Current price RMB 11.87 (as of close on 2026-10-28) | Total market cap RMB 54.943 billion | Total shares 4.6287 billion (4.5899 billion after cancellation of 38.86 million proposed shares) | Margin of safety +5.3% (base-case fair value floor RMB 12.5 vs. current price) | Probability-weighted expected price RMB 13.2 (+11.4% vs. current) | Time horizon 12 months | Confidence 0.60
Tianshan Aluminum is one of the most integrated players at the far-left end of China's electrolytic aluminum cost curve: self-owned power in Xinjiang plus self-sufficiency in alumina/anodes build a per-ton cost advantage, its 1.40 million tons of compliant capacity reached full production in July 2026, and net profit attributable to shareholders for the first three quarters of 2026 was RMB 6.423 billion (+92.3%), with operating cash flow of RMB 8.41 billion and free cash flow of RMB 7.46 billion—profits are essentially fully converted into distributable cash. At the current price of RMB 11.87, the stock trades at 6.95x TTM P/E and a 7.09% TTM dividend yield; based on 2026 consensus earnings and a 50% payout commitment, the forward dividend yield is roughly 7.9%. The market is effectively pricing in "SHFE aluminum center falling back to 2025 levels (RMB 20,100–20,900/ton) + zero growth." This report's base case: the supply ceiling and low inventories support a modest upward shift in the aluminum price center, but mean reversion from the current RMB 23,400–23,700 high toward RMB 21,500–22,500, corresponding to mid-cycle attributable net profit of roughly RMB 6.1 billion—implying the current price is modestly undervalued versus the base-case fair value, not deeply undervalued. The constraints are equally clear: normalization of the income tax rate from 15% to 25%, the controlling family's sell-downs at highs and system-wide share pledges, 1.40 million tons of output fully unhedged and fully exposed to aluminum prices, and supply-return pressure in 2027 from Middle East restarts plus new Indonesian capacity. Rating: cautiously positive—dividends and asset value (replacement NAV of roughly RMB 7.0/share) provide downside protection, while earnings delivery and expectation-gap closure provide upside elasticity; but the cyclical nature makes the odds roughly symmetric, making the stock suitable as an allocation position within a dividend-cyclical portfolio.
The most important changes over the next 6–12 months: ① The 1.40 million tons of electrolytic aluminum enters full-production full-quarter contribution starting 2026Q4, with 2027 as the first full year at full capacity (output rising from 1.1858 million tons in 2025 to 1.40 million tons, +18%); ② the company transitions from peak capex into harvest phase—interest-bearing debt has fallen from RMB 21.527 billion at end-2023 to RMB 9.271 billion at end-2026Q3, the debt-to-asset ratio is down to 38.17%, and 2026Q1–Q3 free cash flow of RMB 7.46 billion is roughly 1.16x attributable net profit—a "deleveraging + dividends + buyback-and-cancellation" shareholder-return loop is taking shape; ③ the key demand-side variables will be determined by the pace of Middle East restarts of roughly 3 million tons of impaired capacity in 2027 and the ramp schedule of Indonesia's 2.125 million tons of new capacity; sell-side balance sheets already reflect expectations of a shift from "shortage in 2026 → surplus in 2027."
Primary share price driver: the SHFE aluminum price center. The 1.40 million tons of output carries no commodity hedging (all periodic reports disclose no derivative investments); each RMB 1,000/ton move in SHFE aluminum swings annual attributable net profit by roughly ±RMB 1.05 billion, or ±17% of the mid-cycle earnings anchor (RMB 6.1 billion)—the aluminum price is both the source of elasticity and the risk itself. Secondary drivers: dividend delivery (forward yield of roughly 7.9%) and tax-rate reclassification (if Tianshan Aluminum Co. regains the 15% preferential rate, annualized accretion of roughly RMB 0.8–1.15 billion, but the 2026 recognition list has not been published and should not be included in the base case).
Verifiable expectation gap: back-solving from the current price implies mid-cycle attributable net profit of only RMB 4.4–5.2 billion, an implied SHFE aluminum center of RMB 20,100–20,900/ton (i.e., the 2025 self-produced average price level), and a DDM-implied perpetual growth rate of roughly 1.8%—the market is pricing "full mean reversion + zero growth" while paying nothing for the Indonesian alumina option, rising mining self-sufficiency, or the aluminum foil second growth curve. Reality: domestic operating capacity utilization is 99.5%, the 2026 global deficit is roughly 1.07 million tons (per Anliang Futures), and social inventories of 623,000 tons are at low levels and trending down. The validation path for expectation-gap closure is clear: SHFE aluminum holding above RMB 22,000, the 2026 annual dividend payout ratio of ≥50% being delivered, and Q4 full-production quarterly earnings being confirmed. The falsification path is equally clear: SHFE aluminum breaking below RMB 22,000 with social inventories turning to accumulation, and 2027 supply-demand clearly flipping to surplus.
Evidence base and limitations: Q3 results, investor relations minutes (2026-10-28, the day after the Q3 report), and industry inventory/price data were all first-hand verified; the cost-curve percentile (broker estimate, no third-party cost-curve verification) and the 2027 supply-demand balance are this report's own deductions—evidence grade is moderately high.
