Anthracite Industry In-Depth Research: The Race Between the Safety-Inspection Premium of a Scarce Coal Type and Structural Demand Decline

Report Date: August 31, 2026 | Industry: Anthracite Coal | Type: Initial Coverage (Full-Scope Research)

Core View: Cautiously Bullish (12 months; Confidence: Low-to-Medium). Anthracite coal sits at the intersection of two opposing forces. Near term, the province-wide safety-inspection crackdown triggered by the Shanxi "5·22" Qinyuan major gas explosion (82 deaths) is suppressing coal output; Jincheng pit-mouth inventory is down 45.9% YoY to historic lows; combined with restricted discounted Russian coal imports and winter restocking demand, this supports lump coal prices moving up toward RMB 1,300/ton in H2 2026. Medium term, demand is structurally shrinking at roughly 1%–1.5% per year (exit of fixed-bed synthetic ammonia, replacement by bituminous PCI coal, crude steel output cuts), and supply will loosen again in 2027 as production resumes and new mines come online, pulling the price center back to RMB 1,100–1,200/ton. This is a race between "how long the safety-inspection pulse lasts" and "the slope of structural demand decline" — we judge the near term as bullish and the medium-term price center as falling, with price elasticity concentrated in scarce lump coal rather than PCI fines coal that can be substituted by bituminous coal.

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I1 Industry Definition and Boundaries

Scope of the research object: In this report, anthracite refers to highly metamorphosed coal (fixed carbon ≥90% range, low volatile matter, low ash and low sulfur premium resources), covering its full value chain — mining (underground mines), washing and processing, trading and logistics, and downstream applications (chemical lump coal / blast furnace injection / sintering / power / building materials / carbon-based new materials). Geographically, China is the absolute dominant player (roughly 75%–80% of global output, per market reports), with East Shanxi (Yangquan–Jincheng mining area) as the global pricing anchor, and Russia and Vietnam as the marginal international supply.

One-sentence value chain map: Scarce resource (East Shanxi anthracite coalfield, proven remaining reserves of about 120 billion tons, only about 1/10 of national coal reserves) → underground mining (high gas content, deep mining, costs significantly higher than Inner Mongolia/Shaanxi thermal coal) → washing and grading (lump coal / fines coal / cleaned coal, one price per mine) → downstream split: lump coal goes to chemicals (fixed-bed synthetic ammonia / sintering / carbon products) and residential use; fines coal goes to power and blast furnace injection (PCI).

Positioning of the coal type: Anthracite accounts for about 8.6% of national raw coal output (4.76 billion tons in 2024) — a typical "small variety, high premium, strong regional character" coal type. There is no futures contract; price discovery relies entirely on the spot quotation system (CCTD China Coal Market Network, sxcoal.com, SCI99, Baichuan Yingfu, and the Ministry of Commerce commodity price network's ten-day monitoring), with volatility driven directly by spot supply and demand.

I2 Demand: A Structural Slow Decline from a High Plateau

2.1 End-Use Breakdown: Power Is the Base, Chemical Lump Coal Is the Largest Source of Decline

China's anthracite consumption in 2024 was about 410 million tons, with the following end-use structure (China Coal Transportation & Sales Association "2025 Anthracite Market White Paper"; Huajing Industry Research Institute data):

2.2 Structural vs. Cyclical: About 2/3 of the Decline Is Policy- and Technology-Driven and Irreversible

The decline in anthracite demand is not cyclical fluctuation but the superposition of three structural curves: ① Process switch in chemical lump coal — fixed-bed gasification is being replaced by pulverized coal/bituminous coal-water slurry processes (bituminous-based urea costs RMB 400–500/ton less), cutting a single user's anthracite lump coal usage from about 1.3–1.5 tons per ton of ammonia directly to zero — a -100% switch rather than a reduction; ② Coal-type substitution in injection — steel mills keep raising the bituminous injection ratio, driven by the RMB 280–330/ton spread between anthracite and bituminous injection; ③ Policy-driven exit of residential and power use. The cyclical component (about 1/3) mainly consists of steel and building materials fluctuating with the property macro cycle, power fluctuating with water inflow and temperature, and imports fluctuating with the Russian coal price spread.

