Report Date: 2026-11-15 | Industry View: Cautiously Bullish (12-24 months) | Scope: On-site supply and industrial park pipeline networks; retail gas used only for comparison; helium not covered separately
This study focuses on the on-site supply and industrial park pipeline network segments of the industrial gas industry: gas suppliers invest in and build air separation units (ASU) at or adjacent to customers' sites under BOO/TOC models, supplying a single large customer directly by pipeline (on-site supply), or building centralized units within chemical/metallurgical/electronics parks and supplying multiple tenant companies through pipeline networks (park pipeline networks). The boundary with the retail model is determined by transport economics: the economic radius of cylinder gas is about 50 km, and liquid tanker trucks about 200–300 km (consistent figures from Qiaoyuan Co.'s prospectus and Heyuan Gas annual reports); pipeline supply is zero-distance. Only large customers with consumption ≥ ~10,000 Nm³/h of oxygen (~340 tonnes/day) and long-term stable demand cross the investment threshold for on-site production (US experience is 200–300 tonnes/day; Hangzhou Oxygen's smallest pipeline project is 12,000 Nm³/h).
One-sentence industry chain map: Upstream (electricity — ~65–70% of operating costs; ASU equipment — Hangzhou Oxygen holds 43% of domestic oxygen capacity share) → Midstream (on-site production/park pipeline operations, with 15–20 year take-or-pay contracts as the product) → Downstream (steel metallurgy, basic chemicals/coal chemicals, electronics semiconductors, glass and building materials, etc.). Helium and specialty gases are not covered separately; retail (cylinder/liquid wholesale) serves only as a pricing and profit pool benchmark.
Note: This industry is analyzed along the generic value chain; segment-specific data depth is limited — there is no authoritative first-hand statistics on total national on-site supply capacity or revenue by operator. All key aggregates in this report are third-party estimates with error bands noted.
Aggregate estimates (error must be noted): Frost & Sullivan (compiled by Industrial Securities, cross-checked with Yingde's/Huaneng's Yingde Gas–Air Power prospectus) estimates China's industrial gas market at ~RMB 232.5 billion in 2025, of which outsourced on-site production accounts for ~63.5%, implying on-site supply revenue of ~RMB 147.6 billion. Note: this metric has conflicting definitions — the Air Power-affiliated definition claims 2025 on-site supply share of 65.5%, while some media cited domestic outsourced supply share at only 40% (undefined scope; unclear whether retail is included). This study adopts the two converging first-hand/continuous time-series definitions (63.5%/65.5%), and applies an overall ±20% error band to the demand bridge. Bottom-up reconciliation is impossible: national total ASU capacity, on-site revenue of the three foreign giants and state-owned players such as Baowu Clean Energy are all undisclosed. Hangzhou Oxygen (3.5 million Nm³/h oxygen) + Yingde (3.45 million Nm³/h) — the two leaders combined at ~6.95 million Nm³/h — converted at 80% minimum-take operation cover only part of the total pool.
Structural drivers (estimated >3/4 of increment): ① Long runway of outsourcing — China's outsourced on-site production share rose from 50.5% in 2015 → 56.5% in 2020 → 63.5% in 2025E, vs ~80% in developed markets; ② electronics bulk on-site production is entirely new increment (ppb purity + 15-year contracts + high gross margin; domestic companies completed the 0→1 substitution only in the past 5 years); ③ park consolidation — MIIT's "Standards and Administrative Measures for Chemical Park Construction and Recognition" (2021) and provincial negative lists push capacity into 672 provincially recognized chemical parks (as of end-January 2024, secondary compilation, pending verification), making centralized park gas supply the default form for new projects. Cyclical drag: crude steel -4.4% in 2025 and expected to fall another ~10 million tonnes in 2026; with steel at ~1/3–1/2 of on-site supply downstream, this implies a drag of ~0.9–1.8 pp/year — but take-or-pay clauses compress the revenue impact far below the output decline. Hangzhou Oxygen's gas revenue still grew positively during the 2013–2016 steel capacity-cut period, a historical validation (see I7-D2 for survivorship bias risk).