Two boundaries that must be presented objectively: first, the "far-left end" percentile is a broker calculation, not a third-party-verified measure; second, integration has not eliminated cyclical exposure, only moved it between segments—the alumina segment's 2026H1 gross margin fell to -5.91% (revenue RMB 2.963 billion / cost RMB 3.138 billion), Jingxi Tiangui posted a net loss of RMB 52.8473 million in H1, and the profit engine of 2024 became a loss-making segment in 2026. Moreover, the self-owned power coverage ratio has been passively diluted as the 1.40 million tons reached full production: the 2025 annual report stated 85–90% of power demand, while the 2026 semi-annual report adjusted it to 70–80% (roughly 7.2 billion kWh generated in H1); management flagged on the Q3 earnings call higher purchased power in Q4, modestly rising coal prices, and a slight sequential increase in costs—the marginal direction of the cost advantage warrants monitoring, though it remains among the cheapest power structures nationally. There is also a hard constraint on cash conversion: cash and cash equivalents at period-end were only RMB 2.250 billion (of the RMB 5.703 billion in monetary funds, roughly RMB 3.45 billion is restricted as bill/borrowing margins), plus RMB 2.602 billion in taxes payable due in Q4—freely available cash is clearly smaller than book profit, and annual dividends at the RMB 4 billion level depend on sustained operating cash inflows rather than cash on hand.
This report's base case explicitly reconciles these two narratives: the supply ceiling and low inventories lift the aluminum price center moderately above 2025 levels (self-produced average RMB 20,600/ton), making a collapse back to the old RMB 19,000–20,000 center unlikely; but the current SHFE price of RMB 23,400–23,700 and industry per-ton profit of roughly RMB 7,000/ton sit in the high range since 2017, and 2027 Middle East restarts plus Indonesia's 2.125 million tons of additions will push prices back toward the mid-cycle level of RMB 21,500–22,500. Accordingly, this report's 2027 base-case attributable net profit is roughly RMB 6.1 billion (1.40 million tons × pre-tax per-ton profit of roughly RMB 5,800 × 75%), about 29% below the 2026 consensus of RMB 8.63 billion and roughly 33% below the sell-side 2027 consensus of RMB 9.16 billion—the essence of the disagreement is that sell-side estimates implicitly assume no fall from high aluminum prices, whereas this report holds that mean reversion is the discipline of cyclical-stock valuation. If SHFE main-contract closes break below RMB 22,000 and social inventories shift from destocking to accumulation (exceeding 750,000 tons), the mid-cycle earnings anchor of RMB 6.1 billion fails and this thesis is falsified.
A two-sided framing of the volume growth story: the 1.40-million-ton full production is a delivered hard fact (construction in progress down -50.5% from the start of the year to RMB 929 million at end-2026Q3, with transfer to fixed assets complete); the aluminum foil's high growth partly stems from the low 2024 base of 46,100 tons, and at current industry processing fees (battery aluminum foil roughly RMB 11,000–15,000/ton), 250,000 tons of output implies profit elasticity of roughly RMB 250–500 million, only 3%–6% of 2026E attributable profit—near term it is a narrative rather than a profit driver, and the 2027 annual report "narrowing losses to breakeven" is the real validation point; battery aluminum foil processing fees are in a downtrend (the broad declines of 2025 pushed peers into losses), so the second curve has not escaped dual exposure to aluminum prices and processing fees.
Based on 2026E consensus earnings of RMB 8.63 billion and a 50% payout ratio, the forward dividend yield at the current price is roughly 7.9%; but the floor must be understood as floating: if earnings revert to this report's mid-cycle RMB 6.1 billion, the yield on the same basis falls to roughly 5.6%, and a further RMB 1,000 drop in aluminum prices brings it to roughly 4.6%—the "high" in high dividends depends on earnings holding. EPS accretion from buyback cancellations totals under 1.4% over two years—more signaling than substance. There is an inherent tension in capital allocation: Indonesian alumina phase-one (1 million tons) capex is budgeted at USD 0.9–1.0 billion (total plan USD 1.556 billion); if construction substantively begins in 2027, "≥50% payout + deleveraging + Indonesian construction" cannot all three coexist—the company has also explicitly stated in IR that the payout ratio "will be judged holistically based on capex, project construction progress, and the pace of deleveraging," reserving room for adjustment. A 2026 dividend below 50%, or Indonesian spending materially crowding out dividends, would constitute a failure condition for this thesis.
The governance narrative requires juxtaposing signals in both directions: the negative—the family cashed out at highs during a record-profit period, and system pledges triggered supplementary pledges in the RMB 10–11 range (Jinlong Energy pledged an additional 16.5 million shares to CITIC Securities on 2026-06-26); the positive—the family announced a further combined 1% sell-down plan on 2026-02-25 but stated on 2026-06-17 that not a single share had been sold and terminated it early—insiders abandoned the sell-down at around RMB 19, and only together with January's high-price cash-outs does this form the complete picture. Pledge pressure will resurface if the share price falls below the RMB 9.5–10 range.
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | 2026Q1–Q3 (latest period) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (RMB 100mn) | 289.75 | 280.89 | 295.02 | 274.21 (+22.85%) |
| Net profit attributable to shareholders (RMB 100mn) | 22.05 | 44.55 | 48.18 | 64.23 (+92.30%) |
| Attributable net profit excluding non-recurring items (RMB 100mn) | 18.83 | 43.09 | 46.60 | 63.06 (+97.07%) |
| Gross margin | 14.10% | 23.27% | Consolidated figure unavailable (electrolytic aluminum segment 30.46%, alumina segment 9.7%) | 37.52% (estimated) |
| Net margin | 7.61% | 15.86% | 16.33% | 23.42% |
| Operating cash flow (RMB 100mn) | 39.16 | 52.20 | 80.53 | 84.10 (+73.19%) |
| Free cash flow (RMB 100mn) | 1.78 | 31.00 | — (full-year CapEx unavailable) | 74.60 |
| Cash and equivalents (RMB 100mn, period-end) | 78.12 | 91.08 | 65.40 | 57.03 (2026-09-30, of which cash and equivalents only 22.50) |
| Interest-bearing debt (RMB 100mn, period-end) | 215.27 | 156.40 | 129.90 | 92.71 (2026-09-30) |
| Debt-to-asset ratio | 57.78% | 52.74% | 45.40% | 38.17% |
| Net debt/EBITDA | — | — | — | ~0.3x (2026 annualized estimate) |
Note: the gap between recurring and attributable profit was under 6% in every period (1.2% in 2026Q1–Q3), indicating limited impact from non-recurring items; the restricted share of monetary funds has long been elevated (84.5% at end-FY2024; roughly 60% at 2026-09-30 in bill and borrowing margins), so freely available cash is significantly below book value.
