Report Date: 2026-10-31 | Rating: Neutral (Previous: Neutral) | Target Price Range: CNY 55–70 (base-case fair value) | Current Price: CNY 70.42 (2026-10-30 close) | Margin of Safety: None (base-case fair value floor of CNY 55 is -21.9% vs. current price) | Time Horizon: 12 months
Market Cap: CNY 34.13 billion (CNY 70.42 × 484.6 million shares) | H Shares: 02631.HK, HKD 40.38 (2026-10-30), A/H premium of approximately 105.7%
| Item | Previous (2026-06-22, price 149.20) | Current (2026-10-31, price 70.42) | Drivers of Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stance | Neutral | Neutral (maintained) | The stock's -53% decline has retraced the overextended portion, but the downside risk list (supply wave / shareholder selling / FX exposure) has simultaneously materialized, restoring symmetric balance between bullish and bearish forces |
| Confidence | 0.70 | 0.60 | The Q3 report confirms the profitability inflection (positive), but the 8-inch supply wave timeline, financial shareholders' selling, and FX exposure are all new variables not previously quantified, reducing conviction in the neutral judgment |
| Target Price Range | CNY 120–140 | CNY 55–70 | Revision of the valuation anchor is the main driver: the previous base anchor "30x FY2026E PS" was in fact the market trading multiple at the time (circular reasoning); this time we adopt an independent anchor (60–70% of the primary anchor, TanKeBlue's implied 18.3x PS, plus the forward PE midpoint for A-share semiconductor material growth stocks). Also newly added: TanKeBlue's IPO application in July to raise CNY 2.78 billion for capacity expansion, J.P. Morgan's warning of an 8-inch price war, and the A/H convergence pull from the H shares' fall from HKD 122.8 to HKD 40.38. Note: the current FY2026E revenue expectation (CNY 2.24–2.28 billion) has actually been raised from the previous figure (CNY 2.05 billion); the target price cut stems from multiple de-bubbling, not a fundamental downgrade |
| Valuation Judgment | Fair but slightly rich | fair | PB back to the 29th percentile of the past 5 years; PS(FY2026E) at about 15x is below the primary anchor — from "overextended" back to "essentially fully priced" |
| Verification of Previous Key Conclusion | "The industry's darkest hour has passed; a gross margin recovery channel has opened" | Verified: gross margin rose for three consecutive quarters, 19.12% → 25.36% → 27.46%, with Q3 turning profitable on a single-quarter basis | The previous C2 judgment was correct; however, the timing recommendation of "wait for a pullback or earnings realization before entering" was front-run by the stock's oversold decline (-53%) |
Tianyue Advanced is the global leader in conductive SiC substrates (2025 share of 27.6%, 8-inch share of 51.3%, per Fuji Keizai). The 2026 single-quarter profitability inflection has been confirmed by the Q3 report: Q3 revenue of CNY 646 million (+102.9%), gross margin of 27.46% — the highest single-quarter level since listing, net profit attributable to parent of CNY 85.83 million, and non-recurring-adjusted net profit of CNY 96.17 million. However, the stock has halved from its June high of CNY 149.2 to CNY 70.42; the triple pressure of FX losses in the interim report, AI-theme capital withdrawal, and successive selling by financial shareholders has moved the valuation from "overextended" back to "essentially fully priced." Back-solving from the current market cap of CNY 34.1 billion implies net profit of CNY 0.9–1.2 billion in 2030–31 (a CAGR of roughly 45–70% vs. the 2026E base); the probability-weighted fair value across three scenarios, approximately CNY 69–70, coincides with the current price: downside to the bear-case midpoint is about -36%, upside to the bull-case midpoint is about +60% — symmetric odds, no margin of safety. Best-in-class quality + no price discount = Neutral watch: wait for the value buffer below CNY 55 (lower bound of the base range, PB around 3.7x), or for right-side confirmation from the full-year loss-to-profit inflection in early 2027 annual results plus quantified disclosure of AI data center orders.
Upcoming Changes: Changes across six upstream dimensions cluster into three threads — ① The profitability inflection moving from "single-quarter verification" to "full-year confirmation" (the January 2027 earnings pre-announcement is the nearest checkpoint); ② The bull-bear wager between the 8-inch substrate "tight-balance price increases" view (CMB International) and the "supply wave-driven price war recurrence in 2027" view (J.P. Morgan) to be settled in 2027H2–2028; ③ On the ownership side, the 11.6% financial shareholder positions being worked off and the controlling shareholder's commitment expiring on 2027-04-29 constitute a supply clock.
Primary Stock Price Driver: The 8-inch ASP trajectory (falsification threshold: falling below approximately CNY 3,500/wafer or single-quarter gross margin dropping below 20%; confirmation threshold: ASP holding above CNY 5,000 with gross margin ≥30%).
Verifiable Expectation Gaps: Consensus FY2027 net profit of CNY 276 million (n=4, pre-Q3-report basis) clearly lags the Q3 run-rate of CNY 86 million per quarter (annualized CNY 340–380 million); this report's base case of CNY 260–360 million sits at the upper end of consensus to above it — if the January 2027 pre-announcement delivers full-year net profit attributable to parent at the CNY 100 million level, there is room for upward consensus revision. The reverse expectation gap is equally real: the CNY 900 million–1.2 billion net profit in 2030–31 implied by the current price requires 2030 revenue to represent only 8–11% of the global market (CMB International basis: CNY 66.4 billion), in tension with the narrative of "share leadership with a widening lead."
Verification Catalysts and Falsification Conditions: See the catalyst calendar and counter-evidence list in the "Comprehensive Conclusions and Tracking" section.
