Rating: Neutral | Target Price: RMB 15.0–22.0 (base-case fair value range, midpoint ~RMB 18.5) | Current Price: RMB 20.71 (close, 2026-11-19) | Margin of Safety: -27.6% (base-case fair value floor of RMB 15.0 below current price, no margin of safety) | Time Horizon: 12–18 months | Market cap RMB 6.322 billion | Total shares outstanding 305 million
Gaolan's order and revenue acceleration is real: 2026Q3 revenue grew +60.78% YoY, period-end order backlog was ~RMB 1.94 billion (roughly 1.7–2.0x 2025 revenue), and AI chip liquid cooling penetration is steeply rising from ~33% in 2025 to ~53% in 2026. However, this report argues that the current price of RMB 20.71 already prices the later phase of the "base-case ramp succeeding": 60.9% of non-recurring net profit in the first three quarters of 2026 came from the already-divested associate Dongguan Silicon Xiang, and excluding it, the core business net margin was only ~3.0%. The current price implies the core business must deliver RMB 105–140 million net profit in 2027 (net margin rising to ~7% and annualized) — an assumption never achieved in any full fiscal year. The 2026 annual results preannouncement (due by end of January 2027) and the 2027 Q1 report are the decisive validation windows. A severe divergence between book profit and cash flow (9M26 net profit attributable to parent +RMB 60.53 million vs. operating cash flow -RMB 98.27 million), the absence of an actual controller, plus litigation over the largest shareholder's divorce-related asset division further constrain a valuation re-rating. The probability-weighted fair value across three scenarios is ~RMB 18.7, about 10.6% below the current price (implied expected return ~-9.6%); the distribution is clearly left-skewed (bear case -78% to -61% @ ~30% probability vs. bull case +50% to +117% @ ~20% probability). Conclusion: Neutral rating, assessed as reasonably to richly valued; wait for the FY2026 annual report and 2027Q1 to validate the core business net margin and cash flow before reassessing entry.
What this company will become over the next 12–18 months: a liquid cooling thermal management equipment maker expanding from RMB 989 million revenue (2025) toward RMB 1.4–1.6 billion (2027 base case), while undergoing a switch in profit basis — the Dongguan Silicon Xiang stake, which contributed 60% of profits, completed transfer and deconsolidation in October 2026; from 2027 profits must be carried by the core business alone. Book profit will "dip then jump": the dip is because associate income goes to zero; the jump depends on whether the core business net margin can climb from 3% to 7%.
Primary share price driver: the FY2026 results preannouncement due by end of January 2027 (under ChiNext rules, a net profit YoY change exceeding 50% requires a preannouncement; 2026 net profit attributable to parent is expected up over +200% YoY, so a preannouncement is certain). The quality of core business profit in the preannouncement — after deducting disposal gains and associate income — will directly determine which valuation basis the market uses to price this stock.
Verifiable expectation gap: this stock has no effective sell-side consensus (iFun shows "no institutional earnings forecasts this year"; the April 2026 forecasts included the divested stake and are obsolete), so market pricing is driven by thematic capital. Of the profits anchoring the TTM P/E of ~116x, roughly 40% comes from associate income that will no longer exist from 2027 — excluding it, the core-business TTM P/E is ~136x. This basis switch has not yet been tested through any periodic reporting window, so the expectation gap could cut both ways: if the core business net margin validates, the valuation basis shifts to a "profitable, order-driven stock"; if it fails, a Davis double-kill path opens (see the cautionary precedents of peer Envicool, down -82% in 2026Q1 net profit followed by two consecutive limit-down days, and Sugon DataEnergy with widening 9M26 losses).
Entry preconditions (currently unmet): ① quarterly validation of the core business net margin — FY2026 core net margin ≥5% excluding associate income and disposal gains, and 2027Q1 (historically a weak quarter) ≥4%; ② operating cash flow turning positive after receipt of the Silicon Xiang cash consideration and the Saudi commissioning payment. Until both materialize, this report maintains a "wait for evidence" stance and does not build a bullish hypothesis.
Key evidence:
The backlog is roughly 1.7x 2025 revenue (excluding 13% VAT, ~RMB 1.72 billion) to 2.0x (VAT-inclusive), and combined with 2026Q3 revenue +60.78% and the leading indicators of dispatched goods and contract liabilities, revenue support is solid. But two constraints must be noted: first, the transmission from "industry penetration rising → company order growth" is not guaranteed — 2025 saw a divergence of industry +45% vs. the company's liquid cooling segment revenue -19% (as the product mix shifted to DC water cooling); second, on an ex-VAT basis and after deducting 2026Q4 delivery needs, the backlog covers roughly three-quarters of the 30% growth target for 2027, still requiring RMB 250–500 million in new orders in 2026Q4–2027, and the surge in dispatched goods is equally consistent with an "acceptance delay" interpretation (peer Sugon DataEnergy's inventory +255% but Q3 revenue -42.7% is a cautionary precedent). The validation key for this thesis lies in 2026Q4 revenue recognition and the pace of acceptance and collection.