Reasons for metric changes (items with YoY ≥ ±20% excerpted, all with company explanations): ① 2026Q1–Q3 revenue +22.85% and attributable profit +92.30%—the company attributes this to "rising sales prices combined with falling costs, driving a sharp YoY improvement in electrolytic aluminum segment profitability" (self-produced aluminum average price +19%, electrolytic aluminum production cost -18%, 1.40-million-ton capacity ramped in July, aluminum foil volume surge); ② income tax expense +304%—"change in the income tax rate of subsidiary Tianshan Aluminum Co. in 2025 and 2026" (high-tech qualification expired, taxed at 25%); ③ asset impairment loss of -RMB 245 million (zero in the prior-year period)—"due to commodity raw material price fluctuations, fall-in-value provisions on certain inventories at period-end"; ④ long-term borrowings -29.07% and notes payable -33.23%—"continued reduction in interest-bearing debt scale and optimization of debt structure"; ⑤ construction in progress -50.53%—"transfer to fixed assets of the 1.40-million-ton electrolytic aluminum project"; ⑥ FY2024 attributable profit +102.03%—"electrolytic aluminum spot prices up roughly 7% YoY and alumina spot prices up roughly 40%, record-high operating results"; ⑦ FY2023 revenue -12.22%—deliberate contraction of low-margin aluminum ingot trading business.
2026Q3 standalone revenue was RMB 9.909 billion (+41.69%), attributable net profit RMB 2.246 billion (+78.79%), and recurring attributable profit RMB 2.239 billion (+80.78%)—single-quarter attributable profit is already close to full-year FY2023 levels, with gross margin (37.52% estimated for the first three quarters) and net margin (23.42%) both at post-listing bests. Volume-price decomposition: full production for the full quarter in Q3 (1.40-million-ton capacity ramped in July) plus SHFE aluminum still at elevated YoY levels meant the +19% YoY gain in self-produced aluminum prices ran through the first three quarters; on costs, per the company, electrolytic aluminum production costs rose sequentially in Q3 (higher purchased power) but integrated total costs were flat sequentially. Reconciliation with sell-side consensus: 2026E consensus attributable profit of roughly RMB 8.63 billion implies a Q4 standalone of roughly RMB 2.21 billion, broadly consistent with the Q3 run-rate of RMB 2.246 billion (modest Q4 cost increases and the 25% tax rate already fully reflected), making a full-year outcome in the RMB 8.3–8.9 billion range highly likely. Market reaction: the stock's response to the Q3 report (released 10-27) was muted; October's roughly -11% decline mainly reflects aluminum prices falling from the mid-September high of RMB 24,200 to RMB 23,470 and a broad sector pullback, with the results themselves not falsified—the combination of strong results and a weak share price is precisely the starting point of this report's expectation-gap analysis.
Business model snapshot: An asset-heavy, vertically integrated resource processing enterprise — Guangxi/Guinea/Indonesia bauxite (self-supply ramping up) → Jingxi, Guangxi 2.5 million tonnes alumina → Shihezi, Xinjiang 1.4 million tonnes electrolytic aluminum (2,100MW captive power plant covering 70-90% of electricity needs, 600,000 tonnes prebaked anodes fully self-consumed) → 60,000 tonnes high-purity aluminum + 180,000 tonnes aluminum foil feedstock / 160,000 tonnes deep processing. Over 90% of revenue comes from spot-price-linked aluminum ingot/alumina sales (aluminum ingots settled at average prices of Yangtze Nonferrous/Nanchong/futures), with no independent pricing power; profitability is essentially the scissors gap between "aluminum price and integrated cost." The cost-side moat (low-cost Xinjiang coal + captive power grid) determines its position in the industry-wide cost curve.
Cash conversion of earnings: OCF/net profit attributable to parent for FY2023-FY2025 and 2026Q1-Q3 were 1.78, 1.17, 1.67, and 1.31 respectively — consistently well above 1, mainly due to the payment-before-delivery settlement model and extremely light working capital occupation (accounts receivable of only RMB 486 million, 1.8% of first-three-quarters revenue), allowing book profits to convert into operating cash at high quality. FCF/net profit attributable to parent: 0.08 (2023, CapEx+Guinea acquisition peak) → 0.70 (2024) → 1.16 (2026Q1-Q3) — after capex contraction, nearly all profit converts to free cash flow. The only constraint to flag is "discretionary availability": restricted cash of approximately RMB 3.45 billion (deposit-type), taxes payable of RMB 2.602 billion due in Q4, leaving approximately RMB 2.25 billion of deployable cash; dividend capacity relies on ongoing cash flow rather than stockpiles.