Global supply shakeout (Wolfspeed's restructuring cutting debt by 70%, SK Siltron CSS liquidating its US SiC subsidiary, LX Semicon exiting via patent sales) is transferring share to the Chinese leader with cost advantages and an 8-inch generation lead; but two caveats must be presented in parallel: first, the 27.6%/51.3% figures are a single Fuji Keizai basis, with sell-side citations inconsistent (Soochow International cites TrendForce, Huayuan and CMB International cite Fuji Keizai); under Yole's basis, both Tianyue and TanKeBlue are at roughly 15% (year basis unclear, pending verification); second, Wolfspeed received a conditional USD 1.5 billion loan from the US Department of Defense to rebuild 200mm capacity, posing a risk of overseas share reversal. This thesis is falsified if third-party independent bases show share falling below 20% or the 8-inch share being caught up.
Gross margin recovering quarter by quarter from 19.12% → 25.36% → 27.46%, with 8-inch exceeding half of revenue alongside full-capacity operation, constitutes a genuine recovery driven by volume-price structure; however, R&D expense contraction (first three quarters -6.16%, Q3 R&D ratio -8.55pct YoY) also contributed part of the profit elasticity. The judgment of full-year attributable net profit of approximately CNY 80–140 million requires a Q4 single quarter of CNY 53–113 million, while the year-end impairment testing base (inventory of CNY 1.182 billion + fixed assets of CNY 3.929 billion) is far larger than the interim period and the FX exposure is not yet cleared — the year-end pattern risk is the main downside source for this thesis. This thesis is downgraded if Q4 turns negative on a single-quarter basis or if the pre-announcement shows attributable profit below CNY 50 million.
The demand chain is quantifiable: driver (NVIDIA's large-scale commercialization in 2027) × unit consumption (PSU 4→12 devices, HVDC 28 devices, SST 600+ devices of 1200V SiC) × penetration pace (2026 as SST year one → 2027 scale commercialization → 2030 with AI accounting for nearly half of SiC demand, per Citrini) × company share (8-inch at 51.3%). But two points must be read conservatively: first, the "CNY 70 billion" figure is an institutional estimate cited by Cailian Press, closely matching CMB International's "2030 global substrate total market of CNY 66.4 billion (including automotive)" — raising suspicion of repackaging the entire market as an AI-specific figure; second, substrate makers are two layers removed from NVIDIA (via device/power suppliers), and with Infineon's in-house Kulikim capacity plus multi-sourcing, the company's capture ratio is unknown, and the company has yet to make quantified disclosure of AI revenue. This thesis is downgraded to an option-expiry-at-zero scenario if NVIDIA's 800VDC is delayed in 2027 or if the interim report still lacks quantified AI revenue.
The current price implies PS of about 15x on FY2026E revenue of CNY 2.24–2.28 billion (16.4x if using Soochow International's CNY 2.078 billion revenue forecast), below the primary anchor of TanKeBlue's IPO-implied ~18.3x PS — not expensive horizontally; but vertically, even on the most optimistic sell-side path (Soochow's 2028E attributable net profit of CNY 536 million), the current price only returns to around 60x PE by 2028, implying fairly full expectations. The A/H premium of 105.7% (H shares at HKD 40.38 ≈ CNY 34.2) constitutes long-term downward pull; this report's bear-case floor of CNY 40 sits close to the converted H-share price. If 2027 earnings exceed CNY 400 million with quantified AI orders landing, the valuation anchor shifts up to the bull case; the judgment is "essentially fully priced, slightly rich."
On the supply side: Jingsheng's Yinchuan 600,000 wafers (filed), TanKeBlue's IPO raising CNY 2.78 billion, and the company's own Lingang plan of 960,000 wafers constitute a 2027–2028 wave of 8-inch nominal capacity — all nominal figures requiring adjustment for yield ramp-up and utilization (2025 industry utilization of approximately 48.8% but leaders above 90%), and the company itself is part of the supply increment; if demand growth falls below about 20%, the price war will reignite (J.P. Morgan path: 8-inch at CNY 2,500–3,500/wafer in 2027, a further 30–50% decline from the current ~CNY 5,000/wafer). FX is a two-way variable (RMB depreciation would generate gains), but H1 2026 already saw an actual loss of CNY 118 million, equivalent to wiping out about 1.4 quarters of Q3-level profit. The pressure is removed if TanKeBlue's IPO is terminated, financial shareholders' selling expires without new plans, or 8-inch supply-demand tightness persists through 2028.
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | 2026Q1–Q3 | 2026Q3 Single Quarter |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (CNY 100 million) | 12.51 | 17.68 | 14.65 | 15.59 | 6.46 |
| Revenue YoY | — | +41.4% | -17.2% | +40.2% | +102.9% |
| Net Profit Attributable to Parent (CNY 100 million) | -0.46 | 1.79 | -2.08 | 0.27 | 0.86 |
| Non-Recurring-Adjusted Net Profit (CNY 100 million) | -1.13 | 1.56 | -2.46 | 0.09 | 0.96 |
| Overall Gross Margin | 17.53% | 25.90% | 13.05% | 24.10% (first three quarters) | 27.46% |
| Net Margin | -3.7% | 10.1% | -14.2% | 1.7% | 13.3% |
| Net Operating Cash Flow (CNY 100 million) | 0.13 | 0.66 | 2.31 | 0.89 | — |
| Free Cash Flow (OCF−CapEx, CNY 100 million) | — | -5.02 | -1.73 | -5.52 | — |
| Cash + Trading Financial Assets (CNY 100 million, period-end) | — | — | 31.9 | 34.1 | 34.1 |
| Of which: Cash and Cash Equivalents (CNY 100 million) | — | — | 31.0 | 8.33 | 8.33 |
| Interest-Bearing Debt (CNY 100 million, period-end) | — | — | 10.6 | 15.9 | 15.9 |
| Debt-to-Asset Ratio | — | — | 25.1% | 32.3% | 32.3% |
Notes: ① Balance sheet stock figures are as of end-2026Q3 (2026-09-30); ② The gap of approximately CNY 2.47 billion between "cash and cash equivalents" and the book monetary funds of CNY 3.30 billion represents restricted funds related to deposits/notes/derivatives (H1 2026 restricted assets of CNY 2.528 billion, 25.22% of total assets); ③ FCF = OCF − cash for fixed asset purchases etc. (calculated basis); ④ R&D investment for the first three quarters was CNY 116 million (-6.16%).