Key evidence:
The math: of 9M26 non-recurring net profit of RMB 59.07 million, the equity-method income from Dongguan Silicon Xiang was RMB 35.96 million; excluding it, core non-recurring profit was ~RMB 23.11 million, a core net margin of ~3.0%, with H1 2026 core business near breakeven (~RMB 4.05 million). Back-solving from the current market cap of RMB 6.322 billion at a 45–60x growth multiple implies the market believes 2027 core business net profit of RMB 105–140 million — i.e., core profit growing 2.3–3.0x from TTM (~RMB 46.49 million), with net margin rising from 3% to 7% and annualized. The other side must be fairly presented: 2026Q3 core net margin already ran at ~7.0%, and 2025Q4 core non-recurring profit implied ~5.8%; the run rates of the last two second halves are close to the implied requirement — the issue is only that "annualization" has never been achieved in a full fiscal year (FY2025 core net margin ~2.3%), and seasonality is extreme (2025Q4 was 40.6% of full-year revenue). The January 2027 preannouncement and April annual report will test this directly: if Q4'26 sustains a 5.8–7% run rate, the discontinuity narrative is half falsified; if Q4 repeats the 2025 pattern of "revenue surge but attributable loss" (concentrated provisions), profit-basis anxiety will fully ferment.
Key evidence:
Net profit attributable to parent of +RMB 60.53 million coexists with operating cash flow of -RMB 98.27 million; the gap consists of a net RMB 299 million increase in "receivables + inventory - payables" — 1.67x the revenue increment (RMB 179 million). This is a typical pattern for order-based equipment companies during a delivery ramp (peer Sugon DataEnergy's 9M26 operating cash flow of -RMB 471 million is worse) and not a fraud signal unique to Gaolan, but it defines the "cash cost" of growth: current available liquidity is cash of ~RMB 198 million (of which ~RMB 62.05 million is restricted, e.g., guarantee/acceptance deposits) + the pending RMB 50 million patent-pledged loan + Dongguan Silicon Xiang cash consideration of ~RMB 160–190 million (not yet received); buffers are contract liabilities of RMB 448 million in prepayments and ~25% commissioning payment from the Saudi flexible HVDC project (~RMB 90.25 million, to be collected as system commissioning progresses through end-2026). If orders keep ramping in 2027 while acceptance collections fall short, scenario modeling implies an equity refinancing need of RMB 500–800 million (dilution of 8–12% of current market cap; a scenario estimate, not a disclosed plan).
Key evidence:
The real profit pillar is high-power power electronics thermal management (HVDC/flexible DC converter valve cooling: first domestic supplier, 40+ project references, qualified supplier status with Hitachi Energy/GE/Siemens), not the data center liquid cooling the market narrative favors — the latter's gross margin is only 11.8%–13.1%, and on its investor platform the company itself describes the field as "highly competitive, with the industry focused on extreme cost-performance." Two static extrapolations should be avoided: first, liquid cooling segment gross margin has not deteriorated monotonically — the company's official 9M26 statement says it "improved YoY"; second, the power electronics segment's +161.75% growth in 2025 came from the flexible DC delivery cycle and had already fallen to -3.69% by 2026H1; 2027 continuity depends on valve cooling tender timing for new DC lines such as Badain Jilin–Sichuan, Southern Xinjiang–Sichuan-Chongqing, and Tibet–Guangdong (2026 UHV equipment cumulative wins of RMB 32.91 billion, +62% YoY; industry tender intensity still rising). The gross margin structure gap between the two segments ("high vs. thin": 35% vs. ~12%, a 23-percentage-point spread) is essentially a bargaining-power gap: grid entry barriers vs. strong bargaining power of computing customers.
Key evidence:
The company has long had no actual controller; Li Qi holds 14.21% (of which 32.54 million shares are executive lock-up shares). In the worst divorce scenario, ~7.11% of shares (~RMB 450 million market value) could be awarded to the spouse; reference the short-term shocks of similar A-share events (-10% to -25%). The other side must be presented objectively: in the subsidiary capital increase, the chairman and other insiders paid cash at a 12.5x PB appraised premium, with independent director review and related directors abstaining — this is closer to a bullish "real-money alignment with the liquid cooling subsidiary" than typical tunneling (which usually involves insiders buying low); and the Q3 shareholder count fell -17.74% QoQ, showing concentration of holdings rather than flight. The true positioning of governance risk: the uncertainty itself (case unheard, no actual controller, hanging voting rights structure) suppresses institutional participation, rather than any realized value destruction.