Base year RMB 147.64 billion (2325×63.5%) → 2028E ~RMB 180.33 billion (2325×1.05³×67%), cumulative net increase of +RMB 32.69 billion, CAGR ~6.9%: total market organic growth +RMB 23.27 billion (assumes total market CAGR of 5%, already embedding steel decline, below the historical 9.5%), outsourcing ramp (63.5%→67%) +RMB 9.42 billion. Cross-validation: Guanggang Gases' revenue from contracted but not-yet-stable gas supply rose from RMB 448M in 2023 → RMB 1.205B in 2025 → RMB 1.668B in 2027E (company first-hand forecast, contract expiries 2037–2039). Key caveat: the 6.9% is an "industry-basis" bridge, not a "third-party operator-basis" bridge — if customer self-supply continues (see I3.3), the achievable growth midpoint for third parties is only ~4–5%.
Switching suppliers ≈ resetting investment + breach costs + shutdown retrofit: ① pipeline physical connection and asset specificity — the unit is built within the customer's site, owned by the gas company, with extremely low redeployment value elsewhere (after Henan Junhua's shutdown, Hangzhou Oxygen's RMB 110 million of dedicated assets recovered only RMB 9.75 million, ~8.9% residual value, per company announcements and Industrial Securities compilation); ② contract breach costs — the Tonggang case precedent: early termination triggers annualized compensation on invested capital (1 year of use = 90% compensation → 4 years = 60%); the Xiangtan case: 20-year contract with a take-or-pay floor of at least 1.1 million Nm³ per month; ③ electronics customers' qualification takes 1–2 years and outage risk is extremely high. In actual cases customers almost never proactively switch suppliers — all contract terminations were due to customers' own shutdowns (Junhua, Tonggang, Taijia alike). This is both a moat and a boundary marker: contracts cannot lock against customer shutdown, and tail credit risk exists in the form of judicial precedents (see I7-D2).
On-site supply is contract-based "contract first, build later" supply, with no open-market capacity addition: Hangzhou Oxygen had 88 owned ASUs / 3.5 million Nm³/h as of end-2024 (~650,000 Nm³/h newly commissioned in 2024, ~430,000 in 2025, 9 new projects signed in 2025); Yingde Gas has 160+ large on-site units / 3.45 million Nm³/h oxygen capacity (plus 886,000 Nm³/h syngas). Pipeline/new-signing anchors: Jinhong Yingkou 66,000 Nm³/h (contract ~RMB 2.4 billion); Jinhong Ruilin 23,000 Nm³/h (~RMB 1.86 billion, commissioning around 2026); Guanggang Shenzhen/Nantong electronics bulk (signed in 2025H1); Hangzhou Oxygen's self-invested Indonesian gas company (oxygen 260,000 + nitrogen 170,000 Nm³/h, its largest overseas investment). Signing→commissioning takes ~18–30 months (Jinhong contracts explicitly state "commissioning within 18 months of construction start"). When the Hangzhou capital consortium acquired Yingde (Air Power) in May 2023, it committed to promoting asset restructuring with Hangzhou Oxygen within 36 months (commitment expiring ~May 2026); if consummated, China's on-site production would see a single entity of ~7 million Nm³/h spanning equipment + gas across the whole chain — the biggest variable at the landscape level.
Variable marginal cost ≈ power price × unit consumption: comprehensive oxygen power consumption of large/medium units ~0.36 kWh/Nm³ (small ~0.65), at commercial/industrial tariffs of 0.5–0.7 RMB/kWh implying marginal cost ~0.18–0.25 RMB/Nm³ oxygen. All-in BOO investment intensity ~6,542 RMB/Nm³/h (Hangzhou Oxygen 2019–2023 new signings RMB 12.986B / 1.985 million Nm³/h, actual calculation), with clear small-project penalty (Jilin Economic Development Zone's 12,000 Nm³/h project reached 11,800 RMB/Nm³/h). Supply constraints lie not in capacity but in contracts, electricity, and capital: ① no investment without a long-term contract (dedicated assets); ② grid access and tariffs (power-fee pass-through must be negotiated, see I4.1); ③ 5–8 year payback, heavy capital occupation; ④ liquid backup + pipeline networks are invisible barriers (standalone points have poor risk resilience).
