Report date: 2026-11-15 | Research scope: certification, installed base, core components, and aftermarket services of commercial aviation engines (excludes whole-engine manufacturing) | Research prototype: Technology Hardware (headline: competitive landscape and pricing power)
The subject of this report is commercial aviation engines and their aftermarket system: new and spare deliveries of commercial (including regional aircraft) turbofan/turboprop engines, spare parts and life-limited parts (LLPs), shop visits, long-term service agreements (RR TotalCare, CFM TIME/LTSA, flight-hour billing), as well as upstream high-temperature components and materials (single-crystal turbine blades, powder-metal disks, castings & forgings) and the MRO network (OEM-owned + licensed + independent third parties). Whole-aircraft/whole-engine manufacturing is excluded; military engines are mentioned only as background for China's supply-chain capability.
One-sentence supply-chain map: superalloys/castings & forgings (Howmet, PCC and other duopolies) → hot-section and key components (blades/disks/casings; Chinese suppliers entering via non-hot-section parts) → OEM final assembly (CFM = GE + Safran, P&W, RR; CR3 ~95%+) → airline installed base for 20–40 years → aftermarket profit pool made up of shop visits/spares/long-term contracts (2/3–3/4 of industry profits).
Size basis: global engine MRO market of US$62.4bn in 2025 (Aviation Week real basis, ex-inflation; Oliver Wyman nominal basis US$70.1bn in 2026), about half of global aviation MRO (annual average within the ~US$1.36 trillion cumulative 10-year basis); new OE revenue roughly US$40bn per year (estimated).
In 2025 there were 69,495 in-service commercial engines globally; Aviation Week forecasts 89,875 by 2034 (+29.3%, ~2.9% p.a.). Structurally, CFM56 remains the largest installed base at over 20,000 units (30%) — 45% of CFM56s have yet to undergo their first shop visit (GE, 2024-07), forming the core aftermarket driver of the next decade; the new-generation LEAP has 9,242 installed (13.3%), PW1000G ~5,600 (8%), and their combined penetration will rise from ~20% in 2025 to 52% in 2034, with LEAP overtaking CFM56 in in-service count in 2029.
In 2025 there were 13,491 annual engine shop visits globally (8,990 performance-restoration visits + 4,501 LLP events), corresponding to US$62.4bn (including US$2.9bn of one-off OEM technical upgrade revenue), with an average visit value of ~US$4.63mn. The net incremental bridge, summed driver by driver:
Net result: 2028E shop visits of 15,091 (Aviation Week top-down basis 14,213, deviation +6.2%, cross-check passed) and dollars of US$66.4bn (AW basis US$65.4bn, deviation +1.5%).
Structural factors dominate (~70–80%): installed-base expansion (17,000-aircraft backlog, over 12 years to clear), LEAP+PW1000G generational penetration (new-generation shop visit volume overtaking old generation by 2030), and the CFM56/V2500 aging long tail (CFM56 still 15% in 2034). Cyclical factors (20–30%): fade-out of one-off OEM technical upgrade revenue (US$2.9bn → 0.6bn → 0), aircraft build-rate cadence, RPK fluctuations, and the used serviceable material (USM) supply released by the 2027–28 retirement wave.
Inflection-point judgment: quantified — build rates (A320 monthly output 54→target 75; 737 monthly 42→57) × 2 engines per aircraft × ~1.1 spare engine coefficient → new engine demand climbing from ~2,500 to ~3,500 units/yr; but we must flag the double-edged nature of build-rate assumptions: Oliver Wyman's official executive summary bluntly states Airbus's 75/month target "seems unlikely" (actual 54 at end-2025), and Boeing's 47/month remained unstable through September 2026 (Leeham). The slower the ramp, the longer the mature-fleet life extension and aftermarket dividend — but the slower the LEAP installed-base ramp as well. Installed-base growth input should be used as a 2.5–2.9% range rather than a single 2.9%.
China (fleet of 4,684 aircraft; engine MRO ~US$9.1bn in 2026), India (fastest fleet growth globally at +11.7% p.a.; MRO spend +8.4% p.a.), and the Middle East (widebody-dense, among the world's highest per-aircraft engine MRO intensity) are the incremental core; C919 delivered only 15 aircraft in 2025 (initial target 75; LEAP-1C export restrictions a key cause), suppressing LEAP-1C demand near-term and mid-term catalyzing an autonomous CJ-1000A aftermarket system.