There is only one positive structural variable: carbon-based new materials (coal-based anode coating materials, carbon products, silicon carbide, activated carbon) — the white paper lists them as "new consumption growth points," but absolute volumes are still small and segment-level tonnage data was unavailable; they are insufficient to offset the first three sources of decline.

2.3 Demand Bridge: 404.00 Million Tons in 2025 → ~388.83 Million Tons in 2028E (CAGR -1.3%)

Bottom-up demand bridge (base year 2025, China consumption basis):

Data-basis discrepancies must be presented faithfully: The industry authority (China Coal Transportation & Sales Association white paper, October 2025) gives a "plateau" view — 2026 consumption of 408 million tons, +0.9% growth, implying resilience in power and steel offsetting chemical and building-material declines. This report's demand bridge applies more aggressive exit slopes for steel and chemicals; the two bases diverge by about 6.4% for 2028. We lead with the demand bridge (fixed-bed exit and crude steel cuts are both backed by explicit policy documents, while the white paper's +0.9% is extrapolated only to 2026 and carries inertia-extrapolation risk), but the uncertainty in the slope is the industry's biggest demand-side controversy (see I7-D2): if fixed-bed capacity exits slowly via "capacity swaps" (2026 total urea capacity is still expected to reach 80.55 million tons) and the new high-efficiency clean gasification process for anthracite lump coal, certified by the nitrogen fertilizer association in August 2025, extends fixed-bed life, the actual decline slope will be closer to the white paper's view.

2.4 Regions and Trade Flows: China Is the Anchor, Vietnam Has Exited Exports, Russia Dominates Imports

• China: Output about 400 million tons/year, Shanxi accounting for about 63% (CCTD, November 2025; Huajing Industry Research Institute gives another figure of 39%, different time point/basis); consumption is "concentrating in power and shifting to northwest pit-mouth plants"; imports about 20 million tons/year, of which Russian coal accounts for over 95% (95.9% in June 2025 alone, Mongolia 4.1%).
• Vietnam: The Quang Ninh anthracite coalfield's resources are nearing depletion + surging domestic coal-for-power demand (coal power accounts for 74.7% of its consumption); Vietnam has shifted from a traditional anthracite exporter to a net importer — 2024 national coal exports were only about 700,000 short tons (over 10 million tons at the historical peak), TKV's 2026–2030 export cap is about 3 million tons/year, and March 2025 monthly exports were only 25,400 tons. Asia-Pacific anthracite seaborne trade supply is structurally shrinking.
• Russia: After the EU embargo, Russia pivoted to Asia and became the absolute dominant source of China's anthracite imports (record 1.9 million tons imported in March 2025 alone, almost 100% Russian coal). But it must be emphasized: Russian coal to China is discounted volume expansion, not contraction — Russia fully abolished its anthracite export tariff effective January 1, 2025, and Russian firms are defending market share with discount strategies, which caps domestic lump coal prices (see I7-D3).

I3 Supply: Near-Frozen New Capacity + Near-Term Suppression from the Safety-Inspection Pulse

