Rating: Neutral | Target Price Range: HK$8.8-10.5 (base-case fair value, midpoint 9.65) | Current Price: HK$9.425 (close as of 2026-10-30) | Time Horizon: 12 months | 2026-10-31
| Key Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Market cap (5.574 billion shares outstanding) | Approx. HK$52.54 billion (approx. RMB45.81 billion) |
| PE (TTM) / Dividend yield | Approx. 11.3x / 7.7%-8.0% |
| Margin of safety (base-case fair value floor 8.8 vs current 9.425) | -7% (no margin of safety) |
| Probability-weighted expected value | HK$9.80 (+4.0% vs current price) |
| 52-week range / distance from high | HK$9.075-17.68 / -46.7% |
At the current price of HK$9.425 (close as of 2026-10-30), Haidilao is being priced by the market under a bond-like logic of "zero growth + ~8% dividend": PE (TTM) of approx. 11.3x sits at roughly the 1-2% percentile since listing (sample of approx. 8 years, spanning the earnings structure break of 2021-2022; the percentile is for reference only). At the current price, the implied expectation under r=10% is a perpetual growth rate of approx. +2%, broadly consistent with the operating reality of "slightly negative same-store sales and flat earnings" — not significantly cheap, but not expensive either. On fundamentals, the core business shows signs of stabilization (2026H1 same-store sales decline narrowing from -6.7% to -1.3%, table turnover up 0.1 YoY to 3.9x/day), but the growth engine has shifted to margin-dilutive delivery and multi-brand businesses. On the balance sheet, the ~8% dividend yield and net cash provide a genuine buffer, but the ~100% interim payout ratio in 2026H1 was funded by drawing down time deposits and new borrowings, and its sustainability remains to be verified. The core variable suppressing valuation is governance: the family trust's HK$2.75 billion share disposal, the RMB100 million unsecured loan extended to Board Chairman Zhang Yong, and the cap for related-party renovation procurement surging to 17x the actual 2025 amount — three consecutive events combined with a trust-held float exposure of approx. 26.6% leave re-rating without a trigger. Base-case fair value is HK$8.8-10.5 (midpoint 9.65, +2.4% vs current price), probability-weighted expected value +4.0% — the odds are slightly positive but sensitive to scenario weights. We maintain a wait-and-see stance, choosing a direction only after two signals are confirmed: same-store sales turning positive and the completion of the trust's share disposal.
The key changes over the next 6-12 months center on three lines: first, the validation window for the operating inflection point — from December 2026 to February 2027, the Chinese New Year peak season, if same-store sales turn YoY positive for the first time (2026H1 was -1.3%, one step away from turning positive), it would be the first confirmation of an operating inflection for the main brand since 2024; second, a cluster of governance events reaching maturity — Zhang Yong's RMB100 million loan is due around mid-November 2026, the circular on Shuyun Dongfang's connected transactions must be published and put to an independent shareholder vote no later than 2026-11-27, and whether the controlling shareholder group will launch another share sale — three observation points that will be answered within the coming quarter; third, the FY2026 annual report due 2027-03 will simultaneously test three milestones: full-year payout ratio, delivery revenue share breaking above 10%, and the scale-up of the "Pomegranate" brands.
The primary share price driver is main-brand per-store efficiency (same-store sales × table turnover): at the current price, approx. 79% of value is supported by zero-growth earnings value, and same-store sales turning positive is the only variable that would switch valuation from a bond-like framework back to a growth framework. The core expectation gap lies not in earnings forecasts — named sell-side estimates for 2026E net profit attributable to shareholders of RMB3.85-4.17 billion essentially overlap with this report's normalized figures — but in the governance/disposal discount: sell-side target prices (Morgan Stanley 10.5, Citi 15.5, post-interim range of 14.3-17.5) imply a dividend yield of only approx. 4.7%, whereas the market's current price implies a perpetual g of approx. +2%, one full notch more pessimistic than the sell side. If same-store sales turn positive and the trust's disposal is completed, there is a path for valuation to repair toward HK$12.5-14.5; conversely, if the payout or the core business is disproven, the floor is at HK$7.8-8.5 (depending on the treatment of lease liabilities). The opportunity grade and odds are computed in real time by the system across three scenarios; this report's evidence grade is B (all core financial figures are anchored to verified announcements, but monthly operating data relies on second-hand broker channel data).
Key Evidence
The evidence chain for stabilization is real: same-store sales decline narrowed from -6.7% to -1.3%, table turnover stopped falling and edged up, and core operating profit returned to positive growth. But the flip side must be given equal weight: main-brand Haidilao restaurant revenue fell 4.0% YoY in 2026H1, and overall revenue growth was entirely driven by delivery (+121.2%) and multi-brand (+113.1%) — precisely the low-margin businesses. The company itself attributed the rise in raw material cost ratio to 41.6% to "the higher revenue contribution of lower-gross-margin businesses"; delivery platform fees drove other operating expenses up 38.9%, the core operating profit margin fell from 11.63% to 11.25%, and the net margin fell from 8.47% to 7.90%. In other words, the +4.4% core operating profit growth was built on +7.9% revenue growth — positive growth under passive dilution, not efficiency improvement. Monthly high-frequency data (broker channel basis, unconfirmed by the company) were also not uniformly positive: after the high of approx. 5.2x/day in July, August was down low single digits YoY for the full month (diverging from management's post-interim statement that "the first three weeks of August were up low single digits YoY"), September was flat YoY, and the National Day Golden Week saw a slight increase. Final confirmation of the trend awaits the 2026Q4-2027Q1 peak season window and the annual report's same-store sales table. This thesis would be disproven if same-store average daily sales fall below RMB75,000 (2026H1: RMB77,800) or table turnover drops below 3.6x/day.
