Rating: Neutral | Target Price: RMB 15.6–17.0 (fair value range, base-case scenario, 12 months) | Current Price: RMB 15.68 (2026-10-28 close) | Margin of Safety: approx. -0.5% (no substantive margin of safety) | Time Horizon: 6–12 months | Overall Confidence: 0.55
China Merchants Securities is a leading full-service brokerage with top-tier earnings quality and stable SOE (central enterprise) shareholders. Its 2025 weighted ROE of 9.94% has risen for five consecutive years, and 2026H1 net profit attributable to parent of RMB 10.624 billion (+104.87%) hit a record high for the period. However, our analysis shows that roughly half of 2026H1 profit came from RMB 5.22 billion of direct investment mark-to-market gains at CMS Investment (FVTPL revaluation after IPOs of Damicro and ChangXin Technology, among others; shares still under lock-up and gains reversible). Excluding these, recurring annualized net profit attributable to parent is approximately RMB 10.8 billion. This report uses a normalized net profit midpoint of about RMB 12 billion and normalized ROE of about 8.4%. At the current price of RMB 15.68, common-equity PB is about 1.07x (excluding RMB 17 billion of perpetual bonds). Although this sits at its lowest 5-year percentile, backward-solving implies a sustainable ROE of about 9.4%–11.2% (depending on cost of equity), meaning the price has partially priced in the "RMB 2 trillion daily turnover new normal + recurring direct investment monetization." Meanwhile, margin financing balance has fallen from its 2026-06-25 peak of RMB 3.03 trillion to approximately RMB 2.46 trillion in late October (about -19%), and Q3 turnover declined quarter-on-quarter; profit base normalization is the base-case assumption for 2027. Across three scenarios (bear RMB 13.2–14.7 / 30%; base RMB 15.6–17.0 / 50%; bull RMB 19.0–20.6 / 20%), the probability-weighted expected value is about RMB 16.3, only +3.9% versus the current price: a good company at a fair-to-slightly-rich price, with no substantive margin of safety but also no basis for a deep drawdown — Neutral / Hold, with the 10-30 Q3 report and 2026-12-31 year-end fair value revaluation as directional checkpoints. A 40% payout ratio (2026E dividend yield of about 4.6%) and China Merchants Group's stable 43.14% shareholding provide downside cushioning.
Opportunity Definition (Evidence Strength: Grade B, neutral market environment): Over the next 12 months, this does not yet constitute an actionable opportunity — the current price already reflects "RMB 2 trillion average daily turnover + recurring direct investment monetization"; the scenario-weighted expected value is only about +4% versus the current price. Directional checkpoints are the 2026-10-30 Q3 report (fair value change line and CMS Investment quarterly net profit) and the 2026-12-31 year-end revaluation; re-assess entry if the turnover midpoint falsifies sell-side consensus or the stock converges toward asset value (around common-equity BVPS of RMB 14.69).
Primary Price Driver: Market beta — the average daily turnover midpoint × margin financing balance, determining the direction of brokerage revenue (24.6% of 2026H1 revenue), net interest income (+144.43%), and proprietary trading including direct investment (62.4% of revenue). Leading indicators: weekly average daily stock-and-fund turnover and margin financing balance (margin balance has already fallen about 19% from the 6-25 peak of RMB 3.03 trillion to RMB 2.46 trillion). Confirmation signal: turnover holding above RMB 2 trillion and margin balance recovering above RMB 2.5 trillion. Falsification signal: turnover persistently below RMB 1.5 trillion and margin balance falling below RMB 2 trillion.
Expectation Gap (Direction: market expectations too high): Sell-side consensus (approximately 50 covering analysts; 39 Buy / 11 Overweight; EPS revised up 29.8% over the past 90 days) implies 2026E EPS of RMB 2.102 (implying about RMB 18.3 billion attributable profit) and 2027E of RMB 2.084 (about RMB 18.1 billion — treating mark-to-market-inclusive earnings as the new normal), with a median target price of RMB 24.0 (+53% vs. current price). This report's 2027E midpoint is RMB 11.9 billion, about 34% below consensus — the core disagreement lies in whether the RMB 5.22 billion mark-to-market gain is one-off or recurring, and the level of the turnover midpoint. Verifiable paths: the Q3 report's fair value change line, Damicro's closing price on 12-31 versus 6-30, and the lock-up expiration and share-sale arrangements beginning April 2027. This consensus is a static snapshot as of 2026-10-28 and will migrate dynamically after the Q3 report.
Three changes most likely to reprice the stock in the next 12 months: ① Monetization/give-back of direct investment mark-to-market gains (12-31 revaluation comes first; Damicro lock-up expires around 2027-04-16, ChangXin Technology around mid-2027; note 8.38 million institutional placement shares already unlocked on 2026-10-12); ② Approval and injection of the ≤HKD 7.6 billion capital increase for CMS International (2026Q4–2027H1), and whether international business profit can climb to the RMB 1.0–1.5 billion scale; ③ Realization of synergies across investment banking / international / custody lines after the "CMB-affiliated" management team of Zhu Jiangtao and Liu Bo is fully in place (H1 investment banking revenue +50.9%, 7 HK IPO sponsorships ranking 5th in the industry are early evidence).
