Industry Profile Report | 2026-11-16 | Commodities Framework (Supply-Demand Balance and Price Cycles as Headline) | Research Scope: Tungsten mining quotas, mine grades, overseas projects, tungsten recycling, cost curve; resource/smelting/cemented carbide profit decomposition (molybdenum supply-demand and business excluded, not consolidated)
Tungsten (W) value chain in one sentence: Upstream resources (wolframite/scheelite mining and beneficiation → 65% WO3 standard-tonne concentrate) → midstream smelting (APT (ammonium paratungstate) → tungsten powder → tungsten carbide powder) → downstream deep processing (cemented carbide: cutting tools/mining tools/wear parts/dies; tungsten metal: tungsten wire/rolled products; tungsten special steel and heavy alloys; tungsten chemicals), plus a recycling loop (scrap carbide/grinding sludge → APT/powder back into the chain).
2025 global primary tungsten demand is approximately 162 kt WO3 ≈ 128,400 tonnes W (S&P Global/Project Blue, August 2026 report); primary mine supply is 85,000 tonnes (USGS MCS 2026), with recycled tungsten at ~33.8%–35% (consistent with ITIA's recycling input rate of ~35%). End-market breakdown (global basis, S&P/Antaike):
| End market | Share | 2025 growth | Logic |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cemented carbide (cutting tools/wear/mining/dies) | 64% (internal: cutting 51%/wear 24%/mining 20%/other 5%, China Tungsten Industry Association 2023) | China +7.0% | Manufacturing CNC upgrade (China machine-tool CNC rate 43.7%) + mining capex + auto output +10.4% |
| Tungsten metal/rolled products (PV tungsten wire/lighting/electrodes) | 15% | China +3.0% | PV tungsten wire's high growth offset by shrinking lighting tungsten wire |
| Special steel and alloys (incl. military heavy alloys) | 13% | China +0.6% (near-zero growth) | HSS continuously displaced by carbide |
| Tungsten chemicals (catalysts/WF6 electronic specialty gas) | 2% | +3.0% | Moderate semiconductor increment |
| Other (lighting/semiconductor interconnect/some munitions) | 6% | Divergent | 3D NAND tungsten interconnect +~3,000 tonnes/yr in 2026–2030 (per Project Blue citation, to be verified) |
Regions: China accounts for ~50%–59% of global primary demand (difference due to re-export of China's deep-processed products); over the past 5 years China consumption grew +5%/yr, faster than global mine output +2–3%/yr; Europe ~20%, North America ~15%, Japan/Korea ~10% (ITIA historical basis, recent primary updates missing, to be verified).
Structural (60–70% of the volatility axis): manufacturing upgrading and CNC adoption (China cutting-tool market projected at RMB 63.1 billion by 2030, CAGR 4.14%, machine-tool tooling association); military rearmament (US DFARS banning procurement of Chinese tungsten powder/heavy alloys entirely from January 1, 2027; the Pentagon plans up to USD 1 billion in critical-minerals stockpiling; DLA inquiry for ~1,700 tonnes of concentrate); semiconductor interconnect. Cyclical (30–40%): PV wafers (2026 China installation guidance 180–240GW, down 24–43% from 2025's 315GW, CPIA), mining capex, monthly auto/machine-tool fluctuations.
Base year 128,400 tonnes → 2028E ~136,300 tonnes (S&P interpolation vs bottom-up bridge discrepancy 0.02%; CICC's 2.7% growth path is 2.1% optimistic):
① Ceramics/cermets and CBN superhard tools: niche substitution of high-end tungsten, <1% impact on total tungsten (USGS explicitly notes most alternatives "reduce rather than replace"); ② coated HSS revival: substitutes low-end tungsten, and HSS itself contains 1.5–8% tungsten — neutral-to-negative for total volume; ③ dematerialization (fine grains/smaller inserts/coating life extension): the broadest mild suppression — China carbide output CAGR ~10% vs primary tungsten consumption CAGR only 2–3% is empirical proof; ④ recycled tungsten: the only path with real elasticity against mine demand (see I3.4). Judgment: substitution suppresses "intensity" rather than the "material," and does not change the ~2% total-volume growth center; the real bear case is recycling and high-price demand destruction.