The real boundaries of three substitution paths:
Conclusion: in the "≥10,000 Nm³/h + 15-year volume lock" space, technical substitution risk for on-site supply is low; the real erosion comes from business-model substitution (self-supply). The counter-evidence data (84% self-supply) and the long-run logic data (outsourcing ramp) differ in scope (new unit counts vs stock structure, industry media vs Frost & Sullivan); this study treats it as the D1 swing factor rather than adopting either side directly.
Three charging formats: ① fixed base fee + actual gas fee, two-part tariff (mainstream for large/medium BOO; fixed fee covers depreciation + fixed O&M); ② pure gas fee + annual take-or-pay true-up (monthly settlement on actual volumes, year-end top-up to minimum); ③ fixed rent (small/ equipment rental). Minimum purchase volumes (take-or-pay) typically range from 65% to 95% of designed capacity (a few early projects at 43%–57%); volumes above the cap are settled at retail liquid prices — liquid price volatility thus partially transmits into on-site project revenue. Energy pass-through: pipeline gas prices "adjust only per electricity price, CPI, and wage indices" (Hangzhou Oxygen announcement wording), but pass-through is not automatic — the Tonggang–Huacheng precedent ((2020) Ji Min Zhong No. 338): when power prices rose 22.2% in 2009, the supplier unilaterally raised prices; the final ruling held that the increase be borne 50/50 by both parties. With electricity at 65–70% of operating costs: full pass-through = profit neutral; 50/50 sharing = EBITDA ~-18%; no pass-through = EBITDA ~-36%, project IRR falling from ~11.9% to ~5%. After Document No. 1439 (2021) fully marketized commercial/industrial power prices and Document No. 136 (2025) brought renewables fully to market, power prices entered a two-way volatility phase — the probability of pass-through disputes rises rather than falls (Shandong already has precedents ordering compensation for shared power-trading losses).
On-site pipeline oxygen contract prices are ~0.3–0.5 RMB/Nm³ (chart shows midpoint 0.40 as illustration), a discount of ~32%–46% vs liquid oxygen tanker gas-equivalent prices (2023 provincial averages 360–550 RMB/tonne, converting to 0.51–0.79 RMB/Nm³, midpoint 0.65); liquid nitrogen retail gas-equivalent is ~1.64 RMB/Nm³ — low price in exchange for locked volume is the product definition of on-site production; electronics bulk reprices on ppb purity + uninterruptible service (gross margin 35.13% vs steel pipeline ~25%, per Guanggang's 2022 inquiry response; stock data under undisturbed bidding discipline).
Simplified model (per Nm³/h of designed capacity, actual calculation): investment RMB 6,500 + 15-year contract value ~RMB 36,400 (5.6x, Jinhong Yingkou basis) → annual revenue ~RMB 2,427 (≈0.35 RMB/Nm³ at 80% utilization); power consumption 2,523 kWh/year × 0.45–0.6 RMB → power costs at 46.8%–62.4% of revenue (cross-consistent with industry "electricity at 65–70% of cost"); EBITDA margin 42.9% (steel-type) ~52.9% (electronics-type); after-tax all-in IRR: steel-type ~11.9%, structurally advantaged ~15.8%; steady-state ROIC ~7.9%–11.1% — consistent with foreign peers' ROCE ~10% (Air Liquide recurring ROCE 10.7%) and Yingde's 2020 net margin 13.2%. Static payback 5.1–6.3 years. Stress and tail corrections (precedent-calibrated): ① on customer shutdown, dedicated asset residual recovery is provisioned at ~10% (Junhua case 8.9%); ② take-or-pay enforcement runs through judicial cycles — the Tonggang case: RMB 26.39 million in arrears litigated for 12 years; the Shengma case: RMB 40+ million unit mired in litigation before gas was even supplied; ③ company-level figures are significantly below project models: Hangzhou Oxygen's 2025 gas business gross margin 16.45% (annual report); project-level "steady-state net margin 12–17%" (Lüliang model) should be understood as the portfolio pool basis of normal-operation, surviving contracts; after adding tail default losses of ~50–100bp/year, the full-portfolio return midpoint shifts down to net margin ~10–14% and IRR stress floor 5–7%.