LEAP deliveries: 845 in 2021 → 1,570 in 2023 → 1,407 in 2024 (below the 1,600–1,650 target on supply-chain drag) → 1,802 in 2025 (+28.1%, above the top of guidance), with 2026 guidance raised to ~+20% (~2,072–2,162 units; H1 already 1,030). On the GTF side, 2023–24 prioritized AOG remediation, cutting new engine deliveries (~800 in 2024); GTF Advantage entered mass production in 2026 (EASA certified 2026-04; 800+ firm orders, backlog over 8,000). LEAP capacity has caught up with demand (Safran says "enough for Airbus, Boeing and the aftermarket"); GTF new and spare engines remain tight — Airbus "gliders" (aircraft awaiting engines) were ~60 as of July 2025, up +250% from before, with a planned halt to the pool in 2027.
The tightest link is high-end single-crystal turbine blade / powder-metal disk casting (an effective Howmet+PCC duopoly): low yields, 2–3 years to expand capacity (including Nadcap and customer qualification); Howmet is expanding simultaneously across ~30 plant sites worldwide (2026-03 technology day). Next is shop visit slots and technicians: GTF mandatory inspections take 250–300 days turnaround (+150% vs the pre-pandemic next-gen baseline), and LEAP shop visit demand will grow 6.25x from 2025 to 2040 (600–800/yr → 5,000+/yr). Expansion pipeline: P&W US MRO network +40% (over US$100mn invested); MTU GTF MRO capacity up to as much as 600 visits/yr; MTU Hannover widebody MRO +20% (US$111.9mn investment, ground-breaking 2026-10); RR–Air China Beijing Trent MRO facility in service late 2025.
GTF powder-metal defect: 600–700 accelerated removals needed over 2023–2026; grounded A320neo fleet peaked at 648 aircraft (2025-03, 28% of the GTF fleet); AOG down -25% YoY within 2026, RTX guides to near zero in 2027; RTX took ~US$3bn of charges in 2023Q3 (including customer compensation), ~US$700mn of cash outflow in 2026, and declining compensation in 2027 brings ~US$500mn of free cash flow tailwind, with the tail through 2027–28. LEAP early durability: absorbed via free durability kits and early part swaps, with no independently disclosed total payout; 2025 GE free cash flow of US$7.7bn and Safran recurring operating profit of €4.79bn (+14.4%) indicate "gross-margin noise" rather than a GTF-style capital event — however, the FAA airworthiness directive effective 2025-12-12 records two in-flight shutdowns of the LEAP-1A in harsh Middle East environments (occurring after 1,200+ durability kits had been installed), signaling the harsh-environment sub-fleet's fix is incomplete (see D2 Disputes for details).
USM (the 2027–28 retirement of 8,600 CFM56s + 2,500 V2500s will release green-time engines; AW explicitly notes it "may flood the mainstream legacy model market and depress prices"); PMA parts (HEICO-led, 30–40% discount to OEM parts, but 2–4 years certification per part; penetration in engines stalled at ~3%); China's CJ-1000A (certification flight first flight 2026-06-30; type certificate expectation slipped from "within 2026" to H1 2027, followed by production license and supplemental installation approvals; no FAA/EASA certification plan, constraining C919 overseas commercial operations). Before 2030, Chinese substitution has limited impact on the global supply landscape, but the 2025 supply cutoff already proved its ability to freeze C919 deliveries (15 units for the full year vs the 75-unit target).
Measured in shop visit volume, supply fulfillment rates were 97.0%/96.4% in 2024–2025 (the shortfall showing up as AOG groundings and MRO queues); with P&W/MTU/Hannover expansion and GTF AOG convergence, 2027 trends toward tight balance, and 2028 shows mild surplus on AW demand basis but remains tight on the bottom-up bridge basis:
(2024 is a back-calculated estimate on AW's 2025 basis, pending verification; 2028 supply reflects existing expansion plans.)
