Report Date: 2026-11-16 | Coverage: Wild-capture fisheries management in countries and species implementing catch quota regimes (TAC/ITQ) | Report Type: initial (full dossier)
The subject of this study is wild-capture fisheries management built on national catch quota regimes (TAC/ITQ): acquiring exclusive harvesting rights to wild species (cod/haddock, pollock, herring-mackerel-blue whiting, anchoveta-fishmeal, etc.) through quota ownership, leasing, or affiliated holdings, and operating integrated harvesting-processing businesses. Aquaculture companies per se are not the subject, but farmed products (tilapia/pangasius/farmed cod) are a substitute supply for wild catch, and their volume growth is a core demand-side variable.
Core methodological discipline: vessel capacity ≠ catchable volume. The industry's "capacity" is determined by stock biomass plus the annual TAC: Norway's registered fishing fleet stood at 4,989 vessels at end-2025, about -35% from its peak, with only 254 active large vessels ≥28 meters; the study's basis implies roughly 2x overcapacity (the Norwegian Auditor General's basis suggests cod-fishery vessel numbers down -36~-51%); the 100% contraction in output is fully explained by quota cuts. Conversely, quotas also ≠ actual catches: Peru's first 2026 season achieved only 24.6% execution (471 thousand tonnes out of 1,914 thousand tonnes authorized), and the US Bering Sea pollock B-season has been subject from 2026 to a hard cap of 45 thousand Chinook salmon bycatch (2025 actual bycatch ~151 thousand, 3x over the cap, NPFMC) — supply for short-lived species and bycatch-constrained fisheries must be discounted by species-level execution rates.
Overview of the world's eight major constraint regimes (quota as property right):
| Regime | Species Covered | Property Form | Tenure/Transferability | 2026 Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Norway-Russia Joint Fisheries Commission (JFC, since 1976) | NEA cod/haddock/capelin | Bilateral annual protocol TAC → domestic unit quotas (IVQ attached to vessels) | Long-term, moderate transferability (constrained by structural quota/vessel-group rules) | 2026 cod 285 thousand tonnes (in line with joint advice); Russia suspending some working groups |
| Iceland ITQ (since 1984) | Cod/haddock/saithe/mackerel-herring etc. | Permanent quota shares (aflahlutdeild) + annual TAC | Permanent, highly transferable (official exchange market) | 2026/27 statutory cod quota 199,285 tonnes; fishing fee +90.4% |
| US Alaska (MSA/NPFMC) | Pollock (AFA co-ops)/cod/crab | Shares within co-ops + 10% CDQ | Medium-term, transferable within co-ops | BSAI pollock flat at 1,394 thousand tonnes; GOA -26.5% |
| Russian investment quotas | Crab/pollock | "Investment-for-quota" auctions (shipbuilding obligations) | 15–16 years | 2019/2023 auctions totaling ~RUB 356.3 billion; crab quota auction failed in Oct 2026 |
| Chile LTE | Jack mackerel/anchovy-sardine | 10-year regional quotas (auction + historical allocation) | First batch 2021, expiring ~2031, transfers limited to same group | SPRFMO 2025 total quota +25%; new law from 2025 redistributing toward artisanal fishing |
| Peru | Anchoveta (north-center/south) | Seasonal quotas (Imarpe acoustic survey → PRODUCE) | Medium-term, science switch can halt fishing anytime | 2026 Season 1 authorized 1,914 thousand tonnes / caught 24.6%; Season 2 cancelled |
| New Zealand QMS (since 1986) | All species | Permanent ITQ (QMS) | Permanent, highly transferable; foreign ownership restricted | Strongest property-right jurisdiction (expropriation-with-compensation precedent) |
| EU/UK TAC | North Sea and other shared stocks | Relative stability shares | Annual, low transferability | 2026 trilateral mechanism normal; bottom-trawling restrictions advancing |
One-line value-chain map: stock biomass (state-owned) → TAC/quotas (quasi-property, source of rent) → harvesting (fleet, overcapacity) → primary processing (thin margins) → brands/channels (fragmented); the profit pool sits in the second link, and the contest is between the first and second — how much the government takes via fishing fees/resource rent taxes/redistribution.