3.1 Capacity and Utilization: Nominally Loose, Effectively Tight

China's total anthracite capacity is 657 million tons/year (end-2023: 516 million tons producing mines + 141 million tons mines under construction); 2024 output was about 408 million tons, a nominal capacity utilization of about 62% — seemingly loose on paper, but effective supply is constrained by three factors: ① about 200 million tons of capacity has not yet completed capacity-swap/overproduction verification confirmation (after the National Energy Administration launched a nationwide overproduction audit in July 2025, monthly output turned negative YoY); ② anthracite mines are generally high-gas and outburst-prone, the coal type most heavily constrained by the Coal Mine Safety Production Regulations (effective May 2024); ③ after the "5·22" Qinyuan accident in 2026, Shanxi-wide production suspensions for rectification — note that the accident directly hit Changzhi/Lüliang coking coal mines (192 suspended mines, about 260 million tons of capacity, all coking coal); the anthracite heartland Jincheng suffered spillover damage rather than a direct shutdown, with a smaller output reduction than the coking coal heartland, but the province-wide high-frequency safety inspections still pushed Jincheng's 49 major mines' pit-mouth inventory down to 771,800 tons, -45.9% YoY. In January–June 2026, the average weekly operating rate of Shanxi's 86 major anthracite mines was 84.44%, down 5.19 percentage points YoY (SCI99).

3.2 Cost Curve: A Steep High-Cost Curve Sets the Price Floor

All anthracite is mined underground, at depth, with high gas content; the main producing regions have entered deep mining, with costs significantly higher than Inner Mongolia/Shaanxi open-pit/shallow thermal coal (the latter's full costs mostly RMB 200–400/ton):

• Shanxi anthracite mining cost: RMB 380–770/ton, averaging about RMB 460/ton (China Coal Transportation & Sales Association, 2024, excluding trading and logistics);
• Listed-company basis: Lanhua Sci-Tech's 2024 unit production cost was RMB 325.98/ton (+12.9% YoY); broker estimates put listed coal companies' full cost per ton in a range of RMB 122–502/ton, with anthracite producers (Lanhua/Huayang) at the high end (Guosheng Securities);
• The high-cost tail (Guizhou high-sulfur underground mines, depleted legacy mines) has full costs of about RMB 700–800/ton — this is the industry's price floor;
• Current prices (Jincheng small lump pit-mouth RMB 1,340/ton, 2026-08-28) are far above average cost; the whole industry maintains positive cash profit, and no high prices are needed to stimulate new supply — the supply bottleneck is resources and approvals, not price.

Note: The horizontal axis is cumulative capacity share (%); costs are on a mining-cost basis (excluding the three expenses/logistics); the current price is the pit-mouth market price (tax-inclusive). The two bases differ; shown only to illustrate the premium space.

3.3 Pipeline and Exits: Near-Zero Supply Growth over the Next 2–3 Years

Projects under construction/coming online are highly concentrated at Huayang: Qiyuan mine, 5 million tons/year (completed and commissioned December 2025, full output in 2026; geological reserves 2.06 billion tons, 137-year mine life); Pori mine, 5 million tons/year (combined trial operation in 2026, expected to contribute about 1.5 million tons); Yujiazhuang mine, 5 million tons/year (planned, not yet approved). Lanhua's Baisheng mine, 900,000 tons, has been commissioned. On the exit side: Guizhou/Sichuan together retired about 1.29 million tons in 2024, and depleted mines (Ningxia Rujigou Taixi coal, Shitanjing — the Shitanjing mining area, once peaking at 7.3 million tons/year, has declined sharply) continue to exit naturally. Net effect: about 10–15 million tons/year of additions vs. offsetting exits and capacity cuts — supply is near zero growth; a new large underground mine takes 5–7 years from approval to production (Qiyuan was approved in 2019 and completed at end-2025); combined with the scarcity of anthracite exploration rights and the "15th Five-Year Plan" halt on new mines below 900,000 tons/year, supply elasticity is extremely low.

3.4 International Supply: Vietnam's Exit Is Certain; Russian Coal Is the Price Ceiling

Vietnam's export collapse (about 700,000 short tons in 2024) is structural and irreversible; Russia's Sibanthracite (the world's largest UHG premium anthracite producer) is suppressed by US/UK sanctions (Q1 2024 output -14.1% YoY, exports -32% YoY), but Russian coal overall has pivoted at a discount to China and other non-sanctioned markets — in January–November 2025, China's coal import value from Russia rose 42% YoY, and Russia again became China's largest coal supplier. For the Chinese market, international anthracite supply is discounted volume expansion, not contraction; imports of about 18–20 million tons/year cap domestic prices at the margin.

