Rating: Neutral | Target price range: RMB 16.8–19.1 (fair value under base-case scenario) | Current price: RMB 17.35 (closing price, 2026-10-27) | Margin of safety: -3.2% (base-case fair value floor below current price, no substantive margin of safety) | Time horizon: 6–12 months | Total market cap approx. RMB 156.6 billion (A-share price × total share capital of 9.027 billion shares, H shares account for 19.02%) | Probability-weighted fair value approx. RMB 17.78 (+2.5% vs. current price)
Huatai Securities is a leading full-service brokerage ranked third in the industry by profit size. Its H1 2026 net profit attributable to shareholders of RMB 11.692 billion (+54.87%) set a historical high for the period, but investment income plus fair-value changes accounted for 60.5% of revenue and brokerage income grew +66.9% YoY — the results were built on high beta from the surge in market turnover in H1. Since Q3, A-shares have fallen sharply (CSI 300 down about -12.5% for the quarter; daily turnover shrank to RMB 1.62 trillion in October; margin financing and securities lending declined for eight consecutive sessions to RMB 2.48 trillion). We estimate Q3 standalone net profit attributable to shareholders fell back to RMB 3.8–5.5 billion (Q2: RMB 6.892 billion), full-year 2026 at approx. RMB 18.5–21.5 billion, with risk of a decline to RMB 16.8–19.2 billion in 2027 (approx. 21% below sell-side consensus). At the current price of RMB 17.35, PB is 0.72x (including perpetual bonds) / 0.86–0.88x (excluding), and back-solving the PB-ROE relationship shows the market has already priced in "sustainable ROE returning to the five-year average of ~8.8% and the 2026 boom fully normalizing" as the base case — valuation is reasonable to slightly cheap, but the odds are roughly symmetrical (bear-case median -23%, bull-case median +32%), constituting no significant mispricing. Conclusion: Neutral. Wait for two right-side signals — the 10-30 Q3 report confirming profit resilience and Q4 turnover stabilizing — before considering an upgrade; on the downside, 0.72x PB, a dividend yield of ~3.2%, and book value per share of RMB 20.3 (ex-perpetuals) provide a floor.
Nature of opportunity: right-side confirmation, not a mispriced-recovery trade. The current price of RMB 17.35 is only +2.5% away from the probability-weighted fair value of RMB 17.78, with a roughly symmetrical upside/downside distribution; market pricing and our analysis corroborate each other (both priced on mid-cycle mean reversion). The real divergence lies in "our 2027E net profit of RMB 16.8–19.2 billion vs. sell-side consensus of RMB 22.3–23.5 billion (approx. 21% lower)" — this divergence will be settled by turnover data, not by narratives.
Three changes over the next 6–12 months that could alter pricing: ① Turnover center — average daily turnover (currently RMB 1.62 trillion) and margin balance (RMB 2.48 trillion, down eight consecutive sessions) are the common causal variables for brokerage, margin interest, and proprietary trading environments; the attribution of the three price scenarios is almost entirely determined by these; ② Earnings verification — the QoQ decline in standalone Q3 proprietary trading and brokerage income in the 10-30 Q3 report will determine whether the market reads the "H1 record high" as a continuing boom or a cyclical peak (reference: CITIC Securities Q3 attributable net profit -20.19% YoY, -41.5% QoQ, already disclosed); ③ Liability side — RMB 37.3 billion of outstanding perpetual bonds are being refinanced tranche by tranche at low rates of 1.77%–1.95% (four put/call exercises between 2026-10-28 and 2027-01-26), saving approx. RMB 200 million in annual interest; the RMB 10 billion HKD H-share convertible bond maturing 2027-02 faces a binary outcome of conversion (approx. 5.5% dilution) or repayment (approx. RMB 8.5 billion).
Primary stock-price driver: the market-wide turnover center (trading volume + margin balance). Secondary drivers, in order: Q3 standalone earnings resilience; the policy and liquidity policy mix (rate and RRR cuts + market-stabilization mechanisms + long-term capital inflows, with a high probability of implementation).
Verifiable expectation gaps and validation/falsification points: 10-30 Q3 report (standalone attributable profit of RMB 3.8–5.5 billion is the base-case range; below RMB 3.0 billion or a proprietary trading loss would trigger a downward revision); 11-02 earnings call (Q4 turnover outlook and proprietary trading exposure commentary); Q4 turnover (average daily turnover returning above RMB 2 trillion with margin balances stopping their decline would confirm a bull market; sustained levels below RMB 1.5 trillion with margin balances below RMB 2.2 trillion would confirm a bear market).
H1's simultaneous rise in volume and price reversed in Q3: the CSI 300 fell about 12.5% for the quarter (down 20.2% from the YTD high as of 10-27, turning negative YTD). Mapping CITIC's actual -20.19% YoY onto Huatai implies approx. RMB 4.14 billion for standalone Q3; we set a range of RMB 3.8–5.5 billion, with full-year 2026 at RMB 18.5–21.5 billion (+13% to +31%). The 2027E of RMB 16.8–19.2 billion is this report's core point of divergence from the sell side (consensus RMB 22.3–23.5 billion): the sell side extrapolates the "new normal" linearly, while we model a 2021→2022-style mean-reversion path (Huatai's net profit fell -17.2% that year) but with a narrower decline — this cycle's margin/institutional/international business bases are thicker, and the FVOCI high-dividend strategy provides stronger smoothing. Falsification condition: if average daily turnover in 2027 sustains above RMB 2 trillion and margin balances stay no lower than RMB 2.6 trillion, this judgment is wrong and the bull-case scenario should apply.