Key Evidence
At the frozen anchor of HK$9.425, the dividend yield is 7.66% on FY2025 figures and 8.00% annualized on 2026H1 — at a two-year high and the first pillar of current valuation. The balance sheet (as of 2026-06-30) provides a second layer of buffer: cash-like assets of approx. RMB7.83 billion (cash and equivalents RMB4.944 billion + time deposits over three months RMB0.985 billion + wealth-management and financial assets RMB1.905 billion); interest-bearing liabilities of RMB5.91 billion (including lease liabilities of RMB3.35 billion); net cash excluding leases of approx. RMB5.27 billion (approx. HK$1.08/share), while net cash including leases is only approx. RMB1.925 billion (approx. HK$0.40/share) — the two definitions correspond to "EPV + net cash" floors of approx. HK$8.5 and HK$7.8 respectively. The weakness is equally clear: the cash flow funding of the 2026H1 dividend of HK$2.042 billion (approx. 100% of attributable net profit) relied on drawing down time deposits (balance falling from RMB2.65 billion to RMB0.985 billion) and RMB2.16 billion of new bank borrowings (comparable in size to the January redemption of US$285 million senior notes; interest-bearing debt excluding leases in fact rose only approx. RMB130 million net). Operating cash flow has declined for three consecutive years (FY2023: 9.00 → FY2024: 7.63 → FY2025: 5.66 billion, 2026H1: RMB2.281 billion, -13.1% YoY), with OCF/attributable net profit falling from 2.0 to 1.29. The dividend is drawing on existing reserves — the direction is clear. If the FY2026 annual report payout ratio falls below 70% (scenario modeling implies a dividend yield of approx. 5%-6% and share price elasticity of approx. -13% to -29%), the buffer logic of this thesis fails.
Key Evidence
Three consecutive events within two months form a clear sequence of governance pressure: the stock fell 9.14% the day after the disposal (a roughly four-and-a-half-year low); on the trading day after the loan announcement, the shares fell as much as 7% intraday — Morgan Stanley explicitly noted in its 14 October comment that "the loan to the Chairman may further dampen investor sentiment." The shareholding structure amplifies this pressure: Zhang Yong's Apple Trust holds 37.35% untouched, but Shu Ping's SP NP holds a remaining 7.92%, and Shi Yonghong/Li Haiyan's SYH NP and LHY NP together hold 18.69% — the three trusts, all structured identically and held in trust via UBS, control approx. 26.6% of the float with an established pattern of disposals (a joint placement in May 2020). One clarification on definitions is needed: the "17x" for Shuyun Dongfang is the 2029 cap relative to actual 2025 amounts; actual amounts declined from 2024 to 2025, a cap does not equal value transfer, and agreements above the 5% threshold require independent shareholder approval (circular to be published no later than 2026-11-27) — this is a market-based test point for observing the boundary of governance. Zhang Yong's on-market share purchase commitment made in April 2026 — no less than HK$100 million within 12 months — has been approx. 77% completed at HK$152 million, directionally hedging against disposals. The opposite scenario must also be presented side by side: if there are no new disposals disclosed in the coming two quarters, the loan is repaid on schedule, and independent shareholders approve the connected transactions by a large majority, there are conditions for the governance discount to converge.
Key Evidence
The skeleton of the valuation conclusion is the coexistence of two points: "extremely low percentile + matching implied expectations." PE (TTM) of approx. 11.3x sits at roughly the 1-2% percentile since listing, and the dividend yield of approx. 8% is at a two-year high — but this percentile must be heavily discounted: the company listed in September 2018 with only an approx. 8-year sample, spanning both the 2021 PE of 60-90x and the 2022 loss-making earnings structure break; the low percentile simultaneously reflects FY2025 earnings of -14%, the governance discount, and weakening channel data — it is not simply "cheap." The more reliable anchor is implied expectations: at the current price, the shareholder cash flow yield is approx. 7.9%-8.0%; with a required return of 10%, the implied perpetual growth is approx. +2% — broadly matching the stabilizing reality of same-store sales at -1.3% and attributable profit at +0.5%; the market has neither made a mistake nor left a safety cushion. The three-scenario probability-weighted expected value is HK$9.80 (+4.0% vs current price); the base-case range of HK$8.8-10.5 corresponds to -6.6% to +11.4% versus the current price, with a margin of safety of -7% (the current price is above the base-case fair value floor) — the odds are slightly positive but sensitive to the subjective 25/50/25 weights and the floor definition (HK$7.8-8.5), and do not constitute evidence of "significant undervaluation."
Key Evidence
On this report's own calculation, the current price of HK$9.425 = zero-growth EPV of 7.40 (79%) + growth option of HK$2.02 (21.5%); of this, approx. HK$1.08 can be attributed to the net cash distribution option (the ~100% payout ratio in 2026H1 is being honored), leaving a pure growth premium of approx. HK$0.9 (approx. 10%) paid for 2027's "renewal of the existing base + incremental expansion." This premium is sensitive to inputs: whether maintenance capex is taken as normalized RMB2.2 billion or FY2025's actual RMB1.67 billion, and whether lease liabilities are included in the floor, swings the premium between 11% and 21%. The underlying assets of the growth option are clear — the street-stall hotpot and sushi formats entering scaled replication, an accelerating 2027 new-store pace, and delivery share climbing toward 12%+ — but as of the date of this report, all of these remain at the management guidance level; same-store sales in 2026H1 were still -1.3%, and the first validation window is the annual report in 2027-03. If other restaurant revenue growth falls below +50% or there are waves of store closures and single impairments exceeding RMB200 million, the option value must be re-assessed.
