Rating: Neutral | Target price range: RMB 4.0–4.3 | Current price: RMB 4.42 (2026-10-26 close) | Margin of safety: approx. -10% (no margin of safety) | Time horizon: 12 months | Report date: 2026-10-27
Currency and unit note: All prices in this report are in RMB per share, amounts in RMB; valuation and market cap are frozen at the 2026-10-26 close of RMB 4.42, total shares 31.264 billion (total market cap approx. RMB 138.19 billion).
China Unicom's 2026 earnings will step down due to the VAT category adjustment (mobile data/SMS/broadband 6%→9%, permanent from 2026) and the front-loading of labor cost accruals, with H1 net profit attributable to parent down 34.8% YoY; the red-chip's first interim dividend suspension in six years leaves the high-dividend pricing anchor unresolved, and the full-year dividend plan (annual report in March 2027) is the single largest valuation variable over the next 6 months. The computing-power second curve shows revenue +13% against investment +80%+, a scissors gap that needs 2027 to validate. At the current price of RMB 4.42, the stock trades at a 3%–10% premium to the base-case fair value of RMB 4.0–4.3 and about 7% above the probability-weighted fair value (approx. RMB 4.11); odds are slightly skewed downward (-27.6% to bear-case center vs +7.5% to bull-case center): valuation is cheap relative to peers (P/B 0.81x, the deepest discount among the three), but absolute levels are fair-to-full; Neutral/hold — the Q3 report on October 30 and the dividend decision in March 2027 are the two switches that could change this view.
Primary share-price driver over the next 6–12 months: delivery of a narrowing full-year 2026 profit decline (management has committed to "full-year labor costs staying flat and a clearly narrowing profit decline," with the first hard validation in the Q3 report on 2026-10-30), followed by the FY2026 dividend plan (annual report 2027-03). A verifiable expectation gap: the market (median A-share sell-side target RMB 5.9, n=3; H-share investment bank targets HKD 5.8–8.3) has broadly capitalized in "payout ratio converging toward 75% + computing-power monetization," whereas the company itself only commits to "proposing a dividend recommendation based on full-year results" — if the Q3 report confirms narrowing and full-year DPS ≥ RMB 0.16, the gap converges upward; if full-year DPS falls below RMB 0.13 (dividend yield 2.94%), a second wave of outflows from bond-proxy capital. Validation timeline: Q3 report (10-30) → share unlock (11-02/11-16) → president succession (2026Q4–2027Q1) → annual report and dividend decision (2027-03). Structurally, the odds at the current price skew downward and catalysts are dense but two-sided; not yet attractive for positioning. A pullback to the RMB 3.7–4.0 deep-value band or dividend clarity would change the conclusion.
This report's estimate: a full-year RMB 7.6 billion (central case) requires 2026H2 attributable net profit of RMB 3.461 billion, +24.6% YoY; that rebound relies mainly not on an operational miracle — 2025Q4 single-quarter attributable profit was only RMB 355 million (an ultra-low base from year-end concentrated accruals), so even if Q3 only reaches RMB 1.9 billion (approx. -22% YoY), Q4 needs just RMB 1.361 billion to lock in the RMB 7.4 billion floor. The falsification line is clear: if Q3 single-quarter profit comes in below RMB 1.9 billion and the earnings call no longer reiterates "stable labor costs," guidance is falsified and the full-year forecast should be revised down.
Hedging evidence (as relayed by this report from a DBS September 2026 note): Management's framing is that the suspension is a one-off arrangement due to early capex deployment and that the full-year capex guidance of approx. RMB 50 billion is unchanged; if the 2026 final dividend restores full-year DPS to approx. RMB 0.16 (dividend yield approx. 3.7% at current price), the high-dividend anchor is rebuilt. Scenario sensitivity: DPS of RMB 0.13/0.1635/0.18 corresponds to yields of 2.94%/3.70%/4.07% — a cut would shift bond-proxy pricing down; and the A-share articles of association require full distribution of red-chip dividends net of expenses, with A-share holders having no direct control over cash flows.
This report's magnitude bridge: full-year computing investment of approx. RMB 18.5 billion over a 5-year depreciation life implies incremental annual depreciation of approx. RMB 3.7 billion, only ~5% of the group's total annual D&A pool (approx. RMB 75 billion); assuming full-year capex guidance stays flat at approx. RMB 50 billion, the "scissors gap" does not constitute P&L-level squeeze in the short term. Falsification signals to track: quarterly computing revenue growth falling below 8%; a 2027 capex guidance above RMB 55 billion without a corresponding dividend commitment; or intelligent computing center revenue growth slipping into single digits. Also note: the company has changed its computing-revenue disclosure definition twice in three years (see the financial engineering section), discounting cross-period growth comparability.