Structural vs cyclical: structural forces account for roughly 1/3 of growth — aquaculture feed's long-term demand for fishmeal and fish oil, Africa's population-driven刚需 for cheap protein [translator's note: hard demand], and farmed whitefish eroding wild whitefish's share (aquaculture's share of global aquatic animal supply rose 51%→53%, 2022→2024; FAO forecasts 111 million tonnes farmed vs 94 million tonnes captured by 2032). Cyclicality dominates year-to-year swings: Peruvian El Niño (2023 collapse → 2024–25 recovery → 2026 crash), cod-class 3–5-year cohort cycles, and Europe/US foodservice and inventory cycles. This industry is at bottom a "quota-conservation market": near-zero total volume growth (2025→2028E, four categories 12.10→12.12 million tonnes); demand-side changes manifest as price repricing rather than volume growth.
Driver detail (figures + sources): pollock -80 thousand tonnes (Russia's 2027 ODU -2.9% to 2.35 million tonnes + GOA -26.5%, BSAI frozen; Federal Register/Russian Order N600); NEA cod -28.4 thousand tonnes (2026–28 average 312 thousand tonnes vs 340 thousand tonnes in 2025); haddock +30 thousand tonnes (2026 quota +17.9% to 153 thousand tonnes, Norway-Russia protocol); aquaculture substitution -100 thousand tonnes equivalent (pangasius exports of US$2.2 billion in 2025, +10%; Norwegian farmed cod 15.5 thousand tonnes, +110%, though still only 5.4% of wild quota — substitution is a potential inflection (to be quantified); the whitefish channel price-elasticity threshold was not obtained, so no structural-inflection claim is made); African herring-mackerel +150 thousand tonnes (+2.5%/year); NEA mackerel quota falling from overfished highs -100 thousand tonnes (2026 agreement 299 thousand tonnes, -59.6%); fishmeal demand +150 thousand tonnes raw-material equivalent (aquaculture +2.5%/year, offset by continued inclusion-rate declines). The bottom-up 12.12 million tonnes deviates -0.9% from FAO SOFIA 2024 forward interpolation (12.23 million tonnes); cross-validation passes.
Norwegian frozen H&G cod first broke NOK 103/kg in December 2025 (~$9,550/tonne), then fell back to NOK 91/kg in early November 2026 (week 44 2026 export average price, Norwegian Seafood Council weekly report); the fishmeal/soybean-meal price ratio went from 3.35 in 2023 → 4.67 in 2025 → ~6.9 spot as of May 2026, or ~8.1 converted at World Bank Sep-2026 prices (vs a 10-year average of ~3.5). An extreme price ratio is simultaneously evidence of scarcity and a substitution trigger: peer-reviewed trials show black soldier fly meal can fully replace fishmeal in salmon smolt-phase seawater feed (Belghit et al., Aquaculture), and fishmeal inclusion in salmon feed has already fallen from ~28% in the 1990s to ~10% — a ratio sustained above 6 for two quarters could squeeze out another meaningful tranche. Demand downside watchlist: European/US consumption down-trading (salted cod at €14/kg has already cut Portuguese volumes while raising prices; Norwegian clipfish exports to Portugal -7% by volume), China processing order volatility, MSC certification risk (mackerel caught 128% of scientific advice; Russian pollock recertification opposed by the State of Alaska).