Three-factor synthesis (2026Q4 basis, actual calculation): existing-contract power price linkage concessions ~-1.5% + weak retail liquid prices dragging excess gas fees ~-2% (excess volume ~20% share × liquid prices -10%~-20% YoY) + electronics bulk structural shift ~+1% ≈ -2.5%, then narrowing over four quarters to -1%~0% and stabilizing. Pricing framework: take-or-pay floor (revenue floor) + energy pass-through (~50% after friction) + new-signing structural shift (rising electronics share). Third-party on-site supply revenue growth midpoint ~4–5%, below the industry bridge of 6.9% — the difference is precisely what self-supply captures.
Global CR3 ~48% (Linde 21% + Air Liquide 20% + Air Products 7%, Soochow Securities citing Zhongshang Industry Research/Air Power prospectus, 2021); China CR5 ~69% (including Yingde 10%, Hangzhou Oxygen 6%). On the ASU equipment basis, Hangzhou Oxygen ranks first with 43% share (2020, convertible bond prospectus). Margin benchmarks: Linde 2025 operating margin 27.2%, Air Liquide 2024 19.9%, Air Products FY2025 adjusted ~24% — oligopoly pricing discipline is a global industry trait.
The thickest, most stable profit link is the 15–20 year on-site production contract: Jinhong's "on-site production and rent" gross margin ~54–60% (Industry Info citing annual report 54.16%, Kaiyuan Securities estimate 59.84%, secondary source pending verification) vs its blended gross margin ~30%; project net margin climbs from ~3% in year one to ~16.7% after 15 years as depreciation is cleared (Lüliang model). Retail/liquid wholesale is the classic "revenue without profit": in 2025 Jinhong's revenue +10% but net profit -34%; first three quarters of 2026 net profit only RMB 15.69 million (-86.47%), net margin ~0.7%, ex-non-recurring -141.85% into negative (Jinhong 2026 Q3 report); Heyuan 2025 net profit -17.5%. Equipment manufacturing (Hangzhou Oxygen gross margin 27.86%) has above-average profit quality but is highly cyclical. Profit migration direction over the next 2–3 years: out of brownfield steel/chemical pipeline gas (production cuts + receivables + repricing) and retail wholesale (price wars), into electronics bulk on-site production and equipment (self-supply capex orders + going global) — but migration gains are being diluted by electronics bulk bidding discounts (already showing in Jinhong's financials, see D3); the yielders are Air Products (strategic retreat, FY2025 exit-related charges of USD 3.7 billion) and small/medium retail players, while the takers are domestic long-term contract operators and equipment leaders.
Strong vs. upstream: electricity costs account for a high share but are passed through via pass-through clauses (~50% after friction); air separation equipment can be self-manufactured (Hangyang) or sourced from multiple domestic suppliers. Mixed vs. downstream: steel/chemical large customers are nominally strong, but hedged by the triple protection of take-or-pay + dedicated plants + excess volumes billed at retail prices; however, in downturns credit and renegotiation risks emerge (Tonggang case; Air Products also disclosed in FY25 customers requesting early termination). Electronic customers, due to qualification barriers, actually leave the gas supplier in the stronger position; industrial park pipeline networks enjoy quasi-utility characteristics and first-mover exclusivity over park tenants (economic exclusivity: heavy pipeline investment + exclusive agreements, typically one operator per park), but are constrained by local governments' investment-attraction concessions.