The three-method cross yields a base-case fair value of RMB 4.0–4.3 (requiring a 3.8% dividend yield / P/B 0.74x / 2027E earnings × 15.5x); probability-weighted fair value approx. RMB 4.11, about 7% below the current price. The offshore pricing spectrum is broadly above this report's base case; the core divergence is confidence in payout restoration. Sensitivity: if the payout ratio converges toward 75%, the EPV floor rises to approx. RMB 3.4. A-shares and H shares are a holding-company structure, not the same company dual-listed — one A share corresponds to only approx. 0.43 red-chip shares, so H-share targets cannot be directly mapped to A-share fair value.
Two qualifications: First, part of the record OCF comes from a temporary component — the +RMB 4.91 billion booked employee compensation payable (same source as C1's labor cost front-loading), which will be partly given back when paid in H2. Second, net accounts receivable of RMB 79.503 billion (+22.8% vs start of year) rose to 20.3% of the most recent full-year revenue (16.5% at end-2025); receivables over 1 year old account for 37.7% (+1.5pp vs start of year; a mild slope) — the main erosion of balance-sheet asset quality.
The president vacancy window coincides with Q3 report interpretation and the setting of 2027 capex/dividend budgets; the successor announcement (expected 2026Q4–2027Q1) and their orientation between "curbing investment to protect dividends vs protecting the computing narrative" are the tracking points.
| Metric | 2023FY | 2024FY | 2025FY | 2026Q1 | 2026H1 (latest period) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating revenue (RMB bn) | 372.60 | 389.59 | 392.22 | 102.82 | 201.36 (+0.6%) |
| Net profit attributable to parent (RMB bn) | 8.17 (est.) | 9.03 (+10.5%) | 9.13 (+1.1%) | 2.14 (-18.0%) | 4.14 (-34.8%) |
| Recurring attributable net profit (RMB bn) | 7.49 | 6.70 (-10.6%) | 7.69 (+14.7%) | 1.88 (-17.5%) | 3.53 (-36.7%) |
| Gross margin | 24.5% | 23.4% | 23.5% | 23.7% | 23.8% (-3.2pp) |
| Attributable net margin | 2.2% | 2.3% | 2.3% | 2.1% | 2.1% |
| Operating cash flow (RMB bn) | 104.34 | 91.26 | 91.41 | 7.54 | 33.28 (+13.6%) |
| Free cash flow (RMB bn) | 30.40 | 29.89 | 37.26 (+24.7%) | — | 9.20 |
| Capital expenditure (RMB bn) | 73.90 | 61.37 (-17%) | 54.15 (-11.8%) | — | 24.08 (+19.1%) |
| Cash (RMB bn) | — | 54.71 | 46.86 | — | 43.28 (total cash-like approx. 87.7) |
| Interest-bearing debt (RMB bn) | 46.43 | — | 34.10 | — | 31.36 |
| Debt-to-asset ratio | 46.0% | 45.2% | 43.9% | — | 43.6% |
| DPS (RMB, pre-tax) | 0.132 | 0.1580 | 0.1635 | — | 0 (interim suspended) |
Note: 2023 attributable net profit is an estimate (derived from the +10.5% YoY growth disclosed in the 2024 annual report; not directly verified against the original report). Free cash flow is the company's definition (operating cash flow − capex). Balance-sheet stock figures are period-end; latest as of 2026-06-30.
Reasons for metric changes (items with YoY ≥ ±20%): ① 2026H1 attributable profit -34.8% — the company attributes this to the higher VAT rate (taxes and surcharges +28.5%) and the pace of labor cost input (admin expenses +11.7%, employee compensation payable +80.2%), and expects full-year labor costs to be stable with a clearly narrowing profit decline; ② 2026H1 inventory +113.1% — rising handset prices and increased stocking; ③ 2024 receivables +44.1% — slower collections in computing-network-digital-intelligence (government/enterprise) business vs traditional business; ④ 2026H1 capex +19.1% — computing investment up more than 80% YoY, rising to 37% of the total; ⑤ 2025 free cash flow +24.7% — cash released by capex tapering (73.9→54.15 bn).