Return on capital: Estimated ROIC for FY2025 approximately 11.3%, annualized 2026 approximately 20% (cycle peak); benchmarked against the industry weighted fully-costed average of RMB 16,434/tonne (2025, Mysteel), the company achieved a 30.46% gross margin in its electrolytic aluminum segment in a year when industry profit per tonne was RMB 4,285, implying an excess cost advantage of approximately RMB 2,500-3,000/tonne — ROIC can stay above 10% even in cycle-neutral years, meeting the "true moat" standard, though it still needs to be tested through a full downcycle.
Capex quality: Investment cash outflow RMB 3.738 billion (2023) → RMB 2.120 billion (2024) → RMB 950 million (2026 first three quarters); construction-in-progress fell from RMB 4.34 billion to RMB 929 million, with the 1.4 million tonne technical upgrade already capitalized — maintenance capex annualized at approximately RMB 1.0-1.3 billion, a normal maintenance intensity relative to the RMB 29.177 billion fixed asset base; the next growth investment is Indonesia Phase I at USD 900 million to 1 billion (not yet started). CapEx/depreciation has fallen from 4.39 to below 1, officially entering the harvest phase.
Red flags: ① Restricted proportion of cash has long been 75-85% (bill/loan deposits), weakening usability of book cash; ② Earnings are highly dependent on the aluminum price-alumina price scissors gap; the alumina segment's profitability swings sharply between +29.0% (2024) and -5.91% (2026H1); ③ High-purity aluminum output has declined for three consecutive years (42,800 → 28,100 → 22,300 tonnes); ④ Overseas resource project execution is slow (bauxite 3 million tonne target missed for two consecutive years; Indonesia project not yet started as of 2026H1).
Consistency of words and deeds: operational targets are pragmatic, resource project targets tend to be exaggerated; overall "partially delivered". Production commitments have consistently been over-delivered: the 2025 plan called for 1.16 million tonnes primary aluminum / 13.0 billion kWh power generation / 2.4 million tonnes alumina / 150,000 tonnes aluminum foil; actual results were 1.1858 million tonnes / 13.9 billion kWh / 2.5154 million tonnes / 176,900 tonnes, all exceeded. However, resource targets have been missed repeatedly: of the 3 million tonne bauxite output target, only about one-third was achieved in both years (about 1 million tonnes in Guinea + partial output from Guangxi late in the year); the Guangxi mining license came about 1.5 years later than promised (obtained on 2025-04-07); Indonesia alumina "gradual commencement of construction" remains in preliminary preparation as of 2026H1. In investor Q&As, quantitative follow-ups on per-tonne aluminum costs and capacity utilization were mostly deflected with "please refer to periodic reports"; transparency is average.
Shareholder friendliness: friendly at the company level, minus points at the controlling shareholder level. Since listing, the company has paid dividends 11 times over 6 years, totaling approximately RMB 10.148 billion; FY2025 payout ratio 52.4%, commitment of no less than 50% for 2026, four rounds of buybacks exceeding RMB 750 million with cancellation and share reduction in two consecutive years; no dilutive financing such as additional issuance or rights offerings. Minus points at the controlling shareholder level: the family cashed out RMB 816 million via high-level share reductions in January 2026 (the 1% stake plan re-announced on 2026-02-25 was terminated on 6-17 without selling a single share); group pledges account for 10.42% of total share capital.
Risk signals: Total outstanding external guarantees of RMB 17.255 billion, accounting for 58.36% of the most recently audited net assets (announced 2026-10-23); all guaranteed parties are consolidated subsidiaries, but some entities have extremely high debt ratios (Shihezi Aluminum Foil 91.03%, Singapore Titan 98.64%, the latter with a net loss of RMB 124 million in 2026H1); related-party fund flows disclosed on schedule with no signs of misappropriation; no abnormal changes in key personnel.
| Segment | 2026H1 Revenue Share | Gross Margin (2026H1) | Gross Margin (FY2024) | Business Logic in One Sentence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Self-produced aluminum ingots (electrolytic aluminum) | 68.74% | 47.63% (+24.08pp) | 22.36% | Integrated Xinjiang power cost advantage + scarce capacity under supply ceiling |
| Alumina (Jingxi Tiangui 2.5 million tonnes) | 16.92% | -5.91% | 29.00% | Strong cyclical swings: 2024 windfall → loss in 2026H1, prices -28% |
| Aluminum foil and feedstock | 9.95% | Deep processing ramping (FY2024 was -2.00%) | -2.00% | Battery foil + food foil second growth curve; feedstock already profitable, deep processing losses narrowing |
| High-purity aluminum | 2.53% | — (FY2024 was 28.04%) | 28.04% | Segregation process; stable processing fee pricing but output declining continuously |
| Purchased aluminum ingot trading | 0% (exited) | — | -0.07% | Proactive exit from low-margin trading; revenue quality replacement |
Main profit driver: The self-produced aluminum ingot segment contributed the vast majority of 2026H1 gross profit (revenue share × gross margin ≈ 32.7 percentage points of gross profit contribution vs. -1.0 percentage point for the alumina segment); at the subsidiary level, TianAl Limited's first-half net profit of RMB 3.806 billion (including RMB 440 million in dividend income) > Tianrui Energy RMB 642 million > combined RMB 407 million for the two carbon companies, while Jingxi Tiangui was -RMB 53 million — nearly all profits come from the Xinjiang smelting-power-carbon integrated entities. The gross margin structure gap of 47.63% vs. -5.91% (a 53.5 percentage point difference) must be highlighted: within the same company, the gross margin spread between smelting and alumina exceeds 50 percentage points, rooted in the massive migration of industry-chain profits between segments during 2024-2026 — alumina overcapacity (global surplus of about 3.6 million tonnes, prices -54% from peak) pushed profits into the supply-locked electrolytic aluminum segment; Tianshan Aluminum's net alumina exposure is only about -200,000 tonnes/year (most of its 2.5 million tonnes self-produced alumina is sold externally, while most electrolytic aluminum ore is purchased externally), passing through this migration essentially neutrally — this is the source of its earnings statement stability relative to Chalco (which has high alumina self-sufficiency and posted -46.7% attributable profit in 2025Q4).