The disclosed 2026H1 weighted ROE of 8.22% (half-year basis) ranks among the top head brokers, but the lead over GF and CITIC is only 0.1–0.4 percentage points, and this measure includes CMS Investment's RMB 5.22 billion mark-to-market gains — excluding them, H1 ROE is only about 4.2%, and the "lead" no longer holds (no comparable public data on peers' ex-gains figures). Margin financing market share of 5.04% is slightly down from 5.06% at end-2025 but broadly stable; private fund custody share has fallen three years in a row from 21.72% to 20.87% — a point of erosion within the core business that warrants monitoring. The shareholding structure is clean: zero pledged shares, no upcoming lock-up expirations, no insider trading within the window; however, the 2025 AGM approved a general mandate for H-share issuance, constituting a potential dilution channel. On balance, C1 supports "high quality," but is insufficient to justify a valuation premium.
CMS Investment's mark-to-market gains stem from FVTPL revaluation of locked-up shares and are reversible at the 2026-12-31 annual report and during the 2027 lock-up expirations. Excluding RMB 5.22 billion, H1 recurring attributable profit is about RMB 5.40 billion, simply annualized to about RMB 10.8 billion; adding back a normalized direct investment exit gain (estimated at RMB 1.2–1.8 billion/year — an estimate without position-level support) and cutting the beta-sensitive portion by about 10% based on a turnover midpoint of RMB 1.7–2.0 trillion yields normalized net profit of RMB 11.0–13.0 billion, midpoint RMB 12 billion. Cross-validation: symmetrically adjusting 2025H1 fair value of -RMB 1.694 billion, the two-year H1 average annualizes to about RMB 12.3 billion, pointing to the same midpoint; the 2025 H2/H1 profit ratio of about 1.38 makes simple ×2 annualization conservative. Normalized ROE is about 8.4 (excluding perpetual bond interest, consistent with the disclosed basis), implying normalized EPS of about RMB 1.23 and normalized PE of 12.7x. The "recurring profit" measure (RMB 10.626 billion) cannot filter out these gains — the annual report's "recurring" tool is ineffective for brokers' FVTPL positions and must be manually decomposed.
Reverse-engineered PB-ROE: with r = 10.5% and g = 0–3%, the current price implies a sustainable ROE of about 11.0%–11.2%; with r = 9% and g = 2.5%, implied is about 9.4% — a premium of 1.0–2.8pp over the normalized 8.4%; the conclusion's strength depends on the cost-of-equity assumption, which this report sets at 10.5% (risk-free rate about 1.8% + β 1.35 × equity risk premium 6.5% + premium for high earnings volatility). PE (TTM) of 7.67x at a historical low percentile is the classic "low PE at cyclical high" and is not a basis for judging cheapness. The low PB percentile is also distorted: common equity grew from about RMB 105.0 billion at end-2023 to RMB 127.785 billion (+22%), and the rapid thickening of BVPS mechanically depresses the percentile — it cannot serve as evidence in either direction. Base-case fair value of RMB 15.6–17.0 = PB 1.05–1.15x × 2026E BVPS of about RMB 14.8 (anchored to its own 3-year median PB of 1.23x, discounted for normalized ROE below 2025 levels, independent of the current price); the current price sits within the range, with a margin of safety of about -0.5%. The H-share 0.707x PB implies an ROE of only about 7.4%, close to this report's normalized measure — the pricing gap for the same fundamentals across two markets is itself a measure of the "new normal" narrative premium.
Brokerage + interest + proprietary trading (including direct investment) accounted for 94% of 2026H1 revenue; earnings are highly beta-sensitive. The gap between sell-side consensus 2027E of RMB 18.1 billion and this report's RMB 11.9 billion (-34%) is essentially a judgment on the turnover midpoint: this report's base case assumes RMB 1.7–1.9 trillion (slightly above October's current level of about RMB 1.6 trillion); if turnover holds above RMB 2.2 trillion, we would revise up. It should be noted: the three-scenario probabilities (30/50/20) are judgment-based assignments rather than statistical derivations; the October contraction has not yet accelerated (10-28 market-wide turnover of about RMB 1.64 trillion, higher than the prior day), and bull-case conditions (Damicro's October share price still more than 6x above its IPO price, no Q4 give-back of mark-to-market gains) objectively exist.
The "two-stage" dividend (interim + annual) discloses each stage's share separately; the 2024 annual final tranche of 31.57% versus the full-year total of 40% reflects the difference between per-stage and total measures, not a disclosure contradiction (this earlier question was verified and ruled out against the annual report text). The two paths for CMS International's capital increase: with zero profit growth, ROE is statically diluted to about 6.1%; if profit climbs to the RMB 1.0–1.5 billion scale, about 8% — both paths coexist, and the verification window is the two reporting periods after the capital increase. Against the central SOE backdrop, dividends and shareholder stability (China Merchants Financial Holdings 23.55% + Jisheng 19.59%, totaling 43.14%) are a downside buffer rather than an upside catalyst; China Merchants Group has committed not to newly establish or acquire controlling stakes in other domestic securities firms, and the company itself has no M&A consolidation theme.