2026H1 revenue was RMB 201.36 billion (+0.6%), main business revenue RMB 178.0 billion (-0.2%); attributable net profit RMB 4.139 billion (-34.8%), recurring RMB 3.534 billion (-36.7%). Compared with the same period of 2025 (attributable +2.7% to RMB 6.349 billion), the three-fold reasons for the profit plunge: the VAT category change compressing net revenue ratio for the full year (gross margin -3.2pp), labor cost accrual front-loading, and costs leading during the computing expansion phase. Positives: operating cash flow of RMB 33.28 billion (+13.6%), a multi-year high; the company says receivables growth slowed significantly YoY; computing revenue approx. RMB 41.9 billion (+13%) accelerated from Q1 (RMB 15.4 billion, +8.3%); the suspension of the H1 interim dividend was a red-chip board decision (see C2). Industry backdrop in the same period: national telecom business revenue -2.1% in 2026H1; China Mobile 9M26 attributable profit approx. -7.9%, China Telecom 9M26 approx. -14.8% — Unicom's decline is deeper than peers', mainly due to its tax-shock exposure and cost timing, not a standalone demand deterioration. As of this report's date (10-27), the Q3 report has not been disclosed (scheduled 10-30); the above review reflects the latest disclosed data. Management has given no quantitative profit guidance; whether the decline "narrows" must be judged on the Q3 report, and this report does not make an "above/below expectations" call on the market's behalf.
Business model: Asset-heavy, licensed basic telecom operator (mobile + broadband connections as the cash cow; government/enterprise computing-network-digital-intelligence as the second curve), centrally controlled SOE with a Hong Kong red-chip listing platform controlled via BVI; service (subscription-type) revenue is 88.7% of revenue — highly recurring; weak pricing power (ARPU constrained by regulation and homogeneous competition; the VAT increase could not be passed through, gross margin -3.2pp).
Cash content of earnings: Book profit converts almost entirely to cash — OCF/attributable net profit was 12.8x/10.1x/10.0x for 2023–2025 (the inflated attributable-based multiple reflects minorities taking 56% of consolidated profit; even on a consolidated basis it is 4.4–5.6x); FCF/attributable net profit 3.7x/3.3x/4.1x. 2026H1: OCF/attributable 8.0x, FCF/attributable 2.2x (a decline from renewed computing investment). Recurring earnings test: Non-recurring items are volatile (RMB 0.680→2.331→1.441 bn, 2023–2025); roughly a quarter of 2024's +10.5% attributable growth came from asset disposals and non-operating items (recurring -10.6% that year), while 2025's +14.7% recurring growth was the genuine repair; analysis should anchor primarily on recurring profit.
Return on capital: This report estimates ROIC at approx. 5.0% (2025) and weighted ROE at 5.39%, below the 6.5% cost of equity used here — telecom is a licensed, regulated industry where excess returns are capped by tariff regulation; low ROIC is industry-wide, not company-specific, but it means growth relies mainly on capital input rather than expanding returns.
Capex quality: Total capex/depreciation was 0.79/0.72 in 2024–2025 (a 5G investment taper period); the 2026 plan is approx. RMB 50 billion with computing rising above 35% — an investment structure shifting from network to computing, directionally restarting expansion; the company does not split maintenance vs growth capex, so the maintenance floor cannot be determined — a disclosure shortcoming. In H1, net fixed assets fell RMB 10.5 billion while construction in progress rose RMB 4.7 billion, deferring depreciation pressure from assets placed into service.
Red flags: ① Receivables/revenue ratio rose from 10.7% to 20.3% (end-2023 → 2026H1, vs most recent full-year revenue); slow government/enterprise collections; ② A-share holders enjoy only ~44% of consolidated profit; valuation and dividends must both be adjusted through the red-chip chain; ③ the 2026 interim suspension interrupted the dividend uptrend (see E2/C2).
Consistency of words and deeds: pragmatic-leaning-cautious. Verifiable commitments vs delivery: the 2023 annual report committed to double-digit 2024 total profit growth and capex of approx. RMB 65 billion — actual total profit +10.5%, capex RMB 61.37 billion: delivered. The 2024 annual report committed to approx. RMB 55 billion of 2025 investment — actual RMB 54.15 billion: delivered. The 2025 annual report committed to 2026 capex of approx. RMB 50 billion with computing above 35% — H1 executed RMB 24.08 billion with computing at 37%: in progress and on track. Two consecutive years of conservative guidance delivered is a plus.
Shareholder friendliness: neutral, with signs of regression in 2026. Payout ratio rose year by year, 51.4% (2023) → 55.6% (2024) → 56.0% (2025, A-share basis; red-chip basis 61.3%), but growth slowed sharply from +21.1%/+19.7% to +3.5%, and the 2026 interim payout was halted along with the red chip — partially breaking the "dividends rising year after year" commitment; no market buybacks (treasury shares are only for equity incentive obligations); no dilution via placements/rights issues. The structure whereby A-share dividends are fully subject to red-chip resolutions is unchanged.
Risk signals: Chairman and president changed within a year (both internal-system promotions; announcements confirm no disagreements); related-party transactions with the group are of controllable scale (related-party sales among top five customers 0.49%, related-party purchases among top five suppliers 1.48%); balances at the group finance company (deposits RMB 5.19 bn / loans RMB 3.80 bn) are subject to quota limits; in April 2026, 224 million restricted shares unlocked and 29.94 million shares are proposed for repurchase and cancellation (from out-of-scope incentive recipients) — normal governance actions.