| Metric (RMB 100 million) | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | 2026H1 (latest period) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 414.53 | 427.55 | 432.25 | 223.37 (+7.9%) |
| Net profit attributable to shareholders | 44.99 | 47.08 | 40.50 | 17.67 (+0.5%) |
| Adjusted net profit (excluding one-offs) | — | 44.74 | 37.23 | 17.65 |
| Core operating profit (Non-IFRS) | — | 62.30 | 54.03 | 25.13 (+4.4%) |
| Gross margin (1 - raw material cost ratio) | 59.12% | 62.08% | 59.45% | 58.41% |
| Net margin | 10.85% | 11.01% | 9.37% | 7.91% |
| Operating cash flow | 90.00 | 76.34 | 56.64 | 22.81 (-13.1%) |
| Free cash flow (OCF - purchases of PPE) | 85.48 | 63.35 | 39.92 | 15.04 |
| Cash and cash-like assets | — | — | — | 78.34 (as of 2026-06-30) |
| Interest-bearing liabilities (incl. leases) | — | — | 59.35 | 60.07 (as of 2026-06-30) |
| Liabilities/assets ratio | — | 54.3% | 54.7% | 53.78% |
| DPS (HKD) | 0.824 (payout 90.3%) | 0.898 (94.7%) | 0.722 (86.0%) | Interim 0.377 (interim payout approx. 100%) |
Reasons for metric changes (items with YoY ≥ ±20%): ① FY2025 net profit attributable to shareholders -14.0% — the company attributed this to "the decline in profit being mainly affected by lower table turnover and adjustments to innovation in products, scenarios and other formats" (table turnover 4.1→3.9, same-store sales -6.7%, raw material cost ratio 37.9%→40.5%); ② Delivery revenue FY2025 +111.9%, 2026H1 +121.2% — the company attributed this to "a substantial YoY increase in sales of solo-dining products such as meal-accompanying dishes... continued advancement of the self-built delivery station model," with over 1,200 delivery outlets nationwide; ③ Other restaurant revenue FY2025 +214.6%, 2026H1 +113.1% — the company attributed this to the Pomegranate program's innovative brands and contributions from scenarios such as camping hotpot and corporate hotpot; ④ FY2025 operating cash flow -25.8% — lower profit before tax combined with income tax paid rising to RMB1.811 billion and a decline in contract liabilities; management did not separately explain the OCF decline; ⑤ 2026H1 bank borrowings +RMB2.16 billion to RMB2.562 billion — the company stated that "operations, expansion, capital expenditure and dividend distributions are funded primarily through cash generated from operations and bank borrowings"; the US$285 million senior notes had been fully redeemed in January of the same period; ⑥ Staff cost ratio 33.8%→31.8% — the company attributed this to "changes in revenue structure," with headcount down YoY again (cumulatively -26% versus end-2023). Note on adjusted figures: the excluded items are one-off gains from transferring restaurants to franchisees (FY2025: RMB347 million; 2026H1: RMB43 million), FVTPL fair-value changes, and foreign exchange gains/losses; no tax adjustments were made.
In 2026H1, revenue was RMB 22.337 billion (+7.9%), net profit attributable to shareholders RMB 1.767 billion (+0.5%), and core operating profit RMB 2.513 billion (+4.4%) — revenue accelerated while profit stayed flat, and the scissors gap comes from mix: all growth came from low-margin engines. Food delivery revenue was RMB 2.051 billion (+121.2%, share rising from 4.5% to 9.2%), driven by the "rice-pairing dishes" single-serve products and self-built delivery stations; other restaurants under the Pomegranate Plan generated revenue of RMB 1.271 billion (+113.1%, 5.7% share); meanwhile, revenue from Haidilao-branded restaurants fell -4.0%, with self-operated stores declining from 1,304 to 1,290 (24 opened, 32 closed, 6 converted to franchise). Operating quality metrics improved marginally: table turnover 3.9x/day (+0.1 YoY), same-store sales -1.3% (a sharp narrowing versus the prior-year base), same-store average daily sales RMB 77.8 thousand (-1.4%); average ticket RMB 97.0 (-RMB 0.9), with Tier-1 cities at RMB 104.2 and Tier-3 and below at RMB 90.9, and lower-tier markets' revenue share rising to 42.5%. On costs, raw materials ratio rose from 39.8% to 41.6% (higher share of low-margin business + consumer-subsidy promotions), other expenses +38.9% (delivery platform fees), staff costs ratio fell from 33.8% to 31.8% (revenue mix change + headcount optimization); other gains and losses swung from +RMB 235 million to -RMB 97 million (impairment on store closures up RMB 149 million, gains on franchise conversions down RMB 141 million). On the balance sheet, bank balances and cash were RMB 5.93 billion (down from RMB 6.60 billion at the start of the year), time deposits fell from RMB 2.65 billion to RMB 985 million, bank borrowings rose to RMB 2.562 billion; an interim dividend of HKD 0.377/share was declared (HKD 2.042 billion, ~100% of attributable net profit for the period, the highest interim payout intensity since listing). Against management's narrative: the interim report outlook maintains "2027 as a new phase combining renewal of the existing base and expansion," while taking "a more prudent approach to franchising." On market pricing, after the interim results sell-side analysts broadly cut earnings forecasts but mostly kept Buy ratings (Citi cut 2026-28E net profit by 9%/14%/15% in October yet still set a HKD 15.5 target; Morgan Stanley lowered to HKD 10.5 and downgraded to In-Line) — this report does not render an "above/below expectations" verdict for the market, and only notes: revenue beat the market's pessimistic beginning-of-year assumptions for the hotpot industry, while profit was in line with the "trade margin for volume" characterization.
Business model in brief: a primarily direct-operated, labor-heavy and asset-light chain hotpot restaurant business (1,290 self-operated + 99 franchised stores as of 2026-06-30). Revenue is predominantly one-off dine-in consumption, with no subscription/recurring income (franchise fees are only 1.1% of revenue); pricing power is weak — average ticket has fallen consecutively from 99.1 (2023) to RMB 97.0 (2026H1), and the company explicitly maintains traffic through "consumer-subsidy promotions," competing on scenario and product differentiation rather than price increases. Vertical integration is its structural differentiator vs. peers: upstream Yihai International (seasonings) and Shuhai (food supply chain) provide in-house supply, with stores retaining roughly 59% gross margin (1 minus raw materials ratio), giving controllable food safety and cost transparency — this is the precondition for the viability of the "strongly managed" franchise model.
