilization hours × tariff," with generation given priority in offtake and tariffs operating under a mixed mechanism of "approved price + market-based trading + mechanism-based price"; engineering, construction and installation as a secondary business (integrated within the group, thin margins). Revenue is highly predictable (load factor 92%+, utilization hours 7,700+), but pricing power is weakening: market-based share rose from 50.9% (2023) → 56.2% (2025) → 65.9% (2026H1).
Cash content of earnings: Book profits substantially understate cash generation—front-loaded depreciation (depreciation life of units far shorter than the 60-year life span) has kept OCF/net profit attributable to parent at roughly 3.1–3.5x for consecutive years (2023–2025: 3.09/3.46/3.07), a core advantage of the nuclear power business model. However, FCF/net profit turned negative from 2025 (-0.42), reaching -RMB 11.16 billion in 9M26—not a deterioration in operations, but growth-related investment in 19 units under construction (CapEx/depreciation at 2.4–2.5x); the cost is that dividends are effectively propped up by new debt, with the debt-to-asset ratio rising from 61% to 68% within 21 months. The "recurring earnings" test: in 2025 the gap between attributable profit and profit adjusted for non-recurring items was RMB 652 million (including government subsidies of RMB 470 million and other one-off gains), so the apparent attributable decline of -9.9% looks better than the substantive adjusted decline of -15.1%; non-recurring items account for about 6.7%—acceptable but requiring monitoring. Cross-check from the opposite direction: of the RMB 580 million of non-recurring items in 9M26, RMB 419 million is Cangnan's pre-consolidation net profit and RMB 289 million the fair-value difference from the second C宁德 (Ningde) equity stake (boosted by related assets under common control/M&A); organic growth should be observed excluding these two items.
Return on capital: 2025 weighted ROE about 9.1% (prior year about 9.3%), below China Yangtze Power (about 16%) and on par with China National Nuclear Power (about 8%); estimated ROIC about 4.1%—the denominator includes RMB 113.9 billion of construction-in-progress not yet commissioned, so the ROIC of existing operating assets is significantly higher than that figure, with a systematic upward channel after the commissioning peak. Still, the suppression of book returns during the construction period is real; it is not sufficient to support either extreme conclusion of a "capital black hole" or "high returns."
CapEx quality: 9M26 purchase and construction spending was RMB 37.72 billion (+11.5%), led by Lufeng (RMB 11.40 billion/2025), Huizhou Nuclear Power (RMB 5.44 billion), and Zhaoyuan (RMB 3.28 billion)—all growth-related investment in new units under construction. The company does not disclose a maintenance/growth split; this report estimates maintenance investment at "about 48% of depreciation" (about RMB 4.3 billion/year). This assumption is a key input to the EPV calculation and carries uncertainty.
Red flags: ①High customer concentration—the top five customers account for 96.39% of sales, with China Southern Power Grid alone at 58.70% (a natural monopoly attribute of the grid; collections are good, with receivables/revenue only about 10.6%—this is industry structure rather than a governance issue); ②Related-party dependence—purchases from controlling shareholder CGN account for 31.46% of total purchases (nuclear fuel, etc.) and sales account for 12.69%; the company continues to acquire project companies from the group (four companies in 2025 for RMB 11.961 billion; Cangnan + the second Ningde stake in 2026 for RMB 8.347 billion+). Injections are the main growth path, but pricing and CapEx diversion require ongoing oversight; ③Minority interests siphon off about 35% of net profit (see C4 for details).
Consistency of words and deeds: pragmatic, partially delivered. ①The 2024 plan of "high-quality commercial operation of Fangchenggang Unit 4" → delivered on schedule on 2024-05-25; ②the 2025 plan of "Huizhou Unit 1 commercial operation" → actually on 2026-04-19, about 10 months late (engineering scheduling deviation during the batch construction of Hualong One units); ③the 2026 plan of "Huizhou Units 1/2 and Cangnan Unit 1 commercial operation" → all three delivered on schedule, restoring guidance credibility; ④the 2026 target of "average unit utilization hours no lower than the three-year average" → 2026H1 utilization hours of 3,554, -6.1% YoY, behind schedule in H1 (dragged by Taishan maintenance); full-year achievement uncertain; ⑤dividend plan (moderate growth in payout ratio maintained for 2021–2025) → delivered at 44.26%/44.26%/44.47%, but absolute DPS fell to RMB 0.086 in 2025.