| Player | Positioning | Key Metrics (Basis) | One-Line Interpretation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yingde Gases / GasGo (YINGY) | China's largest independent on-site gas supplier (3.45 million Nm³/h oxygen + 886,000 syngas) | 2020 revenue RMB 16.1 billion, net margin 13.2%, China share ~10-12.6% | The purest long-term contract asset pool; in 2024 PAG transferred it to a Chinese consortium for USD 6.8 billion, with US relisting in 2026—operational continuity after the ownership change needs monitoring |
| Hangyang (002430) | Equipment (43% share) + gas operations integration | 2025 revenue RMB 15.08 billion (gas 67%); gas gross margin 16.45%, equipment 27.86%; ROE 9.9%; first three quarters of 2026 net profit +30.4%, gas revenue +26.75% | The most balanced of the equipment-plus-gas dual engines: customer self-build actually boosts equipment orders, while pipeline gas base business provides all-weather stability |
| Guanggang Gases (688546) | Purest play on electronic bulk on-site gas supply | Electronic bulk 79.2% of revenue (2025); backlogged not-yet-stabilized gas supply orders RMB 1.668 billion for 2027E; first three quarters of 2026 net profit +105.8% (incl. helium price elasticity) | Steepest electronic volume growth, but Q3 gross margin +10.5pct mainly driven by helium price volatility, operating cash flow -28%—profit quality must be re-verified excluding helium |
| Jinhong Gas (688106) | On-site gas supply (small/mid-size + electronic bulk breakthrough) + retail consolidation | 2025 revenue RMB 2.78 billion; on-site gas supply and rental gross margin 54-60%; first three quarters of 2026 net margin ~0.7%, adjusted (ex-non-recurring) turned negative | Best-in-class assets dragged down wholesale by retail price wars and tender discounting—a textbook case of revenue growth without profit |
| Heyuan Gas (002971) | Hubei regional park pipeline networks + electronic specialty gas transformation | 2025 revenue RMB 1.66 billion, gross margin 18.9%, ROE 3.8%, debt ratio 72% | Real positioning, but a capital-heavy transformation target with back-loaded profits |
| Linde (LIN) / Air Liquide (AI.PA) | Global top two; in-China legacy long-term contracts + electronic bulk | Operating margin 27.2%/19.9%; ROCE 10.7% (Air Liquide) | Benchmark for pricing discipline; in-China incremental share eroded by domestic players but legacy contracts remain high-quality |
| Air Products (APD) | On-site-focused giant in strategic retrenchment | FY2025 revenue USD 12 billion, adjusted margin ~24%; GAAP loss due to USD 3.7 billion exit write-down | The in-China/global increments ceded by its retrenchment constitute an opportunity window for domestic leaders |
No SW "Industrial Gases" industry index exists; the closest broad category is SW Basic Chemicals (PE 21.72x / 36th percentile, PB 1.84x / 19th percentile, since 2014-07, as of 2026-11-13). Individual stocks: Hangyang PE(TTM) 21.2x (31st percentile over 10 years), PB 2.41 (32nd percentile); Jinhong PB 2.73 (3rd percentile over 10 years, but ROE(TTM) has collapsed to ~0.9%—the low PB is fair pricing of impaired profitability rather than mispricing; also listed on the STAR Market only 6 years, percentile sample insufficient); Heyuan PB 3.56 (4th percentile over 1 year), PE(TTM) over 150x. The valuation conclusion is divergence, not a broad rally option: Hangyang's evidence chain of "profit improvement + structural upgrade with gas at 67% of revenue" holds and its valuation is mid-range; Jinhong's and Heyuan's low percentiles correspond to collapsed ROE, and recovery requires new-contract gross margins to rebound—while tender discipline is being tested.
| Scenario | Probability | Narrative | Implications |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 0.30 | Self-build share stays >70%, power pass-through disputes yield new adverse case law, electronic bulk tender price cuts (contract value/capacity →4x), helium price decline exposes Guanggang's elasticity, Jinhong-like adjusted losses persist | Composite ASP down 3-5% annually, third-party revenue growth <2%, project IRR compressed to 5-7%; Jinhong/Heyuan refinancing risk |
| Base | 0.50 | Legacy long-term contracts stable, ASP decline flattens from -2% to 0% annually, electronic orders commission on schedule offsetting self-build encroachment, liquid prices L-shaped bottoming | Third-party revenue growth 4-5%, project after-tax IRR 10-13%, ROIC 8-11%; long-term contract assets deliver bond-like returns |
| Bull | 0.20 | Electronic bulk volume and price both rise + tender discipline holds, new park signings recover, self-build share falls below 50%, liquid price rebound restores excess gas fees | ASP up 1-3% annually; Guanggang/Jinhong offer the greatest turnaround elasticity |