The company's 2025 annual report describes itself as having a single operating segment (telecommunications); the table below presents management's revenue analysis framework:
| Business Segment | Revenue Scale/Share | YoY | Business Logic |
|---|---|---|---|
| Connectivity Services (mobile/broadband/TV/leased lines, etc.) | ~76% of service revenue (2024) | +1.5% (2024) | Cash cow and profit mainstay: connectivity + converged plans, steady low-single-digit growth |
| Computing-Network & Digital Intelligence Services (Unicom Cloud/data centers/integration/data services, etc.) | ~24% of service revenue (2024); computing business >15% of main revenue in 2025 | Segment +9.6% (2024); 2025 data centers +8.5%, Unicom Cloud +5.2%; 2026H1 computing +13% | Second growth curve: IDC/AIDC + AI cloud, highest investment intensity, slowest cash collection |
| Investment Income from Associates (China Tower 20.65%, UGO Financial 50%) | 2025 equity-method income totaled ~RMB 4.15 billion, 16.4% of total profit | Tower RMB 2.62 billion + UGO RMB 1.53 billion (2025) | Important profit supplement, non-operating core |
Profit mainstay: Connectivity Services contribute the vast majority of operating profit (the company does not disclose gross margin by segment, so precise shares cannot be calculated, but the 76% service revenue base plus RMB 4.15 billion in associate income constitute the profit core); Computing-Network & Digital Intelligence is a growth engine rather than a current profit engine, and its receivables accumulation is the main drag on balance sheet quality. Gross margin structure: the company does not disclose gross margin by segment, so inter-segment differences cannot be computed (a disclosure weakness); indirect evidence is that during the expansion of Computing-Network & Digital Intelligence, overall gross margin actually declined (2026H1 -3.2pp), pointing to lower gross margins in the second curve than in traditional connectivity. Definition warning: the definition of computing revenue has changed twice in three years (six items under Computing-Network & Digital Intelligence → computing services + data centers → intelligent computing centers + intelligent computing + digital-intelligence applications + cloud intelligence services); growth rates are not directly comparable across periods.
Accounting red flags (by severity): ① Receivables surging far beyond revenue (med) — 2024 receivables +44.1% vs revenue +4.6%; AR/latest full-year revenue 10.7% → 20.3% (2023 → 2026H1); the company attributes this to slow collections in Computing-Network & Digital Intelligence and lists government-enterprise overdue payments as a risk factor. ② Traces of cross-period management of credit impairments (med) — RMB 8.083 billion provisioned in H1 2025 but only RMB 5.277 billion for the full year; net reversals of ~RMB 2.8 billion in H2 plus write-offs weaken quarterly profit comparability. ③ 2024 one-off gains propping up headline growth (med) — non-recurring items of RMB 2.331 billion, 25.8% of net profit attributable; excluding them, profit fell -10.6% that year. ④ Related-party deposits/loans with the group finance company and intra-group guarantees (low) — balances subject to quota limits, with risk assessment reports in place.
Cross-period consistency: ① Recurring Q4 profit cliff (2024Q4 adjusted profit -RMB 177 million, 2025Q4 only RMB 63 million vs single quarters of RMB 1.8–3.7 billion in Q1–Q3) — not explained by the company; year-end concentrated expenses/impairments are an established rhythm (also creating a low Q4 base for 2026, echoing C1). ② Divergence between attributable and adjusted profit growth (2024 +10.5% vs -10.6%; 2025 +1.1% vs +14.7%) — not explained by the company. ③ Computing revenue definition changed twice in three years — disclosures are inconsistent. ④ Quarterly operating data: from 2026, the company stopped separately disclosing mobile subscribers/broadband users (switching to aggregate "connected users") — not explained by the company; core KPI transparency has declined.
Summary: no fabricated revenue or asset-level financial engineering found, but the combination of "hiding expenses at year-end, front-loading provisions and reversing them in H2, and adjusting definitions to fit the narrative" reduces reporting credibility; the adjusted-profit + full-year view is superior to the attributable-profit + single-quarter view.
Current market data (closing price 2026-10-26): share price RMB 4.42, total market cap RMB 138.19 billion. PE-TTM 20.0x (82nd percentile over the past 5 years — earnings are at an unrepresentative low due to the tax shock; the percentile is for reference only); static PE 15.1x (7th percentile over 5 years); PB 0.81x (30th percentile over 1 year / 23% over 5 years / 11% over 10 years); 2025 full-year DPS-based dividend yield 3.70% (note: the 1.18% computed by market data tools based on the most recent ex-dividend date reflects a window measure including only the final dividend of RMB 0.0523; the full-year forward measure should be 0.1635/4.42 = 3.70%).