Shareholder friendliness: neutral. Payout ratio stable at 44%–45% (the committed floor), but DPS fell with declining profits, and no buybacks executed (only a general mandate from the 2025 AGM, "to be implemented when appropriate"). In July 2025 the company issued RMB 4.9 billion of convertible bonds (conversion price RMB 3.58, potential dilution about 2.7%) instead of equity financing—mild to existing shareholders. Attributable net margin and total dividends fluctuate with tariffs; shareholder return elasticity remains constrained by the CapEx peak until 2029–2030.
Risk signals: ①Postponement of board re-election (announced 2026-09-19)—governance arrangements warrant attention; ②change of signing accountants (2026-08-07, within the normal rotation scope); ③ongoing large-scale related-party transactions and asset acquisitions with the group (Huizhou case priced at about 1.17x PB is still reasonable, but each transaction requires monitoring).
| Segment (FY2025) | Revenue share | Gross margin | YoY | Business logic |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Electricity sales (nuclear operations) | 81.59% | 37.49% (-6.11pp) | -6.33% | Long-term contracts + market-based sales; asset-heavy, high gross margin |
| Construction, installation and design services | 14.98% | 2.20% (+0.63pp) | +4.64% | Integrated in-group EPC; thin margins, fluctuates with construction scale |
| Others (labor services/commodity sales, etc.) | 3.43% | Not disclosed | about +7.5% | Technical services, etc.; small share |
Profit engine: electricity sales contributed about RMB 23.15 billion of gross profit, construction and installation only about RMB 250 million—electricity sales make up about 99% of gross profit and are the absolute and sole profit engine; the purpose of the engineering segment is to secure construction capability and group synergy, not an independent basis for valuation. Gross margin structure differs by more than 35pp, essentially reflecting two different businesses: "licensed operations" versus "engineering contracting"—the former earns quasi-monopoly profits via approved prices + priority offtake, while the latter operates in a fully competitive engineering market. External renewable energy sales are about 0 (only self-use distributed PV); the company is a pure-play nuclear stock, in contrast to China National Nuclear Power's "nuclear + renewables" dual-engine model. By region: Guangxi revenue fell -19.23% in 2025 with gross margin -22.27pp (the largest exposure to regional market tariff shocks), while Guangdong/Fujian are the base; 2026H1 Fangchenggang net profit of RMB 1.407 billion (+250.4%, average price recovery) shows equally large elasticity in regional tariff repair.
Accounting red flags: ①R&D capitalization ratio jumped from 41.75% to 52.82% (+11.07pp; capitalized amount RMB 2.146 billion, +22.59%), with the "reason for change" column marked "not applicable" and no explanation provided—moderate concern; the boost to current profit from higher capitalization is on the order of several hundred million yuan; ②consolidation of related assets under common control books pre-consolidation profits into the current period (Cangnan RMB 419 million), inflating 2026 attributable profit—organic growth needs to exclude it; ③restatement of 2024 data (revenue RMB 86.804 → 78.945 billion) means 2023–2025 figures cannot be directly concatenated—low concern; the restatement stems from common-control consolidation, not error correction.
Cross-period consistency: ①On-grid tariffs and market-based share (50.9%→56.2%→65.9%; average price RMB 0.4228→0.4162→0.3803/kWh) are consistent with management's explanation of "rising market-based share + falling market tariffs"; ②Fangchenggang's volatile net profit (2025H1 RMB 401 million → full year RMB 76 million → 2026H1 RMB 1.407 billion, implying an H2 2025 loss of about RMB 330 million) is unexplained by the company—a confounding factor of regional tariffs and maintenance; simply track its repair; ③attributable growth consistently outpaces adjusted growth (2025: -9.90% vs -15.13%), with government subsidies expanding (RMB 470 million vs RMB 168 million in 2023)—marginal weakening of earnings quality but within a controllable range.