Accounting red flags: ① Massive gap between R&D investment and R&D expenses — FY2024 R&D investment of RMB 1.473 billion vs. income statement R&D expenses of RMB 217 million (6.8x); the difference (destination of materials/trial production costs) is not disclosed item by item; low severity but worth watching for capitalization tendencies; ② Inventory write-downs taken consecutively following the sharp alumina price drop — RMB 119 million in 2025, RMB 245 million in 2026Q1-Q3 (10.9% of Q3 attributable profit), reflecting exposure management of high-priced raw material inventory rather than profit-smoothing suspicion.
Cross-period consistency: ① The alumina segment's gross margin swings of 2.86%→29.00%→9.7%→-5.91% are consistent with management's explanations each period (prices +40%/prices -28%); ② The effective tax rate rose in steps from 15.02%→27.12%, consistent with the expiry of high-tech enterprise status; ③ Capex intensity declined monotonically from 3.738→2.120→950 million RMB, with construction-in-progress simultaneously capitalized — consistent treatment; ④ The exit trajectory of traded aluminum ingot revenue share of 19.24%→1.94%→0% is consistent with the "proactive contraction" explanation; ⑤ Restricted cash share has remained high long-term at 75.9%→84.5%→78.6%→about 60%, unexplained by the company — this is the only transparency shortcoming in disclosures.
Overall judgment: Based on the FY2023-FY2026Q3 reports sampled in this review, no obvious accounting tricks or cross-period anomalies were found; the difference between adjusted (non-GAAP) and attributable profit has long been below 6% — earnings quality is genuine.
Reserves and Production Table:
| Asset | Capacity | 2023/2024/2025 Output | 2026H1 Output (YoY) | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Electrolytic aluminum (Shihezi, Xinjiang) | 1.4 million tonnes | 1.1655/1.1759/1.1858 million tonnes | 660,500 tonnes (+12.8%) | Full capacity and full load since 2026-07 |
| Alumina (Jingxi, Guangxi) | 2.5 million tonnes | 2.1190/2.2789/2.5154 million tonnes | 1.2623 million tonnes (+5%) | Full capacity; segment loss-making |
| Prebaked anodes | 600,000 tonnes | 598,900/548,900/584,600 tonnes | 327,800 tonnes (+20%) | Fully self-consumed |
| High-purity aluminum | 60,000 tonnes | 42,800/28,100/22,300 tonnes | — | Utilization about 41% (estimated), declining continuously |
| Aluminum foil feedstock + deep processing | 180,000 + 160,000 tonnes | 1,000/46,100/176,900 tonnes | 118,100 tonnes (+61%) | 2026 target 250,000 tonnes |
| Captive power plant | 2,100MW (6×350MW) | 13.9 billion kWh generated (2025) | 7.2 billion kWh | Covers 70-80% of power needs |
| Bauxite | Guangxi 1 million tonnes/year mining license (2025-04-07); Guinea exclusive offtake (planned 5-6 million tonnes/year, actual about 1 million in 2025); Indonesia 3 mining rights (detailed exploration essentially complete) | — | — | Reserve figures not disclosed under JORC/domestic classification; reserve replacement rate cannot be listed |
Unit economics: Absolute fully-costed per-tonne aluminum cost is not disclosed; cost structure (FY2024): raw materials 70.08%/energy & power 17.50%/depreciation 4.05%/labor 1.53%/logistics 2.59%. On pricing, self-produced electrolytic aluminum average tax-inclusive price RMB 20,600/tonne (2025, +4%) → RMB 24,070/tonne (2026H1, +19%); estimated net profit per tonne (attributable/electrolytic aluminum output, including other segments' contribution): 1,892 → 3,789 → 4,063 → 6,325 RMB/tonne. Cost curve positioning lacks third-party verification; broker estimates place it at the leftmost ~10th percentile; industry benchmarks: 2025 industry weighted fully-costed average RMB 16,434/tonne (Mysteel), industry profit per tonne RMB 4,285 — the company's electrolytic aluminum segment 30.46% gross margin significantly outperforms the industry average.
Hedging and price sensitivity: All periodic reports disclose no derivative investments — aluminum price and FX exposures are fully unhedged. Sensitivity: SHFE aluminum ±10% (±RMB 2,355) → attributable profit ±RMB 2.35 billion (about ±38% of mid-cycle RMB 6.1 billion); alumina ±RMB 500/tonne has <RMB 100 million impact on consolidated profit (net exposure only -200,000 tonnes/year); tax rate 25%↔15% → ±RMB 800 million-1.15 billion.
Geopolitics and mining rights: Guinea — exclusive purchase rights + equity participation model (consolidated since 2023-12), 2026 shipments constrained by high ocean freight; Guinea's proposed bauxite export controls (market modeling of final quotas of 180-200 million tonnes vs. rumored 150 million tonnes) is the biggest policy variable; the country once revoked 51 mining licenses in one stroke in 2025-05. Indonesia — 3 mining rights closed (consolidated since 2024-11), the 2 million tonne alumina project listed on Indonesia's national strategic project list, environmental approval granted, enjoying income tax exemptions; ODI filing in progress, not yet started. Guangxi Jingxi — mining license in normal status, beneficiation plant and ore transport road under construction, partial output within the year.