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | 2026Q1-Q3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (RMB 100mn) | 5.73 | 6.91 | 9.89 | 7.67 (+30.49%) |
| Net profit attributable to parent (RMB 10k) | -3,183 | -5,032 | 2,838 | 6,053 (+76.82%) |
| Non-recurring net profit attributable to parent (RMB 10k) | ~-3,900 | ~-5,600 | 5,578 | 5,907 (+122.11%) |
| Of which: Dongguan Silicon Xiang associate income (RMB 10k) | — | — | 3,295 | 3,596 |
| Core non-recurring profit ex-associate (RMB 10k) | — | — | ~2,280 | ~2,311 |
| Gross margin | 24.39% | 24.03% | 28.94% | 29.62% (+1.82pct) |
| Net margin attributable to parent | -5.55% | -7.28% | 2.87% | 7.89% |
| Net operating cash flow (RMB 100mn) | +0.49 | -0.68 | +1.11 | -0.98 |
| Free cash flow (RMB 100mn, OCF - capex) | +0.25 | -1.21 | +0.85 | -1.14 |
| Cash and equivalents (RMB 100mn, period-end) | — | 1.24 | 2.84 | 1.98 |
| Interest-bearing debt (RMB 100mn, period-end) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.10 (all lease liabilities) |
| Debt-to-asset ratio | 22.73% | 27.10% | 36.85% | 42.82% |
| Inventory (RMB 100mn, period-end) | 3.02 | 3.60 | 5.46 | 8.10 (+48.4%) |
| Accounts receivable (RMB 100mn, period-end) | 2.63 | 3.69 | 4.04 | 4.75 |
| Contract liabilities (RMB 100mn, period-end) | 0.87 | 1.18 | 3.47 | 4.48 |
Reasons for metric changes (items with YoY ≥ ±20%): ① FY2025 revenue +43.09%: the company attributes this to "substantial growth in DC transmission valve cooling business, with offshore flexible DC continuing to lead at a high market share" (2025 annual report operating discussion), with the power electronics segment +161.75%; ② FY2025 return to profit attributable to parent but RMB 27.40 million below non-recurring profit: due to the intended sale of Dongguan Silicon Xiang changing holding intent, with a one-time deferred tax expense of RMB 36.25 million; ③ contract liabilities quadrupled over two years (0.87→4.48 billion RMB ×0.1, i.e., RMB 87 million→448 million): attributed to "increased project prepayments," corroborating the expanding order backlog; ④ 9M26 operating cash flow turning negative: management attributes this to "growth in order backlog, increased procurement of stock and higher capital deployment" (2026-10-27 earnings call Q8); ⑤ 9M26 inventory +48.4%: attributed to "increased dispatched goods," pointing to concentrated Q4 revenue recognition.
Note: FY2023/FY2024 non-recurring figures are approximations (both loss-making years; annual report attributable losses were RMB 31.83 million / 50.32 million respectively); FY2025 "core non-recurring ex-associate" = non-recurring RMB 55.78 million - associate income RMB 32.95 million.
2026Q3 standalone revenue was RMB 273 million, +60.78% YoY (prior-year base of RMB 170 million was low); standalone net profit attributable to parent RMB 34.8 million, +207.89% YoY; standalone non-recurring profit RMB 34.48 million, +293.72% YoY. Gross margin was 29.62%, +1.82pct YoY, the highest since 2023. The quarter looks like "volume and profit both up," but the structure tells a different story: standalone associate income was ~RMB 15.42 million (9M26 associate RMB 35.96 million - H1 investment income RMB 20.54 million); excluding it, standalone core non-recurring profit was ~RMB 19.06 million, a core net margin of ~7.0% — this is the core data point in this report's entire valuation debate: it proves the core business can run at a 7% net margin during the H2 peak season, but it is only a single-quarter sample. The balance sheet simultaneously signals accelerating delivery (surge in dispatched goods in inventory) and cash consumption (cash -30.4% vs. beginning of year; operating cash flow -RMB 98 million). The company gives no quantitative guidance, and there is no sell-side consensus for comparison, so no market-based "beat/miss" judgment is made here; our own model (see Valuation chapter) projects Q4 revenue of RMB 330–360 million and core non-recurring profit of RMB 15–28 million.
Business model in brief: Order-based/project-based manufacturing—custom liquid cooling equipment plus engineering O&M, with a "produce-to-order, purchase-to-order" model. Customers are mainly grid-state-owned enterprises (UHV/flexible DC) and large computing-power clients (internet/cloud providers). Revenue is essentially non-recurring, project-based order flow; the closest thing to recurring revenue is engineering O&M services (RMB 115 million in 2025, 11.6% of revenue, 39.83% gross margin). Pricing power is tiered: the power electronics segment has pricing power (gross margin rose from ~22% to 35% over three years), while the liquid cooling segment does not ("extreme cost-performance" competition).
Cash content of earnings test: The OCF/net profit series swings violently: 2023 OCF positive while net profit attributable to shareholders was a loss; 2024 both negative; 2025 at 3.91 (though +RMB 285 million in operating payables was the main support that year); 9M26 at -1.62. FCF/net profit was 3.0 in 2025 and deeply negative in 9M26. Over the long run, cash conversion per yuan of book profit is unstable, and 2026 growth is "borrowed growth"—expansion is sustained by a +405% jump in notes payable, patent-backed loans, and pending consideration receivable. The recurring-earnings test also deserves mention: of the RMB 60.53 million in net profit attributable to shareholders in 9M26, most came from associate income (soon to disappear) plus deferred tax and impairment items; recurring profit from core operations was only about RMB 23.11 million.