I4 Supply-Demand Balance and Price Cycle (The Industry's Headline)

4.1 Year-by-Year Supply-Demand Balance (China basis, 10k tons)

Row-by-row arithmetic is self-consistent (supply − consumption = surplus, re-verified). Key judgment: 2026 is the tightest year of this cycle — the white paper's +500,000-ton surplus is only 1.2% of demand, and that forecast was published before the "5·22" accident and excludes safety-inspection-driven output cuts; but it must equally be noted that the safety-inspection shock mainly hit coking coal mines, and anthracite's output reduction is smaller than the national raw coal figure (June's national raw coal -9.7% cannot be mapped directly onto anthracite), and authoritative channels (CCTD) expect the market to "bid farewell to tightness" in September–October, with Q4 capacity utilization recovering to 90%. Our judgment: tight in 2026Q3, weakening balance in Q4, back to looseness in 2027.

4.2 Prices: Current Levels and Historical Percentiles

Jincheng washed small lump pit-mouth price annual averages: 2023 RMB 1,442.65/ton → 2024 RMB 1,109.26/ton (-23.1%) → 2025 about RMB 950/ton → 2026H1 RMB 976.26/ton (+4.9% YoY) → current price RMB 1,340/ton (2026-08-28, flat WoW), a rebound of about 54% from the early-2026 low of RMB 870/ton. National anthracite market reference price RMB 1,307/ton (Baichuan Yingfu, 2026-08-26); national PCI coal market reference price RMB 1,475/ton (Baichuan, 2026-08-28).

Historical percentile: The current price sits at about the 54th percentile of the 5-year range (RMB 870–1,740/ton) and about the 55th–60th percentile of the 10-year range (the 10-year low was about RMB 600–700/ton before the 2015–16 supply-side reform, to be verified). The last peak occurred during the 2021Q4–H1 2022 energy crisis (pit-mouth RMB 1,740/ton in April 2022).

4.3 Price Formation Mechanism: Pure Spot Pricing with No Futures

Anthracite has no futures contract (Zhengzhou's thermal coal and Dalian's coking coal/coke do not cover it) and no on-exchange hedging tools; price discovery runs entirely through the spot quotation system. Mechanisms by product: ① Lump coal (chemical feedstock) is essentially pure market-based spot — direct supply to fixed-bed synthetic ammonia/urea plants plus trader intermediation, with the greatest price elasticity; ② PCI coal runs on a dual-track "long-term contract + spot" system — large coal enterprises' long-term contract prices to steel mills adjust with a lag behind spot (in June 2026, provincial large coal enterprises raised PCI coal long-term contract prices by RMB 60/ton and sintering coal by RMB 30/ton); ③ Fines coal as thermal coal falls under the national thermal coal long-term contract mechanism (base price + floating, linked to the port 5,500 kcal thermal coal long-term contract framework), with high direct-supply share to pit-mouth power plants and small spot exposure. Pricing anchor = cost floor (tail mines' full cost RMB 700–800/ton) + direction of supply-demand balance + pit-mouth inventory position.

4.4 Baseline Price Path (Next 4 Quarters, Jincheng Small Lump Pit-Mouth)

Pricing framework: Cost floor of RMB 700–800/ton as support + tight balance in 2026 (safety-inspection pulse) → loosening in 2027 (surplus +1.4 million tons) + historically low pit-mouth inventory providing price stickiness + discounted Russian coal imports capping the upside. Cross-consistent with the Ministry of Commerce commodity price network forecast (2026H2 Jincheng small lump RMB 1,100–1,300/ton, average RMB 1,200/ton).