Overall judgment: Based on the financials extracted in this review, no systematic earnings-management traces were found; the three items above are mainly "caliber and disclosure quality" issues. Core earnings (generation × tariff − costs) can be independently cross-verified via operational announcements; information transparency is above average among A-share listed companies.
Current market data and percentiles (closing price RMB 4.62, 2026-10-27; total market cap about RMB 233.3 billion): PE(TTM) about 21.5x (computed as frozen-anchor market cap ÷ rolling TTM attributable profit of RMB 10.85 billion; another market convention based on the 2026-10-28 closing price of RMB 4.57 gives 23.3x; both sit at roughly the 95th percentile over 5 years); PB about 1.87x (about the 92nd percentile over 5 years; BPS RMB 2.45); 2025 dividend yield about 1.86%, 2026E about 2.09%. Earnings are in mid-cycle recovery, not at a peak—2025 was a tariff-down year (attributable -9.9%) and 9M26 is already +12.75%; the high PE percentile partly mirrors the low earnings base, so percentiles serve as context, not as headline cheapness/expensiveness signals. The PB-ROE framework is more apt: PB 1.87 corresponds to ROE about 9%, below Yangtze Power (PB 3.33/ROE about 16%) and Huaneng Hydropower (2.68/about 11%), above China National Nuclear Power (1.65/about 8%)—the discount maps to fundamentals, but ROE has an upward channel as capacity is commissioned.
Peer benchmarking (market caps/multiples based on searches around 2026-10-28):
| Company | PE(TTM) | PB | 2025 ROE | Growth profile | Key differences vs this company |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CGN Power | about 21.5 | 1.87 | about 9.1% | 9M26 attributable +12.75% | Pure nuclear; capacity under construction about 62% of operating |
| China National Nuclear Power | about 27.0 | 1.65 | about 8.1% | 9M26 attributable -24.2% | Nuclear + renewables dual engine; renewables tariffs dragging 2026 profit |
| China Yangtze Power | about 19.9 | 3.33 | about 16.0% | 2026H1 +13% (plentiful hydro inflows) | Zero-growth hydro cash cow; 71% payout; yield about 3.4% |
| Huaneng Hydropower | about 23.0 | 2.68 | about 10.9% | 9M26 about +0.2% | Lancang River monopoly; basin development near completion |
Market-implied expectations: Backing out at a 7% cost of equity, the current price implies a zero-growth FCFE of about RMB 16.3 billion, only about 7.5% above this report's normalized FCFE of about RMB 15.2 billion—roughly pricing in FY2027 consensus (attributable about RMB 11.9 billion) and little beyond; the commissioning of 10-plus more units thereafter is largely unpriced. On a DDM basis (2026E DPS about RMB 0.096, payout 44%), the implied perpetual dividend growth is about 5%. In one sentence: the current price demands "2027 consensus + dividends climbing long-term with new capacity," while in reality the volume timetable is locked through 2032 and a price floor mechanism is taking shape—the current price has not paid a high price for growth, it has barely paid for growth beyond 2027; viewed from the other side, PB at 1.87x and the 92nd percentile indicates the "certainty" component has already been paid for at a high-certainty price.
Three-layer value (EPV): ①Asset value (floor): book BPS of RMB 2.45 is a hard floor; on a replacement-cost basis (35.45 GW operating + about 21.81 GW under construction × about RMB 16,700/kW, at about 66% attributable share), far above market cap (total market cap only about 0.39x the rebuild value of operating units)—but the non-replicable nature of licenses and sites means this serves only as a reference, not realizable value. ②EPV at zero growth: normalized FCFE about RMB 15.2 billion (normalized attributable profit RMB 10.5 billion + attributable-share depreciation about RMB 9.0 billion − maintenance CapEx about RMB 4.3 billion, working capital approximately zero) ÷ 7% cost of equity = about RMB 4.29/share (range RMB 3.75–4.62, corresponding to discount rates of 8%–6.5%). ③Growth option: current price − EPV ≈ RMB 0.33/share (about 7%). The current price is mainly supported by the "zero-growth cash flow of existing operating units" layer; it must be stressed that this 7% is highly sensitive to the discount rate (rising to about 19% at 8%), and the EPV maintenance CapEx assumption (48% of depreciation) has no company-disclosed basis—"extremely thin growth option" is a conclusion under low discount rate + low maintenance investment assumptions and should be treated as directional judgment, not precise measurement.
