Industry Research Report | November 16, 2026
Industry View: Divergence | Research Horizon: 12-24 months | Confidence: Medium
One-line thesis: Traffic at China's top famous mountains is still growing modestly, while supply is nearly frozen under dual ecological and approval constraints—but ticket and ropeway prices are sealed by administratively set pricing, and the profit pool is being ceded to both local governments and consumers. The industry "earns money from traffic but not from pricing": buying the right segment (monopoly transportation + low royalty take + low-valuation cash cows) is bond-like rent collection; buying the wrong asset (high valuation + revenue growth without profit growth) is a prosperity illusion.
The subject of this report is the operations industry that relies on world-class natural landscape resources and uses in-park monopoly transportation (ropeways/cable cars/eco-friendly passenger transport) as its core monetization asset. A one-sentence value chain map: Resource owner (local government/administrative committee, holding ticket collection rights and concession-granting rights) → Listed companies (ropeways, passenger transport, hotels, live performances, and other operating assets) → Distribution channels (OTAs/travel agencies) → Tourists. The industry's asset boundary rule is highly consistent: natural landscape resources and first-entry ticket collection rights belong to the government (not on listed companies' books), while man-made structures (ropeways, cable cars, eco-buses, hotels) belong to listed companies—ticket economics and ropeway economics are two different businesses.
Sample scope: nine A-share companies—Huangshan Tourism (600054), Emeishan A (000888), Lijiang Shares (002033), Jiuhua Tourism (603199), Changbaishan (603099), Tianmu Lake (603136), Zhangjiajie (000430), Sand Cableway (002159), Tibet Tourism (600749)—which together control roughly 20 core ropeways and 3 exclusive eco-passenger transport concessions in scenic areas; the reference group is man-made attraction operators such as Songcheng Performance and China CYTS Tours. One clarification: Changbaishan has no ropeway assets; its core asset is the exclusive right to operate road passenger transport across three scenic zones—so in this report it is a peer sample of "monopoly in-park transportation," not a ropeway sample.
The big picture: mid-single-digit visitor growth, persistently declining per-capita spending. Per the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, in 2025 domestic trips in China reached 6.522 billion (+16.2%), with total spending of RMB 6.30 trillion (+9.5%); trips and spending were respectively +8.6%/+10.0% versus 2019; in the first three quarters of 2026, 5.307 billion trips (+6.2%) and RMB 4.95 trillion (+2.2%)—spending growth is systematically below trip growth, with average spend per trip at RMB 933, down 3.4% YoY (China Tourism Academy, Ministry of Culture and Tourism data). This is a consumption market of "stable volume, shrinking price."
Famous-mountain category: the excess recovery period has ended, and beta lags the market. The leading sample (Huangshan entries of 5.1680 million + Emeishan gate entries of 4.3449 million + Changbaishan 3.6773 million = 13.1902 million visits, 2025, all per company filings/official figures) completed its excess recovery versus the 2019 baseline during 2023-2025 (Huangshan entries +47.6% vs 2019), but growth collectively fell back in 2026: Huangshan +2.86% for the first three quarters (Q3 -5.48% due to weather and traffic diversion), Emeishan -6.5% at one point in 2025H1, Tianmu Lake revenue -13.8%. The mountain category's beta to the broader market is roughly 0.7—a considerable portion of overall market growth comes from nearby trips and lower-tier destinations; famous mountains are no longer the growth center.
Structural alpha exists in two places, but both are fading. ① High-speed rail: the Chizhou-Huangshan HSR (April 2024) drove Jiuhua Tourism's 2025 revenue +14.93%, but it fell to +4.31% in the first three quarters of 2026; the Shenyang-Baihe HSR (September 2025) carried 660,000 passengers in its first month, and Changbaishan visitor traffic rose +11.7% in the first three quarters of 2026—the HSR effect follows a "first-year pulse, second-year decay" pattern and cannot be extrapolated linearly. Moreover, Changbaishan Q3 traffic was +8.0% while revenue was -7.04%: the transport dividend lands in traffic, not revenue. ② Inbound tourism: after the 240-hour visa-free transit policy, visa-free foreign arrivals reached 30.08 million in 2025 (+49.5%), with famous-mountain inbound traffic up 25%-76% annually (Wulingyuan +45.79% Jan-Oct 2026, Huangshan City +75.7% in 2025), but this accounts for only 1%-5% of famous-mountain traffic, contributing less than 0.5 percentage point to total CAGR—it is a high-spend marginal increment, not a growth engine.