Core quota pie (2026/latest): NEA cod 285 thousand tonnes (lowest since 1991, in line with joint advice; 2027 set at 325 thousand tonnes, only +3.9% above the 312.7 thousand-tonne advice); Icelandic cod 2026/27 statutory 199.3 thousand tonnes (-1%; the weak 2021–22 cohort is locked in, with MFRI judging little improvement possible for 2–3 years); US pollock BSAI flat at 1,394 thousand tonnes + GOA 129.7 thousand tonnes (-26.5%; data ruling: GOA taken from the Federal Register final version of 2026-03-11 at 129,749 tonnes; the upstream figure "22,550 tonnes" was a sub-area misreading, discarded); Russian pollock ~2.42 million tonnes in 2026, ~2.35 million tonnes in 2027; mackerel 2026 four-party agreement 299 thousand tonnes (-59.6%, with the EU/Iceland at one point sidelined, returning to a six-party 353 thousand tonnes in 2027); NSS herring 534 thousand tonnes in 2026 (+33%) → 588 thousand tonnes in 2027; blue whiting 851 thousand tonnes → ~1.06 million tonnes in 2027; Peruvian anchoveta 2026 Season 1 authorized 1,914 thousand tonnes / caught 471 thousand tonnes, Season 2 cancelled (Imarpe survey: of 5.12 million tonnes biomass, juveniles were 65% by weight); Chile jack mackerel SPRFMO 2025 total quota 1.5525 million tonnes (+25%, a record, Chile taking 66%), anchovy/sardine 625 thousand tonnes (-44%); Icelandic capelin 2026/27 advice +81% to ~358 thousand tonnes.
New-supply lags: 3–6+ years for cod class under weak cohorts; the governance channel can add volume within 1 year (2027 +14%) but is constrained by the HCR ±20% rule; farmed cod takes 2–3 years from stocking to harvest. Substitute supply: Norwegian farmed cod reached 15.5 thousand tonnes in 2025 (Ode 10 thousand tonnes, +110%) and continues expanding in 2026 — fast growth but only ~5.4% of the wild quota in absolute terms; pangasius/tilapia are price-band substitutes (global pangasius exports on the order of ~1.5 million tonnes/year). Within 2–3 years, aquaculture substitution will not change the wild-quota-dominated landscape.
There is no conventional cost curve: short-run supply = TAC; fleet overcapacity makes marginal costs flat, and vessels stop fishing once quotas are exhausted — the real bottleneck is the allocation of quota rent, not harvesting technology costs. Cost components: fuel for bottom trawling is roughly 20–35% of operating costs (to be verified, Nordic research basis); crew shares roughly 50–70% (Nordic share-system convention); unit-cost ranking (qualitative): capelin/herring-mackerel purse seine < Peruvian anchoveta purse seine < US/Russian pollock midwater trawl < Icelandic/Norwegian cod bottom gear < crab. Quota rent made explicit: Iceland's 2026 cod fishing fee is ISK 50.79/kg (+90.4%, levied on a profit basis), mackerel +151%; Norwegian quotas are tied to licenses and cannot be freely traded (no market price), while Iceland's official quota exchange averaged ISK 487.67/kg for annual cod quota in 2024. Hedging basis: no exchange-traded futures for any species here (Fish Pool is salmon-only — the upstream draft wrongly cited it as carrying cod prices, now corrected: primary price sources for frozen H&G cod are Norges Råfisklag auctions plus the Norwegian Seafood Council weekly export report), leaving operators' price exposure essentially unhedged; leaders only run FX forwards and 12–18-month fixed-price supply contracts.