NAV perspective: Replacement cost approach (electrolytic aluminum 1.4 million tonnes × ~RMB 9,000/tonne + alumina 2.5 million tonnes × ~RMB 2,000/tonne + captive power 2,100MW × ~RMB 4,000/kW + anodes/high-purity aluminum/foil + mining rights ~RMB 4 billion) totals enterprise value of approximately RMB 35.8 billion; after deducting net debt of RMB 3.57 billion, equity NAV is approximately RMB 32.26 billion = RMB 6.97/share, nearly identical to book net assets per share of RMB 7.06 — no book inflation; the asset floor is about RMB 7/share (59% of current price). The replacement premium of capacity quotas is not separately valued; actual scarcity value is higher than this figure.
Current market data and multiple percentiles (2026-10-28 close): Share price RMB 11.87, market cap RMB 54.943 billion; PE(TTM) 6.95x — the lowest value over the past 1/3/5 years, but TTM attributable profit of RMB 7.901 billion represents cycle-peak earnings; the low PE percentile is a mechanical result of top-of-cycle earnings for a cyclical stock, for reference only, not a basis for judging cheapness; PB 1.68x (3-year median 1.56, range 1.0-3.0, slightly above median) and TTM dividend yield 7.09% (first tier in the sector) are more reliable anchors. Peer comparison (2026-10-28 close, computed in this report): Shenhuo PE 7.24/PB 1.91, Yunnan Aluminum 8.19/2.35, Chalco 8.37/1.73, Hongqiao 6.17/1.28, Nanshan 11.25/0.98 — Tianshan's PE is about 15% below the A-share peer median, PB close to the median; on a horizontal basis of "equally high-profit years," it is not outlandish.
Market-implied expectations: Current price of RMB 54.943 billion market cap ÷ mid-cycle reasonable PE of 10.5-12.5x (anchors: the company's own 5-year static PE median of 12.15, and the steady-earnings Nanshan at TTM 11.25x — independent of the company's current price) → implied mid-cycle attributable profit of only RMB 4.4-5.2 billion → implied SHFE aluminum center of RMB 20,100-20,900/tonne (equal to 2025's self-produced average price level); DDM reverse-engineering (TTM dividends ~RMB 3.89 billion, cost of equity 9%, 50% payout ratio) implies a perpetual growth rate of only 1.8%. In one sentence: the current price requires aluminum prices to revert to the 2025 center and the company to grow at zero, while reality is SHFE aluminum at RMB 23,400-23,700, a global deficit of 1.07 million tonnes, and low social inventory destocking — but the reverse must also be acknowledged: current aluminum prices are at highs since 2017, and a reversion to RMB 21,500-22,500 is itself part of this report's base-case assumption; market pricing is conservative rather than absurd.
Three-tier value (EPV): Asset value approximately RMB 7.06/share (replacement NAV RMB 6.97, floor = 59% of current price); EPV zero-growth center RMB 13.6/share (normalized FCFE RMB 6.6 billion/year = RMB 1.426/share ÷ cost of equity 10.5%; range RMB 8.8-17.0 depending on earnings and discount rate assumptions); the current price represents a discount of about 14.4% to the EPV center — the market is not only not paying for growth, it is also discounting mid-cycle earnings themselves; the four growth options — Indonesia alumina, ore self-sufficiency, aluminum foil volume ramp, and tax status re-certification — are collectively priced at zero by the market. Normalized approach: dual anchors of FY2025 (attributable RMB 4.818 billion @ self-produced average price RMB 20,600) and 2026H1 (attributable RMB 4.177 billion @ RMB 24,070) back out a fully-costed RMB 15,728-16,095/tonne; mid-cycle assumptions of aluminum price RMB 21,750, tax rate 25%, output 1.4 million tonnes → attributable profit approximately RMB 6.1 billion; FCFE bridge = attributable RMB 6.1 billion + D&A RMB 1.5 billion - maintenance capex RMB 1.0 billion - working capital change 0.
Three scenarios and odds:
| Scenario | Probability | 2027E Attributable Profit | Fair Range | vs. Current Price | Key Swing Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 25% | RMB 3.8-4.4 billion (SHFE aluminum 19,500-20,000) | RMB 8.3-9.5 | -30.1% to -20.0% | Middle East restarts + Indonesia ramp causing surplus in 2027, demand collapse; dividend yield falling to ~4.6% still provides a buffer |
| Base | 50% | RMB 5.5-7.0 billion (center RMB 6.1 billion, SHFE aluminum 21,500-22,500) | RMB 12.5-14.5 | +5.3% to +22.2% | Mid-cycle PE 10-12x (anchored to company 5-year median 12.15 + Nanshan 11.25) × RMB 6.1 billion; PB-ROE 1.5-1.7x cross-validation |
| Bull | 25% | RMB 9.2-10.2 billion (SHFE aluminum 23,500+ sustained + one of tax rate recoveries) | RMB 15-19 | +26.4% to +60.1% | Deficit persistence + high-tech re-certification (+RMB 800 million-1.15 billion); sell-side target prices of RMB 14-17/aggregate median RMB 19.9 fall within this range |
Probability-weighted expected price RMB 13.2 (+11.4% vs. current price). Distribution shape: current price sits in the lower-middle position between bear and base; odds are mildly positive but do not constitute deep undervaluation — the valuation ceiling of cyclical stocks means even the bull scenario yields only +60%. Three-way reconciliation of this report's earnings forecast with management/sell-side: This report's 2026E attributable profit of RMB 8.3-8.9 billion vs. sell-side consensus RMB 8.63 billion (essentially aligned; difference only in Q4 aluminum price assumptions); 2027E base of RMB 6.1 billion vs. sell-side consensus RMB 9.16 billion — about 33% lower, with the divergence entirely from the aluminum price mean-reversion assumption (sell-side implies no fall from highs). Management provides no quantitative earnings guidance, only soft guidance of ≥50% payout ratio and production plans.