Cash content of earnings: OCF/net profit attributable to shareholders was 2.0 → 1.62 → 1.4 → 1.29 for 2023-2026H1 — a four-period decline, but the absolute level remains above 1.2; the cash conversion of book profits is still healthy, and the downward direction is mainly attributable to flat profits, higher tax payments, and lower contract liabilities. FCF/net profit attributable went 1.9 → 1.35 → 0.99 → 0.85, falling below 1 from 2025: renovation (over 200 themed restaurants in 2025) and rising capex for new stores have consumed nearly half of operating cash flow. Recurring earnings test: FY2025 adjusted (ex-non-recurring) attributable net profit was RMB 3.723 billion, 8.1% below attributable net profit of RMB 4.050 billion (the gap mainly a one-off gain of RMB 347 million from franchise conversions); attributable profit was not obviously embellished by one-off items, but note that the pattern of "recognizing gains via franchise conversions amid store closures" will recur in contraction years. The company's self-reported "core operating profit" already excludes such items and is a relatively clean measure.
Return on capital: estimated ROIC ~32.6% (2025FY, core operating profit ×75% after tax / invested capital, excluding lease liabilities) — far above the restaurant industry's cost of capital, a true-moat-level return, but trending down in line with profit. ROE of ~39.6% (FY2025) is inflated by high dividends compressing net assets; the annualized ~16% in 2026H1 is closer to the true operating return.
Capex quality: CapEx/depreciation 0.15 → 0.51 → 0.77 → 0.86 — the underinvestment period after the Woodpecker Plan in 2023 is being repaired, not yet back in overinvestment territory. Maintenance vs. growth capex is not separately disclosed: of the RMB 1.67 billion spent in 2025, the amount covered 200+ store renovations plus new stores; normalized over a renovation cycle for 1,389 stores, maintenance spend is roughly RMB 2.0-2.4 billion/year (this report normalizes at RMB 2.2 billion); current disclosure is insufficient for precise decomposition.
Red flags: ① Same-store sales in the core business keep falling while growth relies on low-margin businesses (delivery/sub-brands), structurally diluting gross margin; ② a "borrowing to pay dividends" pattern — in 2026H1, RMB 1.67 billion of time deposits were drawn down plus new borrowings to fund the dividend and USD bond redemption; ③ expansion depends on related-party supply chains (related-party purchases from Yihai/Shuhai/Shuyun Dongfang of RMB 4.21 billion in 2025, 9.7% of revenue; 2027-2029 caps totaling RMB 7.38 billion, +75% versus actual). All three are directional warnings, not confirmed violations.
Consistency of words and deeds: pragmatic and contraction-leaning, with a generally good delivery record. ① Woodpecker Plan (committed 2021-11 to close ~300 weak stores) — in fact, since 2023 self-operated stores have stabilized at 1,290-1,374 and table turnover held at 3.8-4.1; the bleeding was stopped as promised; ② Pomegranate Plan (FY2024 annual report promised "incubating and developing more new restaurant brands") — expanded to 20 brands and 207 stores by end-2025 with other-restaurant revenue +214.6%, delivering the expansion, but contracted to 183 stores in 2026H1 and pivoted to "focused replication" — expansion was delivered, but the abrupt turn after the single-store model failed to validate raises questions about pacing discipline; ③ 2026 interim report commitment to "accelerate new store openings in 2027, scale street-vendor-style hotpot/sushi from 2026H2" — to be verified. The company gives no quantitative guidance and has no track record of high-profile misses.
Shareholder friendliness: high payouts are real, but sustainability is being tested. Payout ratio FY2023 90.3% → FY2024 94.7% → FY2025 86.0% → ~100% in 2026H1 (estimated); cumulative dividends since listing far exceed equity financing (IPO HKD 7.299 billion + 2021 placement HKD 2.337 billion, no further dilution since); a small buyback of 4.145 million shares (HKD 54.89 million) in September 2025. Dividend intent is not in question; the issue is that the funding source of dividends has shifted from "naturally covered by operating cash flow" to "existing cash plus borrowings."
Risk signals: ① Governance concentration — on 2026-01-13 Zhang Yong assumed the roles of both Chairman and CEO (Gou Yiqun resigned), a deviation from the Corporate Governance Code C.2.1 that the company itself acknowledged; ② the controlling shareholder's family trust reduced its stake by 4.65% in September 2026 (see C3), plus an unsecured RMB 100 million loan to Zhang Yong personally in October; ③ related-party transactions are large with caps surging (Shuyun Dongfang's 2029 cap is 17x actual). Overall judgment: management is trustworthy at the operating level; the controlling shareholders' behavior at the governance level is accumulating a discount.
| Segment (FY2025) | Revenue share | YoY | One-line business logic |
|---|---|---|---|
| Haidilao restaurant operations (self-operated dine-in) | 86.9% | -7.1% | Core base: table turnover 3.9x, ticket RMB 97.7, same-store -6.7% |
| Food delivery | 6.1% | +111.9% | "Rice-pairing" single-serve + self-built stations; already 9.2% of revenue in 2026H1 |
| Other restaurants (Pomegranate) | 3.5% | +214.6% | Incubation platform of 21 brands: BBQ / street-style hotpot / sushi, etc. |
| Condiments & ingredients sales | 2.7% | +100.8% | Retail extension, custom-supplied via Yihai |
| Franchise business | 0.6% | RMB 17 → 270 million | Tightly-managed franchising; expansion turning prudent from 2026 |
The profit engine remains self-operated dine-in (~87% of revenue, contributing the vast majority of core operating profit), but all the increment comes from the periphery: delivery + Pomegranate + condiments combined rose from ~6% in FY2024 to ~16.5% in 2026H1. Segment gross margins are not disclosed, but the structural implication is clear — raw materials and platform fee ratios for delivery and other restaurants are higher than for dine-in, dragging blended gross margin lower (-1.8pp). Haidilao is a single-core business plus an incubation platform structure: the main brand provides cash flow and a valuation floor, while Pomegranate and delivery provide options; the investment risk of this structure is the gap window where "the core business decelerates faster than the second curve scales" — the 2026H1 combination of main brand -4.0% and second curve +113% sits squarely in that window.