Return on capital: 2025 ROIC on an ex-non-recurring basis was roughly 4.0%, significantly below the estimated 11% WACC—current growth is in the value-destruction zone; capital returns from the moat (power electronics) and the growth engine (liquid cooling) have yet to exceed the cost of capital. This is the fundamental reason the valuation can only be an "option price," not a "cash flow price."
Capex quality: 2025 capex was RMB 25.8 million, only 0.62x depreciation & amortization (RMB 41.7 million), versus 1.45x during the 2024 expansion phase. The April 2025 termination of the Huizhou high-end manufacturing project signals a shift toward capital discipline and contraction; capacity expansion has shifted to the model of introducing capital increases into subsidiaries (Golan Innovation). The company does not split maintenance vs. growth capex, so precise separation is impossible.
Quality red flags: Top-five customer concentration jumped from 33.61% to 60.31% over three years (unexplained by the company); profit is highly dependent on already-sold associate equity stakes; zero goodwill (low M&A impairment risk) is one of the few bright spots.
Words-vs-deeds consistency: leans toward "broad rhetoric, no verifiable commitments." The company's 2026 operating plan is purely qualitative ("focus on UHV/offshore flexible DC, expand into the AI computing power market"), with no quantified revenue/profit targets—the upside is they have never been missed; the downside is that execution capability cannot be assessed. Two verifiable records: the Huizhou "full-scenario thermal management R&D and energy-storage high-end manufacturing project" was announced as terminated in April 2025 (repeated planning reversals); the claim of "2025 international business growing over 200% YoY" conflicts in magnitude with actual overseas revenue of only RMB 8.9986 million, or 0.9% of total (the metric should be business volume/orders, not revenue). Overall assessment: prefers narrative statements; discount for definitional looseness.
Shareholder friendliness: at a starting stage. No dividends in the loss-making FY2023/FY2024; FY2025 saw a first dividend of RMB 0.66 per 10 shares, totaling RMB 20.15 million (71% payout), but at the current price the dividend yield is only 0.32%; no buyback record. No history of dilutive share issuance/rights offerings at the listed-company level (a plus), but at the subsidiary level, 40% of Golan Innovation's equity was given up through a capital increase. Assessment: neutral.
Risk signals: Director/General Manager/CFO Guan Shengli reduced holdings by 426,900 shares in 2025; divorce litigation involving the largest shareholder (see C5); in July 2026, Li Qi's daughter Li Mumu was appointed Deputy General Manager, with the "post-2000s succession + no actual controller" combination drawing media attention. At earnings calls, questions on order structure, overseas gross margin, etc. were mostly answered with "not disclosed separately"—disclosure granularity is coarse.
| Segment (FY2025 annual report basis) | Revenue share | Gross margin | YoY | One-line business logic |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| High-power electronics thermal management (DC water cooling/flexible DC/electrical drive valve cooling) | 57.94% | 35.04% (22.2%→31.9%→35.0% rising over three years) | +161.75% | UHV and offshore flexible DC ramp-up; grid entry barriers + 20 years of track record; strong pricing power |
| High-power-density device thermal management (data center liquid cooling + energy storage liquid cooling) | 26.73% | 13.10% (11.83% in 2026H1) | -19.44% (+53.41% recovery in 2026H1) | AI computing cooling is the high-beta segment, but under price war it is "revenue growth with thin margins," driven by volume |
| Engineering O&M services | 11.58% | 39.83% (46.29% in 2024) | +9.09% | Spare parts and maintenance for existing plants; quasi-recurring revenue with the best cash flow |
| Others | 3.75% | 14.00% | -5.13% | Miscellaneous businesses |
Profit driver judgment: Rough gross profit contribution via "revenue share × gross margin": the power electronics segment contributes ~20.3% of the "revenue × margin" product share (57.94%×35.04%), the high-power-density segment only 3.5% (26.73%×13.10%), and O&M 4.6%—roughly 60% of gross profit comes from the power electronics segment; the "liquid cooling" narrative the market focuses on is actually the thinnest-margin segment. The gross margin gap between the two segments is 23 percentage points (35% vs 12%), fundamentally a pricing-power difference determined by customer structure: grid customers value credentials and reliability, while computing-power customers value cost-performance and delivery speed. Key 2027 handoff question: can the flexible DC tender cycle of the power electronics segment (segment revenue already -3.69% in 2026H1) and gross margin repair in the liquid cooling segment both materialize simultaneously?
Accounting red flags (by severity):
Inter-period consistency: Top-five customer concentration rose three years in a row (unexplained—"inconsistent"); high-power-density gross margin swung wildly 15.8%→9.12%→13.10%→11.83% (the company only verbally attributed it to competition—"unexplained"); inventory/revenue ratio rose 52%→55%→106% (the company attributed it to "stockpiling for orders on hand/goods shipped," corroborated by order data—"consistent"); operating cash flow decoupled from earnings direction (management attributed it to stockpiling purchases—logically self-consistent but dependent on acceptance delivery—"partially consistent").