Peer benchmarking (A-shares, own calculations, 2026-10-26):
| Company | PE-TTM | Static PE | PB | Dividend Yield | ROE (2025) | 2026 Earnings Trend |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| China Mobile A | 17.2 | 16.0 | 1.57 | ~4.7% | 9.97% | 9M26 approx. -7.9% |
| China Telecom A | 22.2 | 19.1 | 1.37 | ~3.9% | 7.27% | 9M26 approx. -14.8% |
| China Unicom A | 20.0 | 15.1 | 0.81 | 3.70% | 5.47% | H1 -34.8% |
Unicom has the deepest PB discount, and PB/ROE ≈ 0.15 is the lowest of the three (Mobile 0.16, Telecom 0.19) — the cheapest per unit of ROE; but its dividend yield ranks last (payout ratio 56% vs peers' 75%).
Market-implied expectations: solving backward from the current price of RMB 4.42 with a 6.5% required return implies sustainable, accessible cash flow to A-share shareholders of ~RMB 0.287/share — 1.6x the 2025 actual (RMB 0.179), equivalent to the Red Chip payout ratio rising from 61.3% to ~88% (holding profit constant), or both "payout ratio converging to 75% + growth resuming at ~3% from 2027" materializing. Reality: neither condition is currently committed (interim dividend suspended, 2026 profit ~-17%); the market has already paid a deposit for "dividend restoration + computing optionality." Relative to management's stated framing of the suspension as a "one-off arrangement" (as relayed by DBS), this pricing is not unreasonable, but the margin of safety is thin.
Three-layer value (EPV): asset value (floor reference) = book value per share RMB 5.48; the 10-year PB floor of 0.67x implies ~RMB 3.67. EPV with zero growth (equity measure: A-share accessible cash flow RMB 0.18/share ÷ 6.5%) ≈ RMB 2.77, covering ~63% of the current price. Residual RMB 1.65 (growth optionality ≈ 37% of the current price) = dividend restoration option (EPV increment of ~+RMB 0.6 at a 75% payout ratio) + net cash on an attributable basis ~RMB 0.62/share + computing/AI option RMB 0.2–0.4. The current price is not "the market paying only for zero growth" — more than one-third of the price is a bet on uncommitted restoration and optionality.
Three scenarios and odds (12 months, weighted at midpoints of fair ranges):
| Scenario | Probability | Fair Range | vs Current Price | Decisive Factors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 22% | RMB 3.0–3.4 | -27.6% to midpoint | Full-year attributable profit RMB 6.5–6.9 billion (no narrowing of decline) + full-year DPS cut to ~RMB 0.137, required yield 4.3% bond-like repricing |
| Base | 50% | RMB 4.0–4.3 | -6.1% to midpoint | Attributable profit RMB 7.4–7.9 billion (narrowing on low Q4 base) + full-year DPS flat at ~RMB 0.16, payout ratio rising to ~70% |
| Bull | 28% | RMB 4.5–5.0 | +7.5% to midpoint | Q4 recovery beats + computing volume surge (growth ≥15% or monetized orders) + payout ratio rising to 75% (DPS ≈ RMB 0.176) |
Probability-weighted fair value ~RMB 4.11, -7.0% vs the current price; in distribution terms, the current price sits above the top of the base range and below the middle of the bull range — odds are asymmetric to the downside, but modestly so. External anchors for comparison: the most bearish seller, HSBC (2026-09-23, H-share Hold), targets HK$5.8 ≈ RMB 4.93; the most bullish, Citi (2026-10-16, H-share Buy), HK$8.3 ≈ RMB 7.06 — offshore anchors are generally higher than this report, as they are set on H-shares and assume dividend restoration as the base case; the A-share is a holding structure (1 A-share ≈ 0.43 Red Chip equity interest, ~132% per-unit equity premium), so H-share targets cannot be directly transposed; this report's base range is independent of sell-side views and the current price.
Own earnings forecast (reconciliation anchor): FY2026 revenue RMB 390–395 billion, attributable profit RMB 7.4–7.9 billion (midpoint RMB 7.6 billion, -16.7%); FY2027 revenue RMB 394–402 billion, attributable profit RMB 7.9–8.5 billion (midpoint RMB 8.25 billion) — roughly 60% of 2027 growth comes from the VAT base effect resetting to zero and the annualized cost savings from institutional reform, with computing depreciation ramp-up being the largest downside uncertainty. About 2pp more conservative than sell-side consensus (FY26E RMB 7.82 billion), based on Mobile/Telecom Q3 still at -7.9%/-14.8% with the industry inflection unconfirmed.