① High-price backlash has occurred: Chinese concentrate has pulled back from the ~RMB 1.05 million peak in March 2026; October monthly average RMB 327,100 (-19.63% MoM); tools/carbide October monthly average -14.82% MoM; downstream "rolling purchases of essential needs, resisting high-price speculative inventory" (Baichuan Yingfu basis); ② PV chain second bottom: 2026 installation guidance down 24–43%, compounded by 96% penetration peak and wire thinning — PV tungsten wire demand could fall ~-30% YoY in 2026; ③ demand backlash from export controls: overseas processing chains are passively destocking/seeking alternative sources, compressing ex-China spot primary demand (2025 China tungsten product exports 13,149 tonnes, -27.5%).
| Year | Total mining control quota (65% WO3 standard tonnes) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 105,000 | Primary mining 78,150 + comprehensive utilization 26,850 |
| 2021 | 108,000 | — |
| 2022 | 109,000 | Primary 81,170 + comprehensive 27,830 |
| 2023 | 111,000 | First batch 63,000; primary/comprehensive distinction no longer made from this year |
| 2024 | 114,000 (+2.7%) | First batch 62,000 + second batch 52,000 |
| 2025 | First batch 58,000 (-6.45%) | Jiangxi cut by 2,370 tonnes; full-year notice not published (market rumor ~107,000 standard tonnes, to be verified) |
| 2026 | First batch ~60,000 (+3.45%, market reports, to be verified) | Marginal shift from tightening to slight supply increase |
Quota allocation: 2025 first batch Jiangxi 21,300 (36.7%), Hunan 15,530 (26.8%), Henan 7,050 (12.2%); exceeding quotas strictly prohibited. Note on basis: quotas are on a concentrate basis (1 standard tonne × 0.65 × 0.7393 ≈ 0.48 tonnes W), not directly reconcilable with USGS China production of 67,000 tonnes W (metal basis, including above-quota/byproduct sources).
China quota mines' average run-of-mine grade fell from 0.42% (2004) to 0.28% (2024) (Ganzhou Tungsten Association); 1 standard tonne of concentrate now requires mining 345 tonnes of ore; 12 mines over a century old; the national average tungsten mine grade is below most new overseas mines. Comparison: Sangdong 0.45–0.51%, Dolphin 0.92% (reserve basis, monthly mining 0.63%), Mactung ~0.7% (historical basis, pending new feasibility confirmation), Boguty 0.23%, Hemerdon 0.14% + 0.03% tin, Sisson 0.066% + 0.021% molybdenum (Mo not counted in tungsten supply); China's new high-grade vein mines are only Shaanxi Dongyang 1.2% and Qipangou 1.18% (300,000 t/yr each); Dahutang 0.185% and Zhuxi 0.52% are low-grade large-mine reserves. Grade decline is the most rigid source of cost inflation on China's supply side.
Global reserves >4.7 million tonnes W (USGS MCS 2026), China 2.5 million tonnes (53%); static reserve life ~55 years globally, ~37 years in China — tungsten is not a resource-depletion play but a policy and cost-access play. Overseas pipeline (stratified by delivery probability):
Guosen Securities basis: overseas increment ceiling 2026–27 of ~20,000 standard tonnes/yr ≈ 9,611 tonnes W (≈11% of global output), but "overseas tungsten project construction progress falls far short of expectations" is its explicit judgment; given Sangdong's first production was later than expected and Hemerdon is a second restart, this report counts 20–30% of the ceiling in the 2027 balance, i.e., overseas mine supply +2,500 tonnes W in 2027 and another +2,500 tonnes W in 2028.
Global recycling input rate (RIR) is ~35% and has been stable for years (ITIA basis; S&P Global's August 2026 report uses the same ~35%); China's recycling rate is only 20.7% (2023, Antaike) → policy target 30%; 2025 China scrap tungsten supply ~12,000 tonnes (~16% of consumption); GEM's 2025 recycled/re-manufactured tungsten exceeded 10,000 tonnes (≈10% of national mine output). Recycled WC needs only 1.1–1.2 tonnes of scrap carbide and a 7–10 day cycle vs 2 tonnes of concentrate and 1+ month for primary — superior on both cost and lead time. Two new variables: ① From August 27, 2026, the US BIS bans tungsten scrap/black powder exports for one year (2026H1 US scrap tungsten exports of 2,183 tonnes already ≈ all of 2025), tightening the EU/Japan secondary feedstock pool and marginally raising primary mine demand in reverse; ② high prices stimulate competitive bidding for scrap with diminishing elasticity — recycling is a long-term counterweight to the mine segment, but under stock constraints it cannot fill the gap alone.