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026Q1 | 2026H1 (latest period) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating revenue (RMB 100mn) | 198.21 | 208.91 | 249.72 | 69.73 | 219.02 |
| YoY | — | +5.4% | +19.5% | +48.0% | +108.2% |
| Net profit attributable to parent (RMB 100mn) | 87.64 | 103.86 | 123.50 | 32.71 | 106.24 |
| YoY | — | +18.5% | +18.9% | +41.7% | +104.9% |
| Recurring net profit attributable to parent (RMB 100mn) | — | — | 122.99 | — | 106.26 |
| Net margin (attributable/revenue) | 44.2% | 49.7% | 49.5% | 46.9% | 48.5% |
| Weighted ROE | 7.91% | 8.82% | 9.94% | 2.54% (single quarter) | 8.22% (half-year) |
| Net operating cash flow (RMB 100mn) | 271.04 | 547.26 | -313.69 | 196.91 | 637.38 |
| Net assets attributable to parent (RMB 100mn) | 1,219.61 | 1,301.79 | 1,380.05 | 1,413.19 | 1,447.85 |
| Of which: common equity (ex-RMB 17bn perpetual bonds, RMB 100mn) | 1,049.61 | 1,131.79 | 1,210.05 | — | 1,277.85 |
| Total assets (RMB 100mn) | 6,958.53 | 7,211.60 | 7,534.77 | 7,883.53 | 8,714.08 |
| Leverage (total assets/attributable equity, x) | 5.71 | 5.54 | 5.46 | 5.58 | 6.02 |
| Parent company net capital (RMB 100mn) | 793.70 | 874.12 | 895.50 | 901.02 | 870.88 |
| Risk coverage ratio | 177.28% (old basis) | 239.03% (retroactively adjusted) | 257.08% | 249.78% | 227.55% |
| DPS (RMB, annual incl. interim) | 0.252 | 0.478 | 0.568 | — | 0.167 (2026 interim) |
| Payout ratio (full-year basis) | 25.0% | ~40% | 40.0% | — | — |
Note: Brokers have no gross margin / free cash flow / interest-bearing debt–net debt EBITDA concepts; these are replaced by regulatory metrics such as leverage, net capital, and risk coverage ratio. The 2026-10-28 close of RMB 15.68 corresponds to a 2025 dividend yield of 3.6%, PB (common equity basis) of 1.07x, and PE (TTM) of 7.67x (TTM attributable profit of RMB 17.788 billion).
Reasons for metric changes (items with YoY ≥ ±20%, all with company explanations): ① 2026H1 revenue +108.2% / attributable profit +104.9% — the company attributes this to "investment income plus gains from changes in fair value of RMB 13.661 billion (+181.7%), with both alternative investments and proprietary investment achieving year-on-year growth"; at a deeper level, CMS Investment's RMB 5.22 billion direct investment mark-to-market gains + brokerage +44.2% (surging turnover) + net interest income +144.4% ("growth in margin financing interest income, decline in interest expense on resale agreements"); ② 2025 operating cash flow of -RMB 31.369 billion (vs. +RMB 54.726 billion prior year) — the company explains "a net decrease of RMB 31.784 billion in customer agency brokerage deposits, a RMB 33.589 billion increase in trading financial assets, and a RMB 25.622 billion increase in funds lent," reflecting swings in client funds and financial assets, not deteriorating earnings quality; ③ 2024 other operating income -89.2% (RMB 1.662bn → 0.179bn) — contraction in bulk commodity trading revenue, with no specific company explanation; ④ 2026H1 funds lent +39.5% (margin balance of RMB 152.354 billion); employee compensation payable +63.1% (performance-linked compensation accruals).
2026H1 revenue was RMB 21.902 billion (+108.19%), net profit attributable to shareholders RMB 10.624 billion (+104.87%), and non-recurring net profit RMB 10.626 billion (+105.23%), all record highs for the period; Q2 standalone attributable profit was approximately RMB 7.35 billion (Q1: RMB 3.271 billion). By segment: Wealth Management & Institutional Business +39.2% (net brokerage income RMB 5.384 billion, +44.2%; custodied client assets RMB 5.78 trillion), Investment Banking +50.9% (A-share equity underwriting RMB 9.211 billion, ranked 7th in the industry; IPO underwriting RMB 3.079 billion, +159.6%, ranked 6th; 7 HK IPO sponsorships, ranked 5th), Investment & Trading +325.6% (fair value changes +RMB 6.494 billion), net interest income +144.4%; Asset Management -7.9% (suppressed by public fund fee reforms). Results landed slightly above the midpoint of the company's prior guidance range (RMB 10–11 billion), indicating high delivery on management guidance.