Conclusion: Fair; target price range RMB 4.0–4.3 (base scenario fair value), no margin of safety (~-10%). Assess quality (low ROE, third place, reporting quality blemishes) separately from price (deepest PB discount within the sector, dividend yield still rebuilding): neither cheap nor expensive; wait for two switches — Q3 results verification and the dividend resolution.
Industry size: per MIIT data, 2025 national telecom business revenue was RMB 1.75 trillion, +0.7% YoY (+8% in 2022 → +3.2% in 2023/2024 → +0.7% in 2025, growth stepping down year by year); telecom business volume at constant prices +9.1%, the volume-revenue scissors gap entrenched. Revenue structure (2025): mobile data traffic RMB 609.7 billion (34.8% share, -3.1%, third consecutive year of decline); fixed broadband RMB 289.6 billion (16.5%, +5.9%, the only price-uptick logic: gigabit penetration 34.5%, FTTR 59.39 million households); emerging businesses (cloud/big data/IoT/data centers) RMB 450.8 billion (25.7%, +4.7%, growth retreating from the 2022 peak of 32.1%); voice RMB 125.3 billion (7.2%). Over the next 3–5 years the industry revenue midpoint is low single digits of 0–3% (no authoritative quantitative forecast; this report's own judgment): the VAT increase in 2026 suppresses industry profits (2026H1 industry revenue -2.1%), with the structural bright spot in computing — IDC forecasts China's intelligent computing services market at a 2023–2028 CAGR of 56.2%, reaching RMB 182.5 billion in 2028 (2025 AI IaaS market RMB 48.67 billion, of which GenAI ~84%).
Demand inflection assessment (sub-segment level for Unicom, not company-wide): AI inference demand constitutes a structural demand inflection for carriers' "computing/cloud" sub-segment — the driver trajectory is already quantified: national intelligent computing capacity of 2,592 EFLOPS at end-September 2026, +146% YoY; carriers' schedulable intelligent computing capacity 94.4 EFlops at end-2025 (+87.6%); Mobile's intelligent computing revenue +279% in 2025, +130% in 2026H1. But relative to the industry's total revenue pool (RMB 1.75 trillion), this remains a hedging variable for now: in 2025 emerging business growth actually fell to 4.7% (cloud only +2.9%), and 2026 industry profits are declining overall — the AI increment has not yet outpaced traditional business decay plus the tax shock. Unicom ranks third in the computing increment (computing revenue >15% of main revenue, data centers RMB 28.1 billion vs Mobile's computing services RMB 89.8 billion / Telecom's AIDC RMB 34.5 billion), with AI business revenue +140%, above its own overall growth — a marginal improvement. Per-unit usage leap is still early: consumer-side token monetization has just begun (Unicom's "Token+" plans from RMB 15/month), and enterprise-side penetration is climbing in double- to triple-digit growth ranges — not yet evidence of an "industry-wide re-rating"; this report does not switch its primary valuation anchor to a growth-stock framework.
Value chain and value distribution: upstream is equipment vendors (Huawei/ZTE/FiberHome; 4.838 million 5G base stations), China Tower (jointly owned by the three carriers), optical cables/modules, and AI chips (under export controls, shifting to Ascend and other domestic ecosystems — bargaining power in this link has flipped, with carriers constrained by chip supply). Midstream is network + computing infrastructure operations: 5G/gigabit fiber, IDC/AIDC facilities (93.8k external racks across the three carriers, net addition of 10.8k racks in 2025), cloud platforms and computing-network scheduling — the "national integrated computing network" is a new midstream value link in the computing era, with carriers migrating from "pipe providers" to "computing-network integrated service providers." Downstream is consumers (mobile ARPU ~RMB 45–47/month), households (converged broadband ARPU ~RMB 47), and government-enterprise (industrial digitalization: Telecom RMB 147.3 billion / Mobile government-enterprise / Unicom's Computing-Network & Digital Intelligence); ultimate payers are consumer spending, local government finances, and enterprise IT budgets. Value retention: traditional connectivity is an EBITDA cash cow (Mobile EBITDA margin 32.3%, Telecom 27.2%), with gross profit mostly retained in network operations; the computing/cloud link has lower gross margins and heavy depreciation, and value is being redistributed from "connectivity" to "computing + tokens" — Unicom is in the investment phase of that redistribution.