Three scenarios and odds (probabilities assigned by this report):
| Scenario | Probability | Fair range | vs current | Key drivers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 0.28 | RMB 3.4–3.8 | Median -22.1% | 2027 Guangdong long-term contracts fall further by ≥2 fen/kWh + commissioning delays; 2027E attributable drops to about RMB 9.5–10.5 billion; valuation reverts to 15–17x; PB 1.4x × BPS 2.45 = RMB 3.43 mutually consistent |
| Base | 0.52 | RMB 4.7–5.2 | Median +7.1% | Tariff stabilization (-1%~0%) + 12 scheduled units commissioned on time; about 19.5–21.6x FY2027E own EPS of RMB 0.234–0.249 (midpoint 20.5x)—anchored on zero-growth Yangtze Power at 19.9–20.9x + growth compensation − quality discount for ROE/FCF; DCF cross-check about RMB 4.9 |
| Bull | 0.20 | RMB 6.0–6.6 | Median +36.4% | 2027 long-term contracts rebound to ≥RMB 0.40/kWh + computing-power direct-supply premium materializes + group injections/consolidation of attributable share; 2027–28E attributable RMB 13.0–14.5 billion × 23–24x (vs Huaneng Hydro 23.0x/CNNP 27.0x) |
External anchors for comparison: on the pessimistic side, Morgan Stanley in 2025-01 cut its CGN Power (1816.HK) target price from HK$3.69 to HK$3.19 on Guangdong tariff assumptions (EPS -12%~-14%), and Huatai in 2026-05 cut China National Nuclear Power's 2026–27E attributable profit by -20%/-22% on similar logic—both illustrating the transmission path of "small tariff downgrade → dual hit to earnings and valuation," isomorphic with this case's bear scenario; on the optimistic side, CICC's 2026-04 target price of RMB 5.32 (consistent with the consensus target median of RMB 5.3) and Orient Securities' expectation that 2027 Guangdong long-term contracts break through RMB 0.4/kWh correspond to this case's bull scenario. This report's base case is more conservative than sell-side consensus (assuming only tariff stabilization, no rebound or direct-supply premium).
Own earnings forecast vs management guidance vs consensus, side by side: FY2026E revenue RMB 77.5–79.0 billion, attributable profit RMB 10.7–11.2 billion (consensus about RMB 10.6 billion; no quantitative profit guidance from the company; operating plan is 19 refueling outages, 24 units entering the market, utilization hours no lower than the three-year average); FY2027E revenue RMB 80.0–83.0 billion, attributable profit RMB 11.8–12.6 billion (consensus about RMB 11.9 billion), driven by first full-year contribution from new units (operating capacity +about 8% YoY) + tariff stabilization + Taishan repair. Conclusion: reasonably cheap, target price RMB 4.7–5.2 (base-case fair value), margin of safety +2% (on the base-case fair-value floor)—quality is high while the price is not cheap; risk-reward is mildly positive rather than clearly superior. Basis for anchoring the base-case exit multiple: Yangtze Power (zero-growth hydro) TTM 19.9–20.9x as an independent lower-bound anchor + growth compensation for 62% capacity under construction − quality discount for ROE (about 9% vs Yangtze's about 16%), negative FCF, and market-based tariff exposure; composite midpoint about 20.5x. The company's current trading multiple (about 19.2x FY2027E) sits exactly within that anchor and does not constitute an additional source of margin of safety.