Four-layer pricing mechanism: ① New engines sold at thin margin to win the installed base (OE priced below lifetime value; P&W segment operating margin 8.3%; GE90 lifetime value over US$32mn); ② aftermarket price = cost + capacity scarcity rent (double-digit inflation in shop visit unit prices; narrow-body next-gen true cost per visit US$13.6–14.7mn including LLPs; GE90-115BL long-term lease rate US$170–185k/month; half-life market value +60% vs 2023 — IBA, 2026-10); ③ long-term contracts convert scarcity rents into contractual form (RR LTSA balance net increase of £800mn–1.2bn per year over 2026–28; CFM TIME renewals trending up; Ryanair locked in ~2,000 CFM56+LEAP long-term agreements in 2026-02); ④ USM/PMA discounts of 30–40% form the ceiling.
Dollar paths must be presented on dual bases (the key difference between this report and single-source forecasts): Aviation Week real basis (ex-inflation) is V-shaped — 62.4 → 60.0 → 58.4 (2027 trough) → US$65.4bn (+12.0%); Oliver Wyman nominal basis shows no pullback — US$70.1bn in 2026, extrapolated at +3.9% p.a. to ~US$75.7bn in 2028 (+4.0%). OEM financials are in nominal dollars: on a nominal basis there is no "dollar decline" in 2026–27; what declines is the real basis and one-off technical upgrade revenue. Calibrated through stress testing, we assign a range for the 2028 "re-acceleration" rather than a single point: real basis +6%–+12% (central ~+9%); nominal basis ~US$75.7bn (bear ~71.0 / bull ~79.0).
Cycle position: mid-to-late. Three pieces of evidence: ① GTF groundings past their peak (648 aircraft → -25% within 2026 → near zero in 2027); ② OEM technical upgrade revenue fading 2.9bn → 0.6bn → 0; ③ durability kits nearly doubling time on wing → shop visit demand reverting to normal (direction negative). Prices sit at roughly the 95–100th percentile of the past 10 years (dollar/lease rate/market value composite); mature narrow-body values were already plateauing in 2025–26 (IBA); scarcity rents have peaked and are drifting down from high levels.
Baseline price path (next 4 quarters+): anchored on global engine MRO quarterly dollars — 2026Q4 ~US$15.5bn/quarter → 2027 Q1–Q4 ~14.2/14.5/14.7/15.0bn (full-year 58.4bn real-basis trough; quarterly weights 24.3/24.8/25.2/25.7%) → from 2028Q1 ~US$15.7bn/quarter (full-year 65.4bn); nominal basis runs ~13–16% higher in parallel. Pricing framework: installed-base floor (in-service engines +2.5–2.9%/yr + CFM56 long tail) + scarcity rent from capacity bottlenecks (fading 2026–27: GTF turnaround 250–300 days → recovery) + timing of durability-driven reversion to normal (AOG near zero in 2027; slots loosening in 2028 while nominal unit prices still rise 8–12% per year).
By new-engine deliveries 2025–34 (43,958 units total): CFM (50/50 GE + Safran JV) 56%, P&W 22%, GE widebody 12%, RR 7%, PWC 3% — CR3 ~95%+. The narrow-body market is a platform-exclusive duopoly of LEAP vs GTF (~72% vs 28% of new deliveries); 737 MAX exclusive to LEAP, A350 exclusive to Trent XWB, 777X exclusive to GE9X — switching engines means switching aircraft, locking in 20–30 years.
The razor-blade model, quantified: global engine aftermarket pool ~US$72bn/yr (Oliver Wyman global MRO US$136bn × 53% engine share, estimated) vs new OE ~US$40bn; GE's commercial engine revenue >70% from parts & services; RR civil services ~69% of civil revenue; MTU MRO 69% of revenue. Aftermarket margins 20–30%+ (GE overall operating margin 21.4%, Safran propulsion 24.5%, RR civil underlying margin 20.5%) vs new OE 0–10% (P&W 8.3%; court filings admit new engines are unprofitable, with recovery via aftermarket). Direction of profit migration over the next 2–3 years: continued concentration toward "aftermarket/hourly contracts" — the LEAP/GTF fleets enter their first performance-restoration shop visit peak in 2027–29 (~US$13.6–14.7mn per narrow-body visit including LLPs, roughly the value of 0.6 new engines), OEMs capture the bulk via long-term contract renewal resets (RR LTSA balance growing £800mn–1.2bn/yr; 2028 civil margin target 21–23%), while independent/licensed MROs share the capacity-gap dividend.