Accounting red flags (all with textual evidence): ① one-off gains from converting stores to franchises booked in other income (FY2025 RMB 347 million, 8.6% of attributable profit; FY2024 RMB 99 million) — boosting attributable profit with disposal gains in contraction years, fortunately already excluded from the core operating profit measure (low severity); ② annual caps on related-party purchases far exceed historical actuals (Shuyun Dongfang 2029 cap RMB 3.58 billion vs. actual RMB 210 million in 2025; Yihai/Shuhai caps +40%~75%) — room for value transfer opened up in advance, requiring independent shareholder approval as a check (medium severity); ③ unsecured 30-day loan to the controlling shareholder (medium severity; small in amount but a significant precedent); ④ effective tax rate rising over three years from 22.9% → 29.0% → 30.5% — driven by withholding tax and non-deductible expenses, consistent with increased onshore dividends, eroding net margin but not a tax-avoidance signal (low severity).
Cross-period consistency: ① OCF/revenue 21.7% → 17.9% → 13.1% → 10.2%, declining for four consecutive periods, with absolute OCF falling from RMB 9.00 to 5.66 billion — unexplained by the company; the most important unexplained anomaly; ② same-store average daily sales 84.9 → 85.2 → 79.5 → 77.8 thousand, stepping down since 2025 — consistent with management's explanation (lower table turnover, adjustments to new formats, subsidy promotions); ③ headcount 153,747 → 113,325 (-26% in three and a half years) while store count was essentially flat — not separately explained, together with per-capita efficiency metrics (RMB 270 thousand → 394 thousand per person annualized) pointing to organizational efficiency gains; ④ related-party purchases RMB 4.266 → 4.208 billion with caps jumping +75% — the company attributes this to custom demand from Pomegranate and delivery growth; directionally consistent but the magnitude is questionable.
Current market data and multiple percentiles (frozen anchor: HKD 9.425, 2026-10-30 close): market cap ~HKD 52.54 billion (5.574 billion shares, including ~159 million trust-award shares not entitled to dividends; EPS basis is weighted 5.415 billion shares). PE(TTM) 11.29x (TTM attributable profit RMB 4.058 billion), PE(static FY2025) 11.31x, 2026E PE ~11.0-11.4x, PB 4.69x (distorted by high dividends compressing net assets), EV/EBITDA(2026E) ~6.8x. Percentiles: PE at roughly the 1-2% percentile since listing (1-yr 8% / 3-yr 3% / 5-yr 2%) — the sample is only ~8 years and spans the 2021-2022 earnings structure break; percentiles are for reference only, not a headline cheapness/expensiveness signal. Earnings representativeness: 2025 was a softer-than-cycle year, not a trough (2026H1 has already stabilized at +0.5%); the low percentile genuinely reflects a "zero-growth repricing." Dividend yield 7.66% (FY2025 DPS 0.722) / 8.00% (2026H1 annualized 0.754).
Peer comparison:
| Company | PE(TTM) | PB | Revenue growth (latest period) | ROE | Key difference vs. Haidilao |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Haidilao | 11.3 | 4.7 | +7.9% (2026H1) | FY2025 39.6% (dividend-inflated) / H1 annualized ~16% | Absolute hotpot leader, full supply-chain integration |
| Jiumaojiu (9922.HK) | 14.2 | 0.34 | -13.2% (2026H1) | FY2025 1.8% | Song hotpot closing stores to cut losses; big scale gap |
| Xiabuxiabu (0520.HK) | Loss-making | 0.43 | -23.1% (2026H1) | Loss-making for five consecutive years | Control group of failed value strategy |
| Super Hi International (9658.HK) | 64.1 (abnormal profit year) / static 18.2 | 1.66 | +12.1% (2026H1) | FY2025 9.7% | Haidilao's overseas spin-off, independent pricing system |
| Domino's Pizza China (1405.HK) | 22.5 | 1.4 | +20.8% (2026H1) | FY2025 6.1% | Countercyclical pizza delivery growth stock |
| Yum China (9987.HK) | 16.1 | 2.93 | +11.1% (2026H1) | FY2025 16.7% | Pricing benchmark for mature steady-growth restaurants |
Market-implied expectations: at the current price, shareholder cash flow yield is 7.9%-8.0% (normalized FCFE RMB 3.6-3.9 billion / market cap RMB 45.8 billion; cross-validated with DPS annualized HKD 0.754). At a 10% cost of equity, implied perpetual dividend/FCF growth is +2.0%~+2.3%; if g=0, the implied required return is only 7.7%-8.0%. Equivalent formulation: current price ≈ adjusted annualized earnings (~RMB 3.8 billion) × 10x + net cash, plus an ~6% option premium for 2027 growth. Against the sell-side target price median of ~HKD 15.9: implied dividend yield only 4.7%, and at a required r=10% a perpetual g≈+5.3% — the market is a full notch more pessimistic than sell-side. This implied expectation broadly matches the reality of "same-store -1.3%, attributable profit +0.5%": the current price effectively prices Haidilao as a quasi-bond; if table turnover stabilization continues, g=+2% is achievable — no demanding requirement, but no safety margin either.