Two negative behavioral signals to watch: ① Substitution of light outdoor activities for ropeways—Huangshan ropeway rides per visitor fell from 2.11 in 2019 to 2.02 in 2025 (-4.2%); at Emeishan over the 2026 May Day holiday, "hiking exceeded bus riding for the first time in history" (18-24 age cohort share +7pct to 22.99%)—ropeway unit usage is being slowly diluted by younger visitors' behavior; ② Zero-sum redistribution among famous mountains—within the Buddhist-mountain category, Jiuhua's 2025 revenue +14.9% and Emei's -6.5% happened simultaneously; diversion among homogeneous resources is zero-sum.
Demand bridge (bottom-up, post red-team revision): 13.190 million visits in 2025 → ~14.435 million in 2028E, a net increase of ~1.245 million, CAGR +3.05%—Huangshan +363,000 (falling back to +2% per year after +2.86% in 2026), Emeishan +266,000 (free tickets swap for volume but Golden Summit caps traffic, +3%/+1.5% per year), Changbaishan +616,000 (HSR pulse decaying +9%/+4%/+3%). Components sum cleanly (36.3+26.6+61.6=124.5).
The essence of supply is "administratively capped scarcity." Three constraints stack up: ① Ecological and heritage controls—human activity is in principle prohibited within core protection zones inside ecological red lines; major construction in World Heritage sites requires provincial approval plus a heritage impact assessment (Regulations on Scenic and Historic Interest Areas; National Forestry and Grassland Administration national park spatial layout), leaving an extremely narrow approval window for new ropeways in dual-heritage core zones; ② Administratively capped carrying capacity—Huangshan's approved maximum daily capacity is 40,000 (voluntarily cut from 50,000 in 2021); the Yulong Snow Mountain Glacier Park ropeway is limited to 10,000 tickets/day with 7-day advance sale, routinely sells out in peak season and uses judicial notarization for waitlisting; ③ Special equipment approvals—licensing across the full ropeway design/manufacture/installation/modification chain. Result: nominal annual utilization is not high (Huangshan ~35%, Glacier Park ropeway ~85%), but peak-season capacity hits the administrative ceiling—only "peak-season capacity" counts as effective capacity—supply is a vertical line in peak season.
Supply is not absolutely zero growth; two exceptions are already happening (revising an earlier judgment): ① The Huangshan East Gate and Donghai ropeways opened in June 2026 (invested by the controlling group system, outside the listed company), meaning new ropeways have in fact appeared in a dual-heritage site, while planting two options: asset injection or traffic diversion; ② Lijiang Yak Meadow ropeway upgrade: capacity raised from 360 to 1,900 persons/hour (5.3x), total investment raised from RMB 295 million to 532 million, to be completed and operational within 2026—both a source of volume growth and a potential cannibalizer of the company's own main ropeway. In addition, Emeishan Golden Summit ropeway renovation (RMB 350 million self-funded, expected completion 2027, alpine-section capacity constrained during construction) and Jiuhua Baishui Palace... correction: Jiuhua Baishou Palace cable car upgrade (RMB 110 million, landing 2026Q3) form the stock-renewal mainline. Industry capex characteristics: RMB 100-500 million per project, mostly stock renovation, 3-5 year cycles.