Supply-demand and competitive structure: on the demand side, the demographic dividend is exhausted — 1.827 billion mobile users (130 subscriptions per 100 people), 691 million fixed broadband households near saturation (2025 broadband net adds only 20.99 million); new volume growth lies in IoT (2.888 billion connections, +8.7%) and AI inference. On the supply side, four licensed oligopolies (Mobile/Telecom/Unicom/Broadcasting Network) with triple barriers of licenses + trillion-yuan-scale installed networks + spectrum; entrants are essentially zero. Network supply is in surplus; computing is short-term supply-constrained (Mobile management cites exponential growth in token consumption and insufficient computing supply) but broad intelligent computing supply (including cloud vendors' self-build) is filling in fast, warranting vigilance against localized oversupply in the medium term. Concentration is extremely high: mobile market share Mobile ~55.0%/Telecom ~24.0%/Unicom ~19%; broadband share Mobile ~47.6%/Telecom ~29.1%/Unicom ~19%. Competitive intensity: moderate price wars amid commoditized zero-sum competition — ARPU declining across all three (Mobile RMB 46.8/2025, Telecom RMB 45.1, Unicom RMB 44.8 in 2023 then disclosure stopped); number portability was once publicly called a "tool of vicious competition" by the market leader; in 2024–2026 regulation pivoted to "anti-involution" governance of disorderly price competition, and the VAT increase curbed room for price cuts — price-war intensity has eased at the margin but is not eradicated. Substitution threats: instant messaging displacing voice/SMS (voice revenue -1.7%, call minutes -5.1%); internet cloud vendors + Huawei competing directly with carrier clouds in cloud/intelligent computing; Broadcasting Network's 700M threat is limited.
Cycle and regulation: traditional connectivity is in late maturity (users peaked, volume up price down); the industry overall is in the painful transition of "replacing old drivers with new" — net profits of all three have declined sequentially since 2025Q4, with the downturn confirmed in 2026 (Telecom 2026H1 -14.9%, Mobile 9M26 ~-7.9%), mainly due to VAT + government-enterprise deceleration + AIDC depreciation; the computing/AI sub-sector is in early-to-mid growth. Leading indicators: ① the three carriers' capex mix (2025 combined RMB 285.5 billion, -19% from the 2023 peak, but Mobile's 2026 computing-network investment +62.4% and Unicom's computing share 35%+); ② intelligent computing supply and revenue (schedulable intelligent computing +87.6%, Mobile intelligent computing +279%); ③ ARPU and government-enterprise orders (Telecom government-enterprise -1.9% in first 7 months of 2026) as leading indicators of the downturn. Four regulatory threads: speed-up and fee-reduction policy has exited, replaced by anti-involution; VAT 6% → 9% (from 2026, the most significant impact on profits); SOE "one profit, five ratios" assessment + market-cap management orientation pushing payout ratios up to 61–75%; computing policies (six-ministry action plan + computing interconnection action plan + "15th Five-Year Plan" forward-building of an integrated computing network) endorse Unicom's computing-network strategy. Direction: neutral-to-positive structurally, negative for current profits.
Company positioning: Unicom is the industry's third player (mobile/broadband share both ~19%, broadly stable in recent years; 2025 net adds of mobile + broadband exceeded 20 million, a recent-year high). Three pillars of the moat: ① basic telecom licenses + nationwide network (physical assets + spectrum are non-replicable); ② 5G co-build-and-share with Telecom (over 1 million shared base stations, cumulative capex savings in the hundreds of billions to RMB 100 billion scale, annual base station power savings over 10 billion kWh) — maintaining nationwide coverage with the industry's smallest capex (RMB 54.15 billion, ~1/3 of Mobile's), a relatively favorable asset-return structure; ③ differentiation on the government-enterprise side in IoT/connected vehicles (95 million vehicles) and 5G private networks (revenue RMB 12.3 billion, +50%). Weaknesses are profitability (ROE 5.39% vs Mobile 9.97%/Telecom 7.27%) and cloud scale (Unicom Cloud in the tens of billions vs e-Surfing Cloud RMB 120.7 billion). Positioning summary: a niche-style chaser — surviving on asset-light + co-build-and-share + government-enterprise positioning, betting on the second curve with computing investment; industry standing has not flipped, but the direction of shareholder returns is improving.
Note: computing/cloud definitions are not fully comparable — Mobile is computing services revenue of RMB 89.8 billion; Telecom is e-Surfing Cloud RMB 120.7 billion + AIDC RMB 34.5 billion combined; Unicom is computing business revenue (>15% of main revenue, roughly RMB 52+ billion, converted by this report per its definition).
ARPU and Subscribers: ARPU across all three operators remains stuck at low levels—Mobile at RMB 46.8 (2025, cumulative -5% vs RMB 49.3 in 2023), Telecom at RMB 45.1; Unicom has ceased disclosing mobile ARPU in its A-share periodic reports since 2024 (only stating that converged bundle ARPU "remains above RMB 100"), and from 2026 onward its quarterly operating data no longer itemizes mobile bill-paying/broadband subscribers (replaced by an aggregated "connected users" figure of 1.311 billion, of which 5G network users are 249 million)—the decline in ARPU and subscriber transparency is itself a valuation discount factor. Subscriber base: mobile bill-paying users exceed 357 million (net add of 13.32 million in 2025), broadband exceeds 129 million (net add of 7.61 million), with convergence penetration at 78.3%.