All four barriers are measured in "ten years plus ten years": type certification 5-10 years + full-scope engine testing (the CJ-1000A has accumulated 6,142+ hours of testing without yet achieving certification), hot-section IP (the GTF powder-metal defect itself proves the know-how threshold), test facilities, and the installed-base data loop. PMA penetration stalling at roughly 3% is the result of certification timelines and policy, not a technical ceiling.
But regulatory erosion has shifted from verbal threats to precedent: the European Commission closed its antitrust investigation into P&W Canada on 2026-08-21, conditioned on contract-term adjustments (IATA publicly celebrated); IATA/Emerton set the tone on 2026-06-24 with "parts shortages + restricted aftermarket access," with 2025 supply-chain failures having already cost airlines at least $11 billion; IATA's Director General publicly demanded engine OEMs "stop gouging"; the IATA-CFM fair-access agreement, renewed through 2033-02, covers only CFM. Extrapolating margins from the 2018-2026 regulatory-vacuum era into the 2040s is this landscape's weakest link — if fair access/PMA accelerates its expansion to CFM/RR, OEM aftermarket margins face a 100-200 basis-point downward revision risk.
| Player | Position/Share | Key Metrics (FY2025 basis) | One-Line Take |
|---|---|---|---|
| GE Aerospace | CFM 50% + widebody (~56% of new deliveries combined) | Revenue $45.9bn, FCF $7.7bn, aftermarket >70% of commercial engine revenue; forward PE ~37-38x | Strongest profit-pool holder, but valuation already prices in substantial perfection |
| Safran | CFM 50% (~72% of narrowbody new deliveries on JV basis) | Revenue €31.2bn (+14.7%), Propulsion segment margin 24.5% (H1'26) | Highest-quality carrier of the LEAP aftermarket dividend; segment margin among the industry's highest |
| RTX/Pratt & Whitney | GTF (~28% narrowbody) + V2500 installed base | P&W segment $32.9bn, operating margin 8.3%, cumulative GTF charges ~$3bn | Greatest aftermarket torque but overdrawn by the powder-metal affair; 2026-28 profit ramp coexists with compensation liabilities |
| Rolls-Royce | Widebody oligopolist (exclusive on A350/A330neo) | Civil margin 20.5%, LTSA backlog growing £0.8-1.2bn/year, 2028 FCF target £5.0-5.3bn | Direct beneficiary of TotalCare resets + widebody strength; caution: unfulfilled 787 orders GEnx 677 airframes vs Trent 1000 only 71 — installed-base denominator eroding, and ~30x valuation already prices flawless execution |
| MTU | GTF risk-sharing + one of the largest independent MROs | Revenue €8.7bn, EBIT margin 15.5%, GTF ~40% of its MRO revenue | Clean second-order beneficiary of the narrowbody shop-visit peak; risk is deep single-program GTF dependence |
| Howmet | One of the duopolists in single-crystal blades/titanium forgings | Expansion across ~30 sites globally (2026-03 Technology Day) | The "shovel seller" at the bottleneck, riding both aerospace and AI gas-turbine tailwinds |
| AECC Aviation Power (600893) | Military engine prime contractor + CJ-1000A chain leader | Revenue RMB 46.3bn (-3.2%), net margin 0.6-1.6%, PE-TTM 147x (75th percentile over 5 years) | Priced as a domestic-substitution option with negligible current returns — an overdrawn valuation |
| Yingliu (603308) | Hot-section blades/casings (GE/RR/COMAC customers) | Revenue RMB 2.92bn (+16.1%), net margin ~12% | Scarce positioning but an OE parts supplier — no share of the aftermarket profit pool, limited pricing power |
| Hangya Technology (688510) | Lead supplier of LEAP low-pressure compressor blades | 2025 international aero-engine & gas-turbine revenue -14.42%, net profit ~RMB 0.1bn | Theme stronger than fundamentals: 2025 data shows it is being squeezed by OEMs rather than benefiting |
Return quality: good. The real money in this business is in OEM aftermarket (high and durable: GE FCF conversion >100%, RR 2028 ROCE target 23-26%, MTU EBIT margin 15.5%); new-engine OE and upstream subcontracting are "revenue growth without profit" or thin-margin segments (China chain net margins 1-9%); airlines and lessors are the biggest losers of this industry's boom — new-generation time on wing is only 1/3-1/2 that of the old generation, spare-engine ratios have risen from 8% to 20%, surging maintenance costs swallow fuel savings, and long-term contract pricing power sits with OEMs (lessors can barely even audit true maintenance costs).
