Rating: Cautiously Positive | Target Price Range: HK$24.4–28.2 per share (base-case fair value) | Current Price: HK$22.14 (closing date 2026-10-30, Friday) | Margin of Safety: approx. +10.2% (vs. base-case fair value lower bound of HK$24.4, consistent basis) | Time Horizon: 12 months
Correction (2026-11-11): This report covers Guming (01364.HK), using the closing price of HK$22.14 on 2026-10-30. The research profile was previously linked to another security’s historical prices. That link and the resulting return calculations have been corrected; the business analysis and scenario assumptions retain their original meaning.
Report Date: November 1, 2026
Total share capital is 2.3389 billion shares (HKEX September 2026 statement, excluding treasury shares), corresponding to a market cap of approximately HK$51.78 billion; RMB-to-HKD conversion at 1:1.1791 (exchange rate as of 2026-11-01), noted throughout.
Guming is China's leading freshly-made tea brand in the mass price band (RMB 10–20) and one of the few top-tier brands maintaining positive single-store growth during the industry shakeout. At the current price of HK$22.14, the stock trades at approximately 13.7x FY2026E P/E (consensus net profit attributable to shareholders of RMB 3.1–3.3 billion). Backing out at a cost of equity of 10.5%, the market is implying a perpetual growth rate of only about 3.2% after 2026 earnings are realized — significantly below consensus growth of +24%/+18–20% for 2026–2027, indicating a conservative valuation of growth. This report assigns a base-case fair value of HK$24.4–28.2; the current price is approximately 15.8% below the base-case midpoint, with a margin of safety of approximately +10.2% (vs. the base-case lower bound) — moderate to low. There are three core constraints: the deceleration of the store-opening engine confirmed by downward revisions from two foreign banks, deteriorating franchisee receivables aging, and the overhang of CCASS share transfers involving approximately 36% of share capital amid a thin free float. Single-store slowdown and franchisee ecosystem deterioration are the two falsifiable thesis-breaking points; Q4 2026 results (peak-season same-store) and the March 2027 annual report are the verification windows. High quality, undervalued but not deeply so; conclusion is cautiously positive.
Key Evidence:
Among peers, Auntea Jenny also posted positive growth in average single-store revenue in 2026H1, so Guming is not "unique"; moreover, daily cups sold per store were 440 vs. 439 in the prior-year period — nearly zero growth — meaning positive growth came almost entirely from mix upgrading toward coffee (approximately 13,500 stores now equipped with coffee machines, 12 new coffee SKUs launched in six months) and breakfast occasions. Cup volume and delivery mix (approximately 50%) are the hard metrics for ongoing verification: a drop in daily cups below 430 or single-store GMV turning negative would falsify this thesis. September–October readings were also amplified by a low base from the 2025 delivery subsidy peak; the December off-season is the true litmus test.
Key Evidence:
The most recent verifiable franchisee profit data dates back to 2024, prior to the 2025 delivery wars' impact on per-store P&Ls, and the company did not update this metric in 2026H1 — the "best-in-class ecosystem" judgment carries a data lag. Leading indicators point consistently downward: in July 2026, both BofA Securities and Jefferies cut earnings forecasts on weaker-than-expected store openings (EPS -7% to -8% / adjusted net profit -2.9% to -11.9%); Daiwa cited in May a prior market expectation of roughly 3,345 net new stores for the full year, of which H1 delivered only 797. On September 2 the company introduced a new franchise policy (franchise fee switched to annual payment of RMB 15,000/year, closure subsidies up to RMB 50,000), lowering entry barriers and raising exit compensation — a hedging move under recruitment pressure. Full-year net openings will most likely fall significantly short of the original market expectation; if the semi-annual closure rate rises above 4.5%–5% or franchisee exits exceed 400 per half-year, franchise ecosystem deterioration is confirmed and this thesis is falsified.
Key Evidence:
Under the asset-light franchise model, store capex is borne by franchisees, and the company's CapEx is concentrated in warehousing/distribution and headquarters; after deducting approximately RMB 11.1 billion in cash-like assets, true operating capital intensity is extremely low, with 2026H1 free cash flow of RMB 1.671 billion (FCF/net profit ratio of approximately 1.07). However, it must also be noted that operating cash flow/net profit was below 0.8 for two consecutive years in FY2024–FY2025, mainly due to mounting franchisee receivables — trade receivables rose from approximately RMB 70 million at end-2023 to RMB 588 million at end-2025 (+313%/+102% over two years), rising further to approximately RMB 632 million by mid-2026; the proportion aged over 6 months climbed to 56.0% (40.1% at end-2025), with RMB 144 million over 1 year (+37%), plus approximately RMB 507 million of long-term trade receivables from equipment installment plans — all unsecured against franchisees and with near-zero provisioning. The company is effectively financing coffee machine rollouts on credit; if franchisee collections deteriorate, supply chain revenue quality and cash flow would be hit simultaneously. A gross margin falling below 32%, or receivables over 1 year exceeding RMB 250 million with material write-downs, would trigger a downgrade of this thesis.