Reasons for Metric Changes (company explanations attached for all accounts with YoY ≥ ±20%): Q3 single-quarter revenue +102.9% — the company attributes this to rising penetration of 800V high-voltage platforms in new energy vehicles driving volume in automotive-grade conductive substrates, AI server high-voltage power supplies becoming a key new demand source, compounded by the low base at the bottom of the prior-year price war (2025Q3 revenue of CNY 318 million); financial expenses for the first three quarters +401% (CNY 80.10 million vs. 15.98 million) — increased FX losses on foreign currency due to RMB exchange rate fluctuations (H1 FX loss of CNY 118 million; Q3 financial expenses already turned to net income of approximately -CNY 18.94 million, a direction reversal); CapEx for the first three quarters +98.3% (CNY 641 million) — Jinan/Shanghai Lingang phase-two capacity ramp-up plus overseas plants entering construction, construction-in-progress +161% vs. the start of the year; H1 operating cash flow -107% — decreased other cash received relating to operating activities plus increased payments for goods purchases on higher revenue, turning positive again in Q3; short-term borrowings +81.8% vs. the start of the year (CNY 1.197 billion) — needs for working capital replenishment.
Q3 single-quarter revenue of CNY 646 million, +102.9% YoY and +17.8% QoQ, a record single-quarter high; gross margin of 27.46% (+6.87pct YoY, +2.1pct QoQ), the highest single-quarter level since listing; net profit attributable to parent of CNY 85.83 million (vs. -CNY 9.76 million a year earlier), non-recurring-adjusted CNY 96.17 million — the adjusted figure exceeds the attributable figure (net non-recurring loss of CNY 10.34 million, mainly from financial asset fair-value changes of -CNY 29.07 million); single-quarter earnings contain no one-off gains, quality is better than headline. 8-inch revenue share exceeded 50% for the first time, with demand growing in tandem domestically and overseas. Q3 R&D investment of CNY 41.14 million (-13.3%); expense contraction contributed to profit elasticity, and whether this is a timing fluctuation needs verification in subsequent quarters. Yet the market reaction was "sell the news": the stock fell more than 20% in the three trading days after the Q3 disclosure (confirmed by the company on the interactive platform on 10-28), showing the selling pressure came from thematic capital withdrawal and financial shareholder exits, not the results themselves; on 10-30 the company announced share buyback and cancellation plus the controlling shareholder's 6-month no-selling commitment, yet the decline continued the next day. Relative to this report's base assumption (full-year attributable net profit of CNY 80–140 million), the Q3 run-rate sits at the upper end of the range; full-year delivery depends on Q4 FX and year-end impairments.
Business model snapshot: Asset-heavy semiconductor materials manufacturing — PVT-method crystal growth plus slicing, grinding and polishing; direct sales dominant, with long-term contracts (LTAs) of 4.0–4.5 billion RMB on hand locking in 12–18 months. In-house production rate of core crystal-growth equipment exceeds 90%, powder is self-supplied, and costs sit at the left end of the global cost curve (Soochow Securities estimates Wolfspeed's powder procurement costs are 30–40% higher). Revenue is non-subscription-based; pricing power is weak in 2025 (proactive price cuts to gain share drove revenue -17%), recovering in 2026 amid 8-inch tightness (the company cites "value-based pricing, rejecting race-to-the-bottom price wars").
Cash content of earnings: OCF/attributable net profit in 2024 was only 0.37 (179 million profit yielded just 66 million in cash); OCF turned positive at 231 million RMB in 2025, but the company itself attributes this mainly to government grants (other income of 128 million, of which grants were ~91 million) and interest income; FCF has been deeply negative for consecutive periods — -502 million in 2024, -173 million in 2025, and -552 million in the first three quarters of 2026. Book profits are entirely consumed by CapEx; free cash flow being significantly negative during the capacity expansion peak is a structural feature of this stage of the business model, not an anomaly. Recurring earnings test: 27.22 million attributable net profit vs. 8.83 million ex-non-recurring items in the first three quarters of 2026, a net non-recurring gain of 18.39 million (other income of 68.93 million, mainly government grants, vs. fair-value losses); core earnings are weaker than headline figures. In 2025, the 38 million gap between the -246 million ex-non-recurring loss and the -208 million attributable loss stems from grants and fair-value items. The company discloses no Non-GAAP measures, so there is no aggressive add-back issue.
Return on capital: ROIC in 2024 was ~2.4% (NOPAT 152 million / invested capital 6.34 billion, estimated), significantly below the estimated 10.5% WACC — returns on invested capital have yet to materialize; a "true moat" (ROIC>15%) remains far off, and the moat currently manifests as cost and generational advantages rather than capital returns. CapEx quality: CapEx in the first three quarters of 2026 was 641 million RMB (+98%), construction in progress 337 million (+161%), with Lingang Phase II, Jinan, and Johor, Malaysia advancing in parallel; the company does not disclose a maintenance/growth split, so maintenance outlays cannot be determined, and rigid depreciation (fixed assets of 3.93 billion; 2025 depreciation of 337 million) is an amplifier in a gross-margin downside scenario.