Atlantic cod (round-weight equivalent)
| Year | Supply | Demand | Gap | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024A | 74.0 | 76.0 | -2.0 | NEA 48.3 + Iceland 21.7 + minor items 4.0 |
| 2025A | 58.1 | 74.5 | -16.4 | NEA actual catch 33.0 (96.9% execution) |
| 2026E | 52.4 | 73.0 | -20.6 | Gap = 28.2% of demand; cleared via pollock/pangasius/tilapia substitution + price |
| 2027E | 56.5 | 73.5 | -17.0 | NEA +14% (governance-driven recovery); global cod-family supply +6.5% (Groundfish Forum) |
| 2028E | 56.5 | 74.0 | -17.5 | Assumes NEA flat; if weak compliance is confirmed, HCR cuts again (downside) |
Pollock: 2024–2028E supply 390.1/413.2/404.4/397.4/393.7 vs demand 386.0/390.0/394.0/398.0/401.0 — nominal surplus of +4.1/+23.2/+10.4/-0.6/-7.3; the nominal surplus is absorbed by Chinese processing inventories and execution rates (US B-season Chinook bycatch cap, Russian execution ~92–95%), so reality is near balance, and surimi prices hit a record high in USD terms (Nov 2026). Pelagics (mackerel + herring + blue whiting): 2026E supply 168.4 vs demand ~280 — the "institutional gap" created by agreement cuts is cleared via higher prices, substitute stocks (capelin +81%, SPRFMO jack mackerel +25%), and Africa shifting to other proteins. Fishmeal (global finished product):
| Year | Supply | Demand | Gap | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024A | 500 | 505 | -0.5 | Big Peru year (fishmeal 670 thousand tonnes, +123%) |
| 2025A | 540 | 510 | +3.0 | Surplus coexists with soybean-meal pressure; price stuck at $1,706 |
| 2026E | 460 | 515 | -5.5 | IFFO: below 4.60 million tonnes, lowest since 2016; gap -10.7% |
| 2027E | 490 | 520 | -3.0 | Base case: partial Peruvian Season 1 recovery (1.0–1.5 million tonnes raw material) |
| 2028E | 515 | 525 | -1.0 | Mean-reversion assumption |
H&G frozen cod at NOK 91/kg sits at roughly the 79th percentile of its 10-year range (45–104) and about the 90th percentile by time; fishmeal at $2,951/tonne is a 10-year high (+73% vs the 2025 average, +87% vs the 2025-01 trough; World Bank PFISHUSDM series; the parallel IMF series differs by ~2.9% on the same day — this report consistently uses the World Bank series); surimi is at a record high in USD terms. Price-formation mechanism (a three-tier "quota conservation" pricing with no futures market): ① Raw-material tier = Norges Råfisklag weekly auctions plus fishermen's organization minimum prices (Norway), and explicit ITQ rental value (Iceland) — supply volume is exogenous to TAC, so price bears the entire market-clearing function; ② Processing/trade tier = 12–18 month fixed-price/formula-price forward supply contracts plus two rounds of Chinese re-freezing re-export friction (Russian raw material → China → Europe/US, with trade-flow restructuring raising landed costs); ③ Feed tier = fishmeal/soybean meal relative pricing (a ceiling and a substitution trigger coexist). Term-structure substitution signals: Peru's new-season super prime forward-sale reference price at $3,100/tonne CNF (2026-07, a record) carries a ~+5% premium to spot (a bet that tightness persists into early 2027); cod 2027-delivery forward contract prices trade at roughly -11.8% discounts to spot (priced along a +14% quota path) — steep spot, flat forwards, mutually corroborated by a destocking state (thin channel inventories: US surimi production -12.4%, B season ended early, China high turnover with no stock build-up).
Three cycle templates: Cycle 1 (2013–16, quota + climate double hit): NEA cod fell back from a peak of ~1.0 million tonnes (literature basis: ~800,000 tonnes by 2016, to be verified) plus the extremely strong 2015–16 El Niño (Peru cancelled one season) → cod prices +40–50% over three years, fishmeal ~$2,000, duration 3–4 years; Cycle 2 (2017–20, demand-shock trough): stable quotas + 2020 pandemic food-service freeze → cod price trough ~NOK 45–50 (to be verified), fishmeal trough ~$1,200–1,300, duration ~2 years; Cycle 3 (2021–26, governance-driven contraction upcycle, current): NEA cut consecutively by -67.8% + the twin El Niños of 2023/2026 → cod at NOK 103–104 (first break above 100 in 2025-12), fishmeal at $2,951, surimi at record highs; already 5+ years, amplitude roughly +100% for cod and +145% for fishmeal. Price elasticity (estimated from historical events, not econometric regression; expressed as ranges): quota -10% → cod prices +5–12% (single events confound FX and trade flows; a 0.5–0.9 range is used); fishmeal supply -10% → prices +30–50% (thin inventories plus feed-indispensability amplify the move).