Concession terms and asset ownership (checked company by company): Huangshan Tourism—ticket franchise through end-2036, 50% of net ticket revenue remitted to the administrative committee, franchise fees collected and paid on behalf; the 4 ropeways are owned by the listed company, but from 2025 a 15% paid-use fee on ropeway revenue for scenic resources is levied (two-year trial); Emeishan A—entrusted with operating mountain-entry tickets since 1997, sharing revenue with the administrative committee; in addition an 8% resource fee is deducted from ticket proceeds (2026 interim report); ropeways owned; Lijiang Shares—tickets belong to the Yulong Snow Mountain Scenic Area Investment Company; the three ropeways are subsidiary assets; Jiuhua Tourism—tickets belong to the administrative committee; inner-line passenger transport franchise rate of 3% (unchanged for 13 years); Changbaishan—passenger transport concession from 2010-08-21 to 2030-08-21 (RMB 1.1 million/year), ~3.8 years remaining, renewal terms undetermined, and the company's prospectus itself lists "inability to extend or a sharp rise in license fees" as the top risk; Tibet Tourism—BOT revenue rights (Grand Canyon 40 years, sacred mountains and holy lakes 50 years, etc.), already pledged for financing; Tianmu Lake—self-built assets, no franchise expiry constraint, the sample's lowest government dependence. Common conclusion: ropeway assets are long-duration, but concessions can be re-tendered and fee rates unilaterally adjusted—the value of this "quasi-license" must be discounted for renewal repricing.
Substitute supply: The Bailong Elevator (1,380 persons/hour, 60 million passengers over 20 years) proves elevators can substitute ropeway functions at scale; the net addition of 40 national 5A scenic areas over three years (318→358) dilutes famous-mountain scarcity; glass walkways and low-altitude sightseeing divert and complement. For "single-channel" assets (Glacier Park, Golden Summit), substitution elasticity approaches zero; for mountains with "multiple channel options," diversion occurs both internally and externally.
Brand matrix (ranked by scarcity):
| Scenic Area/Brand | Positioning | 2025 Traffic (basis) | Full-experience list price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Huangshan | World dual heritage, No.1 mindshare among mountains | 5.1680 million entries | RMB 398 |
| Emeishan | Dual heritage + Buddhist pilgrimage | 4.3449 million gate entries | RMB 370 |
| Changbaishan | Dual summer-cool + ice-snow seasons | 3.6773 million main-area visits | RMB 270 |
| Jiuhuashan | Buddhist mountain, highest revisit rate | Not disclosed | RMB 420 (all items) |
| Yulong Snow Mountain | Exclusive snow-mountain IP | 3.1072 million Glacier Park visits (2024) | RMB 240 (list) |
| Wulingyuan | World natural heritage | 7.2203 million ticketed visits (shares) | RMB 225 (excluding ropeway) |
| Fanjingshan | World natural heritage (growth stage) | 1.98 million (2024) | ~RMB 290 (to be verified) |
| Tianmu Lake | Regional scenery, no national mindshare | Not disclosed | ~RMB 200 |
Note: inclusion scopes differ across areas—Jiuhuashan is ticket + two ropeways + cable car full package; Wulingyuan excludes ropeways and elevators; Yulong Snow Mountain is ticket + eco-bus + main ropeway list-price bundle (channel execution prices are higher; no approval documents); Fanjingshan is a guidebook figure pending verification. Ticket prices cluster in the RMB 105-190 band and have not moved for 8 years since 2018; price competition has shifted to transport bundling and secondary-spend combos.