4.5 Historical Cycle Templates

The past three cycles: ① 2016 supply-side reform-driven, roughly 2 years up + 1.5 years down, amplitude about +60%; ② 2020–2021 energy crisis, Jincheng mid lump RMB 880/ton in April 2021 → pit-mouth RMB 1,740/ton in April 2022 (amplitude about +100%) → a long 3.5-year decline into early 2026 (cumulative about -50%); ③ the 2026 safety-inspection shock: RMB 870 → 1,340/ton (8 months, +54%), a supply-shock-type pulse rather than a demand cycle. Pattern: anthracite's amplitude is smaller than thermal coal's (thermal coal long-term contracts + rigid chemical demand as buffers), downcycles are longer (3+ years), and upcycles are short and steep (driven by supply/policy shocks) — this round's 8-month rebound fits the "pulse" profile and should not be extrapolated into a new upcycle.

I5 Competitive Landscape and Profit Pool

5.1 Concentration: The Highest Resource Concentration Among Coal Types, and Rising

Anthracite has the highest resource concentration among coal types: proven remaining reserves of about 120 billion tons, only about 1/10 of national coal reserves, with premium low-sulfur lump coal resources concentrated in East Shanxi (Yangquan–Jincheng Qinshui coalfield). By output estimate, China's anthracite CR3 is about 30–35% and CR5 about 45–50% (2025, estimated, to be verified); the top three groups are Jinkong Equipment (formerly Jinneng/Jincheng Coal, Jincheng), Huayang Group (formerly Yangquan), and Henan Energy (Yongcheng/Jiaozuo). The "15th Five-Year Plan" halt on new low-capacity mines + small-mine exits + consolidation by large groups point to rising concentration.

Note: Huayang Co.'s 2025 raw coal output was 41.61 million tons (including some lean/meager coal) and Lanhua Sci-Tech's 14.4416 million tons; shares are estimated against national anthracite output of about 400 million tons, on a raw coal/blended coal basis, for order-of-magnitude reference only.

5.2 Profit Pool: Profits Stay at the Mining End — In Essence, "Resource Rent"

Profits are concentrated at the mining end (the resource segment): the anthracite premium stems from scarcity (resource depletion + freeze on new supply), with lump coal and PCI coal priced significantly above thermal coal (2026-08-28 national anthracite market reference price of RMB 1,348/ton vs. a clearly lower midpoint for port 5,500 kcal thermal coal). The annual profit pool at the mining end is roughly RMB 20-50 billion (estimated on output of nearly 400 million tons and net profit of RMB 50-150 per ton), with representative gross margins of 30-43% (Huayang 39.5%, Jinkong 42.2%, Haohua 35.1%, 2025 annual reports). Downstream retains virtually no profit: urea capacity is severely oversupplied (2025 capacity of 72.45 million tons / output of 72.01 million tons), steel is barely profitable, and trading captures only the spread.

Profit migration over the next 2-3 years: ① Lump coal profits will concentrate further in high thermal-stability, low-sulfur quality resources (Jincheng/Yangquan core mining areas), squeezing out marginal mining areas and the trading segment; ② PCI coal share profits will be ceded to bituminous PCI, with anthracite PCI's share in structural decline; ③ Players with new mines under construction (Huayang's Qiyuan/Boli, Haohua's Hong'er) will grab share with volume offsetting price; ④ If fixed-bed processes exit at an accelerated pace, the absolute size of the lump coal profit pool will slowly shrink. There is no "mining end → downstream" profit migration — downstream has no profit to give up.

5.3 Bargaining Power Up and Down the Chain: The Key Distinction Lies in Lump Coal vs. Fines

• PCI coal: Steel mills are concentrated and can switch to bituminous PCI (a price spread of RMB 280-330/ton triggers switching), so bargaining power sits with the mills — anthracite PCI is the coal type most visibly squeezed by substitution, and its premium will be captured by steel mills;
• Lump coal (fixed-bed synthetic ammonia/sintering): Can be replaced by semi-coke/coke fines/briquettes/coal-water slurry; substitution elasticity is moderate but conversion entails process and capex barriers, and substitutes for premium low-sulfur lump coal are of inferior quality — large mining groups still hold scarcity leverage over small customers;
• Toward upstream (equipment/civil explosives/transport): Large groups' procurement is diversified and they hold strong bargaining power.