① Grade decline (0.42%→0.28%) + rigid taxes (6.5% ad valorem resource tax + effective VAT burden >10%) raise the cost center; ② quota constraints (2025 first batch -6.45%, over-quota mining strictly prohibited; 2026 first batch turned +3.45%, to be verified); ③ old mining district depletion (China reserve-to-production ratio ~37 years, southern Jiangxi vein tungsten mine cluster grades depleted); ④ overseas financing/permitting bottlenecks — low-grade projects rely on government funding rather than commercial financing; ⑤ gray channels: Myanmar has again become one of China's largest tungsten ore suppliers (first 8 months of 2026 imports of 8,734 tonnes of ore, +148.9%, annualized ~13,100 tonnes of ore ≈ 4,585 tonnes WO3 ≈ 3,390 tonnes W), North Korea route flows (2025 ~USD 31.5 million; Jan–May 2026 ~USD 87.5 million), Kachin situation is a tail risk; ⑥ short-cycle non-China supply (Almonty disclosure: Spain Los Santos tailings take-or-pay ≥1,720 tonnes WO3; Rwanda tailings/purchased ore already >100 tonnes of ore/month) — "material already on the ground" supply is not constrained by construction cycles.
| Year | Mine supply | Recycling | Total supply | Primary demand | Apparent gap (+surplus/-deficit) | % of demand |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024A | 82,000 | 43,882 | 125,882 | 125,882 | 0 | 0.0% |
| 2025A | 85,000 | 43,400 | 128,400 | 128,400 | 0 | 0.0% |
| 2026E | 87,000 | 44,000 | 131,000 | 130,968 | +32 | +0.02% |
| 2027E | 90,000 | 44,900 | 134,900 | 133,587 | +1,313 | +0.98% |
| 2028E | 92,500 | 45,500 | 138,000 | 136,300 | +1,700 | +1.25% |
Basis and reconciliation notes: 2024–25 balanced as "mine supply (USGS) + recycling (residual, consistent with ITIA's ~35% input rate) = demand" — the 2025 tight balance was essentially achieved jointly by export compression, smelting inventory accumulation, and high-price demand rationing; it is an artificial tight balance; 2026E mine supply includes a small China quota rebound + Myanmar gray increment, with overseas new projects contributing near zero within the year (Sangdong only had first production in September); 2027–28E overseas increments counted at 20–30% of the Guosen ceiling (20,000 standard tonnes/yr ≈ 9,611 tonnes W), including net additions from gray/short-cycle supply; demand follows S&P's ~2% base path.
Stockpiling is one-off, not sustained buying: The DLA inquiry for ~1,700 tonnes of concentrate ≈ 817 tonnes W is only 0.6% of global demand, and the USD 2 billion is a FY2026 umbrella program covering multiple critical materials; US restocking ahead of the DFARS ban (fully effective January 1, 2027) is classic pull-forward; after January 2027 this buying most likely drops sharply MoM — from 2027 the apparent surplus will be exposed, which is the core pressure item in the price path.
Tungsten has no exchange inventories or futures (CME plans to launch cash-settled APT futures in Q1 2027). Baichuan Yingfu sample data for October 2026: tungsten concentrate plant inventories of 385 tonnes (flat m/m), APT 618 tonnes (+10.4%), tungsten carbide powder 106 tonnes (+19.1%) — a sample of only a few hundred tonnes has limited statistical significance and cannot prove "low inventories"; the qualitative industry characterization under the same sample basis is "industry-wide inventories at high levels, with continued accumulation at midstream smelters." Overseas strategic stockpiles (DLA/EU/JOGMEC, US pre-ban restocking by defense contractors) are not visible but are trending upward. Confidence in inventory assessment is moderate; direction is cross-validated by price action (stabilization after a deep drawdown).