Key Evidence:
Backing out at a cost of equity of 10.5%, the current price implies a perpetual growth rate of only about 3.2% after FY2026 is realized (range of 2.7%–3.7% at discount rates of 10%–11%), versus 2026H1 adjusted net profit growth of +44.4% and consensus 2026–2027 growth of +24%/+18–20%. Zero-growth EPV of approximately HK$13.90 per share forms the floor, plus net cash of approximately HK$0.90 per share after deducting all declared dividends (FY2025 final dividend of HK$1.189 billion + June 2026 special dividend of RMB 1.034 billion). Three-scenario fair values: bear HK$12.3–16.0 (probability 0.30), base HK$24.4–28.2 (0.50), bull HK$33.2–39.1 (0.20), probability-weighted at approximately HK$24.40; the current price is +10.2% vs. the base-case lower bound, -36.3% vs. the bear-case midpoint, and +59.4% vs. the bull-case midpoint. It must be acknowledged that systemic sector risks have concrete evidence (ChaPanda forcibly suspended by the SFC in October 2026, Mixue below its IPO price, and Guming at one point ranking among the top three in food & beverage short-selling value), and the absence of any Sell ratings within coverage implies consensus expectations themselves carry stickiness — if FY2026 consensus continues converging toward Jefferies' revised-down RMB 3.14 billion, the 13.7x multiple and margin of safety will narrow in tandem.
Key Evidence:
All contractual lock-ups (IPO cornerstone investors, controlling shareholders, the 90-day commitment attached to the convertible bond) have expired; the controlling shareholders (Wang Yun'an, Qi Xia, Ruan Xiudi acting in concert) together hold 75.92%, unchanged; full conversion of the convertible bond would represent only approximately 83.26 million shares (approximately 3.5% of share capital), which cannot explain transfers of the 24%+12% magnitude — with free float at only approximately 24% and average daily turnover of approximately HK$100 million, the impact multiplier of any substantial stake reduction is high. Counter-evidence (HKEXnews filings of stake increases, sustained autonomous buybacks unrelated to the convertible bond, or shares transferred back out of depositories) has yet to appear on any count. If the company restores the final dividend in the March 2027 annual report and launches autonomous buybacks beyond hedging, the overhang would be partially removed.
| Metric (RMB) | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | 2025H1 | 2026H1 (latest) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (RMB 100mn) | 76.76 | 87.91 | 129.14 | 56.63 | 74.70 (+31.9%) |
| Net profit attributable to shareholders (RMB 100mn) | 10.96 | 14.79 | 31.09 | 16.25 | 15.71 (-3.4%) |
| Adjusted net profit (Non-IFRS, RMB 100mn) | 14.59 | 15.42 | 25.75 | 10.86 | 15.68 (+44.4%) |
| Adjusted core profit (RMB 100mn) | — | 15.79 | 28.08 | 11.28 | 17.30 (+53.3%) |
| Gross margin | 31.3% | 30.6% | 33.0% | 31.5% | 33.4% |
| Net margin (attributable basis) | 14.3% | 16.8% | 24.1%* | 28.7%* | 21.0%* |
| Operating cash flow (RMB 100mn) | 15.73 | 13.21 | 24.09 | 13.40 | 20.62 |
| Free cash flow (RMB 100mn, OCF-CapEx) | 11.74 | 8.71 | 21.60 | 12.29 | 16.71 |
| GMV (RMB 100mn) | 192.14 | 223.97 | 327.32 | 140.94 | 197.47 (+40.1%) |
| Stores at period end (units) | 8,327** | 9,914 | 13,554 | 11,179 | 14,351 |
| Daily GMV per store (RMB '000) | 6.8 | 6.5 | 7.8 | 7.6 | 7.8 |
* Net margin distorted by fair value changes of convertible redeemable preferred shares: FY2025 attributable profit included RMB 557 million of fair value gains (net margin of approximately 19.8% excluding); 2025H1 similarly included high-base gains of the same kind (causing the apparent -3.4% YoY decline in 2026H1 attributable profit); preferred shares converted to equity at listing and this item no longer arises from FY2025 onward. ** FY2023 period-end store count is per the restated 2024 annual report basis (9,914 is the pre-net-addition base at end-2024; FY2023 year-end stores were 9,001 with additional closure adjustments; refer to the annual report original text — flagged for verification).
Balance sheet and shareholder returns (as of 2026-06-30, unless noted): cash-like assets totaling approximately RMB 11.135 billion (cash and equivalents 30.62 + restricted cash 65.26 + wealth management products 9.54 + long-term deposits 3.60); interest-bearing bank borrowings of approximately RMB 5.732 billion (all short-term within one year, a spread-arbitrage structure collateralized by restricted cash); HK$1.96 billion zero-coupon convertible bond issued in July 2026 (matures 2027-06-30, conversion price HK$23.54, not in the 6-30 statements); company-reported gearing ratio of 59.2%. FY2025 total dividends paid of approximately HK$3.2 billion (special dividend 20.10 + final dividend 11.89), plus a special dividend of RMB 1.034 billion declared in June 2026, unpaid.