Quality red flags (with sources): ① Restricted funds of ~2.528 billion RMB equal 25.22% of total assets (2026 H1 interim report), with available cash and equivalents of only 833 million vs. ~1.96 billion in short-term debt; ② earnings are highly dependent on government grants, FX gains and other non-operating items (2025 annual report: other income of 128 million mainly from government grants); ③ top five customers account for 57.14%, with the largest at 20.17% (2025 annual report) — concentration remains elevated.
Say-do consistency: partially delivered (2 of 4 promises fulfilled, 1 unfulfilled, 1 partially deviated). ① The 2025 annual report pledged to "deepen mainstream adoption of 8-inch" — 8-inch revenue share exceeded 50% in 2026 H1/Q3 (~44% in 2025), delivered above expectations; ② "earnings recovery, value-based pricing" — gross margin rose three consecutive quarters to 27.46%, with single-quarter profitability restored from Q2; delivered; ③ pledged to "maintain R&D investment intensity on the 2025 base of 166 million" — R&D in the first three quarters of 2026 was 116 million, -6.16% YoY; not delivered (the company attributes this to "stage-specific differences in project investment cadence"; this explanation, alongside claims that "overall strategy is unchanged," has been repeated on the investor interaction platform and cannot yet be falsified, but it is inconsistent with the annual report's wording); ④ "prudent advancement of capital expenditures" — CapEx in the first three quarters already exceeds 59% of full-year 2025, and expansion has restarted amid improving industry sentiment; partially deviated.
Shareholder friendliness: neutral-to-cautious. No cash dividends since listing (2022–2025; parent company's retained earnings are negative); a 100 million RMB buyback was executed from Nov 2023 to May 2024 (43.96–61.15 RMB/share), and on 2026-10-30 the board resolved to cancel 1,609,600 shares of it (0.33% of total share capital — more symbolic than substantive); the August 2025 H-share IPO raised 2.062 billion RMB, diluting ~11.33%. The buyback cancellation plus the controlling shareholder's no-reduction pledge are defense measures following the late-October share-price plunge, but the magnitude is insufficient to offset the potential selling pressure of 3.95 billion RMB from financial shareholders.
Risk signals: In 2025, back payment of 2019–2020 corporate income tax plus late fees totaled 82.97 million RMB (with 38.98 million in late fees booked as non-operating expenses in 2025Q4), reflecting historical tax-compliance issues; on 2026-10-21 (the day after Q3 results, during the share-price plunge window) the board secretary changed — the former secretary moved to assistant to the chairman, replaced by Wang Junguo, the former CFO who led the dual listing, who was also promoted to Deputy General Manager; a capability-enhancing rotation, but the timing is dense, and changes to the CFO or auditor over the next two quarters warrant monitoring; the controlling shareholder's control has further consolidated (direct shareholding of 26.68%) following adjustments to employee stock ownership platform interests.
Based on the latest segment disclosures in the 2025 annual report (quarterly 2026 reports do not disclose segments):
| Segment | Revenue (RMB 100M) | Share | Gross margin | YoY | One-line business logic |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SiC materials — overseas | 6.77 | 55.3% | 35.97% (-6.08pct) | -19.45% | Automotive/industrial large-customer LTAs; the profit base amid the price war |
| SiC materials — domestic | 5.48 | 44.7% | -6.22% (-27.01pct) | -13.46% | The most brutal domestic price-war market; prices falling below cost |
Overseas is the profit mainstay: estimated overseas contribution to core gross profit is ~244 million RMB (6.77×35.97%), while domestic contributes ~-34 million — overseas contributes more than 100% of core gross profit, with the domestic business actually consuming profit. Gross margins differ by 42.2 percentage points between the two markets (≥10pp red line), because these are entirely different businesses: overseas comprises automotive-grade LTAs with Infineon/Bosch and high-end 8-inch orders, while domestic is homogeneous 6-inch cut-throat bidding — the sustainability of the blended 27.46% gross margin depends on whether the overseas order pricing system holds, not on across-the-board cost advantages; if overseas large customers shift orders or 8-inch premiums converge, the blended gross margin could fall faster than the market expects.
By wafer size (not disclosed segments; the company only discloses shares): 8-inch revenue share went from 30% in 2024 → ~44% in 2025 → over 50% in 2026 H1/Q3, the core driver of gross-margin recovery; 6-inch supplies are stable, 12-inch delivered in small batches (thousand-wafer scale). The company does not disclose gross margin or amounts by size, so further breakdown is not possible.
Accounting red flags: ① Losses and impairments concentrated at year-end — 2025Q4 single-quarter attributable loss of -209.4 million exceeded 100% of the full-year loss (impairment of 48.69 million plus late fees of 38.98 million recognized in a concentrated manner), a pattern signal of earnings being compressed via inter-period distribution (medium severity); ② historical tax back payments and late fees (medium); ③ continuous inventory write-downs even as inventory keeps rising — 48.69 million impairment in 2025, another 30.13 million in 2026 H1 (12.03 million credit impairment + 18.10 million inventory write-down, per announcement reducing total profit by 30.1320 million); inventory at Q3-end reached a new high of 1.182 billion, ~305 days turnover (medium); ④ government grants and FX swings materially influence the direction of profit/loss — ex-non-recurring losses in 2023/2025 with book direction driven by grants and FX (medium); ⑤ R&D spending cadence deviating from annual-report pledges (low; possibly a profit-smoothing signal, to be verified in coming quarters).