Where return quality lands: This is a "quasi-resource-rent" business — the premium resource segment at the mining end earns real money (gross margins of 35-43%, ample operating cash flow; Jinkong's 2025 operating cash flow of RMB 3.1 billion vs. net profit of RMB 1.8 billion), and resource scarcity supports mid-to-long-term ROIC; but the 2025 decline in the price midpoint proves its strongly cyclical nature, with ROE generally only 5-10%. The illusion of "revenue growth without profit growth" appears in two places: ① downstream urea/chemicals (Lanhua's "strong coal, loss-making chemicals" overall loss is the classic case); ② anthracite fines/PCI coal — shipment volumes are stable but the premium is eaten away by the bituminous PCI spread and steel mills' bargaining power. Whether the boom dividend stays at the mining end depends on the share of scarce lump coal (not fines that can be replaced by bituminous PCI).

5.4 Where Sector Valuation Stands

The SW Coal Index (801950.SI) trades at 22.77x PE (~79th percentile over the past 10 years) and 1.57x PB (~82nd percentile; window from April 2014, as of 2026-08-28). But this measure cannot directly represent the anthracite sub-sector: the sector's high percentile is mainly driven up by high-PB dividend heavyweights such as China Shenhua, and cyclical stocks' PE percentiles are naturally elevated at earnings troughs (E is in the denominator) — using PE percentiles to argue "valuations are expensive" is a textbook misuse. Dispersion among pure anthracite names is extreme: Huayang Co. PB 1.22 (near its own 5-year median), Lanhua Sci-Tech PB 0.71 (below book, but reflecting balance-sheet deterioration rather than a mispricing — see I8), Jinkong Coal PB 1.61, Haohua Energy PB 1.72 (at historical highs). Index-level valuation percentiles for the anthracite sub-sector were not obtained.

I6 Policy · Geopolitics · ESG

Net direction: Neutral-to-positive (supply-side constraints outweigh demand-side pressure).

• Institutionalized safety supervision: The Coal Mine Safety Production Regulations (State Council Decree No. 774, effective May 1, 2024) + Shanxi's special rectification of "three excesses" (April 2024) + the 2025 edition of the Coal Mine Safety Regulations + the July 2025 nationwide overproduction audit — tighter safety supervision bears hardest on high-gas-content anthracite mines, and has been the most important supply-side support for anthracite prices since 2024.
• Capacity reserve system: NDRC Energy [2024] No. 413 allows mining-area planned capacity to increase by up to 30% for reserve capacity (sealed in normal times, released in emergencies), with pre-approved capacity additions to be withdrawn when appropriate — adds supply elasticity but is not released in normal times; neutral with a floor-supporting tilt.
• Mining-area planning management: The Provisions on the Administration of Overall Coal Mining Area Planning (NDRC Decree No. 29 of 2024, effective February 2025) constrains disorderly capacity expansion at the planning source; the Coal Industry "15th Five-Year" Plan (issued August 2026) proposes reducing the number of coal mines to around 4,000, raising large mines' share of capacity to 85%, and striving to stabilize coal consumption before 2030 — the earlier-peak framing eases pessimistic demand expectations.
• Import tariffs: Coal import tariffs were reinstated from January 1, 2024, with anthracite's MFN rate at 3% (0 under FTAs with Australia and Indonesia) — raising the cost of Russian coal imports and supporting domestic prices, though Russian coal has offset part of the tariff impact via discounts.
• Coal-for-chemicals policy: NDRC Industry [2023] No. 773 strictly controls new coal use in modern coal chemicals, but "feedstock energy use excluded from dual energy-consumption controls" is established — policy treatment diverges between anthracite as chemical feedstock and as fuel, with the feedstock attribute granted an exemption.
• Dual carbon and ESG: The "15th Five-Year" period is the first five-year plan under dual carbon-emission controls: the fuel end (power/residential/building materials) faces structural headwinds, while the feedstock/materials end (PCI, coal-based anodes, carbon materials, silicon carbide) enjoys dual endorsement from policy and industry white papers — anthracite is transitioning from fuel to feedstock, its long-term narrative distinguishing it from thermal coal.
• Geopolitics: Vietnam's export quotas + domestic retention (positive); Russia's removal of export tariffs + discounted volumes to China (negative, capping prices); the Russia-Ukraine situation and sanctions evolution are two-way variables — if sanctions ease and Russian coal returns to Europe, supply to China tightens (positive); if discounted volumes to China continue, domestic prices are pressured.