Conclusion: Modest undervaluation — assess quality and price separately. Quality: first-tier sector cost positioning + one of the industry's lowest net leverage (RMB 3.57 billion) + first-tier dividend yield + genuine cash conversion. Price: the "cheapness" of 6.95x TTM PE at current price contains cyclical distortion; the real pricing is a conservative combination of "aluminum price reverting to the old center + zero growth," with a safety margin of +5.3% (base-case fair value lower bound RMB 12.5); downside protection relies mainly on the ~RMB 7 asset/book floor and the dynamic dividend yield of 7.9%→5.6%, rather than valuation itself. Target price range RMB 12.5-14.5 (base-case fair value).
1. Industry Size: Global electrolytic aluminum production in 2025 is approximately 74.52 million tonnes with consumption of approximately 74.53 million tonnes, in a state of tight balance (IAI/WBMS data as cited by Zhiyan Consulting); China's 2025 production is approximately 44 million tonnes, accounting for 59.4% of the global total, with consumption of approximately 45.2 million tonnes, accounting for 62.1% (China Nonferrous Metals News, 2026-01); China's alumina production and consumption both exceed 90 million tonnes, accounting for over 60% of the global total. Growth trajectory: China's production grew +4.6% in 2024, approximately +1.8% in 2025, and is estimated at approximately +1.0% in 2026E—growth is narrowing year by year under capacity ceiling constraints; global supply growth for 2027-2028 is 4.29%/3.00% versus demand growth of 3.41%/3.38% (Soochow Securities estimates). This is a business of "near-zero aggregate growth, where profits depend on industry structure."
2. Value Chain and Profit Distribution: Bauxite (China holds only about 2% of global reserves, with an import dependence of about 64%; Guinea accounts for about 80% of shipments to China) → Alumina → Electrolytic aluminum → Aluminum processing. From 2024 to 2026, a textbook-grade migration of profit along the chain occurred: alumina spot prices rose from RMB 3,040/tonne at the start of 2024 to RMB 5,710/tonne at year-end (+88%), then fell back to RMB 2,663 in June 2025, and stood at RMB 2,610 for the SHFE main contract on 2026-10-28 (-54% from peak, approaching cash cost, with 90% of industry capacity having been loss-making at one point); meanwhile, the full cost of electrolytic aluminum fell to RMB 16,434/tonne, and industry per-tonne profit rose to RMB 4,285 (2025, +70.2%)—profit shifted wholesale from the alumina segment into the electrolytic aluminum segment, with smelting becoming the main profit-retention link of the entire chain due to the scarcity of capacity quotas. Tianshan Aluminum occupies an integrated position of midstream smelting plus upstream raw materials: strong bargaining power against upstream (essentially self-sufficient in alumina/anodes/electricity, with a net alumina exposure of only -200,000 tonnes/year), a price taker downstream (aluminum ingots sold at market prices), and a certification-barrier premium in aluminum foil—gross profit is retained mainly in the smelting segment where it operates itself.
3. Supply-Demand and Competitive Landscape: On the supply side, the domestic 45-million-tonne ceiling (execution-basis capacity of approximately 45.43 million tonnes) plus an operating-capacity utilization rate of 99.5% has brought supply elasticity to zero, with net new additions in 2026 of only 590,000–770,000 tonnes; damage to approximately 2.8–3.0 million tonnes of capacity in the Middle East in March 2026 created a temporary global supply gap (approximately 1.07 million tonnes, per Anliang estimates), being quickly filled by Indonesia (where Nanshan/Hongqiao/Tianshan have established positions). On the demand side, structural shift is the main theme: construction aluminum's share has fallen from about 1/3 to 15.8%, while transportation (26.9%; NEVs use 219kg of aluminum per vehicle, rising to 300kg in the long run) and power & electronics (22.9%; photovoltaics estimated at approximately 5.02 million tonnes in 2026E, ultra-high voltage, AI data centers' "aluminum-for-copper" substitution) have become the two largest segments; new energy's combined share rose from 9% in 2022 to approximately 19% in 2025, contributing about 2–3 percentage points of demand growth annually—this is penetration-ramp-style structural support (smooth incremental growth, no single-point volume jumps), which, combined with zero supply elasticity, forms the judgment of "balanced aggregate, rising center of gravity." Concentration: CR2 is approximately 33% (Chinalco 8.08 million tonnes + Hongqiao group 6.545 million tonnes), CR5 approximately 46%, with the first tier leading by a wide margin; Tianshan (1.1858 million tonnes) sits at the front of the second tier. Fourfold entry barriers: capacity quotas (transfer licenses are scarce; Tianshan's 1.4 million tonnes of quota is itself a premium), energy endowments (locational lock-in of Xinjiang coal/Yunnan hydropower), integration capital thresholds (tens of billions of yuan in full-chain investment), and downstream certification cycles. Substitution threat: recycled aluminum (approximately 10.5 million tonnes in 2024, with a target of 15 million tonnes by 2027) will erode low-end primary aluminum demand in the long run, but has limited short-term impact.