Reasons for Metric Changes (YoY≥±20%, with company explanations): ① FY2025 revenue +46.9% — "expansion of the store network and increase in total GMV, leading to increased demand for goods" (annual openings of 4,292 stores vs. 1,587 in the prior year); ② FY2025 attributable profit +110.3% — included RMB 557 million of preferred share fair value gains (one-off remeasurement gain, "primarily attributable to the decline in the Company's valuation post-listing compared with end-2024"); ③ FY2025 other income and gains +117% to RMB 405 million — mainly a RMB 121.5 million increase in bank interest income plus fair value gains on wealth management products and government grants; ④ surge in restricted cash/interest-bearing borrowings (0.42→6.482 billion / 1.21→6.462 billion) — "a result of our cash and yield management strategy, benefiting from interest rate differentials available in the market" (deposit-collateralized borrowing arbitrage, borrowing rates of 1.62%–3.25%); ⑤ 2026H1 other expenses rose to RMB 86.75 million (approximately 19.7x) — "mainly due to foreign exchange losses" of RMB 84.72 million; ⑥ 2026H1 store openings -16.1%/closures +70.8% — "increasing focus on store quality, prioritizing upgrading existing stores to sixth-generation stores and applying stricter site-selection criteria for new stores," with rising closures "primarily due to the higher store base at the beginning of the period"; ⑦ 2026H1 CapEx +251% to RMB 391 million — includes right-of-use assets for the new Hangzhou headquarters site (land premium totaling RMB 455 million), a non-maintenance investment.
2026H1 revenue RMB 7.47 billion (+31.9%), GMV RMB 19.747 billion (+40.1%), adjusted net profit RMB 1.568 billion (+44.4%), adjusted core profit RMB 1.730 billion (+53.3%), gross margin 33.4% (+1.9pp) — a broad-based acceleration in operations. The headline decline in net profit attributable to shareholders of -3.4% is an accounting mismatch caused by the high base of RMB 557 million in fair-value gains on preferred shares in 2025H1; the preferred shares were terminated upon listing, so this item no longer exists from FY2025 onward, and comparisons should be made on an adjusted basis. Three notable structural signals: First, the monetization rate (revenue/GMV) fell from 40.2% in 2025H1 to 37.8%, with revenue growth (+31.9%) lagging GMV growth (+40.1%) by about 8 percentage points, which the company has not explained — this may reflect the fade of high-margin food-delivery subsidy income and concessions to franchisees, a hidden concern about revenue quality. Second, 1,318 store openings (-16.1%) versus 521 closures (+70.8%), and new franchisees down -40.2%, indicating a clear shift in franchise recruitment. Third, the +2.6% positive growth in average daily GMV per store came almost entirely from category mix (coffee + breakfast), with cup volume of 440 cups showing near-zero growth. Market reaction was positive: after the results, sell-side analysts broadly maintained Buy ratings (CICC target price HK$29.5, Huachuang HK$31.96) but mostly cut earnings forecasts; September and National Day channel data (Daiwa) showed GMV growth outpacing peers, validating the per-store resilience narrative. Anchoring "whether results beat expectations" against consensus: 2026H1 adjusted net profit fell within 47%-50% of the consensus full-year figure of RMB 3.1-3.3 billion (2025 H1:H2 seasonality was roughly 42:58), i.e., in line to slightly ahead.
Business model in brief: an asset-light franchise platform + self-operated supply chain. Stores are invested in by franchisees (97.3% of company revenue comes from franchised stores); the company sells ingredients and raw materials to franchisees (72.2%), equipment (7.3%, including coffee machines), and charges franchise management service fees (20.4%, including initial fees/ongoing support/training) — essentially "supply chain monetization": in 2026H1, the monetization rate was about 37.8%, meaning the company captures about RMB 38 of every RMB 100 of terminal GMV. Revenue is not subscription-based and depends on store openings and per-store purchases, but there is no direct exposure to the consumer end.
Cash content of earnings: OCF/net profit: FY2023 1.44 → FY2024 0.88 → FY2025 0.77 → 2026H1 1.31; FCF/net profit: 1.07 → 0.58 → 0.69 → 1.07. FY2024-FY2025 were persistently below the 0.8/0.5 warning lines, mainly due to the buildup of franchisee receivables and contract assets (each RMB 1 of incremental revenue consumed about RMB 0.28 of working capital in FY2024) — part of book profit became credit extension to franchisees. 2026H1 rebounded to 1.31, but this includes timing effects from advance receipts and payables; sustainability awaits annual report verification. Recurring earnings test: of FY2025's RMB 3.109 billion net profit attributable to shareholders, about RMB 557 million was a one-off fair-value gain on preferred shares; core earnings (adjusted RMB 2.575 billion) grew +66.9%. Meanwhile, the company's self-reported Non-IFRS definition is loose — adjusted core profit adds back withholding tax on dividends and net FX gains/losses on top of adjusted profit (about RMB 234 million combined in 2025 and about RMB 162 million in 2026H1), yet these two items are recurring costs. About 9% of 2026H1's adjusted core profit of RMB 1.730 billion comes from "treating withholding tax and FX as if they didn't exist." Also note: within 2026H1's other income and gains of RMB 319 million, interest income was RMB 159 million plus fair-value gains on wealth-management products of RMB 40 million, together about 11.5% of adjusted core profit — as dividends and debt repayment deplete cash, this portion of profit will trend down; the "cleanliness" of core profit growth is lower than the headline suggests.