Pricing framework: quota-path floor + biological-switch risk premium + alternative-protein ceiling.
| Period | H&G frozen cod (NOK/kg) | Fishmeal FAQ65% ($/tonne) | Surimi |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026Q4 | 88–94 (bull 95–102 / bear 80–86) | 2,700–3,000 (bull 3,100–3,500 / bear 2,300–2,600) | High (after USD record) |
| 2027Q1 | 84–92 (bull 92–100 / bear 76–84) | 2,300–2,800 (bull 2,900–3,400 / bear 1,900–2,300) | High, stable |
| 2027Q2 | 82–90 (bull 90–98 / bear 74–82) | 2,100–2,600 (bull 2,600–3,200 / bear 1,700–2,000) | Gradual decline |
| 2027Q3 | 78–88 (bull 88–96 / bear 72–80) | 2,000–2,500 (bull 2,400–3,000 / bear 1,600–1,900) | Declining but above 2025 |
Slope judgment on the baseline path: on the cod side, 2027 supply rises +14% with 2028/2029 recruitment recovering, so prices decline gradually from high levels while the center stays above 2024; on the fishmeal side, the last recovery (2023 El Niño) took about 5 quarters and inventories are lower this time, so the baseline already assumes a flatter decline (ranges shifted upward). However, substitution-driven inclusion-rate cuts triggered when the price ratio exceeds 6, together with the price retreat already visible in 2026-10 ($2,840), simultaneously cap the bull scenario — fishmeal is "higher for longer," not a "permanent upward shift in the center."
Iceland's quota CR3 = 25.3%, CR5 = 36.8%, and the top 25 holders control ~75% (Directorate of Fisheries basis, the same basis as the chart above); Norway's largest single cod quota holder, Lerøy Havfisk, holds 11.2% of national quotas (Norwegian basis); Chile's V–X region industrial jack mackerel CR2 = 46.6% (Orizon 25.9% + Blumar 20.7%), CR4 ≈ 74.6% (Sernapesca 2024 allocation basis — a different country and species from Iceland's; not directly comparable); New Zealand's Sealord (Nissui 50%), after acquiring Independent Fisheries (a quota package of ~46,000 tonnes), becomes the largest holder. Barriers are extremely strong: the core barrier is the quota itself — Iceland's permanent ITQs can be bought but are expensive (28-year nominal annualized return of 21.6%); Norway ties quotas to licenses, so entry is possible only via acquiring vessel-owner companies; NZ imposes constitutional restrictions on foreign ownership; new entrants can essentially only acquire whole quota packages.
① Profits accrue to "quota holding + harvesting": Iceland's fishing fee is levied on a profit basis; 2023 fee receipts were ISK 10.2 billion, implying an industry-wide "model profit" pool of roughly ISK 31 billion/year (~US$220 million); EBIT margins at quota-holding + harvesting companies run 9–20% (Brim net margin 14.6–19.7%); primary processing/trading margins are thin (Royal Greenland posted a 2024 pre-tax loss of DKK 196 million with a target EBIT margin of just 5%). ② Value migrates from fishmeal to human-consumption frozen products: 90% of Chilean jack mackerel goes to frozen products (Blumar own-catch share) vs an industry average of ~65%; players with quotas + frozen-product integration capture the upgrade dividend. ③ Rent flows out from companies to governments/the artisanal sector: Iceland's state take jumped in a single year from ~20% (1997–2017 research basis) to ~33% (per the Minister's statement that "companies retain 67% of profits"); Chile's 2025 new law redistributes quotas to artisanal fisheries (two listed companies have already sued for "implicit expropriation" compensation); Russia's two "quota-for-investment" auction rounds totaled ~RUB 356.3 billion (equivalent to obligations of ~US$7.9 billion), and a new crab-quota round failed to sell in 2026-10 — the precedent of states repricing quota rents has hardened in two major jurisdictions.