The key lies in structure rather than size: roughly half of profit came from RMB 5.22 billion in unrealized gains at CMS Investment and fair value revaluations. This portion will be revalued at each period end as lock-up shares of DapuStor (listed April 2026; as of October, share price still over 6x above the RMB 46.08 issue price), ChangXin Technology (listed July 2026), and others unlock on 2026-12-31 and in 2027, creating two-way volatility. Since sell-side firms do not publish company-specific consensus details, we use industry benchmarks to judge "beating/missing": the China Merchants Securities non-bank team expects the top 42 listed brokers' 9M attributable profit +36% (CICC +43.3%), with Q3 standalone industry sequentially -17% to -21% and +14% to 15.5% YoY—if the company's Q3 lands at RMB 4.5–6.0 billion (9M: RMB 15.1–16.6 billion), it would be consistent with the industry slowdown. This outlook is scenario analysis; the Q3 report on 10-30 is the validation point.
Model: A full-license integrated brokerage blending capital-light (brokerage/IB/AM/custody, fee income) and capital-heavy (margin financing, prop trading, market making, direct investment, balance-sheet income) businesses; no gross margin/free cash flow concept in the traditional manufacturing sense. ROE decomposition (2025): net margin 49.5% × asset turnover 3.3% × equity multiplier 5.46 ≈ 9.9%—earnings highly dependent on balance-sheet expansion of capital-consuming businesses.
Cash content of earnings (brokerage framework): Operating cash flow / attributable net profit for 2023/2024/2025 was 3.09/5.27/-2.55—broker cash flows are dominated by swings in client margin deposits and financial assets, so the typical corporate red-flag heuristic of "OCF<0.8" does not apply. Shareholder return capacity should be judged by net capital (RMB 87.088 billion) and retained earnings (RMB 46.161 billion at end-2026Q1); risk coverage ratio of 227.55% far exceeds regulatory minimums, leaving ample capacity for dividends.
Recurring earnings test: Attributable and non-recurring profits are nearly identical (RMB 10.624 vs 10.626 billion); the non-recurring lens cannot filter out FVTPL unrealized gains. After adjustment, recurring annualized profit is roughly RMB 10.8 billion + normalized direct investment of RMB 1.2–1.8 billion ≈ normalized ~RMB 12 billion—a gap of nearly half versus apparent annualization (RMB 21.2 billion). The 2026 "inflation" in apparent earnings lies in unrealized gains, not expense capitalization.
Return on capital: Disclosed weighted ROE rose five consecutive years from 7.91% to 9.94%, among the top-tier peers but with a narrow lead (see C1); normalized ROE ~8.4%, below the 10–12% norm of international investment banks but above the domestic industry average (annualized ~8.1% in 2026H1). Cost of equity is ~10.5%; normalized ROE sits below cost of equity—the microeconomic basis for the sector-wide discount.
Capital allocation: Payout ratio rose from 25% to 40% over three years; in 2025 it issued RMB 2 billion of perpetual bonds (other equity instruments RMB 15→17 billion, annual interest RMB 615 million, RMB 633 million accrued in 2026H1, persistently eroding common shareholder returns); it plans to inject ≤HKD 7.6 billion into CMS International (~80% of its net assets)—the largest capital allocation decision over the next two years.
Moat and red flags: 22.07 million client accounts, RMB 5.78 trillion custodied assets, 5% margin financing share, SOE credit backing and the China Merchants ecosystem form a breadth moat—but no pricing power (commission rates at a floor of 2bps). Three red flags: a high-beta structure with prop + direct investment at 62.4% of revenue; equity and fund trading share of 4.51% on a downtrend with disclosure suspended since 2025; private fund custody share down three consecutive periods (21.72%→20.87%).
Consistency of words and deeds: pragmatic. (1) The guidance range of RMB 10–11 billion was met with actual attributable profit of RMB 10.624 billion; (2) the 2024 annual report pledged "interim dividend no lower than prior year, ratio capped at 40%," and 2025 delivered RMB 4.940 billion total, 40.0% at the cap; (3) the "quality, efficiency and returns" action plan's semi-annual self-assessment states "all items implemented as planned" (self-assessment, no external benchmark). Overall: conservative guidance, high delivery.
Shareholder friendliness: moderately friendly. Payout ratio rose from 25.0% to ~40% to 40.0% over three years and has been institutionalized (two consecutive years of interim + final dividends; 2026 interim DPS +40.34%); cumulative historical buybacks RMB 664 million, no new ones in 2024–2026; no equity refinancing since the 2020 A+H rights issue—but perpetual bond expansion and the H-share general mandate for issuance (approved at the 2025 AGM, unexercised) are two potential dilution channels. Verdict: friendly on dividends, neutral on capital instruments.
Risk signals: Intense governance turnover in 2026 (chairman/president/board secretary/one-third of directors all replaced; 6 departures, ~30% of the start-of-year board)—part of China Merchants Group personnel rotation, with no penalties or disputes involved—but strategic continuity (execution window for the two capital-intensive strategies of direct investment and internationalization) enters an observation period. On related-party transactions: the 2026 semi-annual risk assessment of China Merchants Group Finance Co. shows no deposit/loan exposure of the company at that finance company and all indicators compliant—no anomalies.