Industry Space: China's nuclear power industry is in a mid-growth phase characterized by "upstream approval boom + eve of capacity commissioning peak." As of August 2026, China had 62 operating nuclear units (66.14 GW) and 58 under construction (69.51 GW), with a total of 135 GW ranking first in the world (National Energy Administration, China Nuclear Power Development Report (2026)). Nuclear power generation in 2025 was 485.2 billion kWh (+7.6%), about 4.6% of total power generation; at approximately RMB 0.4/kWh, this implies a power market of roughly RMB 300 billion. Growth is locked in by hard planning targets: the New Energy System "15th Five-Year Plan" explicitly targets about 110 GW of operating nuclear capacity by 2030, implying roughly +76% versus 62.48 GW at end-2025, or about 8-9 new units per year. The China Nuclear Energy Association projects nuclear's share of generation at about 8% by 2030 and about 10% by 2035 (4.6% in 2025). Approval cadence is the industry's leading indicator: from 2019-2025, the State Council approved 4/4/5/10/10/11/10 units per year, and another 8 units in July 2026 — under "active, safe, and orderly development," approvals have become normalized at about 10 units/year. Each 1,000 MW-class unit requires about RMB 20 billion of investment; the 49 units approved since 2022 represent total investment approaching RMB 1 trillion.
Value Chain and Value Distribution: Upstream, natural uranium is globally priced (long-term contracts at about USD 95.5/lb at end-June 2026, a high since 2008, but mine cash costs are only USD 25-32/lb, and the Company has locked prices via group long-term contracts; our estimate is that uranium moving from USD 75 to 90/lb would affect nuclear power gross margin by only about 1.7pp) — weak fuel cost pass-through gives operators strong bargaining power over upstream. Midstream nuclear island engineering is monopolized by the China Nuclear E&C (CNECC) system; construction and installation within the Company's system is handled by CGN Engineering (low-margin, service-oriented construction). Downstream, grids engage in unified purchase and sale plus market-based trading, with nuclear power enjoying "priority generation and priority purchase" for priority offtake. The best-positioned segment for value capture is operations: in 1H2026 the Company's power business gross margin was about 46%, well above coal power (about 10-15%) and below hydro (Yangtze Power at about 66%) — zero fuel price volatility, zero carbon emissions, and baseload attributes make it a "hydro-like" cash flow business.
Supply/Demand and Competitive Landscape: On the demand side, total electricity consumption in 2025 was 10.37 trillion kWh (+5.0%); CEC forecasts 10.9-11 trillion kWh for 2026 (+5%~6%). Structural increments come from AI/computing — internet data services power consumption grew at a 35.9% CAGR from 2021-2025; computing infrastructure consumed about 360 billion kWh in 2025 (about 3.5% of total consumption), and CAICT projects data center consumption to exceed 400 billion kWh by 2030. CEC judges the "15th Five-Year" period to feature "ample energy, tight capacity" (loose total volumes, tight peak load); as zero-carbon baseload, nuclear power is scarce in evening-peak supply security scenarios (2025 national nuclear utilization hours 7,809; capacity factor 89.1%). On the supply side, operating licenses are held by only 4 state-owned enterprises (CGN, CNNC, SPIC, Huaneng); entry barriers are extremely high (license approval + ~RMB 20 billion investment per unit + 60-month construction cycle + full-lifecycle nuclear safety licensing + first-mover occupation of coastal sites). The top two (CGN system + CNNC system) account for over 85% of operating plus under-construction capacity — an extremely stable duopoly with no price wars within the industry. The real competition is on volumes and prices against coal and renewables: falling market power prices in many provinces in 2025-2026 (the Company's market price -8.8% in 2025) are the main pressure. Under Document No. 136, Liaoning/Guangxi provide a nuclear power floor via "mechanism price difference settlement, shared by commercial and industrial users" (refund overpayments, collect underpayments), reshaping earnings stability; more nuclear provinces are expected to follow after 2027. On substitution threats: falling LCOE of wind/solar + storage erodes baseload value, but as variable renewables' share rises to 47.3%, this actually amplifies the value of nuclear's stable baseload and capacity; inclusion of nuclear in the green electricity/green certificate system is advancing, offering an environmental premium option.