Cross-period consistency: ① Blended gross margin 17.5%→25.9%→13.1%→19.1%→25.4%→27.5%, a deep V-shaped drop followed by rapid recovery; management's attribution (proactive 2025 price cuts for penetration → 2026 price stabilization + 8-inch mix optimization + cost reduction) is consistent across periods and cross-validates with industry price data (6-inch: 4781→1696→rebound; 8-inch: 29,400→6,200 RMB/wafer→stabilizing with modest gains); ② OCF coverage of net profit was only 0.37 in 2024, and the 2025 turnaround relied on grants and interest income — self-acknowledged by the company; consistent; ③ R&D expense ratio 10.97%→8.02%→11.32%→7.42% — inconsistent with annual-report pledges (company explains "cadence differences"); ④ top-five customer share stable at high levels, 57.23%→57.14%, but the second-largest customer's revenue fell from 309 million to 185 million (-40%), unexplained by the company — an unexplained change in large-customer structure is the most notable gap in cross-period data.
Current market data (frozen anchor at 2026-10-30 close): share price 70.42 RMB, market cap 34.13 billion RMB. PE(TTM) negative (TTM attributable profit ~-182 million) — earnings are in the early stage of turnaround; PE and PE percentile discarded altogether; percentiles for reference only; effective metrics: PB 4.74x (29% percentile over 5 years since listing; reference set includes the 2021–22 bubble period, for reference only), PS(TTM) 17.85x, PS(FY2026E) ~15.1x (based on this report's revenue of 2.24–2.28 billion; 16.4x based on Soochow's 2.078 billion), forward PE(FY2027E) ~110–124x (on consensus 276 million to this report's base case 310 million). A/H premium 105.7% (H shares at 40.38 HKD ≈ 34.2 RMB). Average daily turnover ~890 million RMB (past 30 days, ~2.6% of market cap); liquidity normal.
Peer and private-market anchors:
| Company | Basis | Multiple/valuation | Growth/earnings | Key difference |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SICC Co., Ltd. | 2026-10-30 | PS(FY2026E) 15.1x / PB 4.74x | Q3 revenue +103%, gross margin 27.5% | Pure-play global substrate leader, only one with positive gross margin, A+H listed |
| TankeBlue (IPO inquiry stage) | Private-market anchor | IPO-implied ~17.5 billion ≈ PS 18.3x (2025 revenue 956 million) | 2025 gross margin -20%, ex-non-recurring -700 million | Global No. 2 but deeply loss-making; private anchor 17% pricier than SICC's public valuation |
| Zhejiang Jingsheng Mechanical & Electrical 300316 | 2026-10-30 | PB 2.37x (7% percentile over 10 years) / static PE 45.9x | SiC as second growth curve; core PV equipment business -68.6% | Equipment + materials synergy challenger |
| Wolfspeed (post-restructuring) | — | Multiples distorted (non-GAAP gross margin -34%) | Materials revenue -44% | High-cost capacity being cleared; received $1.5 billion US loan for rebuild |
Market-implied expectations: Back-solving from the 34.1 billion market cap (terminal 50x PE, 10% discount) requires attributable net profit of ~0.9–1.2 billion in 2030–31 — a CAGR of ~45–70% from the 2026E base of 80–140 million (base-sensitive; better viewed as a range than a point). Reality check: Q3 annualized ex-non-recurring profit is only 385 million, sell-side consensus FY2027 is only 276 million, with the most optimistic (CMB) at 410 million. The current price requires the company to expand profits 7–15x within five years with no recurrence of the 8-inch price war, whereas reality is quarterly annualized profits below 400 million — the direction (AI high-voltage power supplies, confirmed as the core incremental demand in Q3 results) is real, but the slope has been front-run. Also note the implied share tension: 0.9–1.2 billion net profit back-solved at a 15–20% net margin implies ~2030 revenue of 5.5–7.3 billion, only 8–11% of CMB's forecast for the 2030 global market (66.4 billion), below the current 27.6% revenue share — the current price actually implies not "share leadership" but a "profitability leap," and whether both can coexist is the core contradiction.
Three-tier value (EPV): Asset value ~14.85 RMB/share (attributable net assets of 7.195 billion at 2026Q3-end ÷ 484.6 million shares) — standalone floor reference; EPV with zero growth ~8.8 RMB/share (normalizing on the realized 2026Q3 run rate: annualized revenue 2.58 billion → gross profit 709 million → operating expenses ex-interest 375 million → NOPAT 280 million (15% high-tech tax rate) + D&A 400 million − maintenance CapEx 400 million − working capital 30 million → normalized FCFF ~255 million = 0.53 RMB/share, WACC 10.5%, plus net cash of 3.75 RMB/share); growth optionality accounts for ~87.5% of the current price — the price is almost entirely supported by "8-inch volume-price rises + AI HVDC ramp + 12-inch optionality." This is typical of a growth stock early in turnaround (zero-growth valuation is a floor, not a conclusion), but it means any revision of growth expectations would trigger sharp valuation compression. Planned capacity (Lingang 960k wafers, Malaysia 2027Q1, Jinan Phase II) is not included in EPV and is reserved for future scenarios.