Sector valuation position: SW Aero Equipment II PE 72.4x (57th percentile since 2014-07) / PB 2.80x (16th percentile) (2026-11-13) — A-share sector PE in the upper-middle range, PB in the lower range; thin earnings inflate PE. Overseas: GE forward ~37-38x, RTX ~32x, RR ~30x (mid-November 2026) — most of the aftermarket profit pool's boom is already reflected in valuations; the combination of an upcycle × high valuation percentile requires continued earnings beats.
D1: Is the 2026-27 decline in dollar terms "technical" or a cyclical peak? (Bulls) Installed base +2.5-2.9%/year + LLP peak + CFM56 long tail as floor; the nominal (OW) measure shows no decline at all — the real-terms decline is purely a modeling artifact of advanced-technology revenue fading ($2.9bn → 0) and kit de-contenting. (Bears) AW's same report models a 2028 retirement peak of 1,220 aircraft and warns "green-time engines could flood the legacy market and depress prices" — CFM56 is 28% of engine MRO (~$17.5bn); every 10% substitution of materials content by USM/PMA is roughly -$1.75bn/year, and the price pressure lands in exactly the same year as the "2028 re-acceleration"; moreover, the "floor" narrative relies on a build-rate assumption (A320 at 75/month) that OW itself deems unlikely — the floor may hold only until 2027. Metrics to track: updated 2027 AW/OW forecasts, CFM56 shop-visit unit pricing and retirement rates (GE has cut its 2026 retirement-rate expectation from 3-4% to 1.5-2%), IBA lease-rate indices, and the pace of single-crystal blade capacity additions.
D2: Can durability fixes deliver "near-doubling of time on wing"? (Bulls) The LEAP-1B HPT kit received dual FAA/EASA certification in 2026-07 with 1,200+ kits already installed; the GTF hot-section upgrade delivers ~90-95% of Advantage benefits and enters the shop in 2026; post-fix shop visits are heavier per event and OEMs monetize via paid upgrades. (Bears) All "doubling" claims come from OEMs themselves, with no independent time-on-wing data — FAA airworthiness directives (2025-12-12) record two in-flight shutdowns of kitted LEAP-1As in the harsh Middle East environment; and "doubling time on wing" is itself a subtraction from aftermarket demand (bridge: -1,050 visits ≈ -$4.9bn > the 2027 trough of $4.0bn); the 2028 re-acceleration is essentially deferred shop visits returning on schedule — each quarter of deferral shifts the re-acceleration by a quarter. Metrics to track: LEAP harsh-environment subfleet unscheduled removal rates, GTF average turnaround time (falling below 150 days = scarcity rents dissipating), RTX GTF compensation cash flow (whether the ~+$0.5bn 2027 tailwind materializes), GE/Safran warranty provisions.
D3: Timing of cutoffs and domestic-substitution erosion? (Bulls) Cutoffs are pulse-like (5-week restoration in 2025, $12.9bn mega-order signed 2026-11; mutually self-harming constraints); CJ-1000A certification has slipped again, with 3-5 years from installed validation to scaled commercial entry; before 2030 limited to China's domestic increment. (Bears) The 2025 "pulse" effectively froze C919 deliveries for the year (-80%); the truce's 2027-01-10 expiry is a near-term event, not a tail risk; China has designated CJ-1000A a top-priority program — security-driven substitution runs faster than cost-driven — airline procurement preferences hurt by cutoffs will migrate. Metrics to track: US-China interactions around 2027-01-10, CJ-1000A certification timing, C919 monthly output and LEAP-1C license status.