Return on capital: this report estimates TTM ROIC at about 25% (numerator: TTM adjusted net profit of RMB 3.057 billion; denominator: net assets + interest-bearing debt). More critically, after deducting about RMB 11.1 billion of cash-like assets, net invested capital is near zero — the RMB 5.64 billion of borrowings is effectively a spread-arbitrage against RMB 6.53 billion of pledged restricted deposits; real operating capital occupation is extremely low. This is the "negative working capital" characteristic of a franchise platform, not the ROIC of an ordinary asset-heavy business. This estimate does not adjust for the mechanical depression of the equity base by dividends (cumulative payouts and buybacks since FY2025 exceed HK$6 billion), so the figure is for reference only. CapEx quality: CapEx/depreciation FY2024 3.2 (expansion phase), FY2025 1.51, 2026H1 4.64 (including a one-off RMB 455 million land purchase for the Hangzhou headquarters); store capital is borne by franchisees, and the company's CapEx is concentrated in warehousing/distribution cold chain and headquarters — capacity and efficiency investment, with no signs of runaway maintenance spending. The company does not disclose a maintenance/growth split, so the maintenance level cannot be determined.
Moat and red flags: moat = the lower-tier-market cold-chain twice-daily delivery network (the only one among the top ten brands) + density economies in warehousing and distribution from regional intensification (the top eight provinces contribute about 87% of GMV). Red flags: ① rapidly expanding credit exposure to franchisees (see C3); ② per-store growth partly depends on food-delivery platform subsidies, which were amplified in 2025 and are fading in 2026 — a high exogenous component; ③ no pricing power over consumers (per-store GMV -4.3% during the 2024 price war), and upside for the monetization rate is constrained by franchisees' profit ceiling.
Consistency of words and deeds: pragmatic. Three verifiable promise-delivery pairs: ① The FY2024 annual report outlook said "continue raising density in the 17 provinces already covered, enter adjacent provinces, and expand the coffee category" → in 2025 the company actually opened 4,292 stores, fitted coffee machines in over 12,000 stores, and launched 27 new coffee drinks — over-delivered. ② The FY2024 annual report promised, amid an industry slowdown, to "focus on improving existing store efficiency and slow the pace of openings" → after the industry recovered in 2025, the company switched to aggressive expansion; a directional shift but in sync with the cycle, not a breach of trust. ③ The FY2025 annual report outlook: "expansion + sixth-generation store upgrades + Hangzhou headquarters + evaluating overseas expansion" → in 2026H1, upgrades and the headquarters land purchase (capital commitments of RMB 717 million) are both progressing. The company gives no quantitative guidance and has no record of missing high guidance.
Shareholder friendliness: high total returns, quality to be verified. Cumulative declared since listing: pre-listing dividend RMB 1.74 billion (2025-01), special dividend HK$2.010 billion (2025-12), FY2025 final dividend HK$1.189 billion (paid in two installments in August/December 2026), special dividend RMB 1.034 billion (declared 2026-06); buyback of HK$693 million cancelled (2026-07, paired with convertible bond hedging). Based on the FY2025 final dividend, the payout ratio is about 33% (attributable basis); including special dividends it far exceeds that year's profit — partly consuming IPO proceeds and retained cash (of the HK$1.930 billion IPO net proceeds, only HK$567 million had been used as of 2026-06). Media reports say "nearly RMB 3.75 billion in cumulative dividends within 9 months of listing, over 70% flowing into the founders' family trust" (Linkshop, 2026-04); investors should be aware of the direction of these returns. The no interim dividend in 2026 is a marginally weakening signal for the return narrative; whether it resumes depends on the March 2027 annual report.