| Segment | 2025 Revenue (RMB bn / share) | 2025 YoY | 2025 Segment margin | 2026H1 Revenue (RMB bn / share) | 2026H1 YoY | Business logic in one line |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wealth Management & Institutional Business | 13.825 / 55.4% | +35.1% | 50.93% | 8.258 / 37.7% | +39.2% | Brokerage + margin financing + custody; stable share, commission pressure |
| Investment Banking | 1.031 / 4.1% | +20.3% | 25.68% | 0.608 / 2.8% | +50.9% | IPO recovery + HK sponsorship jump to 5th |
| Investment Management | 0.954 / 3.8% | +3.3% | 62.48% | 1.281 / 5.8% | +148.7% | CMS AM + stakes in Bosera/CMS Fund (combined AUM ~RMB 3.5 trillion) |
| Investment & Trading | 6.940 / 27.8% | +9.6% | 76.27% | 10.891 / 49.7% | +325.6% | Prop trading + market making + direct investment; core profit elasticity |
| Others (bulk commodity trade, etc.) | 2.222 / 8.9% | -12.6% | 38.06% | 0.864 / 3.9% | -22.3% | Low-margin trading revenue keeps shrinking |
Profit engines: In 2025, dual engines of Wealth/Institutional (55.4% revenue × 50.9% margin) and Investment & Trading (27.8% × 76.3%); in 2026H1 the profit center shifted sharply to Investment & Trading (49.7% of revenue, segment margin 68.1%, with CMS Investment's unrealized gains contributing nearly half of group net profit)—the spread between highest (Investment Management 88.1%) and lowest (IB 50.3%/Others 32.2%) segment margins exceeds 38pp, driven by business model differences: AM/prop earn management fees and spreads; IB earns deal fees with upfront labor costs; trading is a pure pass-through. This shift is precisely the micro-level manifestation of the C2/C3 concerns: within six months, the "quality" of the profit engine changed from fee income to mark-to-market.
Accounting red flags: (1) Direct investment unrealized gains released in bulk under FVTPL (high): CMS Investment net profit +8370% to RMB 5.22 billion, "multiple equity investment projects going public caused a sharp increase in fair value change gains"; lock-up revaluation gains are unsustainable and reversible. (2) Bulk commodity gross-basis revenue inflating then shrinking (medium): ~RMB 1.5–1.7 billion/year of low-margin gross-basis revenue in 2022–2023 plunged to RMB 179 million in 2024 (-89.2%) without specific explanation, distorting the historical revenue base. (3) Credit asset expansion with mild provisioning (low): margin loans +39.5% to RMB 133.353 billion in 2025, while full-year credit impairment was only RMB 260 million (prior year reversal of RMB 113 million); provisioning adequacy hinges on collateral quality (margin maintenance ratio 300.34%).
Cross-period consistency: (1) Fair value change gains 2023–2026H1 at +2.063/+1.110/-1.227/+6.494 billion RMB—sharp two-way swings; the 2025 annual report's attribution contradicts the numbers (it cites "growth in investment & trading income due to rising equity investment gains" while fair value changes fell -210.6% that period); in 2026H1 everything is attributed to IPOs—company explanations "inconsistent." (2) Other business income at 1.482/1.662/0.179/0.287 billion RMB—cliff drop then slight recovery—"unexplained by the company." (3) Operating cash flow +27.1/+54.7/-31.4 billion RMB—direction reversals, consistent with margin financing and financial asset expansion; company explanations "consistent." (4) Dividend ratio disclosure—verified against the annual report as a per-period vs aggregate caliber difference, consistent (prior concern removed).
Current market data (2026-10-28 close): Share price RMB 15.68, market cap RMB 136.36 billion (8.6965 billion total shares); PB (common equity) 1.07x, ~1st percentile of 5 years; PE(TTM) 7.67x, 0% percentile of 1/3/5 years—earnings are at a cyclical high (TTM attributable profit RMB 17.788 billion including RMB 5.22 billion unrealized gains); the two percentiles are reference only, not a cheap/rich headline. H-shares at HKD 12.23 ≈ RMB 10.39 (HKD/CNY=0.8498), PB 0.71x, A/H premium 50.9%. Normalized: EPS RMB 1.23, PE 12.7x, dividend yield 3.15% (40% payout); TTM yield 3.93%. Liquidity normal (daily turnover ~0.6%–1.1% of market cap); no liquidity-risk flag needed.
Market-implied expectations: With r=10.5% and g=0–3%, the current price implies a sustainable ROE of ~11.0%–11.2% (sensitivity: at r=9%, g=2.5%, ~9.4%)—1.0–2.8pp above the normalized 8.4%. In one sentence: the current price demands "RMB 2 trillion daily turnover as the new norm + sustainable realization of direct investment unrealized gains," while reality shows margin balances down 19% from peak, turnover down to ~RMB 1.6 trillion, and the unrealized-gain holdings still in lock-up. The implied expectation is not absurd—if the new normal holds, incremental net profit of RMB 2–3 billion from brokerage + margin financing would fill the ROE gap; H-share pricing (implying 7.4%) is essentially this report's normalized reality, and the A/H spread measures the narrative premium.