Three scenarios & odds (12 months):
| Scenario | Probability | Fair value range | vs. current price | Decisive factors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 30% | 40–50 RMB (midpoint 45) | -36% (to midpoint) | 8-inch price war recurrence (J.P. Morgan path: 2,500–3,500 RMB/wafer in 2027) + AI demand falsified + selling pressure; PS 8–10x × 2027E revenue 2.4 billion |
| Base | 45% | 55–70 RMB (midpoint 62.5) | +13.6% (to midpoint; current price at upper edge of range) | Q3 run rate sustained, 2027 attributable profit of 260–360 million delivered, gross margin above 30%; 2028E attributable profit 450–550 million × PE 55–70x (anchor: A-share semiconductor materials growth-stock forward PE midpoint + cross-validation at 6–7 discount to TankeBlue's private-market 18.3x PS on 2027E revenue 2.8 billion × PS 10–12.5x — anchor independent of the company's current multiples) |
| Bull | 25% | 100–125 RMB (midpoint 112.5) | +60% (to midpoint) | AI HVDC ramp in 2027 delivered (quantified AI revenue disclosure + Infineon orders doubling sustained) + LTA price increases + early 12-inch ramp; 2028E attributable profit 800 million–1.0 billion × PE 55–65x |
Ramp math (bull-case skeleton): 2027 revenue 3.2–3.5 billion (AI power substrate starting to contribute 200–400 million incremental) → 2028 attributable profit 800 million–1.0 billion (net margin ~25%, above the historical 2024 peak) → exit multiple 55–65x (benchmarked against current trading ranges of proven growth stocks), self-consistent with the 100–125 range after discounting. Bear-case external coordinates: Huayuan Securities (2026-05-08) 2026–2028E attributable profit of only 38/185/309 million RMB (lowest sell-side earnings path, no target price attached); J.P. Morgan's 8-inch price path (3,000–4,000 RMB/wafer by end-2026, 2,500–3,500 RMB/wafer in 2027) — both are directional coordinates, not pricing conclusions. If the Huayuan path values the stock below this bear case's lower bound, then this bear case does not cover the most extreme scenario; but the 40 RMB lower bound is close to the H-share conversion (~34.2 RMB), implying PB 2.7x, and already incorporates A/H convergence.
In-house earnings forecast (results reconciliation anchor):
| Period | Revenue | Attributable net profit | Key drivers |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY2026E | 2.20–2.28 billion RMB | 80–140 million RMB | Q4 revenue +5%~+12% QoQ, gross margin 28–29%; year-end impairments (2025Q4 precedent) and FX are downside risks |
| FY2027E | 2.7–3.1 billion RMB | 260–360 million RMB | Lingang ramp + Malaysia production start 2027Q1, shipments +30–40%; assumes 8-inch ASP flat only (no weight given to price increases); gross margin 30–32% |
Benchmarks: sell-side consensus FY2026E 72 million RMB (n=4, lagging Q3 run rate), FY2027E 276 million (CMB 410 million, Soochow 354 million); management discloses no quantitative guidance. The biggest variables are the 8-inch ASP path and FX, which can swing 2027 net profit by ±150 million RMB.
Conclusion: Undervalued/fair/overvalued judgment: fair; target range 55–70 RMB (= base-case fair value); no margin of safety (base-case fair floor of 55 RMB is -21.9% vs. current price). Assessing quality (global leader, left-end costs, 8-inch generational edge, turnaround proven) and price (implied expectations fairly full, symmetric odds) separately: top-tier quality, no discount on price. Upward re-rating requires 2027 quantified AI orders and right-side confirmation of 30%+ gross margin; value buffer appears only below 55 RMB (~3.7x PB). Probability-weighted fair value of ~69.75 RMB (0.30×45 + 0.45×62.5 + 0.25×112.5) essentially coincides with the current price — the weighted value is for magnitude reference only (scenario parameters involve subjective calibration); the robustness of the conclusion comes from the direction of the gap between "implied expectations vs. real earnings power."
1. Quantified chain of industry size and demand inflection. Global N-type SiC substrate market revenue in 2024 was USD 1.04 billion (TrendForce, -9% YoY, volume up, price collapse); per CMB International's estimates, ~RMB 11.3 billion in 2025 and ~RMB 66.4 billion in 2030 (the firm-labeled CAGR of 39%; direct endpoint calculation ~42.5%); demand volume ~2.5 million wafers in 2025 (Supplyframe) → nearly 12 million wafers in 6-inch equivalent by 2030 (SemiInsights Research). 8-inch shipment share: <2% in 2024 → ~15% in 2026 → >20% in 2030 (TrendForce). The EV base case: 23.54 million NEVs globally in 2025, main-drive SiC penetration >30% (Frost & Sullivan), 800V platform penetration at 11.17% with SiC penetration in 800V vehicles at ~76%; by 2030, >50% main-drive SiC penetration corresponds to 4.32 million substrates. Quantified chain of the structural demand inflection (AI data centers): driver trajectory (NVIDIA's May 2025 white paper explicitly targets 800V HVDC at commercial scale in 2027, 1MW+ per rack, SST ramp in 2028) × step-up in per-unit usage (PSU: 4→12 devices; HVDC: 28; SST: 600+ 1200V SiC devices; retrofitting a 100,000-GPU AI data center from silicon to SiC power infrastructure implies a difference of hundreds of millions of RMB) × penetration pace (2026 as SST commercialization year one → large-scale commercial deployment in 2027 → AI approaching half of SiC demand by 2030, per Citrini) × company share (51.3% in 8-inch; Infineon's 2026 orders doubled YoY, indirect entry into the AI power chain via TSMC). Caliber warning: Cailianshe's cited "2030 AI power + advanced packaging substrate demand of ~RMB 70 billion" is highly close to CMB International's total-market figure (RMB 66.4 billion, including automotive); AI-specific figures vary enormously across institutions, so the conservative reading is "2030 AI-related incremental demand on the order of tens of billions of RMB, with direction certain but slope uncertain."