| Company (Market) | Position/Quota | Scale & Returns | One-Line Take |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brim (Nasdaq Iceland) | Iceland's largest quota package at 9.55% (≈30,600 t cod equivalent); groundfish + pelagic integration | FY25 revenue €410M, net margin 14.6%; market cap ISK 178.1bn, PE 13.2, dividend yield 2.3% | The No.1 listed vehicle for Icelandic quota rents; the fishing-fee ratchet is the main headwind |
| Lerøy Havfisk (Oslo) | 11.2% of Norway's cod quota + 29.6 cod/haddock quota units; largest trawler owner | 2025 revenue NOK 2.14bn (2024: 1.80bn); sharp profit recovery in 2025 | Highest-purity Norwegian cod quota play; extremely small free float |
| Vinnslustöðin (Iceland) | Icelandic mid-cap integrator (groundfish + pelagic) | 2025 revenue ISK 27bn; returned to profit | More torque than Brim, thinner disclosure |
| Blumar (Santiago) | Jack mackerel industrial quota of 107,000 t (20.7%) + ORP purchases + salmon | LTM revenue $618M, EBITDA margin 13.8%, net margin 2.9% | Representative of "quota + value upgrading," but the 2025 law directly cuts its core asset; in litigation |
| Camanchaca (Santiago) | Jack mackerel ~112,000 t (17.3%) + salmon; the $87M CPS acquisition implied a $290M valuation | 2024 revenue $813M, EBITDA margin 13.0%, net margin 2.7% | Higher quota purity; policy is the decisive variable for returns |
| Sanford (NZX) | NZ QMS permanent quotas carried at NZ$377M book (cost method); inshore shifted to "hold quota, lease out ACE" | FY25 revenue NZ$584M, ROE 8.8%, PE 8.1, PB 0.70 (market cap < book of NZ$741M) | Independent valuations suggest quota excess value covers the market-cap gap; but the discount hasn't converged in 5 years — a re-rating standoff |
| Royal Greenland (unlisted) | Greenland halibut/snow crab/shrimp quotas + onshore processing | 2024 revenue DKK 5.6bn, pre-tax loss DKK 196M | The counterexample of "losing money despite quotas": operating leverage can eat resource rents |
| Nissui/Maruha (TSE) | Indirect exposure: Nissui owns 50% of Sealord (NZ's largest quota package); Maruha owns an AK inshore pollock JV + 4.7% of Sanford | Group food businesses | Indirect exposure to overseas quotas, low purity |
Bargaining power along the chain: quota holders are strong vs downstream (fragmented retail/distribution, dependent on MSC-certified supply), strong vs Chinese OEM processors, and cyclically advantaged vs feed mills (fishmeal chain) — but Peru's supply recovery will compress prices via substitution effects, so there is a ceiling on bargaining power.
Return quality: medium (dispersed). The real money is made by low-cost own-quota holders (Iceland's official quota prices trend up long-term, Brim's net margin 15–20%, Havfisk profits recovering with prices); the illusion of revenue growth without profit growth shows up in two places: the Chilean duo (revenue +7% but net margin <3%, and the "volume" thesis is being directly cut by policy) and quota-less processing/trade (raw-material costs devour gross margin). Note the time-period bias in return benchmarks: the 21.6% Icelandic series is nominal ISK over 1992–2019 (includes post-2008 high-inflation gains, excludes the 2025–26 fee-ratchet period); after the rise in the rent-sharing rate, sustainable returns should be assumed at a nominal high-single-digit rate. Industry valuation position: there is no unified global industry index for quota assets (industry-level valuation percentile: unavailable); available anchors — Brim PE 13.2, Sanford PE 8.1/PB 0.70; the A-share SW Fisheries L2 index (mainly small-cap aquaculture/deep-sea names, limited comparability) trades at PE(TTM) 80.3x (31st percentile since 2014) and PB 2.33x (62nd percentile) — the same asset class is priced an order of magnitude apart in the two markets; the A-share notion of a "fisheries boom" does not price quota rents at all.