Current market data (close of 2026-11-19): Share price RMB 20.71; market cap RMB 6.322 billion; PB 4.46x (66th percentile over 5 years, 0th percentile over 1 year—i.e., a one-year low); PE(TTM) 115.6x (59th percentile over 5 years, 0th percentile over 1 year); PS(TTM) 5.41x. Must be stated: the current profit basis is unrepresentative (of the TTM net profit attributable of RMB 54.68 million, about RMB 42.45 million is associate income that will soon disappear); the PE and its percentile are background reference only, not a cheap/expensive signal. Excluding associate income, the core-business TTM P/E is about 136x; on the base case of RMB 105 million core-business net profit in 2027 (midpoint), the current price implies a forward P/E of about 60x and a PEG of about 1.24 (on a 2026-2028 core-business net profit CAGR of ~48.7%).
Peer comparison (as of 2026-11-19):
| Company | Market cap (RMB 100M) | PE(TTM) | PB | Revenue growth (first three quarters of 2026) | Profitability |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Envicool | 4,429 | 90.1 | 11.65 | +22.9% | 2025 weighted ROE 16.58% |
| Shenchling Environment | 2,096 | 100.4 | 7.44 | +36.9% | 2025 net margin 5.35% |
| Tongfei Co. | — | 43.8 | 5.36 | +30.4% | 2025 net margin ~8.8% |
| Golan Co. | 632 | 115.6 (~136 on core-business basis) | 4.46 | +30.5% | Core-business net margin ~3% (lowest) |
The sector is undergoing collective de-rating: Envicool's market cap has nearly halved from RMB 93.27 billion in June 2026, and all three comparable companies' PE(TTM) have been compressed to the 0th percentile over one year. Golan's PB being below peers is not cheap—its ROE is the lowest among peers (core business ~3% vs Envicool's 16.58%), so it does not look attractive on the PB-ROE relationship; PS at 5.41x is above Tongfei's 3.51x while its net margin is only one-third of Tongfei's.
Market-implied expectations: Solving back from the current RMB 6.322 billion market cap at a 45-60x growth multiple, the market implicitly believes 2027 core-business net profit of ~RMB 105-140 million (revenue RMB 1.5-2.0 billion × 7% net margin). Reality check: the latest "exit run-rate" (2026Q3 core-business net margin of 7.0% annualized) corresponds to core-business net profit of ~RMB 89 million—the current price is 18%-58% above that, implying the requirement that the "Q3 net margin" persist for the full year while revenue continues to scale. On revenue there is order-math support (RMB 1.94 billion backlog + industry CAGR of 43%); what remains unvalidated is full-year net margin conversion: core business earned only ~RMB 4.05 million in 2026H1 (near breakeven), with extreme seasonality. In one sentence: the current price requires the company to "more than double core-business profit in 2027," whereas reality is "achievable in a single quarter, never achieved over a full year."
Three-tier value (EPV): Asset value ~RMB 4.69/share (book value per share RMB 4.64 + ~RMB 0.04 premium from the Guixiang disposal consideration; including 9.3837 million shares of Aike Co. valued at the 2026-11-19 close of RMB 32.32, worth RMB 303 million in market value, under a 12-month lockup, no liquidity discount deducted—if Aike's share price falls 30%, the asset floor drops to ~RMB 3.7, so this floor is somewhat loose); EPV (zero growth) ~RMB 2.13/share (normalized FCFF ~RMB 51 million: NOPAT RMB 48 million + D&A RMB 32 million - maintenance capex RMB 29 million, discounted at 11% WACC + net cash of RMB 0.62/share; sensitivity range RMB 1.8-2.6). ~90% of the current price is growth option value—this is not a story of "the market paying only for zero growth"; the valuation stands or falls entirely on liquid cooling ramp-up delivery. A strict cross-check: if 2027 FCFE is RMB 80 million, followed by three years of 25% growth, 3% perpetuity, and 11% discounting, the value is only ~RMB 6.1/share—showing that the 45-60x base multiple pays for a "sustained growth premium," premised on growth continuing through 2028-2030 and ROIC exceeding WACC (current core-business ROIC ~3.9% << 11%).