2. Industry chain and value distribution. The chain runs: high-purity carbon powder/graphite thermal fields/crystal growth furnaces (upstream) → substrates + epitaxy (midstream) → devices/modules (Infineon, STMicro, onsemi, ROHM, Bosch; domestic players BYD Semiconductor, SICC, Silan Micro) → end markets (automakers, solar/storage, AI data centers). SiC substrates account for ~47% of total device cost and epitaxy ~23% (Yole) — an "inverted pyramid" in which materials capture ~70% of value, rare in global power semiconductors. Tianyue sits at the very upstream: strong bargaining power against suppliers (in-house equipment rate >90%, self-supplied powder, immune to equipment export controls); weak bargaining power downstream in 2024–2025 (price cuts for share), recovering significantly in 2026 (double-digit price increases on new/urgent orders, RMB 4.0–4.5 billion of signed LTAs locking in 12–18 months, 8-inch LTA gross margins 30%+).
3. Supply/demand and competitive landscape. 2025 global substrate capacity of ~4 million wafers vs demand of ~2.5 million, an oversupply of ~1.5 million wafers concentrated in homogeneous 6-inch products; industry utilization only ~48.8% (SemiInsights) but leading players >90% (CMB International) — "low-end oversupply + high-end scarcity" coexisting. Supply-side shakeout underway: Wolfspeed's Chapter 11 restructuring cut debt by ~70% (USD 4.6 billion) and closed the Durham 150mm device fab; SK Siltron CSS announced liquidation of its US SiC substrate subsidiary (~140 staff); LX Semicon exited via the sale of 60+ patents. Concentration: 2024 revenue-based CR4 ≈82% (Wolfspeed 33.7%, TanKeBlue 17.3%, Tianyue 17.1%, Coherent 13.9%, TrendForce); in 2025, by revenue of conductive-type products per Fuji Keizai, Tianyue ranked first at 27.6%, TanKeBlue 15%. Caliber comparison (company claims vs third parties): Tianyue's annual report cites Fuji Keizai's 27.6% as global #1, while TanKeBlue's prospectus cites Yole's figures of WOLF/Tianyue/TanKeBlue = 28%/15%/15% (year not explicitly stated) — the gap stems from statistical scope (conductive-type vs all N-type) and measurement (revenue vs shipments). This report uses Fuji Keizai as the latest 2025 caliber with Yole as cross-reference; sensitivity of the #1 share judgment to caliber cannot be ruled out. Entry barriers: 8-inch crystal growth know-how (thermal field/defect control), 2–3 year automotive qualification cycles, capital-intensive depreciation (Wolfspeed's USD 2.1 billion annual CapEx crushing cash flow as a cautionary tale), customer switching costs. Substitution threats: silicon-based IGBT/superjunction (low-price vehicle models), GaN (medium/low voltage), but SiC has physics-level irreplaceability in 800V EV and AI HVDC scenarios.
4. Cycle and regulation. The industry is in "early upcycle after shakeout completion": 2025Q4 was the darkest trough (Tianyue single-quarter gross margin ~-6%, TanKeBlue full-year gross margin -20%, Wolfspeed's bankruptcy restructuring); 2026 sees volume and price rising together (STMicro raising prices effective 2026-06-28, Infineon's second hike of the year on 07-01 with automotive high-voltage up >15%, 6-inch rebounding sharply from lows, 8-inch stabilizing with slight gains to ~RMB 5,000/wafer). Leading indicators: substrate quotes (6-inch ~RMB 1,600–1,800/wafer, 8-inch ~RMB 5,000/wafer), utilization rates, leading players' orders (Tianyue Q1 new orders of RMB 800 million, +120% YoY), supply exit events, device-side price increase letters, Wolfspeed AI data center revenue (three consecutive quarters of +30–50% QoQ). Regulation: China's NEV purchase tax halved in 2026–2027 (effective 5%), a mild step-down; the US Section 301 investigation explicitly covers SiC substrates, with tariffs to be imposed in steps within 18 months from 2027-06-23 (initially 0%), plus a USD 1.5 billion Pentagon loan to help Wolfspeed rebuild 200mm — a long-term barrier for direct Chinese substrate exports to the US; Tianyue's Johor, Malaysia base entering small-batch production in 2027Q1 is the core hedge (adjacent to Infineon's Kulim fab).
5. Peer benchmarks:
| Company | Revenue scale | Growth | Gross margin | Share/rank | Key differences vs Tianyue |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Advanced Technology (Tianyue) | RMB 1.465 billion in 2025; RMB 1.559 billion in 2026Q1–Q3 | Q1–Q3 +40.2% | 27.46% (Q3) | Conductive-type 27.6% #1, 8-inch 51.3% (Fuji Keizai) | Pure-play substrates, left end of cost curve, A+H listed |
| TanKeBlue | RMB 956 million in 2025 | ~-10% (two consecutive years of decline) | -20.06% (2025) | Conductive-type 15% #2 (Fuji Keizai); utilization 94–98% | 6-inch + epitaxy integration; shareholders include Huawei Hubble/CATL; IPO raising RMB 2.78 billion to catch up in 8/12-inch |
| Zhejiang Jingsheng Mechanical | SiC segment not separately disclosed | Main business (PV equipment) -34.6% | Not available | One of domestic 8-inch players | Dual-track equipment + materials; three-site layout: Shangyu 300k wafers + Yinchuan 600k + Penang 240k |
| Wolfspeed | FY26Q2 materials revenue USD 50 million | Materials -44% | Non-GAAP -34% | 2024 #1 at 33.7% (TrendForce) → overtaken in 2025 | Restructuring cut debt 70% + USD 1.5 billion US loan for rebuild; costs 30–50% higher |
| Coherent | SiC segment not separately disclosed | Not available | Not available | 2024 #4 at 13.9% (TrendForce) | Strategic pivot to AI thermal management (300mm SiC sampling), AR waveguides |
6. Company industry positioning: Leader with rising share trend (22.8% → 27.6%, Fuji Keizai caliber), with three moats — ① left end of the cost curve (the only pure substrate player with positive gross margins during the price war); ② generational lead and yield (8-inch yield 75%+, 12-inch 65% vs industry 40–50%, world-first 12-inch launch); ③ LTA lock-ins (cooperation with over half of the global top ten power device makers, Bosch preferred supplier, Infineon long-term contract, 80–90% supply share at SICC for 8-inch). Main threats: price war recurrence amid the 2027–2028 supply wave (see C5) and share reversion by Wolfspeed after US government support.