Risk signals: ① Wang Yun'an serves as both Chairman and CEO; the company has acknowledged for two consecutive years deviation from Corporate Governance Code provision C.2.1 (separation of Chairman/CEO roles); ② the four controlling shareholders acting in concert hold 75.92% — highly concentrated ownership; ③ two large CCASS transfers in October 2026 (24.46% + 12%) remain unexplained; with all lock-ups expired, positioning for share reductions is possible (see C5); ④ media rumors (2026-08, self-media sources, no official confirmation) that the founders' offshore trust faces back taxes (the factual backdrop: Ministry of Finance/State Taxation Administration Announcement No. 21 of 2026 brought offshore trust income into the 20% tax net); if confirmed, it would bring one-off tax burden and a governance discount — treat as unverified and defer to company disclosure.
| Business Line (FY2025) | Revenue Share | YoY | One-Sentence Business Logic |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sale of goods (ingredients etc.) | 72.2% | +42.0% | Selling fruit tea/milk tea/coffee ingredients to franchisees; the core revenue and profit engine |
| Sale of equipment (incl. coffee machines) | 7.3% | +104.1% | Coffee machine rollout scaling up; partly on installment terms creating finance lease receivables |
| Franchise management services | 20.4% | +50.2% | Initial fees RMB 15 million + ongoing support RMB 235 million + training RMB 13 million; recognized over time, closest to "recurring" |
| Direct-operated store sales | 0.1% | +14.7% | Only RMB 16.34 million; negligible scale |
The company manages as a single operating segment and does not disclose gross margin by business line, so segment margin differentials cannot be computed — itself a disclosure limitation: investors cannot distinguish the profit contribution of the 72.2% goods revenue versus the 20.4% service fees. The inferable profit mainstay is ingredient sales (the weighted driver of scale × 33% gross margin), while the equipment line is the fastest growing (+104.1%) and is supported by credit sales — the "lowest cash content" piece of revenue growth (see Chapter 9, "Financial Engineering and Cross-Period Consistency"). Direct-operated stores account for only 0.1% of revenue; the company is essentially a supply-chain enterprise, not a retailer.
Accounting red flags: ① Receivables growth significantly outpacing revenue with deteriorating aging (medium) — trade receivables +313% in 2024 and +102% in 2025 (vs. revenue +14.5%/+46.9%); 6-12 month aging of RMB 210 million (+60% vs. end-2025) and over 1 year of RMB 144 million (+37%), while the company merely states "expected credit loss rates are extremely low and recovery is full," with near-zero provisions and no collateral from franchisees; ② Equipment installment sales booked as finance lease receivables (medium) — revenue from coffee machines and other equipment is fully recognized at delivery, while cash is collected in installments over up to more than a year (total long-term trade receivables RMB 507 million, of which RMB 424 million due within one year), with revenue and receivables rising together; ③ Non-IFRS add-backs contain recurring components (low) — adjusted core profit adds back dividend withholding tax and net FX items (combined RMB 234 million in 2025 and recurring), a loose definition.
Cross-period consistency: ① OCF/net profit declined continuously 1.44→0.88→0.77 (rebounding to 1.31 in 2026H1); the company did not explain the decline (inconsistent-unexplained); ② the V-shaped pattern in per-store daily GMV (RMB 6,800→6,500→7,800), with the 2024 decline attributed to "industry slowdown and intensified competition" and the 2025 recovery attributed to new products + coffee + delivery subsidies, is consistent with management explanations; ③ monetization rate 39.9%→39.3%→39.5% was stable long-term, then dropped sharply to 37.8% in 2026H1, unexplained by the company (inconsistent-unexplained) — recommend tracking as a metric. The disclosure history covers only 3 periods (FY2024/FY2025/2026H1) plus pre-listing data, limiting the sample for cross-period assessment.
Current market data: share price HK$22.14 (2026-10-30 close), market cap HK$51.78 billion ≈ RMB 43.92 billion, total shares 2.3389 billion. PE(TTM) 14.7x (roughly the 14th percentile over the past year since listing; listed only 1.5 years, sample too short — reference only), PE(2026E) ~13.7x, PE(2027E) ~11.6x, PEG ~0.69, PS(TTM) ~2.98x, PB 7.14x (the high PB reflects a thin net-asset base after large dividends and should be read alongside the FY2025 ROE of about 53% — not a like-for-like cheapness signal). Average daily turnover about HK$100 million (~0.19% of market cap, above the 0.1% warning line); liquidity is normal-to-low, free float only about 24%, so large positions must be built in tranches.
Peer comparison (valuations as of 2026-10-30 close or each name's latest available snapshot; financials per each company's latest disclosure):
| Company | Ticker | PE | Revenue Growth (latest) | Gross Margin | Store Count | Key Differentiator |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mixue Group | 2097.HK | 10.3x | 2026H1 +2.3% (attributable -14.7%) | 32.5% (FY2024) | 59,823 (end-2025) | Value-tier dominant player, global No.1, currently in a period of exposed per-store decline |
| Auntea Jenny | 2589.HK | 8.4x | 2026H1 +42.4% | 31.5% (FY2025) | 11,449 (end-2025) | Northern China and lower-tier focus; about 1/3 of Guming's scale, similar growth tier |
| Chagee | CHA.US | 11.4x | FY2025 +4.1% (same-store declines for five straight quarters) | Not disclosed on this basis | 7,453 (end-2025) | Premium tier, fresh whole-leaf milk tea hit product; growth has stalled |
| ChaPanda | 2555.HK | 6.4x | FY2025 +9.7% | 31.2% (FY2024) | 8,863 | Low-growth floor valuation; forcibly suspended in 2026-10 (regulatory investigation) |
| Nayuki | 2150.HK | Loss-making | FY2025 -12.0% | — | 1,646 | A case study in the unwinding of the direct-operated premium model |
| Guming | 01364.HK | 14.7x (TTM)/13.7x (26E) | 2026H1 +31.9% | 33.4% (2026H1) | 14,351 | Mainstream tier + lower-tier cold chain; the only industry leader with 30%+ revenue growth and positive per-store growth |
Guming's growth is second only to the smaller Auntea Jenny, but its PE premium to Mixue is about +43% and above the sector median — the market has already awarded a "quality" premium; the debate is over the sustainability of "quantity."