Three scenarios & odds (12-18 months):
| Scenario | Probability | Fair value range | vs current price | Decisive factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear: net margin ramp-up falsified + price war + continued sector de-rating | 30% | RMB 4.5-8.0 | -78% ~ -61% | 2027 core-business net profit stalls at RMB 40-50 million, priced at 25-35x |
| Base: normal order delivery + net margin rises to ~7% | 50% | RMB 15.0-22.0 | -28% ~ +6% | 2027 revenue RMB 1.4-1.6 billion, core-business net profit RMB 90-120 million × 45-60x |
| Bull: overseas large orders scale up / supply chain certification confirmed | 20% | RMB 31.0-45.0 | +50% ~ +117% | 2027 revenue RMB 1.8 billion+, net margin 9-11%, net profit RMB 160-200 million × 60-80x |
Probability-weighted fair value is ~RMB 18.7, with the current price about 10.6% above it, at roughly the 72nd percentile of the base range—odds are asymmetric to the downside. The base multiple is anchored on the lower-middle of the comparables' TTM multiple band (Tongfei 43.8x—Envicool 90.1x—Shenchling 100.4x), adjusted for Golan's weaker earnings quality vs Tongfei but greater elasticity; this multiple band is independent of the company's current price (no circular reasoning). Sensitivity must be disclosed: if the multiple band shifts down to 35x (continued sector de-rating), base fair value falls to ~RMB 12.0-13.7; if it shifts up to 70x (bull-market scenario), it rises to ~RMB 21.9-27.5—this report's "fair, leaning expensive" judgment is sensitive to multiple assumptions. External cross-checks: on the pessimistic side, the industry leaders' "revenue growth without profit growth + cash flow alarms" (Envicool's 2026Q1 net profit -82% followed by two limit-down days; Sugon DataEnergy's 9M26 loss widening 70.7%) point the same direction as this report's bear case, but the "neutral-pessimistic" estimate in our internal risk calculation of ~RMB 12-16 (implying modest core-profit growth with mild valuation contraction) is above this report's bear case—suggesting that if the 2026 annual report shows core-business run-rate continuing at 5.8%-7%, the actual floor may not be as extreme as the bear case. On the optimistic side, CCID Consulting's industry size forecast (RMB 15.98 billion in 2025 → RMB 47.04 billion in 2028) and UHV tender intensity (cumulative 2026 wins +62%) provide hard demand-math support, but these are industry-level benchmarks whose transmission to the individual stock still depends on net margin assumptions.
This report's earnings forecast (performance reconciliation anchor):
| Period | Revenue | Net profit attributable to shareholders (reported basis) | Core-business net profit (ex associate/disposal/fair value) |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY2026E | RMB 1.10-1.13 billion (+11%~+14%) | RMB 85-105 million (incl. ~RMB 13 million Guixiang disposal gain and Aike Co. fair value noise) | RMB 46-51 million |
| FY2027E | RMB 1.4-1.6 billion (base, +25%~+42%) | Core-business basis + bidirectional Aike Co. fair value noise | RMB 90-120 million (net margin ~7%) |
Driving assumptions: Q4 revenue of RMB 330-360 million (aligned with 2025Q4's 40.6% seasonality and the stock of goods shipped); of the RMB 1.94 billion backlog, 70-80% recognized in 2027 plus new order fill-in; gross margin flat at 29.6%-31%; expense ratio diluted by ~3.5 percentage points as revenue grows 30%+. No management quantified guidance to benchmark against (none disclosed); no sell-side consensus (no coverage).
Conclusion: Fair, leaning expensive (fair). Target price range RMB 15.0-22.0 (base-case fair value, midpoint ~RMB 18.5), safety margin -27.6% (base-case floor below the current price). Separating quality from price: on quality—the legacy power electronics business has a scarce moat, and orders and industry trends are real, but ROIC of 3.9% is far below the cost of capital and growth is consuming cash; on price—the current price already reflects the upper half of the base case, offering neither a discount for earnings quality nor room for expectation gaps. Waiting for validation is the highest expected-value action for now.
Industry space: Gaolan operates in the niche segment of "liquid cooling thermal management for high-power-density scenarios," with three product lines sharing the same liquid cooling technology root. China's liquid-cooled data center market (infrastructure scope, including primary + secondary side, excluding servers) reached RMB 15.98 billion in 2025, +45.2% YoY; CCID Consulting forecasts RMB 23.25 billion in 2026 and RMB 47.04 billion in 2028, implying a 2025-2028 CAGR of ~43%; China's liquid-cooled server market (full-unit scope, IDC) was USD 2.37 billion in 2024 (+67%), projected to reach USD 16.2 billion in 2029 (2024-2029 CAGR 46.8%); global data center liquid cooling (Dell'Oro) is approximately USD 3.0 billion in 2025 (nearly doubling) and approaching USD 7.0 billion in 2029. Energy storage thermal management noted separately: China's cumulative new-type energy storage installed capacity reached 144.7GW by end-2025 (+85%, CNESA); energy storage thermal management market estimates vary widely across institutions (GGII China scope ~RMB 16.4 billion in 2025, relatively broad; CICC global scope ~RMB 10.2 billion; LeadLeo liquid-cooling scope ~RMB 4.87 billion); we adopt CICC's global scope as the middle reference. All headline figures are sourced from primary institutions such as CCID/IDC/Dell'Oro/CNESA.