| Scenario | Probability | Narrative | Implications |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 0.30 | Durability fixes fully deliver + concentrated capacity additions dissipate scarcity rents + 2028 retirement peak USM price pressure (CFM56/V2500 materials prices -10%+); if the truce also breaks, the CFM China flow repeats the 2025 freeze | Real-terms 2028 $60-63bn, nominal ~$71bn; OEM aftermarket growth falls to single digits — double kill of valuation and earnings |
| Base | 0.50 | Nominal dollars don't decline (low-single to low-double-digit growth); real terms V-shaped (2027 trough of $58.4bn → 2028 $65.4bn, red-team calibrated range +6~12%); AOG trends to zero in 2027, LTC resets continue, GE/Safran aftermarket revenue growing double digits | OEM aftermarket profit pool keeps expanding, but with a slope below consensus |
| Bull | 0.20 | Further narrowbody ramp delays (A320 75/month pushed out again) + 777X delays + deferred kit shop visits concentrated into 2028-29 | 2028 nominal $78-80bn; scarcity rents persist longer |
| Date/Window | Event | Directional Impact | Related Debate |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-12~2027-01 | GE/RTX/Safran/RR annual results and 2027 guidance (AOG trending to zero, GTF compensation cash turning positive, aftermarket growth) | Validates base-case path | D1/D2 |
| 2027-01-10 | US-China rare-earth truce expiry | Risk of cutoff/countermeasure recurrence | D3 |
| 2027-03~04 | Aviation Week/Oliver Wyman annual MRO forecast updates | Validation of the 2027 trough and 2028 re-acceleration | D1 |
| 2027H1 | CJ-1000A CAAC type certificate window | Domestic-substitution launch signal | D3 |
| 2027-06 | A320 output at 70-75/month and validation of Airbus glider halt | Double-edged validation of build assumptions | D1 |
| 2027-07 | LEAP-1B durability kit entering new-build aircraft from 2027, first independent time-on-wing data | Quality of durability fixes | D2 |
| 2027-09 | IATA agenda: MRO bottlenecks and aftermarket fair access | Pace of regulatory erosion | Structure |
| 2027-11 | Whether GTF AOG trends to zero per RTX guidance | Validation of scarcity-rent fade | D2 |
Deconstructing the value trap: A bullish cycle ≠ a buy. The typical bottom-right occupant is AECC Aviation Power — the cycle direction of domestic substitution and military engines is genuinely up (x=65), but net margins of 0.6-1.6% and a 147x PE price a distant commercialization option, not current returns (y=12); Yingliu/Hangya sit in the OE subcontracting segment of "volume benefits, capped pricing" (y=30-40), and Hangya's 2025 international aero-engine revenue of -14.42% reveals the pricing-power reality. Bottom-left airlines/lessors are the cost bearers of this industry's prosperity (under-reserved maintenance liabilities) — an avoid, not a "cyclical overkill." True core holdings are top-right: Safran/GE/Howmet/MTU — but remember GE's ~37-38x forward already prices in substantial perfection.
| Scenario | Biggest Beneficiaries | Biggest Losers |
|---|---|---|
| Bear (0.30) | Airlines/lessors (cost relief), USM/teardown chain (FTAI model) | GE/RR (peak-margin × peak-multiple double kill), MTU (GTF overhaul volume declines) |
| Base (0.50) | Safran, MTU, Howmet (aftermarket volume and price both up) | Aviation Power-type option names (expectations keep shifting out), airlines (costs stay elevated) |
| Bull (0.20) | GE, RTX (parts and lease scarcity lasts longer), Hangya/Yingliu (subcontracting volumes revised up) | Airlines (under-reserved deepens), Boeing/Airbus (glider backlog persists) |
① Durability fixes fall short of OEM claims (FAA airworthiness directives already provide the first brick of counterevidence), with a GTF-style $3bn-scale charge recurring on LEAP; ② concentrated capacity additions dissipate overhaul scarcity rents faster than expected (GTF turnaround falling below 150 days); ③ the 2028 retirement peak's USM price pressure combined with expanding regulatory fair access drives OEM aftermarket margins through 100-200 bps of mean reversion; ④ escalation of cutoffs/countermeasures after the US-China truce expires on 2027-01-10, repeating the 2025 CFM China-flow freeze; ⑤ peak valuations amplify any growth downgrade (GE 37-38x forward, RR ~30x).
Key data sources: Aviation Week 2025 Commercial Fleet & MRO Forecast; Oliver Wyman Global Fleet and MRO Market Forecast (2026-2036 edition); IATA/Emerton (2026-06-24); RTX, GE Aerospace, Safran, Rolls-Royce, MTU FY2025 results and announcements; IBA Engine & Lease Rate Update H1 2026; Ishka AirFinance; official documents from FAA/EASA/European Commission/China Ministry of Commerce; A-share periodic reports of listed companies. Basis and units: amounts are nominal US dollars unless otherwise noted; "real terms" = Aviation Week modeled values excluding inflation.