The decisive factors in the SiC substrate industry lie not in revenue growth but in three structural variables:
Size generational shift: An 8-inch wafer offers +78% usable area per wafer vs 6-inch, ~1.8x die output, and 30–50% lower unit cost (company interim report caliber) — whoever first ramps 8-inch mass-production yield gains the upper hand in the next round of pricing power. Tianyue's 8-inch revenue share: 30% in 2024 → 44% in 2025 → >50% in 2026, with global 8-inch share of 51.3% at a clear #1; 12-inch world-first launch in November 2024, having completed full-series development of conductive N/P-type + semi-insulating with small-batch deliveries to leading customers (yield 65% vs industry 40–50%). Competitor progress: Wolfspeed produced 300mm crystals in January 2026, Coherent sampling 300mm (pivoting to a thermal management narrative), Jingsheng small-batch optical-grade 12-inch — a first-mover window of roughly 1–2 years.
Yield and cost curve: Crystal growth know-how determines one's position on the cost curve. Tianyue's core equipment in-house rate >90% and self-supplied powder place it at the left end of the global cost curve; Wolfspeed's substrate prices are 30–50% higher than Tianyue's (Soochow Securities estimate), and its restructuring is essentially the clearance of capacity on the right end of the cost curve; TanKeBlue's 2025 average prices of RMB 1,696/wafer for 6-inch and RMB 6,172/wafer for 8-inch were both below unit cost — the price war pushing right-end players below cash cost is the industry mechanism behind Tianyue's share leap.
LTAs and utilization: Substrates are an order-driven business where utilization determines unit depreciation dilution. The current divergence of "industry utilization 48.8% vs leaders >90%" is typical of a shakeout period; Tianyue's RMB 4.0–4.5 billion of LTAs lock in 12–18 months of capacity, and at full production the gross margin sensitivity to ASP is amplified (a +10% price increase at full production yields ~+5–7pct gross margin elasticity, and vice versa — downside is equally severe). Capacity caliber warning: the company's IR caliber states existing design capacity of "over 700k wafers/year" (2025 production of 690k wafers, sales of 630k), Soochow cites Lingang's planned 960k by end-2026 "without inch conversion," and Jingsheng's Yinchuan 600k is a filing-based caliber — nominal vs effective capacity differs greatly, so the 2027–2028 supply shock must be reassessed after discounting for yield ramp.
Overall rating: Neutral (confidence 0.60, 12-month horizon). Tianyue's investment story has switched from "AI narrative stock with overstretched valuation" (June, RMB 149) to "global leader with inflection verified but pricing stabilized" (RMB 70). Quality is indisputable — #1 share, left end of the cost curve, 8-inch generational lead, Q3 single-quarter adjusted net profit turning positive with clean quality; but the price offers no discount — it implies demanding 2030–31 net profit of RMB 0.9–1.2 billion, a 105.7% A/H premium pull, and 11.6% of financial shareholders' chips still to be digested. With symmetric odds, the expected value of active trading is low: existing holders should hold and observe; new capital should wait for one of two triggers — a value buffer below RMB 55 (lower bound of the base range, ~3.7x PB), or right-side confirmation from the January 2027 earnings pre-announcement plus quantified AI order disclosure.
Strategy implications: Above the upper band of RMB 70–72 (base fair value ceiling), the margin of safety is negative; a rebound into that zone should prompt evaluation of trimming rather than chasing; a break below RMB 55 requires first screening for fundamental deterioration (gross margin, ASP, impairments) before deciding on a contrarian move.
Risk and catalyst alerts (next 6–12 months):
Key counterevidence conditions: ① 2026Q4 single-quarter attributable net profit turning negative, or pre-announced attributable profit below RMB 50 million (recurrence of year-end concentrated impairment model) — falsifies C2; ② single-quarter gross margin falling below 20%, or 8-inch price index declining MoM for 3 consecutive months / breaking below RMB 3,500/wafer — price war recurrence, switch to bear case; ③ new sell-down pre-disclosures by SDIC Fund/Hubble/Liaoning Zhongde, or the controlling shareholder selling after the 2027-04-29 commitment expires — chip deterioration; ④ NVIDIA's 800VDC delayed in 2027 or no quantified AI revenue disclosure in the interim report — impairment of C3 option value. Upside catalysts: ① January 2027 pre-announced attributable profit ≥ RMB 110 million with Q4 gross margin ≥27%; ② first quantified disclosure of AI data center substrate orders/revenue; ③ Malaysia production launch in 2027Q1 with major overseas customer lock-in; ④ financial shareholders' sell-down period expiring with no new plans, controlling shareholder commitment extended; ⑤ TanKeBlue's IPO listing at a high valuation raising the sector's primary market anchor.
This report is based on public information as of 2026-10-31. Price anchor is the 2026-10-30 close of RMB 70.42 (CNY); inputs and limitations of all valuation calculations are noted in the text. Forward-looking judgments in this report involve uncertainty and do not constitute investment advice.