Quantified chain of the structural demand inflection (core of this report's industry judgment): This is not natural industry growth, but a forced paradigm shift in heat dissipation driven by the power leap of AI chips. Each of the four links in the chain has hard numbers: ① Driver trajectory — single-rack power has jumped from the air-cooling ceiling (≤15-20kW) to 120-180kW for GB200/GB300 NVL72 and the planned 330-600kW for the Rubin architecture; air cooling physically fails above 20kW, making liquid cooling shift from "optional" to "mandatory"; Morgan Stanley forecasts NVIDIA-platform AI rack demand of ~28,000 units in 2025 → at least 60,000 units in 2026; ② Per-unit usage leap — in the air-cooling era, per-rack cooling value was at data-center-air-conditioning level (tens of thousands of RMB); Morgan Stanley estimates the liquid cooling heat dissipation components of a GB300 NVL72 rack at ~USD 49,860 (approx. RMB 360,000), a tenfold increase in per-rack value; at 60,000 racks in 2026 × RMB 360,000/rack, NVIDIA-platform secondary-side liquid cooling components alone would be ~USD 3 billion/year, consistent with Dell'Oro's global market size; ③ Penetration ramp — AI chip liquid cooling penetration ~33% in 2025 → 53% in 2026 → approaching 60% in 2027 (TrendForce); the industry is in the steep phase of the S-curve; ④ Company share — Gaolan's absolute share is not disclosed (fabrication prohibited); evidence of positioning includes ranking in CCID's 2025 China Top 10 liquid cooling vendors (top three being Sugon DataEnergy/Shenling/Envicool), product coverage across the full chain of cold plates/CDU/Manifold/quick-connect couplings/TANK, capability for full-package delivery of primary + secondary side, and the liquid cooling segment's revenue share rising from 26.7% in 2025 to 42.6% in 2026H1. The volume inflection is confirmed (segment revenue 2026H1 +53.4%), but the price inflection is not (segment gross margin 11.8%-13.1%) — Gaolan's share and per-unit profitability in the incremental market remain "qualitative but unquantified," which is the biggest gap in translating industry judgment into stock valuation.
Value chain and value distribution: Upstream: copper/aluminum cold plate materials, heat exchangers, pumps and valves, coolants (fragmented suppliers; thermal management vendors have moderate bargaining power); midstream: the core liquid cooling equipment layer — secondary side (cold plates, Manifolds, UQD quick-connect couplings, CDUs) + primary side (cooling towers, dry coolers, chillers); downstream: major internet companies, telecom operators, third-party IDCs, computing power lessors, and grid-system general contractors. Value distribution (industry research scope, excluding primary side): cold plates 30%-40%, CDU ~30%, Manifold >10%, quick-connect couplings ~10%. Technical barriers are clearly tiered: cold plates have the lowest barrier and fiercest competition; CDUs, UQD quick-connect couplings, and coolants have high barriers and long R&D cycles (CCID scope). Margins reside in the technically demanding CDU/quick-connect coupling and system integration segments, while standalone cold plates carry the thinnest margins — Gaolan has full-chain coverage but its share is undisclosed; its liquid cooling segment's 13% gross margin confirms that it currently participates mainly in downstream, fiercely competitive segments. Weak bargaining power downstream: computing power customers demand heavy customization, acceptance-based revenue recognition, and payment terms of 30-60 days and lengthening industry-wide; real bargaining power lies with the chip platform (NVIDIA specifies thermal architectures and certifications).
Supply-demand and competitive landscape: High demand-side prosperity coexists with supply-side delivery ramp-up; the industry is in a cyclical mismatch of "abundant orders but lagging revenue recognition" (CCID judges "the real earnings explosion point may be in 2027-2028") — Envicool's inventory surge to RMB 2.507 billion and Gaolan's RMB 810 million both represent leading indicators of "shipped but pending acceptance." Concentration remains low (CCID gives no CR figure): the leading tier of Sugon DataEnergy/Shenling/Envicool firmly holds the top three; Gaolan is in the second tier of the TOP10; server vendors (Inspur, etc.) and cross-industry structural parts makers can also participate (overall infrastructure barriers are not high); the overseas full-rack market is dominated by Vertiv and the Taiwan thermal supply chain, with mainland vendors mostly entering via secondary-side components. Price wars have emerged: Envicool's research explicitly states "domestic competition is fierce"; in 2026, leading players saw revenue growth without profit growth (Envicool's first three quarters net profit -7.62%, Shenling -5.38%, Gaolan's liquid cooling segment gross margin 13.1%); CCID judges the competitive focus is shifting from technical validation to scale delivery capability. Substitution threat: rack power of 130kW+ has exceeded the physical limits of air cooling; liquid cooling faces no substantive substitution in the short term; the contest among sub-routes (cold plate currently 93.5% vs immersion in ultra-high-density scenarios) is a structural variable.