Three-layer value (EPV, equity basis): Asset value = common BVPS RMB 14.69 (broker assets are mostly fair-valued; book value approximates liquidation value; current price carries only ~7% asset premium); EPV (zero growth) = normalized FCFE RMB 1.18/share ÷ 10.5% ≈ RMB 11.24 (bridge: normalized attributable profit RMB 12.0bn − perpetual bond interest RMB 1.266bn − maintenance capital replenishment RMB 0.5bn = RMB 10.23bn ÷ 8.6965bn shares); growth option = price − EPV ≈ RMB 4.4, ~28.3% of current price—the market is paying nearly 30% of the price for "upshifted turnover center + direct investment pipeline realization (690 projects in the Antelope Leap program) + internationalization," an option that expands and contracts with market beta. Zero-growth EPV sits below asset value because normalized ROE (8.4%) is below cost of equity (10.5%)—the floor of the current price is asset value at RMB 14.69, not EPV.
Three scenarios and odds (12 months; probabilities are judgment-based assignments):
| Scenario | Probability | Fair value range | vs current price | Key drivers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 30% | RMB 13.2–14.7 | -15.8% ~ -6.3% | Turnover center falls to RMB 1.3–1.5 trillion + unrealized gains give back; 2027E net profit RMB 8.5–9.5bn, ROE 6.5–7.5%, PB 0.9–1.0×BVPS |
| Base | 50% | RMB 15.6–17.0 | -0.5% ~ +8.4% | Turnover confirmed at RMB 1.7–1.9 trillion; 2027E RMB 11.0–12.5bn, ROE 8.5–9.3%, PB 1.05–1.15×2026E BVPS RMB 14.8 |
| Bull | 20% | RMB 19.0–20.6 | +21.2% ~ +31.4% | Turnover holds above RMB 2.2 trillion, new margin highs, wave of direct investment monetization; 2027E RMB 14.0–16.0bn, ROE 10.5–11.5%, PB 1.27–1.38×BVPS |
The bear case is independently constructed (compound pressure from falling turnover + unrealized-gain giveback), benchmarked against external anchors: BofA Securities' 2026-10-28 target of RMB 15.5 (Underperform, implying PB ~1.05x) is higher and more optimistic than our bear-case upper bound and was not adopted as a boundary. Probability-weighted expectation is ~RMB 16.3 (+3.9%); odds are roughly symmetric, slightly skewed upward.
Our forecasts vs guidance vs consensus (reconciliation anchor for next results):
| Basis | 2026E attributable profit | 2027E attributable profit |
|---|---|---|
| This report | RMB 15.1–16.2bn (midpoint 15.6; common EPS RMB 1.65, PE 9.5x) | RMB 11.0–12.8bn (midpoint 11.9; EPS RMB 1.22, PE 12.8x) |
| Management guidance | No formal earnings guidance; committed to 40% payout ratio with improved stability | Same as left |
| Sell-side consensus (~50 brokers, static as of 10-28) | ~RMB 18.3bn (EPS RMB 2.102) | ~RMB 18.1bn (EPS RMB 2.084) |
Root of the divergence: we treat the RMB 5.22 billion unrealized gains as one-off (2027E direct investment reverting to RMB 1.2–1.8 billion of normal exit gains), while consensus treats them as the new norm; the median sell-side target of RMB 24.0 (+53%) is expected to migrate dynamically with the Q3 report and year-end revaluations.
Verdict: Fair. Target price RMB 15.6–17.0 (base scenario), safety margin ~-0.5—assessing quality and price separately: quality is strong (top-tier brokerage, five-year ROE uptrend, 40% payout, SOE shareholder), while price is fair, slightly rich (implied ROE 1–2.8pp above normalized; growth option 28.3% of price). If the turnover consensus is falsified and the stock converges toward RMB 14.7 (near common BVPS), the safety margin will re-emerge; if the 12-31 revaluation does not reduce unrealized gains and turnover holds above RMB 2 trillion, this report will be revised up.
Industry Size: In 2025, China's securities industry—with 150 brokerages—recorded total operating revenue of RMB 541.171 billion and net profit of RMB 219.439 billion (+31.2%, unaudited aggregate from the Securities Association of China), a record high; in 2026H1, revenue was RMB 329.810 billion (+31.4%) and net profit RMB 138.664 billion (+23.5%), with total assets rising to RMB 17.23 trillion. Key drivers—A-share turnover reached RMB 419.86 trillion for full-year 2025, with a daily average of RMB 1.73 trillion (Wind, historical record, +62.6% vs. 2024); the daily average was roughly RMB 2.32 trillion in the first three quarters of 2026, with Q3 averaging RMB 2.77 trillion per day (+10% YoY, -18% QoQ), and a single-day record of RMB 3.64 trillion in January; margin financing balance peaked at RMB 3.03 trillion on 2026-06-25 (highest since 2015) before easing to roughly RMB 2.46 trillion in late October; client transaction settlement funds reached RMB 4.45 trillion as of 2026-06-30. On the financing side: 123 A-share IPOs raised RMB 216.3 billion in the first three quarters of 2026 (+180% YoY, already exceeding full-year 2025), while Hong Kong IPOs raised HKD 385.6 billion in the same period (+105%). The industry's net profit margin reached 42% in 2026H1, a historical high. Mid-term expansion logic ("15th Five-Year Plan" opening phase, M&A consolidation, internationalization) coexists with commission/fee-rate deflation; sell-side analysts broadly forecast industry net profit growth of +15%–20% for 2026.