Four facts about the pricing system: ① Nominal prices are sealed by three institutional layers—Tourism Law Articles 43/44 (ticket and transport fees at scenic areas using public resources are subject to government pricing/guidance prices; hikes require hearings and 6-month advance notice; "separately charged items that have recovered investment costs should cut or cancel fees"); NDRC Price [2018] No. 951 established cost-review-based pricing (note: the correct document number is No. 951); NDRC General Office Price [2019] No. 333 explicitly brought monopoly ancillary services such as cable cars and shuttle buses into price-cut supervision. After the 2018 price-cut order (Huangshan 230→190, Yulong main ropeway 180→120, Emei 185→160, Wulingyuan unified at 165), the sample recorded zero nominal price hikes in 8 years, and the "investment recovered should cut prices" clause hangs over old ropeways built in the 1980s-2000s whose costs are fully amortized. ② All execution-price elasticity lies in structure: off/peak differentials (Huangshan 190/150, Emei 160/110), combo-ticket upgrades (Wulingyuan "three ropeways one elevator" RMB 518), individual/group quota allocation (Glacier Park guarantees 5,000 individual tickets/day). One market rumor needs clarification: the "random time slots RMB 140 / designated slots RMB 200" appearing in Yulong Snow Mountain channels in 2026 is not a ropeway price hike—an official July 2026 scenic-area notice confirms the Glacier Park ropeway ticket remains RMB 120/person; RMB 140 is a ropeway + eco-bus package and RMB 200 is an OTA bundled-product quote. ③ Net prices are squeezed both ways by resource rents: 15% of Huangshan ropeway revenue (~RMB 126 million/year; the company estimates the trial period reduces total annual profit by ~RMB 50 million) is remitted as a paid-use resource fee; Emeishan's effective ticket price is ~RMB 116 (list 160 × realization rate 72.5%), half of which is paid to the administrative committee, then an 8% resource fee deducted, leaving the company ~RMB 58 net per visitor—on tickets the company keeps barely a third of the list price. ④ Free-ticket concessions are government-led: Huangshan free tickets for under-18s through end-2026; Emei summer half-price and temple free incense vouchers; Changbaishan shuttle fare cuts conceding RMB 15.72 million for the full year; in December 2025 Lingyin Feilai Peak (RMB 45) and the Xixia Imperial Tombs became free in succession, and Wuyishan (dual heritage) was free for all of 2025—the sign that the free-ticket wave is spreading from cultural sites to mountain parks is the biggest tail risk on the price side.
Per-visitor economics model (2025 annual report basis): Emeishan A revenue per visitor RMB 214.7 (net ticket take RMB 58 + ropeway 89.8 + hotels etc.); Huangshan ropeway RMB 162.9 per entrant (2.02 rides × RMB 80.7); Changbaishan RMB 214.3 per visitor (of which passenger transport 141.4, 66%); Lijiang ropeways RMB 131.0 per Glacier Park visitor. Best per-visitor economics is Lijiang (single channel + capacity-capped sellouts); most squeezed are Emei (revenue sharing + resource fee + construction-limited traffic, triple pressure) and Changbaishan (conceding price for volume: first three quarters of 2026 traffic +11.7% but revenue only +2.1%, net profit -6.3%).
Per-visitor revenue baseline path (asset-specific, not a uniform index): 2026E sample per-visitor revenue roughly -2% (range -5% to +1%: Emei -9%, Lijiang ropeways +4.5%, Jiuhua +4.3%—three directions coexist); 2027E -1.5%; 2028E flat (Golden Summit completion + Yak Meadow launch + concession base effect clearing). Corresponding sample revenue path: RMB 3.830 billion (2025) → 3.927 → 3.961 → 4.046 billion, CAGR ~+1.85%—nearly all revenue growth over the next three years comes from traffic; per-visitor spend is a drag, not a driver.
The essence of the landscape: nationally fragmented, individually monopolistic. China has ~1,200 passenger ropeways in operation (China Ropeway Association), with the 9 listed entities together controlling ~20—national concentration below 3%; but each mountain's ropeway/passenger transport/ticket operating rights are 100% exclusive—Huangshan's 4 ropeways, Yulong Snow Mountain's 3, Jiuhua's 3 + passenger transport franchise are each the sole operator in their area. Competition occurs on two layers: same-region mountain diversion (Emei vs Jiuhua, Yulong vs Cangshan/Shilin) and visitor stratification between "once-in-a-lifetime" vs "nearby high-frequency"—Jiuhua/Huangshan sit within a 3-hour Yangtze Delta circle of repeat visitors; Yulong/Changbaishan/Wulingyuan rely on long-haul national flows and are more sensitive to macro consumption.