Cycle and Regulation: The industry is in an approval upcycle, not a cycle peak — the under-construction/operating capacity ratio exceeds 100%, and commissioning certainty over the next 5-7 years is very high. Leading indicators: ① State Council annual approval counts (leading commissioning by 4-6 years); ② FCD/dome/hot-testing milestones (leading 2-3 years); ③ provincial mechanism price rollout progress; ④ the spread between market prices and approved prices. The regulatory direction is broadly favorable: hard capacity targets + normalized approvals open up volume growth, and mechanism prices lock in the downside risk of falling power prices. Neutral-to-negative items: the passively rising share of market-based pricing (65.9% for the Company) puts temporary pressure on blended prices, and nuclear power's market entry rules under the 2030 unified national electricity market remain uncertain; nuclear safety regulation (NNSA full-lifecycle licensing; regulators in 2026 warned of a "dual peak of new construction and new commissioning, diluting specialized talent") and decommissioning fund provisions under the Interim Measures for Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning Preparation Management are long-term cost items.
Company Positioning in the Industry: A leader with steadily rising share. The Company manages 31 operating units (35.45 GW) plus 19 under construction (as of 2026-09-30), representing about 44.5% of national operating + under-construction capacity and about 52.2% of on-grid power share (1H2026); its scale is about 1.37x that of #2 China National Nuclear Power, ranking first nationally in both operating and under-construction capacity. Its WANO composite index has ranked first globally for 10 consecutive years, and refueling outage efficiency outperforms peers (2025 average outage 28.2 days, 5.8 days less than peers). Sources of moat: ① monopoly on operating licenses; ② proprietary Hualong One technology + globally leading operating metrics; ③ first-mover occupation of premium coastal sites at Daya Bay/Yangjiang/Fangchenggang/Taishan; ④ group-level full value-chain synergy across "fuel–engineering–operations–uranium mining," with the group committing to inject newly approved projects into the listed company within 5 years of construction start — injections of Huizhou, Cangnan, Ningde Phase II etc. continued to be delivered in 2025-2026; the Company is the group's sole nuclear asset listing platform. Share calculation note: 44.5%/52.2% are the Company's self-reported managed-scope figures (including associate Hongyanhe) from annual/interim reports; third-party bodies (e.g., China Nuclear Energy Association) report slightly lower CGN-system share on a controlled-scope basis, with the difference mainly in Hongyanhe (Company equity stake 38.88%) and group-managed units; the trend judgment (rising share) is consistent under both scopes.
The valuation framework for nuclear operations is "capacity × utilization hours × price − cost." This chapter provides current readings and forward schedules for the three factors.
Capacity: 31 units in operation (managed scope 35.45 GW, comprising 28.74 GW at subsidiaries + 6.71 GW at associate Hongyanhe, as of 2026-09-30); 19 units under construction (2 commissioning, 2 equipment installation, 8 civil works, 7 in FCD preparation), with under-construction capacity about 62% of operating — the highest-visibility growth pipeline among A-share utilities. Commissioning schedule: 2027 Lufeng 5/Cangnan 2; 2028 Lufeng 6; 2029 Ningde 5; 2030 Ningde 6/Lufeng 1/2, Huizhou 3, Cangnan 3; 2031 Huizhou 4, Zhaoyuan 1; 2032 Zhaoyuan 2; Taishan 3/4 (EPR) and 5 other units have no timetable.
Utilization Hours: 7,509 (2023) → 7,710 (2024) → 7,767 hours (2025), capability factor 92.65%; 1H2026 was 3,554 hours (-6.1%, dragged by Taishan outage and unplanned shutdowns), and the full-year target of "no less than the three-year average" is in doubt — utilization hours are the core metric for tracking outage cadence, verifiable via monthly operations announcements.