| Cycle | Period | Driver | Pattern |
|---|---|---|---|
| Demand + QE cycle | 2009–2013 | Global manufacturing recovery | Gradual rise over 3–4 years; US APT annual average peaked at USD 449/mtu in 2012, fell back to 358 in 2013 (USGS); amplitude ~100% |
| Great trough | 2015–2016 | Slowing Chinese demand + overhang of Pan-Asia inventories (end-2018 Pan-Asia still held 29,651 tonnes of APT ≈ 3 months of Chinese output, USGS) | Break below cost lines, production cuts at most mines, November 2015 State Reserve procurement |
| Policy cycle | 2016–2018 | State Reserve procurement + environmental inspections + supply-side reform | US APT at USD 353–397/mtu in October 2018 (USGS), a gain of ~60%; pullback in 2019–20 |
| Plateau cycle | 2021–2024 | Moderate demand + cost-push (declining ore grades) | Chinese concentrate central level slowly rising from RMB 90k to 137k/mt; ten-year high in May 2024 (MMTA) |
| Super policy cycle | 2025–2026 | Export controls (Dec 2024 vs. US, Feb 2025 comprehensive) + defense stockpiling + speculation | Chinese concentrate 2025 average RMB 217.9k (+59%) → Dec 2025 peak 462k → March 2026 historical peak ~1.05m → 9-month deep drawdown → stabilization at 380–390k; European APT 2025: 331 → 675 → July 2026 peak 3,400 → now ~USD 2,650 |
Patterns: Policy-driven cycles rise steeply (over several quarters, +60% to +600%), last as long as the policies persist, and draw down deeply (-30% to -70%), but each cycle's trough and central level shifts systematically higher (concentrate trough: RMB 50k → 75k → central level 137k → this cycle's plateau far above that); demand-driven cycles rise slowly but persist longer. This cycle combines "dual policy drivers + market bifurcation," with a policy duration (controls not loosened + DFARS effective January 2027) longer than a typical policy cycle — after the drawdown, prices are more likely to hold a high plateau than revert to the old central level — but the -70% drawdown in 2026 proves that speculative premiums are eventually given back; a policy premium ≠ permanent pricing.
Pricing framework = incentive-price floor (USD 235–260/mtu ≈ RMB 108,500–120,000 per metric tonne of Chinese concentrate) + direction of supply-demand balance (tight balance in 2026 → mild surplus of +1.0–1.2%/yr in 2027–28) + inventory positioning (speculative inventory in the later stages of release, rising overseas strategic stockpiles, smelter-side accumulation) + gradual retreat of policy premium (spread narrowing from 3.0x to ~2x).
| Period | Chinese Concentrate (RMB 10k/mt) | European APT (USD/mtu) | Logic |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026Q4 | 35–38 (center ~36) | 2,400–2,800 (~2,600) | Current price of RMB 380–390k contains overstated elements; October average 327.1k; restocking pulse vs. price-support standoff |
| 2027Q1 | 33–38 (~35) | 2,200–2,700 | Final phase of pre-DFARS-ban stockpiling + Spring Festival restocking; post-January fade in US restocking is a timing risk |
| 2027Q2 | 31–35 (~33) | 2,000–2,500 | Sangdong ramp-up + Hemerdon ramp + Myanmar volumes; continued speculative give-back |
| 2027Q3 | 29–33 (~31) | 1,800–2,300 | Peak period of overseas supply delivery; Western stockpiling at high levels fading |
| 2027Q4 | 27–32 (~30) | 1,600–2,200 (~1,900) | Center = 2.2x the 2024 average, 2.7x the incentive-price equivalent; spread converging to ~2x |
The 2027Q4 center of RMB 300k per metric tonne is a neutral, not a conservative, assumption — if controls loosen while Myanmar flows stay elevated (see bear case), the center could fall to RMB 250–280k; in an upside scenario, a Q1-2026-style spike could recur.
Roughly 60–70% of profits currently sit with the resource end, and the peak was passed in Q2 2026:
Direction of profit migration (next 2–3 years): ① As domestic prices fall, profit margins swing back from the mine end toward smelting/alloys (Zhongwu High-Tech/Zhangyuan and Xianglu's Q3 2026 quarterly net profit falling -89%/-95% q/q is the mirror image of mine-end profit contraction); ② if the tungsten price center stays high (sell-side assumption of RMB 500k/tonne for 2026–2028), the mine-end profit pool remains thick, and profits are redistributed internally toward a fully integrated leader as Shizhuyuan's technical upgrade plus Minmetals' three entrusted mines are injected by 2029; ③ overseas "de-China-fication" of supply chains (Almonty–GTP/Sandvik long-term contracts, Boguty reaching capacity in 2027, GTP/Wolfram securing feedstock) + recycling growth slowly dilute China's resource-end pricing power; ④ smelting in the long run reverts to a toll-fee model, with excess profits unsustainable; ⑤ alloy-end profits depend on premiumization (AI microdrills/aerospace tooling) rather than tungsten prices.