Industry Chain and Value Distribution: Upstream = the funding side (household and institutional capital, client deposits of RMB 4.45 trillion) + brokers' own capital (industry net capital of RMB 2.59 trillion); Midstream = brokerage platforms (brokerage channels / underwriting & sponsorship / asset management / market-making & derivatives / margin financing); Downstream = the financing side (enterprises) and the investment side (household wealth). Value distribution has shifted from channel-based to capital-intensive activities: in 2026H1, proprietary investment income of RMB 113.1 billion was the largest revenue source (34% of total), brokerage was RMB 104.1 billion (32%), and net interest income RMB 40.5 billion (12%). China Merchants Securities holds a full-license position in the midstream: weak bargaining power on the retail side (commission rates bottoming at roughly 0.02%, and the three-phase public fund fee reform transferring about RMB 51 billion per year cumulatively, compressing distribution margins), while pricing power on the institutional side rests on comprehensive services; gross profit is concentrated in proprietary trading and capital intermediation—which is precisely the structural root of its high earnings beta.
Supply-Demand and Competitive Landscape: Demand is expanding faster than licensed capacity—surging turnover, margin financing, and financing demand against excess homogeneous channel capacity (150 interchangeable licenses)—driving accelerating head concentration: CR10 (revenue basis) reached 58.85% in 2026H1, and 63.95% on a net profit basis (STCN; sample of 75–77 firms); CITIC alone posted net profit equal to the sum of the next 52 firms; in A-share IPO underwriting for the first three quarters of 2026, CICC + CICC Construction (CSC)+ CITIC + Guotai Haitong jointly accounted for 79% of funds raised. Price wars: commission rates have hit the floor (~0.02%), and competition over margin rates and distribution fees continues; differentiation now hinges on institutional business, derivatives, international operations, and large-deal investment banking. Substitution threats: internet platforms (East Money) siphoning retail traffic, bank wealth management and public fund direct/offline distribution diverting asset allocation, and AI advisors eroding human brokerage value. A supply-side consolidation wave is underway: Guotai Junan's merger with Haitong (completed 2025, total assets of RMB 2.1 trillion, industry No.1), Guolian + Minsheng, Zheshang + Guodu, Guosen + Wanhe, and Western + Rongrong already closed; CICC's "three-in-one" merger (share-swap absorption of Dongxing + Cinda, both delisted on 2026-10-19); Orient Securities' RMB 25.12 billion acquisition of Shanghai Securities (review meeting on 10-29) in progress.
Cycle and Regulation: This upcycle began with the 2024-09 market rally, with net profit growing strongly for two consecutive years (2025–2026H1), placing the industry in the middle-to-late stage of the upcycle (high-base zone)—leading indicators show margin balance down ~19% from the 6-25 peak (declining continuously), Q3 turnover down 18% QoQ, and single-day volume shrinking to the RMB 1.6 trillion range by end-October; the brokerage sector's PB has already priced in cooling (China Merchants Securities down 31.7% from its 52-week high). Regulation generally favors leaders: the new "Nine National Guidelines" and "Six M&A Measures" support building first-class investment banks; the Securities Association of China released its first set of brokerage M&A model practices on 2026-10-21, and the CSRC Chairman voiced support for consolidation on 10-19; public fund fee reform (new sales fee rules effective 2026-01-01) structurally compresses distribution and asset management fee rates.
Peer Benchmarks (2025 Annual / 2026H1):
| Company | 2025 Revenue (RMB bn) | 2025 Net Profit Attributable (RMB bn) | 2026H1 Net Profit YoY | 2026H1 Weighted ROE | Key Differences vs. China Merchants Securities |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CITIC Securities | 74.854 | 30.1+ (first to exceed RMB 30bn) | +69.6% | 7.81% (official) | Full business chain + absolute leader in institutional derivatives, ~3x the size |
| Guotai Haitong | 63.107 | 27.809 (+113.5%, consolidated) | — | N/A | Industry No.1 in total assets post-merger; step-change in large-deal IB capability |
| Huatai Securities | 35.810 | 16.383 (+6.7%) | +54.9% | 5.53% (aggregate basis) | Benchmark in technology + digital wealth management; industry-best commission rate efficiency |
| GF Securities | 35.493 | 13.702 | +80.1% | 8.08% (official) | Thicker earnings elasticity from its public fund twin stars (GF Fund + E Fund) |
| CICC | 28.481 | 9.791 | +89.3% | 6.40% (aggregate basis) | Investment banking aristocrat + cross-border ace; currently pursuing "three-in-one" consolidation |
| China Merchants Securities | 24.972 | 12.350 (+18.9%) | +104.9% | 8.22% (official) | Dual engines of wealth management + public funds; relative weaknesses in IB / international business |
Company's Industry Position: Back half of the first tier—2025 net profit attributable ranked No.6 industry-wide (about 5.6% of total industry net profit), with ROE above most direct peers; still more than 2x the size gap versus the merged Guotai Haitong and CITIC. Positioning: margin financing share of 5.04% (about No.5) is its most stable foundation; wealth management—22.07 million clients / RMB 5.78 trillion in custody assets—plus 49% of Bosera Fund and China Merchants Fund form the "wealth + public fund" dual engines; investment banking (equity underwriting No.7–8) and internationalization (CMS International H1 revenue of RMB 880 million) are relatively weak, precisely the focus areas for new management (Liu Bo overseeing IB / international / custody). Note a caliber conflict: the company's reported total operating revenue growth of 108% for 2026H1 is on the group consolidated basis (including structural effects such as shrinkage in bulk commodity trade), and cannot be directly compared with industry rankings on the "fee-type income" caliber. China Merchants Group has committed not to establish or acquire controlling stakes in other domestic securities firms—in the industry consolidation wave, the company is "an unconsolidated leading state-owned brokerage"; the consolidation theme affects it only as sector beta transmission, with no company-specific event.