| Scenario | Probability | Narrative | Implications |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 0.20 | Peru's two 2027 seasons recover (3M t+ of raw material) + cod supply rises consecutively + consumer downtrading accelerates + farmed substitution speeds up; Iceland's fee rises again | Fishmeal $1,600–2,000, cod NOK 72–84; double hit to quota stocks' earnings and valuations |
| Base | 0.50 | Peru partially recovers in 2027-I (1.0–1.5M t of raw material), cod at 325,000 t delivered and flat in 2028, rent taxes don't spread | Cod NOK 78–92 declining gradually from highs, fishmeal $2,000–2,700; quota leaders' net margins plateau at 12–18% |
| Bull | 0.30 | El Niño persists through mid-year / another 2027-I cancellation + the 2028 cod assessment triggers further cuts (or a weak-compliance scandal) | Fishmeal $3,000–3,800, cod NOK 95–108; a second price spike, but note: the bull case is a tailwind for current earnings but an overdraft of quota assets' long-term value |
| Date/Window | Event | Directional Impact | Related Debate |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-12 | Peru IMARPE spring acoustic survey + ENFEN bulletin | Shapes 2027-I quota expectations | D2 |
| 2027-01 | Norwegian Parliament budget: direction of wild-catch resource rent tax | Rent-sharing rate | D3 |
| 2027Q1 | PRODUCE announces Peru 2027-I quota | Largest single point for fishmeal prices | D2 |
| 2027-03/04 | Peru north-central Season I opening and juvenile-fish rule enforcement | Enforcement risk | D2 |
| 2027-06 | ICES/JRN-AFWG 2028 cod advice + Iceland MFRI advice | Cod supply path | D1 |
| 2027-07 | Iceland 2027/28 quota regulations and veiðigjald fee rate | Whether fee ratchet is confirmed | D3 |
| 2027-10 | Norway-Russia JFC 2028 protocol | Russian working group participation | D1 |
| 2027-11 | MSC Russian pollock re-certification ruling | Premium on Russian-origin assets | D1/D2 |
| TBD | Chile quota reallocation litigation ruling | Value of Chile's two industrial-quota players | D3 |
Beneficiaries:
Avoid:
| Scenario | Biggest Beneficiaries | Most Hurt |
|---|---|---|
| Bear (0.20) | Downstream feed mills / Chinese contract manufacturers (falling raw-material costs); Icelandic pelagic processing relatively resilient | Lerøy Havfisk (cod price + Norwegian tax double hit); Peru fishmeal assets |
| Base (0.50) | Brim, Lerøy Havfisk (volume-price plateau + tolerable fee rates) | Quota-free processing/trade (raw materials still expensive); high-valuation A-share fisheries |
| Bull (0.30) | Lerøy Havfisk (cod price re-spike), Peru fishmeal assets, Brim | Quota-free processing (further raw-material cost rise); feed mills (fishmeal costs) |
① Biological risk: weak NEA cod compliance overshoots → forced further cuts in 2028 (volume-price double hit on quota asset valuations); systematic deterioration of Peruvian anchoveta stock. ② Policy risk: ratchet diffusion of rent-sharing rates (Norwegian tax landing, Icelandic fees rising again, unfavorable Chilean litigation); spatial constraints on bottom trawling (EU/UK). ③ Demand risk: accelerated downgrading in EU/US consumption toward basa/tilapia; shift of Chinese processing orders. ④ Substitution risk: farmed cod volume growth (+110%/year) faster than expected. ⑤ Methodology risk: demand series in this report are anchored estimates and price elasticities are event-window estimates; key conclusions are highly sensitive to a single Peru variable (fishmeal) and the Norway-Russia protocol (cod).
Data and Methodology Notes: ① All supply-side data taken from first-hand quota/protocol documents (IMR-VNIRO 2026-1, Icelandic Reglugerð 870/2026, Federal Register 2026-03-11, Russian official decree N600, SPRFMO COMM14, PRODUCE announcements); ② Price sources: H&G frozen cod = Norwegian Seafood Council weekly export reports / Norges Råfisklag auction system; fishmeal = World Bank PFISHUSDM (FRED), used consistently throughout; ③ The "GOA pollock 22,550 t vs 129,749 t" contradiction has been adjudicated in favor of the final Federal Register version; ④ The demand column of the balance sheet is an anchored estimate (±40,000 t), not consumption statistics — the gap conclusion should be used in terms of direction and magnitude; ⑤ Not obtained: consolidated quota annual rental price quotes, EU/US cold storage inventory series, Chilean quota per-ton transaction prices.