Profit pool: the monopoly transport segment is the real profit; tickets and hotels are weak segments. 2025 annual-report gross margins: ropeways/cable cars 75%-86% (Jiuhua ~86%, Huangshan 75.2%—already including the 15% resource-fee hit; pre-fee 87.6%), Jiuhua passenger transport 52.6%, Impression Lijiang 51.6%, Emei ticket share 37.7%, Lijiang hotels 23.2%. Huangshan's 4 ropeways generated RMB 842 million in revenue, exceeding all 22 of its hotels combined; Lijiang's Regalia Resort, ~RMB 700 million in assets, earned only RMB 2.03 million net in 2025—hotels are the industry's worst "revenue up, profit not" zone; ropeways are the sole profit ballast.
Two directions of profit migration: ① Toward government—Huangshan's 15% resource fee drove its ropeway gross margin down 12.4 percentage points in one year, operating costs +20.35%, net profit attributable to parent -7.15% (against a record-high 2025 traffic backdrop); Emei's ticket-sharing ratio is trending up; Changbaishan's operating-rights renewal is imminent in 2030. Restraint is needed on extrapolation: the Huangshan model is a one-off "make-up plus add-on" case (Emei has long deducted 8%; Huangshan's ropeways previously paid RMB 10 per ticket—resource fees are already industry norm), any spread is more likely via Emei-style differentiated rates than a uniform 15%; we assess spread probability at 20%-30%—but the direction is undeniable: under fiscal pressure, the concession renewal repricing mechanism is running. ② Toward consumers—free tickets, half-price, and shuttle fare cuts are all led by local governments, with listed companies bearing the cost (no standing fiscal compensation mechanism). Squeezed from both ends, operators' retained profit growth will systematically lag traffic growth; what remains in their hands is precisely the ropeway/passenger transport segment most vulnerable to royalty takes and repricing.
Return quality stratification (2026 evidence): True cash cows—Jiuhua (ROE 13.4%, 40% payout, operating cash flow RMB 312 million > net profit RMB 213 million, first three quarters of 2026 revenue +4.31%, among the few positive growers in the sample); Lijiang (debt/asset ratio only 7.4%, 2026H1 net profit +40.5%); Sand Cableway (net margin 24.1%, ROE 10.1%, but first three quarters of 2026 revenue -3.31% and attributable profit -10.49%, declining in line with the industry—the "national chain hedge" narrative has yet to deliver). Prosperity illusions—Changbaishan (81x PE; traffic +11.7% but net profit -6.3%); Tianmu Lake (no strong monopoly segment; first three quarters of 2026 net profit -41.6%); Zhangjiajie (Dayong Ancient Town dragged five years of cumulative losses of RMB 1.3 billion before judicial restructuring; still loss-making on an ex-non-recurring basis in 2026). Middle ground—Huangshan (strongest endowment, cash flow RMB 666 million, but the heaviest royalty take; 2026Q3 attributable profit -34.34%); Emeishan A (still cash-cow-like, but construction-limited traffic plus sharing squeeze; first three quarters of 2026 revenue -9.09%).
Industry valuation position (2026-11-16): SW Social Services Index PE 39.9x (27th percentile since July 2014), PB 2.35x (3rd percentile)—the sector's PB is at a decade low. At the stock level: Jiuhua PE(TTM) 17.1x (5th percentile of 10 years), Lijiang 18.3x (11%), Sand Cableway 17.9x, Emeishan 27.1x (42%), Huangshan 29.5x (65%), Tianmu Lake 36.4x, Changbaishan 81.0x (84%); dividend yields Jiuhua/Sand ~2.2%, Emei ~1.5%, Huangshan ~1.4%, Changbaishan ~0.4%. Conclusion: the market has already priced the monopoly cash cows (Jiuhua/Lijiang/Sand) at historic lows on "earnings decline + rising royalty takes," while high-growth narrative stocks (Changbaishan) and deteriorating-earnings stocks (Tianmu Lake) remain expensive—the prosperity conclusions must be read against this valuation set.