I7 Core Debates and Scenarios

7.1 Three Decisive Battlegrounds

D1: Duration of Shanxi's safety-supervision pulse — the No. 1 price variable for 2026H2

• Bulls: Normalized safety supervision + continued constraints on high-gas mines, "restart without volume recovery" (restarted mines' output only back to 66% of pre-halt levels with a slow ramp), and low pit-mouth inventories amplifying price elasticity.
• Bears: Accidents directly hit coking coal mines rather than anthracite mines; the safety-supervision storm is a 2-3 quarter pulse; authoritative channels expect the market to "bid farewell to tightness" in September-October, Q4 capacity utilization to rebound to 90%, and stabilization by year-end; winter supply-security pressure may loosen policy.
• Tracking indicators: Whether Jincheng/Yangquan pit-mouth inventories turn from -45.9% YoY to positive growth for 4+ consecutive weeks (a leading signal of restart volume); Shanxi halted mines' restart rate and output recovery (recovery above 80% would invalidate the strong-Q4 assumption); whether 2026 winter supply-security documents name Shanxi for output increases.

D2: The slope of structural demand decline — -1.3%/yr or +0.9%/yr

• Bulls (fast decline): Fixed-bed exit has explicit policy documents (no new fixed-bed units in principle from 2015), crude steel output cuts continue under the "15th Five-Year," and the RMB 280-330/ton bituminous PCI spread keeps driving substitution.
• Bears (slow decline): Enterprises mostly exit outdated capacity via capacity swaps rather than outright closures (2026 total urea capacity still expected at 80.55 million tons); in August 2025 a new high-efficiency clean gasification process for anthracite lump coal passed appraisal by the Nitrogen Fertilizer Association, providing a technical path to extend fixed-bed life; increments in carbon-based new materials are under-quantified; and bituminous PCI substitution has reflexivity — when safety supervision tightens and pushes up both coal prices simultaneously, the economic driver of substitution weakens.
• Tracking indicators: Fixed-bed synthetic ammonia capacity share, pace of urea capacity swaps, anthracite blend ratio in PCI per ton of hot metal, lump coal volumes for coal-based anodes/carbon materials.

D3: Discounted Russian coal to China vs. international supply contraction — do imports cap domestic prices?

• Bulls (imports constrained): US/UK sanctions restrict settlement and logistics channels, Far East rail capacity bottlenecks, 3% import tariff.
• Bears (discounted volume surge): Russia fully removed anthracite export tariffs from January 1, 2025 and is defending share with discount strategies; January-November 2025 coal import value from Russia to China +42% YoY, with Russia reclaiming the position of China's largest supplier — contraction into OECD markets ≠ contraction into the Chinese market.
• Tracking indicators: Monthly Russian anthracite import volumes to China and port discount depth (discounts above RMB 100/ton would mean significant import pressure).