| Date/Window | Event | Directional Impact | Related Debate |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-12~2027-01 | NBS 2026 crude steel output and "15th Five-Year Plan" production policy signals | Legacy contract volumes and renewal direction | D1/D2 |
| 2027-01 | Provincial chemical park review wrap-up, rectification freeze lifted (Document No. 317) | Thaw of park pipeline new project approvals | D1 |
| 2027-03 | Hangyang/Jinhong/Heyuan/Guanggang 2026 annual reports: on-site gas segment gross margin, new contract value/capacity ratio | Verify tender discipline and profit pool migration | D1/D3 |
| 2027-04 | Guanggang's RMB 1.668 billion 2027E not-yet-stabilized order realization milestone; helium elasticity exclusion verification | Electronic bulk profit quality | D3 |
| 2027H1 | Full power spot market operation + fourth regulatory cycle transmission tariffs (from 2026-08): power price center and linkage supplementary agreements | Effectiveness of energy pass-through | D2 |
| Around 2027-05 | Hangyang-Yingde (GasGo) restructuring commitments expiry and subsequent progress | Landscape restructuring | D1 |
| 2027-06 | Association/third-party annual new air separation statistics: self-build vs. third-party share | Core D1 win/loss indicator | D1 |
Top-right "Core Holdings": Hangyang (equipment + gas dual engine, self-build trend actually boosts equipment orders, mid-to-low valuation percentiles with profit improvement evidence chain), Yingde Gases (purest long-term contract asset pool), Linde/Air Liquide (global pricing discipline benchmarks). Middle-right "High Growth, Unverified": Guanggang Gases (steepest electronic volume growth but profit quality must exclude helium; cash flow divergence needs to converge). Top-left "Turnaround Candidate": Air Products (adjusted returns still high post-retrenchment; the ceded increments are a domestic opportunity). Bottom-right "Value Trap" warning: Jinhong Gas and Heyuan Gas—industry demand isn't bad (right half), but returns are eaten up by retail price wars, tender discounting, and capital-heavy ramp-up (bottom half); "decent cycle" does not equal "worth buying"—Jinhong's recovery first requires two consecutive quarters of positive adjusted profits. Bottom-left "Avoid": retail liquid/cylinder segment (the price war's main battleground).
| Scenario | Biggest Beneficiaries | Worst Hit |
|---|---|---|
| Bear (0.30) | Linde (defense + global diversification); Hangyang (equipment orders hedge operations downturn) | Jinhong (persistent adjusted losses + refinancing), Heyuan (high leverage), Guanggang (helium decline + tender price cut double hit) |
| Base (0.50) | Hangyang (dual-engine balance), Yingde (long-term contract asset realization) | Regional retail gas players (continued shakeout) |
| Bull (0.20) | Guanggang (steepest electronic volume-price rise), Jinhong (greatest turnaround elasticity) | Foreign players' in-China legacy (accelerated substitution) |
① Steel/chemical customer production cuts exceeding expectations, driving downward revision of legacy contract minimum volumes and rising arrears (take-or-pay enforcement subject to judicial cycles); ② Power pass-through clauses becoming contentious under market liberalization (case law supports only 50/50 sharing), with electricity at 65-70% of costs making project IRR sensitive to power prices by ~7 percentage points; ③ Continued customer self-build, with third-party new-signing capture rate stuck at ~16%, decoupling industry revenue growth from listed players; ④ Electronic bulk tender price wars compressing new contract value/capacity ratio from 5.6x toward 4x, collapsing growth-segment returns; ⑤ Hangyang-Yingde restructuring uncertainty; ⑥ Data basis risk—three conflicting outsourcing rate figures, no authoritative national on-site gas supply statistics, demand bridge error band ±20%.
Key Data Sources: Frost & Sullivan China industrial gas market data (compiled via Industrial Securities Hangyang deep-dive and GasGo prospectus); Soochow Securities Hangyang deep-dive (2025-12) (concentration, Lüliang model); Guanggang Gases IPO inquiry response (electronic bulk orders and margins); Qiaoyuan Co. announcement 2023-04-25 (electricity cost share 70%+); china-gases 2025 industry analysis (self-build statistics, unit-count basis unverified); GBF〔2017〕No. 77, MIIT-LY〔2022〕No. 34, NDRC-Price〔2021〕No. 1439, NDRC-Energy〔2025〕No. 650; China Judgments Online Tonggang-Huacheng case ((2020)吉民终338号) and related case law series.