One-line return quality conclusion: this is a "medium"-return business—the ropeway segment approaches utility-style rent collection (high gross margin, low capex, near-zero marginal cost), but pricing power and sharing rights are not in its own hands; the industry as a whole is not a value trap—only certain high-percentile-valuation names are.
Policy is a pricing-level variable for this industry, with a net direction of neutral-to-positive: Tailwinds — the 240-hour visa-free transit policy (57 countries) and departure tax refund facilitation; in 2025, 30.08 million foreign nationals entered visa-free (+49.5%), accounting for 73.1% of foreign arrivals; the Measures for the Administration of Franchising of Infrastructure and Public Utilities (Order No. 17 of 2024) relaxed the maximum franchise term to 40 years in principle; no nationwide mandatory price-cut directive has been issued since 2022. Headwinds — institutionalization of ticket price cuts (Documents No. 951/333/568/701 brought ropeways and cable cars under monopoly-related price-reduction regulation); free-admission demonstration effects (the West Lake model; Lingyin and the Western Xia Imperial Tombs offering free admission from December 2025); explicit levying of resource usage fees (Huangshan piloting a 15% rate). Ecological red lines are a "double-edged sword" for the industry: they block supply expansion (raising the scarcity value of existing franchises) while lifting environmental and compliance costs; ropeways, as low-disturbance transport, align with conservation priorities. Geopolitical exposure is minimal—the sole transmission chain is bilateral relations with source countries → international flight routes → inbound tourist flows. Key policy watchpoint: the re-pricing of the Huangshan resource fee after its pilot expires at end-2026 — this is the first litmus test of the government's take-rate direction.
D1 Will government take-rates rise systematically (the contest over profit-pool ownership) Bulls: Huangshan is an idiosyncratic case of "catch-up plus escalation"; the company estimates an annual profit impact of only about RMB 50 million over a two-year pilot; the industry already has a common revenue-sharing norm (Emei 8%, Huangshan previously RMB 10/ticket), making renewals neutral; no new nationwide price-cut directive since 2022. Bears: the Huangshan ropeway's gross margin fell 12.4pct in one year, already proving the mechanism's destructiveness; under fiscal pressure, franchise re-pricing is a trend — Changbaishan's 2030 renewal and Huangshan's ticket franchise expiring in 2036 are both re-pricing windows; the free-admission wave is turning tickets into the government's traffic-acquisition tool. Tracking indicators: the outcome of the Huangshan resource fee re-pricing at end-2026; announcements by other famous-mountain management committees; disclosure of Changbaishan renewal terms.
D2 Can traffic α convert into revenue and profit (the contest over the volume-price scissors gap) Bulls: high-speed rail plus inbound tourism bring genuine incremental traffic; sample traffic CAGR of +3.05%; Jiuhua/Lijiang still posted positive per-capita revenue growth in 2026 (+4.3%/+4.5%), proving that structural price increases (secondary spending, mix optimization) are feasible. Bears: in the first three quarters of 2026, all four companies deteriorated simultaneously (Huangshan Q3 net profit attributable -34.34%, Emei revenue -9.09%, Lijiang Q3 revenue -7.97%, Changbaishan Q3 revenue -7.04%) — the "traffic → profit" mapping is breaking down; national per-capita spending of -3.4% combined with the concession war suggests revenue may grow only +1%-2%. Tracking indicators: quarterly per-capita revenue data; whether free-admission measures expand; whether Jiuhua/Lijiang post two consecutive quarters of negative revenue growth (a falsification signal for the demand bridge).