Cycle and regulation: The industry is in the early-to-mid phase of a steep penetration ramp (10%→53%); leading indicators include liquid cooling penetration, NVIDIA rack shipments, backlog orders/inventory, and data center physical infrastructure capex (2026Q2 global DCPI revenue USD 14 billion, +27%). Regulatory direction is clearly favorable: national hub node PUE red lines (new data centers PUE≤1.3), Shanghai requiring new intelligent computing centers from 2025 to have liquid-cooled racks exceed 50%, and the EU energy efficiency directive making liquid cooling subject to mandatory certification (CER≤0.2) — but policy drives "compliance demand," not margins; if capacity is over-expanded, price competition will swallow the policy dividend (which is exactly what is happening).
Company industry positioning: "Industrial liquid cooling veteran, data center liquid cooling chaser." Its base business, power electronics liquid cooling, is China's first HVDC transmission liquid cooling supplier with 40+ engineering track records and leading market share — a leader position. The second curve, data center liquid cooling, is in a chaser position — revenue is 1/6 of Envicool's (RMB 989 million vs RMB 6.068 billion), ROE 1/8, in CCID's TOP10 but behind the top three. Share trend is upward (liquid cooling revenue share 26.7%→42.6%; overseas revenue +1,641% in 2026H1 but absolute value only RMB 55.57 million); moat sources include the technological homology with power electronics liquid cooling (coolant/sealing/insulation processes carried over from converter valves), first-mover overseas certifications, and system integration capability. Note on market position sourcing: the company's own claims ("offshore flexible HVDC business continues to lead the industry with a high market share") apply only to the power electronics niche; there is no disclosed share in the broader data center liquid cooling market, and the third party (CCID) only gives a TOP10 tier position — the two do not contradict but must not be conflated.
Overall rating: Neutral, confidence 0.50, time horizon 12-18 months. Gaolan is on a genuine structural demand curve (AI liquid cooling penetration 33%→53%→60%), with solid leading order indicators (RMB 1.94 billion backlog, contract liabilities +29%, goods in transit +48%), and its power electronics base business has a scarce grid-access moat. However, the investment decision hinges not on the industry but on the company's profit structure: the current price prices in RMB 105-140 million of core business net profit for 2027, yet that net margin level (~7%) has only a single-quarter record, no full-year record, and the core business was near break-even in H1; combined with growth consuming cash (OCF -RMB 98 million), no controlling shareholder, and the unresolved divorce litigation of the largest shareholder, the current price of RMB 20.71 sits in the upper part of the baseline fair range (RMB 15.0-22.0) and about 10.6% above the probability-weighted fair value (~RMB 18.7) — odds skew to the downside. Strategy: do not chase high, do not short (the right tail of the bull case +50%~+117% is supported by options on overseas orders and supply chain certifications); wait for two verification points before deciding direction — ① the quality of core business profit in the 2026 annual results forecast due by end of January 2027; ② the direction of operating cash flow after the Guitex cash consideration (~RMB 160-190 million) and Saudi commissioning payments are recovered.
Risk and catalyst notes (written summary): Downside risks ranked by probability — net margin ramp falsified (an R2-type scenario with ~55% probability; trigger: annual report core business net margin <4% or liquid cooling segment gross margin falling below 10%); liquid cooling price war worsening (overseas gross margin already -37.4pct YoY to 17.95%); expansion funding triggering refinancing dilution (triggered upon disclosure of a private placement/convertible bond plan); divorce ruling dividing ~7.11% of shares or Li Qi's resignation triggering supply and governance shocks; sector-wide de-rating resonance (Gaolan's PB/PE are already at one-year lows, but the profit accounting switch is incomplete). Upside catalysts ranked by certainty — 2026 annual results forecast exceeding expectations (2027-01); Guitex cash consideration receipt and Saudi commissioning payments improving liquidity; disclosure of expanded liquid cooling orders from European cloud providers (hundreds of millions of RMB level); winning bids in the Badain Jaran-Sichuan and Southern Xinjiang-Sichuan-Chongqing flexible HVDC valve cooling tenders (industry backdrop of +62% UHV awards in 2026); official confirmation of Southeast Asia projects such as Thailand BDC Phase II (currently only self-media sources, unconfirmed); resolution of governance uncertainty. Monitoring conditions and invalidation lines are itemized in the watchlist.
Intraday note: On 2026-11-20, the intraday share price fell as much as ~5.9% from the 11-19 close to RMB 19.49. No new company announcement that day; per verification, the main cause was the continued correction in the liquid cooling sector (on 11-16 the sector fell -4.48% in a single day and Gaolan -7.13%, a 60-day low; on 11-20 peer Chuanrun hit limit-down), compounded by a second wave of governance concerns triggered by the largest shareholder's divorce litigation disclosed on the evening of 11-17; no other new negatives such as share reduction or earnings warnings were found. All valuations and target prices in this report remain based on the 2026-11-19 closing price of RMB 20.71 and are not adjusted for intraday prices.
This report is independently researched and written based on public information. Data sources: Gaolan's periodic reports and announcements (cninfo), earnings briefings and investor relations records, industry data from CCID Consulting/IDC/TrendForce/Dell'Oro/CNESA, and comparable companies' periodic reports. Report date: 2026-11-20.