Three-layer value (EPV) (this report's estimates): zero-growth EPV HKD 7.40/share (normalized FCFE HKD 0.74/share ÷ r=10%; range 7.05-7.80 for r=10.5%~9.5%); book asset value HKD 2.01/share (net assets attributable of RMB 9.765 billion, 2026-06-30 — high dividends keep compressing net assets, so PB of 4.7x is distorted and the true floor is not book value); growth option is 21.5% of the current price (this report's calculation), of which ~HKD 1.08 is the net-cash distribution option (ex-lease basis; only HKD 0.40 including leases) and the pure growth premium is ~HKD 0.9 (~10%). Normalized FCFE bridge: normalized attributable profit RMB 3.85 billion (FY2025 adjusted RMB 3.723 billion, cross-validated with 2026H1 adjusted annualized RMB 3.81 billion) + D&A (excluding right-of-use assets) RMB 2.05 billion − maintenance CapEx RMB 2.2 billion (normalized basis) − working capital RMB 0.1 billion ≈ RMB 3.6 billion. Discount rate 10% = HKD risk-free ~3.8% + risk premium ~6% (including a governance discount of 0.5-1pp). The growth option at 21.5% is not in the low band of "the market pays only for zero growth" — the market has already paid a moderate but non-trivial price for the 2027 recovery.
Three scenarios and odds (figures consistent with the thesis's structured scenarios):
| Scenario | Probability | Fair range | vs. current price | Swing factors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 25% | HKD 5.8-7.0 | -38.5%~-25.7% | Table turnover falls below 3.6 to 3.5, ticket drops to RMB 90 (same-store elasticity ~-17%), FY2027E attributable profit RMB 2.9-3.2 billion; payout cut to ≤70%; further trust selling/loan rollover, required return rises to 11%; RMB 3.05 billion × 8.5x + net cash ≈ HKD 5.7-6.0 |
| Base | 50% | HKD 8.8-10.5 | -6.6%~+11.4% | Same-store decline holds within -1%, 2027 openings/renovations delivered, payout ≥90%; DDM (DPS 0.754-0.79, r 9.5-10%, g 0-1%) cross-checked with a discount to historical center (1-yr median PE 15.8x at a 25-30% discount → 11-12x × EPS HKD 0.79-0.85); peer anchor Yum China 16.1x discounted to 11-12x |
| Bull | 25% | HKD 12.5-14.5 | +32.6%~+53.8% | 2027 growth delivered: table turnover 4.0+, same-store turns positive, Pomegranate model validated (FY2027E attributable profit RMB 4.5-4.7 billion) + selling pressure cleared; EPS ~HKD 0.94 × 13-14x (still below its own median 15.8 and Yum's 16.1) → 12.8; DDM 12.6; upper bound 14.5 implies partial delivery of the bullish sell-side end |
External anchor comparison: the most bearish sell-side, Morgan Stanley at HKD 10.5 (2026-10-14, downgrade to In-Line), is above this report's bear case — this report's bear case adds, beyond its earnings cuts, assumptions of a payout cut and second-order governance deterioration, making the scenario more severe; the most bullish sell-side, Citi at HKD 15.5 (2026-10-13, Buy maintained), is above this report's bull upper bound — this report is more conservative in discounting 2027 delivery. Probability-weighted expectation HKD 9.80 (+4.0%), margin of safety -7% (base-case fair floor 8.8 below current price).
Own earnings forecasts (results-reconciliation anchor):
| Period | Revenue (RMB bn) | Attributable net profit (RMB bn) | Key assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY2026E | 45.2-46.2 (+4.6%~+6.9%) | 3.85-4.15 | Table turnover 3.9±0.1, same-store -1%~0%, ticket RMB 96-97, delivery ~11% of revenue, gross margin 58.0-58.5%, payout 90-100% |
| FY2027E | 47.5-49.5 (+5%~+8%) | 4.2-4.5 | 2027 store openings accelerate + street-style hotpot/sushi scale up (other restaurants climbing toward RMB 3.5 billion) + delivery share 12%+ |
This forecast is below Huatai/Huachuang's 2026E of RMB 4.17 billion, incorporating Citi's and Morgan Stanley's October cuts for Q4 macro and deepening consumer subsidies; directionally consistent with management's strategic narrative (no quantitative guidance).
Conclusion: reasonably cheap; grade quality and price separately. Quality (brand + supply chain depth + 30%+-level ROIC + dividend track record) is strong, less a governance deduction; price sits at a historically extreme low percentile with an 8% dividend yield providing real cushion, but the base-case fair-value midpoint is only +2.4% above the current price with a negative margin of safety — not a buy-grade undervaluation, nor a short-grade overvaluation, but a wait-and-verify zone.
Market size: China's catering market generated RMB 5,798.2 billion in revenue in 2025 (+3.2%, 11.6% of total retail sales of consumer goods, National Bureau of Statistics), of which above-quota enterprises accounted for RMB 1,633.7 billion (+2.0%). The hot pot sub-segment reached approximately RMB 639.0 billion in 2025 (+3.5%, Hongcan Industry Research Institute; Frost & Sullivan's estimate is approximately RMB 660 billion, projected to exceed RMB 1 trillion by 2030; Caitong Securities, citing Frost & Sullivan, projects RMB 849.8 billion by 2029). Growth has stepped down year by year: hot pot +19.9% in 2023 → +5.6% in 2024 → +3.5% in 2025; catering overall +20.4% → +5.3% → +3.2% over the same period. Measured from RMB 555.4 billion in 2019 to a projected ~RMB 670 billion in 2026, the seven-year CAGR is approximately 2.7%—hot pot is already a low-single-digit growth stock market; the total-volume story is over, and the remaining dividend is rising chain penetration: national catering chain penetration rose from 15% in 2020 → 23% in 2024 → ~25% in 2025 (Meituan/Hongcan); hot pot chain penetration exceeds 25%, and share shift from single-store operators to chains is the industry's most certain structural increment.