The mine end's leverage over global buyers is extremely strong and institutionalized (quotas + export controls + crackdowns on illegal mining); price increases pass through smoothly, and overseas buyers can only lock volumes via 15–21-year long-term contracts (Almonty × GTP 4.41M mtu/21 years; Almonty × Sandvik signed September 2026). The smelting end's leverage vs. mines is weak (toll fees lag), and vs. downstream it locks in via long-term processing-fee contracts. The tools end has strong leverage over end-manufacturing customers (brand + process services + surcharges), but price wars are normalized in China's mid/low-end alloy segment. Note: reports that China Rare Earth Group would consolidate tungsten assets are unconfirmed — tungsten consolidation within the state-owned system occurred under Minmetals (Shizhuyuan injected into Zhongwu High-Tech).
Return quality: overall "resources good, smelting poor, alloys mixed." The resource end currently earns real money (mine-end net margins 36–44%) but is highly cyclical, and profits have passed their peak — excess profits cannot be extrapolated linearly. The smelting end is the classic "revenue up, profit not" segment (revenue +85% to +139% with prices, but thin margins that get devoured by inventory impairments during violent price swings). The alloy end's overseas majors and domestic high-end niches (PCB microdrills/PV tungsten wire with 80%+ global share) offer sustainable returns backed by brand and technology moats. Q3 2026's coexistence of high revenue growth and steep q/q profit declines is a direct signal of the divergence between industry momentum and returns.
Valuation position: The SW Minor Metals Index (801054.SI) trades at 26.17x PE (20th percentile since July 2014) and 3.59x PB (40th percentile) as of 2026-11-13 — the sector overall is not expensive. But in October 2026 the tungsten sector fell -28.16% in a single month, underperforming the CSI 300 by ~19.6pct, with PE(TTM) crushed from 28.8x to 18.8x (4.48% historical percentile at month-end) — the market completed the repricing of "falling tungsten prices" in just over a month. Stock-level layering: Xiamen Tungsten at 14.8x PE(TTM) (4th percentile over 10 years) / 2.93x PB (median) is the most balanced; Zhongwu High-Tech/Zhangyuan Tungsten at ~7.1–7.2x PB (~90th percentile over 10 years — still high despite a large pullback from 52-week highs); Xianglu Tungsten at 13.8x PE(TTM) (0th percentile) is an artifact of peak earnings (a low-PE percentile ≠ cheap; cyclical earnings peaks depress PE). Conclusion: sector valuations have partially priced in the price decline, but high-PB resource names still embed a "tungsten prices stay high" assumption — if the 2027 average price comes in significantly below RMB 300k per metric tonne, both earnings and valuations could still get hit. The combination of momentum rolling over from highs × mid-to-low valuation percentiles means stock selection matters more than sector beta.
| Player | Positioning | Share/Scale | Advantages & Interpretation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Xiamen Tungsten (600549) | Full chain: mine–smelting–tungsten wire/alloys | Producing mines ~12,000 mt (≈10% of national); PV fine tungsten wire 80%+ global share | Tungsten/molybdenum segment revenue RMB 24.31bn and total profit RMB 4.38bn (+86%) in first three quarters of 2026; most balanced valuation (PE 4th percentile/PB median) |
| Zhongwu High-Tech (000657) | Minmetals full chain: Shizhuyuan + Zhuzhou Carbide/Zigong/Zhuzhou Drills/Jinzhou Precision | Cemented carbide 25.5% national (No. 1 globally); APT 12.2%; equity mine volumes can double after entrusted-mine injection | Net profit attributable RMB 2.98bn (+227.9%) in first three quarters of 2026; PB ~7.2x (90th percentile) already embeds high-price expectations |