On-grid Volume and Price: On-grid power 214.1 (2023) → 227.3 (2024, +6.13%) → 232.6 billion kWh (2025, +2.36%); 9M26 was 176.749 billion kWh (+2.65%). The price structure has three layers: ① legacy approved prices of RMB 0.3590-0.4350/kWh (Ningde 4 lowest, Taishan highest); ② RMB 0.4153/kWh (tax-inclusive) for new units prior to market entry — note the announcement's wording is "during the period of non-participation in market trading"; the timing of market entry is policy-determined, and 0.4153 is not a full-lifecycle locked price; ③ market-based trading (65.9% share, 1H2026); in Guangdong, a government-authorized one-way contract-for-difference applies (anchored at about RMB 0.4153, covering about 90% of volumes, with about 85% of upside clawed back); Guangdong's 2026 long-term contract at RMB 372/MWh touched the provincial floor, while 3Q26 spot at RMB 389/MWh was already above the long-term contract. Blended average price 0.4228 → 0.4162 → 0.3803 RMB/kWh (2023-2025), with a markedly narrower decline in 2026.
Single-Unit Economics: Cost per kWh is about RMB 0.2 (nuclear fuel ~25%, depreciation ~31%, spent fuel disposal fund ~10%, O&M ~34%; per the 2023 annual report). Each 1,000 MW-class unit requires about RMB 20 billion of investment, about a 5-year construction period, and generates about 8.0-9.5 billion kWh/year of on-grid power at full capacity, contributing about RMB 0.4-1.0 billion/year in steady-state net profit attributable to shareholders (equity stakes vary 46%-100%: Lufeng 5 100%, Huizhou 82%, Cangnan 46%, Ningde Phase II 51%). Sensitivities: every -1 fen/kWh in market prices → about -RMB 0.77 billion annual net profit attributable (about 7% of 2026E attributable profit); -2 fen ≈ -RMB 1.53 billion; rates +50bp → about -RMB 1.0 billion.
Overall Assessment: Cautiously bullish, confidence 0.55, horizon 6-12 months. CGN Power combines "hydro-like certainty of cash flows" with "a scarce 20-year capacity growth curve on A-shares." The 3Q2026 report has confirmed the volume growth inflection; the base-case fair value is RMB 4.7-5.2 with a probability-weighted expectation of about RMB 4.84, i.e., +2%~+13% versus the current price (+7.1% to midpoint). However, the current price sits at a high percentile of its own valuation history, the margin of safety is only +2%, and the risk-reward symmetry is mediocre — it is better suited as a core holding in dividend-growth allocation than as an aggressive offensive play. Strategically, position flexibility should be restrained before the Guangdong long-term contract is finalized in December; if the contract holds at RMB 372/MWh and the annual report delivers RMB 10.7 billion+, both premises of the base case will be validated.
Strategy and Risk Alerts: Upside catalysts — FY2026 annual report (late March 2027; delivery of RMB 10.7-11.2 billion attributable profit + whether the payout ratio breaks 45%), Guangdong 2027 long-term contract (Dec 2026–Jan 2027), commercial operation of Lufeng 5/Cangnan 2 (within 2027), trigger of CGN convertible bond forced redemption (15/30 trading days at share price ≥ RMB 4.654; ~2.7% dilution but a "dilution in exchange for gains" scenario), 2027 State Council approval batch (Lufeng 3/4 candidates). Downside risks — a further ≥1 fen/kWh decline in the 2027 long-term contract (starting at about -RMB 0.4 billion attributable profit, breaking the price stabilization assumption); nuclear safety event tail risk (historically zero INES Level 2+ record, but regulators have warned of a "dual peak and talent dilution"); heavy Q4 outage schedule causing quarterly volatility; construction delays/cost overruns (no timetable for Taishan 3/4 is a long-term uncertainty); convertible bond forced redemption dilution. A share price break below RMB 3.8 (upper bound of the bear case) or a 2027 long-term contract below RMB 0.362/kWh would be explicit falsification signals for this report's thesis, warranting reassessment rather than mechanical averaging-down.