D3 Is there hidden room for price increases under administratively set prices (the contest over pricing power) Bulls: combo-ticket upgrades (Wulingyuan at RMB 518), peak/off-peak price differentials, shifts in individual-vs-group mix, and market-priced secondary-spending items (performances/hot springs/ice-and-snow) not subject to price hearings are compliant revenue-management tools. Bears: nominal prices unchanged for 8 years with the "investment recovered should mean price cuts" clause looming; Yulong's RMB 140/200 prices were confirmed as bundled-ticket packages rather than price increases — no precedent exists for time-based floating pricing; free-admission concessions are overall negative-sum (in the first three quarters of 2026, all concession-offering samples underperformed on revenue vs. traffic). Tracking indicators: any scenic area obtaining approval for ropeway tickets or time-based price schedules above current prices; changes in combo-ticket/secondary-spending per-customer spending.
Scenarios (12–24 months):
Catalyst Calendar:
Decision matrix (prosperity direction × business quality):
The point that must be made explicit: a favorable prosperity direction does not mean the stock is worth buying. Changbaishan has the strongest traffic prosperity in the entire sector (a double tailwind from high-speed rail + ice-and-snow), yet it sits in the lower-right quadrant — at 81x PE (84th percentile over 10 years), perfect delivery is fully priced in, while its actual 2026 showed a volume-price divergence of traffic +11.7%, revenue +2.1%, and net profit -6.3%, compounded by two unpriced risks: the RMB 305 bundled charge flagged for rectification by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, and the 2030 franchise renewal. It is the sector's most typical value-trap candidate. In the lower-left, Tianmu Lake (no strong monopoly segment, net profit -41.6%) and Zhangjiajie (still loss-making on recurring earnings post-restructuring) belong in "Avoid," not "Value Trap."
Beneficiaries (ranked under the base case):
Names to avoid: Changbaishan (value-trap logic above), Tianmu Lake (short-haul diversion + no monopoly segment), Zhangjiajie (still in restructuring repair, recurring losses not yet turned around). Huangshan Tourism and Emei Shan A are in-between cases: Huangshan's cash flow and endowment remain first-class, but the 15% take-rate and the off-balance-sheet diversion to the East Sea ropeway cap its valuation (PE at the 65th percentile of 10 years is not cheap); Emei Shan hinges on capacity recovery after the Golden Summit completion in 2027 — a lower-left distressed-reversal candidate that could be upgraded if the revenue decline narrows from Q4 onward.
Scenarios × Names:
| Scenario | Most Benefited | Most Hurt |
|---|---|---|
| Bear (30%): concession expansion + higher take-rates | Jiuhua (low valuation + high dividend, defensive) | Changbaishan (double kill on valuation and earnings), Huangshan (take-rate deepens again) |
| Base (55%): prices frozen, volumes grow, profit divergence | Jiuhua, Lijiang (cash-cow compounding) | Tianmu Lake, Zhangjiajie (no profit anchor) |
| Bull (15%): per-customer spending recovery + expansion delivery | Lijiang (Yak Meadow ramp-up), Emei Shan (Golden Summit completion reversal) | Crowded-short high-percentile names lag on catch-up |
Key industry risks: ① Free-admission/price-cut policies spreading fully across mountain-type 5A scenic areas (structural downward revision of revenue); ② resource usage fees raised or spread (another 10%-15% compression of ropeway net prices); ③ extreme weather and safety incidents; ④ weak macro consumption amplifying the downside in long-haul "once-in-a-lifetime" traffic; ⑤ deterioration of franchise renewal terms (Changbaishan 2030 as the nearest example). For those needing further modeling on specific names (Jiuhua/Lijiang etc.), individual deep-dive dossiers with target price estimates can be prepared separately.
Data and Definitions Note: Traffic figures are per company announcements/management committee definitions (mountain/gate/ticket entries; definitions differ by scenic area); prices are current posted prices as of November 2026 (flat-to-peak season); valuations are as of the 2026-11-16 close (PE-TTM); financials are from the 2025 annual reports and 2026 Q3 reports. Fanjingshan ticket prices and all Tianmu Lake prices are per OTA/travel-guide sources (unverified); absolute traffic figures for Jiuhuashan and Tianmu Lake were not obtained. National-level data come from the Ministry of Culture and Tourism / China Tourism Academy; policy document numbers are per the original texts in the NDRC and NPC law databases.