4. Cycle and Regulation: Cyclical position—Shanghai aluminum at RMB 23,400–23,700 is in the high zone since 2017 (up approximately 13% from the 2025 midpoint); LME at USD 3,078 (-18% from the March Middle East shock high); alumina at RMB 2,610 sits in the lowest percentile band of the past 5 years; aluminum ingot social inventory of 623,000 tonnes (2026-10-28) is destocking from low levels, and LME inventory of approximately 550,000 tonnes is at a multi-year low; industry per-tonne profit of approximately RMB 7,000 is at a historical high—in the middle of an upcycle with rising volume, price, and profit. Leading indicator checklist: ① Weekly social inventory (falling below 550,000 tonnes strengthens the bullish case; breaking above 750,000 tonnes turns bearish); ② restart announcements for the 2.068 million tonnes of idled Middle East capacity, and power-on milestones for Indonesia's Kaltara/Nanshan Bintan (determining the 2027 balance-sheet inflection point); ③ details of Guinea's export controls and ocean freight rates; ④ the cutback-rebound cycle triggered by alumina losses; ⑤ far-month contango/backwardation structure. Regulation—the October 2025 "Implementation Plan for High-Quality Development of the Aluminum Industry (2025-2027)" reaffirmed aggregate constraints and set targets of a 30% energy-efficiency benchmark / 30% clean energy / 15 million tonnes of recycled aluminum; the carbon market now includes electrolytic aluminum (quotas will tighten after 2027; the company's coal-power structure is a long-term exposure, with current explicit cost <RMB 1/tonne of aluminum); CBAM will be levied starting in 2026 (the company's direct EU export exposure is limited); the cancellation of aluminum product export rebates in December 2024 suppressed processed-product exports. The overall direction favors "low-cost incumbents + energy-efficiency leaders"; Tianshan's 1.4-million-tonne green low-carbon upgrade is policy-friendly.
5. Peer Benchmarking (see the peer benchmarking chart in the earlier valuation chapter): Compared with five comparable companies, Tianshan's differentiated position is "smallest scale (approximately 1/7 of Chinalco, 1/5 of Hongqiao) but the best cost percentile + lowest net leverage + first-tier dividend yield"; versus Shenhuo, it carries no coal burden (Shenhuo recorded RMB 1.254 billion in coal mine impairments in 2025); versus Yunnan Aluminum, it has no reverse exposure from externally purchased alumina; versus Chinalco, its self-produced alumina ratio is low (avoiding a Chinalco-style profit give-back in Q4 2025); weaknesses are a lower green-power share than Yunnan Aluminum/Hongqiao (a long-term discount factor under carbon constraints) and shallower mining control than Chinalco/Hongqiao (Guinea offtake plus self-mining still ramping up vs. Hongqiao's equity stakes in 50-million-tonne-class mining rights).
6. Company Positioning: The most cost-advantaged integrated player in the second tier, with a market share of approximately 2.7% (2025 production/national production), ranked sixth to eighth nationally by third-party measures (the company itself claims "capacity ranks among the industry's leaders"; both measures are presented for reference); market share trend is stable with slight upward drift (the 1.4-million-tonne upgrade adds +18% output plus aluminum foil as a second growth curve). Moat = capacity quota scarcity × Xinjiang coal energy location × raw-material self-sufficiency providing cycle immunity. Xinjiang's 2023 full cost of approximately RMB 13,328/tonne represents the leftmost end of the national cost curve (Guohai Securities estimate), and Tianshan shifts further left through integration.
Rating: Cautiously bullish, confidence 0.60, time horizon 12 months. The conclusion in three parts: ① Business essence—under a supply ceiling, scarce capacity + leftmost cost position + genuine cash conversion + first-tier dividends make it a quality pick among cyclical stocks; ② Price judgment—the current price is based on "aluminum price returning to the 2025 midpoint + zero growth," a modest undervaluation relative to the baseline fair value (RMB 12.5–14.5); the safety margin of +5.3% is thin, with the RMB 7 asset floor and the 7.9% forward dividend yield providing the primary downside protection; ③ Strategy implications—suitable for a allocation-style buy within a dividend-cycle portfolio rather than a volatility trade; below RMB 12.5 it offers accumulation value, above RMB 14.5 (the upper end of baseline fair value) the safety margin is exhausted and gains should be realized.
Risks and Monitoring (by importance): ① Aluminum price—a break below RMB 22,000 on Shanghai aluminum combined with a turn to inventory accumulation (>750,000 tonnes) would falsify the mid-cycle earnings anchor; monitor weekly inventory and Middle East/Indonesia restart milestones; ② below RMB 9.5, the share price enters the bear-case range and the zone of pledge pressure sensitivity, requiring reassessment; ③ a 2026 annual payout ratio <50% would undermine the dividend floor; verify in the annual report window around 2027-03-30; ④ confirmation of Tianshan Aluminum Co.'s high-tech enterprise status (2026 list not yet published) is an unpriced option worth +13%–19%; ⑤ a renewed share reduction by the controlling shareholder or a rising pledge ratio would suppress valuation recovery; conversely, family share increases would be a strong signal; ⑥ if the Indonesia Phase I project materially breaks ground, watch the competition for resources between the USD 900 million–1 billion capex and dividend commitments.
chart {"type":"bar","title":"Revenue and Net Profit Attributable to Shareholders","unit":"RMB 100M","x":["FY2023","FY2024","FY2025","2026Q1-Q3"],"series":[{"name":"Revenue","values":[289.75,280.89,295.02,274.21]},{"name":"Net Profit Attrib. to Shareholders","values":[22.05,44.55,48.18,64.23]}]}