Value chain and value distribution: Upstream comprises condiments (Yihai International, 1579.HK, 2025 revenue RMB 6.613 billion, of which related-party revenue RMB 1.831 billion, 27.7%) and ingredient supply chains (Shuhai, central kitchen + cold chain across the full pipeline, also serving third-party restaurant clients)—Haidilao, as the largest related-party customer, has de facto pricing dominance over Yihai (Yihai's 2025 related-party revenue fell 7.2%, mainly due to product pricing adjustments on the Haidilao side). Cost structure at the midstream restaurant level (Haidilao 2025): raw materials 40.5%, staff 32.6%, rent and D&A 6.0% (asset-light leasing model), core operating margin 12.5%—by comparison, Jiu Mao Jiu's raw material ratio is 34.5% (2026H1) and Banu's 32.1% (2024); Haidilao's higher food cost ratio stems from high-ticket freshly-cut offerings and in-house supply chain investment; staff cost ratio also exceeds the China Cuisine Association industry average of 28.6%. Downstream are highly price-sensitive mass consumers (384 million visits in 2025) and delivery platforms (delivery share rising to 9.2%). Haidilao is the only player in the industry that has integrated the full vertical chain from "condiments → supply chain → restaurants → home delivery": restaurants retain a gross margin of ~59.5%, while supply chain profits accrue to Yihai (net margin 12.9%) and Shuhai; vertical integration delivers controllable food safety, rapid new-product rollout, and the feasibility of strongly managed franchising—a systemic barrier difficult for competitors relying on third-party supply chains (Banu built 5 in-house central kitchens; Xiabuxi built its own ranch) to replicate. Strong bargaining power over upstream suppliers but weak bargaining power over downstream consumers—same-store price increases are constrained by both public sentiment and rational consumption (the 2020 price hike withdrawn after public backlash set the precedent), so profit improvement can only come from table turnover and cost control.
Supply-demand and competitive landscape: On the demand side, retail catering sales grew +0.9% in September 2026 and +2.1% in October (weak recovery); per-capita spend at hot pot restaurants fell from over RMB 80 in 2023 to over RMB 70 by end-2024 (Hongcan), with restaurants under RMB 70 rising to 65.7% of the total; structural increments lie in lower-tier markets (tier-3-and-below stores account for 52.3% of hot pot outlets) and single-diner delivery scenarios. Supply is severely oversupplied and undergoing consolidation: in 2025, 165,000 hot pot restaurants opened and 192,000 closed—a net decrease of 27,100 to approximately 448,000 stores; from July 2025 to July 2026, a further net reduction of ~15,000 stores; the national restaurant closure rate is roughly 40% (projected to approach 50% in 2025). Leading players are diverging: Haidilao shifted from net closures of self-operated stores to franchising; Xiabu closed 173 stores in 2026H1 alone (revenue -23.1%, five consecutive years of losses, reduced to penny-stock status); Song Hot Pot closed a net 8 stores (same-store -26.1%, turnover 1.9); Banu is expanding against the trend (~200 direct-operated stores, third HKEX listing attempt); supermarket cross-over offerings (Hema's RMB 78-88 dine-in hot pot, Yonghui's RMB 9.9 single-serve broth, Pang Dong Lai's low-price hot pot) are siphoning traffic from the retail side. The market is highly fragmented: on 2025 revenue, the hot pot market CR5 is only ~7.9% (Frost & Sullivan, per Banu's prospectus); Haidilao ranks first with a 6.5% market share (6.9% in 2024), roughly 16 times second-place Banu (~0.4%)—"one dominant player, many small ones". The share dip from 2024→2025 mainly reflects contraction of self-operated stores; what was ceded was the portion closed by self-operation. Entry barriers: low at the single-store level (hot pot requires no chef dependency), high at the chain level (supply chain and food safety systems, brand-driven traffic mindshare, mentor-apprentice organizational replication, rising food safety compliance costs); substitution threats come from retail formats like Guoquan Shihui, self-heating mini hot pots, lighter formats such as malatang/chuan chuan, and supermarket dine-in hot pot.
Cycle and regulation: The industry is in the maturity stage of its lifecycle, with the sentiment cycle in a "post-downturn bottoming and stabilization" phase: 2023 post-pandemic revenge rebound (catering +20.4%) → 2024-2025 rational consumption/downgrading (+5.3%, +3.2%) → 2026 low-single-digit weak growth. Leading indicators: ① monthly retail catering sales growth (September +0.9%, October +2.1%); ② above-quota catering persistently lagging the industry (2026H1 above-quota +1.8% vs industry +2.8%)—headwinds more pronounced for large players; ③ net hot pot store closures (pace of consolidation); ④ top-player table turnover and same-store sales (Haidilao's same-store decline narrowing from -6.7% to -1.3%, a signal that consolidation is nearing its end); ⑤ the China Cuisine Association's restaurant performance index was below the boom-bust line for 13 consecutive months. The regulatory direction is neutral-to-favorable for leaders: the March 2025 General Offices "Special Action Plan to Boost Consumption" and normalized local consumption vouchers (Yunnan's RMB 1 billion Caiyun consumption package in 2026, Jiangxi's RMB 80 million in catering voucher subsidies); from January 2026, special rectification of online food delivery and strengthened joint liability of chain headquarters—raising compliance costs for smaller players and benefiting leaders with in-house supply chains. The headwind is the May 2025 "strictest alcohol ban" spillover onto business banquets (expected to be absorbed within 6-12 months; the 2026H2 year-over-year base has already normalized).
Company positioning: The absolute leader of the hot pot track, with a triple moat—full value-chain vertical integration (unique in the industry), service-based brand mindshare and scale network effects from 384 million annual customer visits, and mentor-apprentice organizational replication capability (the only system that has scaled thousand-store direct operation in a fragmented industry). The weakness is single-store efficiency: table turnover of 3.9x/day still lags the 4.8x of 2019, with average ticket flat and traffic under pressure. Three growth avenues: lower-tier markets (tier-3-and-below store share 44.8% vs industry's 52.3%, leaving penetration headroom), asset-light franchising (99 stores, early model validation, company has turned cautious), and delivery/single-serve (9.2% of revenue, growing +121%), supplemented by the Red Pomegranate 21-brand portfolio and Super Hi International's overseas expansion (126 stores, separately listed and not consolidated) as external extensions.