Regulated Tariffs: The era of "speed upgrades and fee reductions" (2015–2018) that systematically suppressed ARPU has ended, with regulation shifting toward "anti-involution" governance of disorderly low-price competition; however, the VAT category adjustment (6%→9% from 2026) effectively imposes an approximately 3pp in-price tax on basic connectivity services that the companies could not pass through (gross margin -3.2pp)—explicit tariff suppression has exited while implicit tax-based suppression has entered, and this is the biggest change to the operators' valuation framework in 2026. Upside tariff flexibility is also constrained: Gigabit/FTTR is a structural price-increase channel (industry broadband revenue +5.9%), but Unicom's 19% broadband subscriber share limits its benefit.
Capex Intensity: Unicom's capex has declined for four consecutive years, from RMB 73.9 billion (2023) → RMB 61.37 billion (2024) → RMB 54.15 billion (2025) → ~RMB 50 billion (2026 plan), with capex/revenue falling from 19.8% to ~12.8%—the wind-down of the 5G investment cycle released FCF (RMB 37.26 billion in 2025, +24.7%), which is the cash basis for shareholder return improvement over the past two years. However, structurally, computing power investment is re-expanding (35%+ of the total in 2026, amount up 80%+), with capex "declining in total while shifting in structure"—if the computing power arms race intensifies in 2027 (cf. Mobile's 2026 computing network investment +62.4%), the FCF release logic will be tested, creating direct tension with the dividend commitment.
Dividends: This is the first anchor of Unicom's valuation. A-share payout ratio of 51.4%→55.6%→56.0% (2023–2025), red-chip basis 61.3%, all below Mobile/Telecom's 75%; DPS of RMB 0.1635 corresponds to a 3.70% dividend yield at the current price, below Mobile A at ~4.7% and Telecom A at ~3.9%. The suspension of the 2026 interim dividend is the first in six years; management attributed it to "a one-off arrangement due to early capex deployment"—if the annual report in March 2027 restores a full-year dividend (DPS ≥ RMB 0.16), the dividend narrative will be rebuilt; otherwise, it will confirm a new ordering of "investment before dividends," and bond-like funds will reprice against Mobile's 4.7% dividend yield as the anchor (implying roughly a 14% valuation decline). Telecom operators' dividend capacity is ultimately determined by FCF and state-owned asset assessments, and the two currently point in opposite directions (improving FCF vs. an assessment framework centered on total profit); the 2026 annual report will be the arbiter.
Conclusion: Neutral (confidence 0.55, 12-month horizon). The essential nature of China Unicom's business is unchanged—a low-growth cash cow under a licensed oligopoly; in 2026 it experienced a step-down in earnings from the tax shock and an interruption in dividend cadence, and the market is pricing it between the "deepest P/B discount" and an "uncommitted recovery option": the current price of RMB 4.42 is about 3%–10% above the baseline fair value of RMB 4.0–4.3, probability-weighted fair value ~RMB 4.11 (-7.0%), -27.6% to the bear center vs. +7.5% to the bull center—odds skewed downward but modest in magnitude. Strategy: Holders can continue holding to await the two switches—Q3 results and the dividend decision; new money should await one of two signals—a share price pullback below RMB 4.0 (dividend yield rebuilt to 3.9%+) or confirmation of full-year DPS ≥ RMB 0.16. Quality score (low ROE, third-place ranking, reporting transparency blemishes) and price score (deepest sector discount, with RMB 3.67 as a downside reference floor) should be assessed separately: low bubble risk, but upside equally lacks committed support.
Key Risks: Full-year dividend cut or no dividend (collapse of the dividend anchor); Q3 results falsifying the "narrowing decline" guidance; computing power investment returns falling short combined with the 2027 depreciation ramp-up; receivables impairment tail risk; execution disruption from share unlock and executive turnover. Key Monitoring Points: 2026-10-30 Q3 report (Q3 standalone net profit falsification line at RMB 1.9 billion / parity line at RMB 2.42 billion; computing growth rate; receivables and cash flow); post-unlock selling activity after 2026-11-02 unlock of 812 million shares (2.60% of float); president successor selection in 2026Q4–2027Q1; 2027-03 annual report and full-year dividend decision (DPS and payout ratio); 2027 capex guidance (whether it exceeds RMB 55 billion).
This report is based on public information and company disclosure documents, with prices frozen at the 2026-10-26 close; the 2026 Q3 report (scheduled for disclosure on October 30) may constitute an immediate revision to the 2026 earnings judgments herein. This report does not constitute investment advice.