Market-implied expectations: solving backward from a 10.5% cost of equity, the current price implies a perpetual growth rate of about 3.2% after FY2026 earnings are delivered (2.7%-3.7% when r is 10%-11%) — the market is effectively pricing a "bond-like mature supply-chain company." Against reality: 2026H1 adjusted net profit +44.4%, consensus 2026-2027 +24%/+18~20%, market cap/GMV of about 1.08x on a franchise-chain basis, and implied per-store value of about RMB 3.06 million per store. The current price requires Guming to decelerate to about 3% growth from 2027, while it is still posting 30%+ revenue growth amid industry consolidation — but it must be acknowledged that the other half of the low multiple is real: systemic valuation compression across the tea sector (Mixue down about 60% from its peak and below its IPO price, ChaPanda suspended, short interest among the sector's top three) plus uncertainty over the fade of delivery subsidies — not simply a case of mistaken selling.
Three-tier value (EPV): asset value about HK$2.95/share (book net assets attributable to shareholders, including net cash of about HK$1.93/share before deducting dividends; net cash of about HK$0.90/share after deducting all declared but unpaid dividends) — an independent floor reference, not to be added to EPV. Zero-growth EPV about HK$13.9/share (sustainable FCFE basis: 2026H1 adjusted net profit of RMB 1.568 billion annualized to about RMB 3.1-3.2 billion × 0.90 cash conversion ≈ RMB 2.9 billion, ÷ 10.5% cost of equity), sensitivity range HK$12.8-15.6. About 63% of the current price is supported by zero-growth EPV; about 37% is a growth option (about HK$8.2/share, equivalent to the present value of about 5,300 incremental effective stores) — while the company's headroom exceeds 20,000 stores (blank provinces + higher-tier pilots + a stretched benchmark of Luckin's 36,000 stores), so the option price is not aggressive. Whether growth deserves a payment depends on verification that same-store sales don't lose momentum.
Three scenarios and odds (fair value ranges, HK$/share; probabilities are this report's judgment):
| Scenario | Probability | Fair Range | Key Assumptions | vs. Current Price |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 0.30 | 12.3-16.0 | Same-store turns negative (per-store daily GMV below RMB 7,000), FY2027 net openings <500, sector valuation compresses to 8-9x EV, FY2027 adjusted net profit falls to about RMB 2.8 billion | Median 14.1, -36.3% |
| Base | 0.50 | 24.4-28.2 | Same-store flat to low single digits, FY2026/27 net additions of about 1,600/1,400 stores, FY2027 adjusted net profit about RMB 3.8 billion (+19%), 12-14x EV (anchors: Mixue ex-cash ~10x, company's median PE since listing 17.6x, sector leader FY26 ~15x — all independent of the current price) | Median 26.3, +18.8% |
| Bull | 0.20 | 33.2-39.1 | Coffee share rises 20%→30%+, same-store +3~5%, FY2027 adjusted net profit about RMB 4.2 billion, 15-17x EV (similar in magnitude to CLSA's HK$32 target) | Median 35.3, +59.4% |
Probability-weighted fair value about HK$24.4 (+10.4%); the current price sits between the bear and base cases, closer to base — odds mildly positive with limited asymmetry. External reference points: within the search scope, the most pessimistic sell-side is Jefferies at HK$27 (still implying +22% after its 2026-07 cut), the most optimistic is CLSA at HK$32 — this report's bear case is well below the sell-side floor because it assumes the compound stress of "same-store turning negative + systemic valuation compression," not a sell-side view, and is not directly comparable. House earnings forecast (results reconciliation anchor): FY2026 revenue RMB 15.7-16.1 billion, adjusted net profit RMB 3.16-3.30 billion (aligned with the consensus of RMB 3.1-3.3 billion and management's qualitative guidance); FY2027 revenue RMB 17.8-19.3 billion, adjusted net profit RMB 3.65-4.0 billion. FX note: the company's profits are in RMB while the share price is in HKD; for every 1% weakening of RMB against HKD, the PE in HKD terms mechanically rises about 1%.