For hot pot chains, the valuation battleground is the single-store model, not total store count—and Haidilao's disclosures happen to be sufficient for decomposition:
Single-store economics (2026H1): average same-store daily sales of RMB 77.8k per store (vs RMB 78.9k in 2025H1), of which tier-1 cities RMB 81.6k, tier-2 in the middle, tier-3-and-below RMB 75.3k, and HK/Macau/Taiwan RMB 176.8k—lower-tier market per-store output is ~92% of tier-1, while gaps in average ticket (RMB 90.9 vs 104.2) and table turnover (tier-3 at 3.9x, in line with overall) are small, explaining the economic rationale of the company's下沉 strategy; tier-3-and-below revenue share is 42.5% and rising yearly. On the cost side, a rough 2026H1-based monthly single-store model: daily sales RMB 77.8k × 30 days ≈ RMB 2.33 million/store/month; raw materials 41.6%, labor 31.8%, utilities/rent + D&A ~12.5%, other expenses (including delivery platform fees) ~6.8%—store-level operating margin of roughly 7%-8%, meaning the single-store model carries extremely high operating leverage to table turnover: a combination of turnover falling 3.9→3.5 and average ticket 97→90 RMB would imply same-store sales elasticity of ~-17%; with labor and rent rigid in the short run, store-level profit elasticity is amplified to -70%~-80% (this report's estimate)—this is the micro foundation of the bear-case range, and why "turnover of 3.6" was set as the falsification threshold.
Store-count ceiling and opening pace: 1,290 self-operated stores (1,267 in mainland China) + 99 franchised. In 2026H1: 24 new self-operated openings, 32 closures (aging, relocations, underperformance), 6 conversions to franchise—a net contraction of 14; FY2025 saw 79 openings and 85 closures/relocations. The company has explicitly signaled an accelerated opening pace in 2027, in both directions: "premium tier-1/2 shopping malls + mass lower-tier markets." Ceiling judgment: benchmarking against the industry's tier-3-and-below hot pot store share of 52.3%, Haidilao's lower-tier store share of 44.8% leaves 7-8pp of structural headroom; however, drawing on the lessons of the 2021 overexpansion (the Woodpecker Plan closed 300 stores) and the reality that same-store sales remain negative, faster openings presuppose same-store turning positive—first validate the single store, then expand total count; the pace judgment should be conditioned on 2026Q4-2027Q1 same-store data. Franchise model: 99 stores, revenue RMB 254 million (1.1% of total); under the "strongly managed" model, franchisees provide capital while the company operates—the P&L contribution is minimal while brand and regulatory joint-liability exposure is real (see risk chapter); the company explicitly turned cautious in 2026H1—franchising is not a near-term volume driver. Industry benchmark for table turnover: Haidilao 3.9x/day vs Song Hot Pot 1.9, CouCou 1.4, Xiabu main brand 2.8, Banu 3.6, Super Hi 3.9—Haidilao's turnover efficiency remains top-tier in the industry; the gap to its own 4.8 in 2019 represents recovery headroom, not a competitive disadvantage.
Overall rating: Neutral (confidence 0.58, 12 months). Haidilao is a great business (ROIC 30%+, vertical integration, the industry's only thousand-store direct-operation system) sitting in an uncomfortable price structure: the market has fully priced it like a quasi-bond (8% dividend yield, lowest percentile range since listing), but same-store turning positive is unconfirmed, dividend sustainability rests on balance-sheet reserves, and governance incidents within the controlling shareholder system have occurred three times in two months—upside requires two pieces of evidence (same-store turning positive + share overhang cleared), while downside requires only one (turnover decline or payout cut). Base-case fair value is HK$8.8-10.5; the current price of 9.425 sits slightly below the midpoint of the range, with a safety margin of -7% and probability-weighted expected return of +4.0%—stay on the sidelines; below HK$8.8 with fundamentals intact offers better odds; a rating upgrade is possible after dual confirmation of same-store turning positive and share overhang clearance.
Strategy implications: For existing holders, the 8% dividend yield provides a holding rationale, but "FY2026 full-year payout ratio ≥90% and OCF/net profit ≥1.0" should be set as the minimum holding condition; for those on the sidelines, there is no rush to enter before governance overhang clears. November 2026 (loan maturity, circular vote) and March 2027 (annual report triple verification: payout/same-store/Red Pomegranate) are two natural decision checkpoints.
Risk and catalyst calendar (written presentation; full condition list in the tracking file):
Key downside scenarios: turnover falling to 3.5 + average ticket RMB 90 (net profit -40%~-60%, implying HK$5-7); payout ratio cut to 70% (dividend yield 5.7%, implying ~HK$6.7-8.2); further trust stake sales at a discount (a single shock reference: September's -9.14%); a franchise food safety incident transmitting to the main brand (historical single-store incidents caused -4%~-9% shocks). Key upside scenarios: same-store turning positive in peak season + confirmed Red Pomegranate volume ramp (recovery toward HK$12.5-14.5); share overhang cleared + high-dividend capital inflows; sector re-rating driven by Banu's high IPO pricing.
This report is based on publicly available information as of 2026-10-31; the price anchor is the completed close of HK$9.425 on 2026-10-30, and all multiples, market caps, and odds calculations in this report are based on that anchor. RMB amounts are converted at the company-disclosed rate of HK$1 = RMB 0.872 (market spot is ~1.18; the ~2.9% discrepancy is noted in the calculations). Monthly turnover data is sourced from broker channels and has not been confirmed by the company.