7.2 Scenarios and Probabilities (next 12 months, Jincheng small-lump pit-mouth midpoint)

I8 Investment Implications and Beneficiaries

8.1 Boom Direction × Business Quality Decision Matrix

The matrix exposes the value-trap logic: a bullish boom ≠ worth buying. Lanhua Sci-Tech sits in the bottom-right quadrant — the boom dividend from the lump coal price rebound is devoured by three forces: urea losses, the Yamei Daning shutdown (41% stake; 2026H1 equity-method loss of RMB 94.20 million plus an arbitration dispute), and debt-servicing pressure (short-term borrowings +85% from the start of the year to RMB 4.35 billion, current ratio 0.62, debt-to-assets 60.37%). Its PB of 0.71 below book reflects balance-sheet deterioration, not a mispricing — a classic value trap. The anthracite PCI fines segment and downstream chemicals sit in the bottom-left — boom direction is already downward and returns are poor: avoid, not value trap.

8.2 Beneficiaries / Names to Avoid

Preferred:

• Huayang Co. (600348): Core beneficiary of scarce anthracite resources — 2025 raw coal output of 41.61 million tons (+8.43%), roughly 10% of national anthracite output; the Qiyuan mine (commissioned December 2025, 137-year service life) and the Boli mine provide long-term succession; 2026H1 net profit attributable to parent of RMB 1.06 billion (+35.6%). Risks: sodium-ion battery/carbon fiber new materials still in investment phase; Qiyuan's H1 net loss of RMB 66 million on ramp-up drag; PB 1.22 at the 5-year median.
• Jinkong Coal (601001): Strictly speaking a thermal coal name (Tashan mine dominant); its allocation value lies in "low leverage (debt ratio 23%) + high dividends (~50% payout, ~3.0% yield) + an option on the group's Jindong anthracite asset injection." As a sector substitute, be clear that its exposure is thermal coal β, not lump coal prices.

Avoid:

• Lanhua Sci-Tech (600123): Premium coal quality but "coal profits, chemical losses" — 2025 net profit attributable to parent of -RMB 540 million (urea drag), 2026H1 only RMB 83 million with coal output -8.55% YoY, and core profit engine Yamei Daning essentially shut down; short-term borrowings +85%, current ratio 0.62. Below-book is not a mispricing; no turnaround has emerged — avoid until debt-servicing and arbitration risks clear.
• Shenhuo Co. (000933): Not an anthracite name — electrolytic aluminum dominates (2026H1 net profit RMB 4.78 billion, +151%); anthracite exposure is negligible, and including it in an anthracite portfolio is a misallocation.
• Anthracite PCI fines exposure / pure trading plays: Premium structurally eroded by the bituminous PCI spread and steel mills' bargaining power; trading margins are thin with no moat.

Neutral watch: Haohua Energy (601101) — scarcity of its Jingxi anthracite export license and brand + low-cost eastern Inner Mongolia thermal coal ramp (2025 output of 18.43 million tons, a record; 2026H1 net profit +66.1%), but anthracite purity keeps declining and PB 1.72 is at historical highs; mediocre value.

8.3 Scenarios × Names

8.4 Key Sector-Level Risks

① Early easing of Shanxi safety supervision / winter supply surge, with supply returning in pulses faster than expected (trigger signal: pit-mouth inventories rising for 4 consecutive weeks); ② demand declining faster than expected (concentrated fixed-bed exits + accelerating hot metal decline); ③ discounted Russian coal volumes capping prices; ④ tightening of coal total-consumption control rules narrowing the chemical feedstock coal definition; ⑤ sector level: valuation reversion risk in high-PB coal stocks as the dividend premium fades.

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Key data sources: China Coal Transportation & Sales Association's "2025 Anthracite Market White Paper" and Anthracite Committee market reports, General Administration of Customs, National Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Commerce commodity price network, SCI99 (Zhuochuang), Baichuan Yingfu, CCTD China Coal Market Network, listed companies' periodic reports, NDRC/Ministry of Emergency Management policy documents, Argus Media.