Valuation conclusion: undervalued — not deeply so. Consider quality (cold-chain barriers, per-store resilience, ROE ~53%, net cash) and price (13.7x FY2026E, implied growth 3.2%) separately: quality is strong, price is on the low side; the safety margin of about +10.2% (against the base-case floor) is moderate-to-low and hinges on 2026H2 verification that same-store sales don't lose momentum. Basis for anchoring the base-case exit multiple at 12-14x EV: Mixue ex-cash ~10x (sector-leader floor), the company's median PE since listing 17.6x (its own historical center), and sector leaders at FY26 ~15x (peer median) — taking a conservative tier below its own historical center, reflecting the slowdown in store openings and overhang of shareholdings.
Market Size: China's freshly-made tea beverage segment is the mainstay sub-segment of freshly-made drinks. Three data sources side by side: ① CIC (cited in Guming's prospectus) — China's freshly-made beverage market GMV was RMB 517.5 billion in 2023, of which freshly-made tea was about RMB 258.5 billion and freshly-made coffee about RMB 172.1 billion; the market is projected to reach RMB 1,163.4 billion by 2028, with 2023-2028E CAGR of 16.7%, and freshly-made tea 2024-2028E CAGR of 16.4%; ② CIC (cited by Guotai Haitong 2026-08) — freshly-made tea market size in 2025 of about RMB 360 billion, +20% YoY; ③ China Chain Store & Franchise Association (CCFA, narrower scope) — new-style tea drinks at about RMB 149.8 billion in 2023, an estimated RMB 201.5 billion in 2025, with growth slowing from 44.3% in 2023 to 12.4%. Structurally, the two most important sub-segments: the mass price band (RMB 10-20) where Guming operates — GMV of RMB 108.6 billion in 2023, about RMB 280.9 billion in 2028E, CAGR 20.8%, the largest and fastest-growing sub-segment; and tier-3 cities and below with 2023-2028E CAGR of 22.8%, the fastest-growing geographic sub-segment (per Zhaimen Canyan, lower-tier markets already account for over 50% of store count; Donghai Securities estimates national store capacity at about 489,900 stores, leaving roughly 25% headroom versus 393,200 existing stores in 2025).
Value Chain and Value Distribution: Upstream (tea leaves/fresh fruit/dairy/packaging) — leading brands' bulk procurement gives them strong bargaining power over origins (Mixue's procurement costs for the same-grade milk powder/lemons are 10%-20%+ below industry average), plus reverse integration via self-built bases; midstream brand owners (supply-chain backbone: central factories/warehouse-distribution cold chains/franchisee management/R&D) — this is where the industry's value and gross margin mainly accumulate; under the franchise model, listed companies' revenue is essentially "supply-chain monetization" of franchisees (Guming's product sales + equipment account for ~80% of revenue, Mixue ~97.5%); downstream stores and the C-end — high price sensitivity, high delivery share (freshly-made tea delivery GMV share ~45% in 2023), brands have no pricing power over consumers (85%+ of new products priced below RMB 20 in 2024). Guming sits midstream: 24 warehouses / 258,000 sqm / cold storage over 70,000 cubic meters, ~98%-99% of stores on next-day delivery, warehouse-to-store cost below 1% of GMV — gross margin (33.0%-33.4%) retained at the company level, and the denser the cold-chain network, the lower the unit delivery cost, forming a virtuous cycle of regional densification.
Supply-Demand and Competitive Structure: The supply side has entered aggregate consolidation: per Zhaimen Canyan, China's freshly-made tea store count grew from 293,000 in 2019 to 448,000 in 2024, then declined for two consecutive years in 2024 and 2025 (net reduction of ~17,000-18,000 stores in 2024; ~29,300 net from Dec 2024 to Dec 2025: 102,000 opened / 131,000 closed); in July 2026 alone, 47 mainstream tea/coffee brands opened 4,560 stores < 6,902 closures — consolidation is still deepening. Rising concentration: CR5 by retail sales rose from 38.5% in 2020 to 46.8% in 2023 (CIC); the 2025 delivery-price war accelerated share concentration among leaders (Donghai Securities estimates store-count CR5 up +6.16pct YoY). Competitive tiers are clear: budget band (<RMB 10) dominated by Mixue Bingcheng (59,823 stores, ~14,000 net adds in 2025, ~49.6% share by cup volume); mass band (RMB 10-20) — Guming (per prospectus/CIC: ~18% share of mass-band merchandise sales in 2023, ~22% in tier-2 cities and below, the largest mass-band brand; ~9.1% on an all-price-band GMV basis, versus Mixue's leading ~20.2% — both metrics shown side by side for verification), locked in close combat with ChaPanda and Auntea Jenny; premium band (>RMB 20) — Chagee (No. 1 premium-band store-count share of 20.3% in 2024) alongside the retrenching HEYTEA and Nayuki. Entry barriers lie not in product (highly homogenized; Guming launched 106 new items in 2025) but in supply-chain warehouse-distribution networks (next-day cold-chain delivery requires heavy assets and scale density) and the franchisee system (mature franchisees opening repeat stores).