The decisive factors missed by the three generic frameworks of brokerage research:
① Turnover and margin financing are common leading variables for nearly all revenue lines. Brokerage (rate ≈ fixed at ~0.02%) ≈ turnover × market share × rate; margin interest ≈ balance × spread (company margin balance of RMB 152.354 billion, share of 5.04%); directional equity exposure/net capital ≈ 30% (end of 2026H1), fixed income ≈ 332%–358%—in bull markets all three amplify in the same direction (2026H1 revenue +108%), and in bear markets they contract in tandem. Tracking this stock is essentially tracking two numbers: weekly trends in daily average stock/fund turnover and margin balance (currently RMB 1.6 trillion range / RMB 2.46 trillion, both down from highs).
② Net capital and risk indicators determine the balance-sheet expansion ceiling. Parent-company net capital of RMB 87.088 billion, risk coverage ratio of 227.55%, capital leverage ratio of 11.48% (centered around the 9.6% regulatory alert line since)—leverage rose from 5.46x at end-2025 to 6.02x (4.45x excluding client funds), still within the safe zone, but the risk coverage ratio fell 29.5pp in half a year: the current balance-sheet expansion (margin lending + proprietary trading) is consuming the risk capital buffer—a constraint to monitor alongside the 40% payout ratio and the HKD 7.6 billion international capital increase.
③ Direct investment's FVTPL accounting is both a profit amplifier and a volatility amplifier. CMS Investment (net assets of RMB 14.27 billion) marks holdings to fair value into P&L each period: no impact pre-IPO, large paper gains recognized upon listing (RMB 5.22 billion in H1), full pass-through of share price volatility before lock-up expiry (Dapu Micro trading more than 6x above its issue price in October, with 8.38 million institutionally placed shares unlocked on 2026-10-12), and gains become realized only upon post-lock-up sell-down. This mechanism produces "front-loaded profits + back-loaded risks" in the brokerage's statements during big IPO years—the 2026 annual report (12-31 revaluation) and the 2027 April–June lock-up expiries are two key pricing points; company IR has confirmed it "will holistically consider the sell-down strategy after lock-up expiry."
Overall Assessment: Neutral, confidence 0.55, time horizon 6–12 months. High quality (C1) coexists with earnings containing a large high-volatility component (C2); the price has partially priced in the new normal with no substantive margin of safety (C3); industry leading variables are weakening at the margin (C4); governance and capital allocation are entering a validation period (C5). The three-scenario expected value is about RMB 16.3 (+3.9%), with odds symmetric but slightly skewed upward—strategically, neither chase highs nor short: wait for the 10-30 Q3 report (fair value change line item, CMS Investment quarterly net profit) and the 12-31 year-end revaluation to provide direction; if the share price converges toward the common equity BVPS of RMB 14.7 and the turnover center does not break down, the margin of safety will re-emerge. The 2026E dividend yield of about 4.6% (40% × RMB 15.6bn) and the stable state-owned shareholder provide the return floor for the position.
Key Risk Warnings: ① Continued decline in margin/turnover triggering a dual "earnings-valuation" kill (bear case -15.8% to -6.3%); ② Dapu Micro and other direct investment holdings turning negative at the 12-31 revaluation, or valuation declines after lock-up expiry, eroding the 2027 profit base; ③ Exercise of the H-share general mandate or continued perpetual bond expansion diluting common shareholders' returns; ④ Sustained pressure from public fund fee reform on asset management/distribution (asset management revenue already -7.9% in H1); ⑤ Execution friction risks after the management transition.
Monitoring Points (next 6–12 months): 10-29 EGM (election of Liu Bo as executive director) → 10-30 Q3 report and results briefing (Q3 standalone attributable net profit, fair value changes, IB market share) → 2026Q4 approval of CMS International capital increase → 12-31 year-end fair value revaluation → 2027-03 annual report and dividend proposal (delivery of the 40% payout ratio) → 2027-04-16 Dapu Micro lock-up expiry and sell-down strategy → continuous tracking of weekly trends in daily average turnover and margin balance.
Price anchor of this report: closing price of RMB 15.68 on 2026-10-28; unless otherwise noted, financial data as of 2026-06-30 (2026 interim report). All "report estimates / normalized / scenario" figures within are analyst estimates, not company-disclosed calibers.