| Zhangyuan Tungsten (002378) | Jiangxi integrated mining & smelting (self-sufficiency ~20%) | Concentrate ~4,000 mt/yr | Large mine-end leverage (net profit +279% for first three quarters) but -89% q/q in Q3 alone; PB at 90th percentile |
| Xianglu Tungsten (002842) | Pure midstream: APT + tungsten powder + alloys | Second tier | Q3 quarterly net profit -95.5% q/q — a typical sample of the profit fragility of mine-less companies during price swings; molybdenum business excluded from assessment |
| Almonty (NASDAQ:ALM) | Overseas pure resources: Sangdong + Panasqueira | Sangdong Phase 1 first production Sept 2026; GTP offtake 4.41M mtu over 21 years | Lowest decile of the cost curve (company-reported ~USD 110/mtu); long-term contracts lock volumes and prices — the purest carrier of the Western price-spread dividend, though realized prices are below spot |
| Tungsten West (AIM:TUN) | Restart of Hemerdon, UK | Grade 0.14% | NWF up to £71m + government right to purchase 50% of output; went bankrupt in 2018 — high execution risk |
| GEM (002340) | Recycling/re-refining | Recycled >10,000 tonnes of tungsten in 2025 (≈10% of national mine output) | Dual catalyst of high prices + recycled certification; a long-term hedge against resource-end pricing power |
| Sandvik (SAND.ST) | Tools + closed-loop captive ore-to-powder (Wolfram) | Machining segment EBITA margin 19.9% | Tungsten price volatility manageable for it (self-supply + pass-through + locked-volume contracts) |
| Kennametal (KMT) | Pure-buyer tools/wear parts | FY2025 revenue ~USD 2bn | Gross margin 30.4%, insensitive to tungsten prices — direct evidence of the tools end's bargaining power |
① DFARS 252.225-7052: From January 1, 2027, defense procurement comprehensively bans components containing Chinese tungsten powder/heavy tungsten alloys (current waiver expires 2026-12-31) — pre-ban stockpiling was a 2026 buy, fading in 2027; ② Defense stockpile: FY2025/FY2026 each authorize USD 2bn in critical minerals procurement, with DoD planning to stockpile up to USD 1bn; in March 2026 DLA issued supply solicitations for tungsten among 13 minerals (RFQ ~1,700 tonnes of concentrate); ③ Section 232 critical minerals investigation (Proclamation 11001, January 2026): negotiations on agreements + price floors first, with a ~180-day checkpoint (H1 2027) after which tariffs or a minimum import price may be imposed. Separately, IEEPA tariffs on China (cut back to 10% in November 2025) raise import costs of tungsten-containing goods.
US DPA/DoD direct funding (Fireweed Mactung USD 15.8m, Guardian Pilot Mountain USD 6.2m, 6K recycling USD 23.4m); UK NWF up to £71m in equity-style support for Hemerdon (government receives rights to purchase up to 50% of output); the EU CRMA lists tungsten among 34 strategic raw materials, with Spain's El Moto among the first 47 strategic projects (claiming to meet ~20% of EU tungsten demand by 2030); Australia proposes a AUD 1.2bn critical minerals buyer-of-last-resort reserve; South Korea lists tungsten among critical minerals. With commercial financing absent and government capital stepping in — the shape of the overseas supply curve is decided in Washington/London/Brussels.
Myanmar (8,734 tonnes of ore to China in the first 8 months of 2026, +148.9%) has become one of China's largest tungsten ore suppliers; the North Korea channel (tungsten is not on the UN embargo list) is accelerating; Russia's Tyrnyauz restart is progressing but excluded by Western demand. Net policy direction: tailwind (bullish) — controls tighten the supply side while Western legislation and stockpiling create the demand side, jointly pushing the East-West spread to ~3x and lifting the value of overseas projects; the main headwinds are détente spillover, speculative give-back, and gray-channel volumes. The US scrap export ban (one year from August 27, 2026) tightens the Western secondary raw-material pool, marginally reinforcing the bargaining power of primary ore and Western mines instead.