Cycle and Regulation: The industry is in late growth/early maturity, in a phase of "stock consolidation + leader concentration" — retail sales still growing double digits (~+20% in 2025) while total store count shrinks: "volume down, value up." Leading indicators: monthly store openings/closings of leading brands (Zhaimen Canyan/Dihai), daily GMV per store, delivery-platform subsidy intensity, price-band distribution of new products. Regulatory direction is neutral-to-favorable for leaders: normalized food-safety supervision (ingredient disclosure, strict checks on expired ingredients; Oct 2026 draft revision of the Food Safety Law soliciting comments, strengthening online food and campus food safety), gradual rollout of nutrition labeling (Shanghai's Feb 2024 pilot ABCD beverage nutrition grading; the National Health Commission's "Weight Management Year" three-year action advocating sugar reduction) — higher compliance costs raise barriers and accelerate the exit of smaller players, favoring leaders with leading supply-chain and quality-control systems.
Company Positioning: Guming is China's leading mass-market freshly-made tea brand and the No. 2 brand across all price bands (by GMV), in the first tier with a clearly rising share trend: GMV of RMB 19.2 billion in 2023 (+37.3%) → RMB 22.4 billion in 2024 (+16.7%) → RMB 32.732 billion in 2025 (+46.1%), consistently and substantially outperforming the industry (~+20% in 2025). Three sources of moat: ① lower-tier cold chain (the only top-10 brand with lower-tier, high-frequency, short-shelf-life fresh-fruit delivery capability); ② franchisee density and stickiness (top 8 provinces contribute ~87% of GMV, township stores 45%, 2.01 stores per franchisee on average); ③ category extension (~13,500 stores equipped with coffee machines, entering freshly ground coffee to hedge against slowing tea growth). Share metric note: the company's prospectus claims "No. 1 in the mass band" (CIC), while third-party GF Securities, citing CIC, puts Guming's 2023 all-price-band share at ~9.1%, second place — the discrepancy stems from price-band definitions; both are presented side by side.
Key Industry Ratios (single-store franchise model, a dedicated focus of this report): daily GMV per store RMB 6.8k→6.5k→7.8k (FY2023-2025); daily cups per store 417→384→456; franchisee per-store annual operating profit ~RMB 376k / margin 20.2% (2024 basis; industry generally below 15%); initial investment ~RMB 400-500k; payback ~12-17 months (Guosen: ~16.5 months); 2.01 stores per franchisee; 71% of franchisees operating 2+ years run 2 or more stores; semi-annual closure rate 3.1% (2025H1) → 3.8% (2026H1); membership base of 236 million registered / 59 million quarterly active (2026H1). The single-store model is the decisive factor of this business: every yuan of brand revenue passes through "whether franchisees are willing to keep opening stores and whether single stores are profitable" — which is why this report flags slowing store growth and receivables deterioration as the two critical tracking items.
Core Risks (ranked by damage to the investment thesis): ① Single-store economics stalling as delivery subsidies taper (per-store daily GMV/cups turning negative, full-year same-store at the -5% floor) — precedent: Chagee's net profit -94.7% in 2025Q4 after five consecutive quarters of same-store decline; ② deteriorating franchisee returns extinguishing the store-opening engine and triggering a closure wave (semi-annual closure rate above 5%, franchisee departures above 400 per half-year), exposing impairment risk on receivables exposure (~RMB 1.14 billion including equipment installments); ③ chip supply: ~24% + 12% of share capital pending CCASS transfer disclosure + full lock-up expiry + thin free float — any large-holder filing constitutes immediate pressure; ④ spillover of sector systemic risk (ChaPanda's trading halt under investigation, Mixue's IPO break, top-three short interest); ⑤ payment/dilution disruption from convertible bonds maturing 2027-06-30 (conversion price HKD 23.54, 6.3% premium to current price); ⑥ systematization of an isolated food-safety incident (14,351 franchise stores, 45% in townships — a single point of failure has wide contagion); ⑦ RMB/HKD FX beta. Additionally, unverified reports of the founder's offshore trust tax issues, if substantiated, would bring one-off tax liabilities and a governance discount.
Monitoring and Verification Calendar:
Strategic Implications: The current price of HKD 22.14 implies a moderate-to-low margin of safety, suiting staged accumulation rather than a single heavy position. Add signals = company confirmation of positive Q4 same-store growth or stabilization in net store openings in the annual report; trim signals = price touching the upper bound of the target range at HKD 28.2 (safety margin exhausted) or a trigger of single-store/closure falsification conditions.
This report uses the 2026-10-30 (Friday) closing price as its price benchmark. The report was completed on November 1, 2026, with research information and news search current as of that date. Key data sources: Guming FY2024 annual report, FY2025 results announcement, 2026 interim results announcement, convertible bond announcements (HKEXnews); sell-side reports (CICC, Huachuang, Daiwa, CLSA, Jefferies, BofA, Kaiyuan, Great Wall, China Post, Zheshang, Huatai) as republished via public channels; industry data (CIC, CCFA, Zhaimen Canyan) as cited in broker reports and media.