| Scenario | Probability | Chinese Concentrate | European APT | Narrative |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 30% | RMB 180,000–250,000 per mtu | $800–1,400/mtu | Tungsten included in easing arrangements / licenses released in batches + Myanmar/North Korea volumes ramp up + overseas projects on schedule + speculative stampede: silted inventories and gray flows released simultaneously, surplus widens to 2–3%, prices revert toward incentive price + risk premium band |
| Base | 50% | RMB 270,000–380,000 (2027 center around 300,000) | $1,600–2,800 | Controls continue but licensing normalizes, overseas gradual ramp-up (partly delayed), spread 3x→2x: slow decline from highs |
| Bull | 20% | RMB 500,000–800,000 per mtu | $3,000–4,000 | Controls tighten / renewed conflict + Myanmar corridor disrupted + further overseas delays + early-stage speculation around CME futures listing: replay of the 2026Q1-style spike |
| Timing | Event | Directional Impact | Related Debate |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 months from 2026-11-10 | Rolling renewal of the China-US consultation pause, Announcement No. 21 measures suspended again — whether tungsten is included in adjustments is the biggest variable | Easing → bearish for prices / bearish for Western projects | D1 |
| 2027-01-01 | US DFARS full ban on tungsten powder/heavy alloys takes effect; pre-ban restocking tapers | Offshore panic buying short-term → buying tapers thereafter | D3 |
| 2027Q1 | CME tungsten APT cash-settled futures planned launch | Introduces forward price discovery and a speculation amplifier (both directions) | D1 |
| 2027-03/04 | China announces first batch of 2027 mining quotas | Increased supply → suppressive; further tightening → supportive | D1 |
| Around 2027-04 | US Section 232 critical minerals ~180-day milestone (agreement/price floor/tariffs) | Western price floor → supports offshore prices | D1/D2 |
| 2027H1 | Sangdong Phase II completion (>460,000 mtu/year), Hemerdon/Boguty ramp-up | Delivered → suppresses prices; delayed → supportive | D2 |
| 2027H2 | DLA tungsten stockpile purchases materialize, Boguty reaches full capacity (10,000 mtu) | Western buying vs. supply increments offset each other | D2/D3 |
| Monthly | China tungsten product exports, Myanmar/North Korea imports, Baiinfo sample inventories, Zhangyuan long-term contract quotes | High-frequency tracking of controls and gray flows | D1/D3 |
Debunking the value trap: The bottom-right quadrant's "smelting/blank intermediates (Xianglu-style)" is the sector's most typical momentum illusion — beneath the surface of +139% revenue growth in the first three quarters of 2026, Q3 net profit fell -95.5% QoQ; profit elasticity during price surges is amplified by unhedged mine exposure, and nearly wiped out during price declines. Bullish momentum ≠ worth buying. Almonty sits furthest to the upper right (Western spread + long-term locked volumes + lowest cost percentile), but its "deep in-the-money" position is partially absorbed by long-term contract pricing, so elasticity is lower than the spot impression suggests. Cutting tool majors sit in the upper left (mine-side momentum decline is a cost tailwind for them and brand returns are high quality, but constrained by overall manufacturing volumes). Tungsten West's execution risk drags down the vertical axis. Note: The matrix is a static view under the base scenario; sensitivity to wrong scenario bets is shown in the table below.
| Scenario | Biggest Beneficiaries | Worst Hit |
|---|---|---|
| Bull (tighter controls / overseas delays) | Almonty (Western spread widens again), Zhangyuan Tungsten (price elasticity) | Kennametal/Sandvik (raw material costs), downstream users |
| Base (slow decline from highs, spread converges) | Xiamen Tungsten, China Tungsten (full-chain hedge + injections/high-end volume) | Pure intermediates (inventory write-downs absorbed before processing fee recovery) |
| Bear (controls ease / gray flows surge / demand weakens) | Sandvik/Kennametal (raw material costs fall), GEM (relatively resilient) | Zhangyuan Tungsten (high PB + elasticity backlash), Almonty (spread collapse + incentive price breach risk), China Tungsten (earnings downgrades) |
① Faster-than-expected policy easing: Tungsten included in China-US easing arrangements or licenses released in batches, collapsing the East-West price spread and hitting both domestic and offshore prices; ② Deepening demand destruction: High prices + manufacturing weakness push primary demand growth below 2%, with 2027 surplus widening to 2–3%; ③ Overseas supply delivered ahead of expectations: Sangdong/Hemerdon/Boguty reach full capacity simultaneously + gray flows stay high, pressuring the incentive-price floor; ④ Inventory data blind spots: Tungsten has no exchange inventories; sample data (hundreds of tonnes scale) cannot verify true industry-wide inventories, so judgment relies on indirect confirmation via price behavior; ⑤ Data caliber risk: China's full-year 2026 mining quotas are not public, overseas project disclosures (e.g., Sangdong) are at inconsistent times, and Myanmar/North Korea flows are customs/secondhand calibers — key assumptions in this report's balance sheet are flagged as "to be verified"; investors should track and verify each item via the catalyst calendar above.
Caliber and verification notes: All tungsten figures in this report are in tungsten metal content (W) or 65% WO3 mtu, annotated throughout; molybdenum supply/demand and businesses are not consolidated; figures flagged as "to be verified" — including China's full-year 2026 mining quotas, the pace of Sangdong Phase II ramp-up, global penetration rates (60–80%, secondhand), and some historical troughs — are provided only as ranges for reference, not as headline conclusions.