On a like-for-like basis (market price × shares / net assets attributable to shareholders), Huatai's 0.72x represents an approx. 31% discount to the peer median of 1.05x — a discount directionally consistent with Huatai's slip in H1 2026 weighted ROE rankings (6.30%, overtaken by CITIC at 7.81% and GF/CMB at 8%+), though deeper in magnitude. Back-solving PB-ROE, the current price implies a sustainable ROE of approx. 8.5%–9.35%, almost exactly the 2021–2025 five-year actual average (8.78%; using net profit/net assets for 2022–2025, the average is 7.74%, implying an even lower figure). Absolute value in three layers: asset floor of RMB 20.26/share (H1 2026 end, common shareholders ex-perpetuals; RMB 23.94 including perpetuals); EPV (normalized ROE 8.8%, cost of equity 10%) approx. RMB 17.8/share — parameter sensitivity range of RMB 16.6–19.8 (ROE 7.7%–8.8%, Ke 9%–10.5%), with the current price in the middle of the range, indicating "fair value" is a band, not a precise point; growth-option residual approx. -2.5%, i.e., the market pays nothing for growth. On the other side: the brokerage sector's PB of 1.09x sits at about the 9th percentile over 5 years, and public fund holdings are 0.60% (benchmark weight 3.13%) — "pessimistic overshoot" is equally possible. Overall judgment: reasonably cheap (slightly below fair), with symmetrical upside/downside odds.
The industry is shifting from a "scale race" to an "efficiency race," and efficiency is precisely Huatai's strength: H1 2026 net profit of RMB 11.692 billion ranks 3rd among listed brokerages (approx. 7.0% share), net margin about 5 percentage points above the industry, and MAU leading the No. 2 player by about 20%. The Jiangsu state-owned system holds approx. 28.7% in aggregate (Guoxin 15.22% + Traffic Control 5.42% + GaoTou etc.); as Jiangsu's largest brokerage, the probability of Huatai being "consolidated away" is extremely low. Market speculation about "Huatai + Nanjing Securities" regional integration occasionally surfaces (unverified, no company announcement), constituting a low-probability call option excluded from the base case. The risk is a valuation-anchor shift from the ranking decline: the market's reference point for pricing Huatai's recovery could shift from "quasi-leader" to "strong second tier," capping the PB re-rating ceiling.
Based on 2026E attributable net profit of RMB 18.5–21.5 billion and a 30% payout ratio, the forward dividend yield is approx. 3.7%–4.1% (FY2025 basis: 3.17%); below-book valuation plus bond-like yield form a valuation floor. Structural costs must be acknowledged: perpetual bond interest is distributed ahead of common shareholders (approx. 5.6%–6.2% of profit attributable to common shareholders), and high-coupon legacy bonds are being refinanced at 1.77%–1.95% (annual savings approx. RMB 200 million); CB repayment at maturity, at a frozen exchange rate, equals approx. RMB 8.50 billion, while conversion dilutes approx. 5.5% — either outcome has a cost, but both are manageable. The shareholder register is clean, with no supply overhang.
Volume sensitivity: if average daily turnover falls from approx. RMB 2.5–2.7 trillion in H1 to RMB 1.5 trillion (a decline of approx. 40–45%), with a historical revenue elasticity below 1, brokerage income (annualized from H1 2026 at approx. RMB 12.5 billion) would contract by roughly 30–40%; the margin balance has already fallen approx. 18% from its peak, compounded by a rate war compressing spreads. Fee rates are a certain long-term variable: asset management fees declined consecutively over FY2023–2025 (RMB 5.264 → 4.146 → 1.798 billion, including the AssetMark deconsolidation and fee reform effects), with H1 2026 stabilizing at +3.7% YoY — the marginal impact of Phase 3 fee reform landing in 2026 remains to be seen. The rise in credit impairments reflects more a normalization from an abnormally low base (only RMB 298 million for full-year 2025) than a deterioration in asset quality; however, if the market falls another 10–15%, margin financing impairment risk could amplify.
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | 2026Q1 | 2026H1 (latest) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating revenue (RMB bn) | 31.642 | 33.519 | 35.810 | 10.422 | 23.658 |
| Net profit attributable to shareholders (RMB bn) | 12.751 | 15.351 | 16.383 | 4.800 | 11.692 |
| Net profit excl. non-recurring items (RMB bn) | 12.887 | 9.034 | 16.268 | 4.802 | — (not separately disclosed in interim report; H1 non-recurring items minimal) |
| Net margin (attributable/revenue) | 40.3% | 45.8% | 45.75% | 46.1% | 49.4% |
| Weighted average ROE | 8.12% | 9.24% | 9.20% | 2.61% (standalone quarter) | 6.30% (half-year, annualized approx. 12.6%) |
| Total assets (RMB bn) | 905.508 | 814.270 | 1,077.348 | 1,225.406 | 1,351.617 |
| Net assets attributable to shareholders (RMB bn) | 179.108 | 191.674 | 206.939 | 211.407 | 216.145 |
| Operating cash flow (RMB bn) | -31.458 | +68.168 | -12.602 | +35.905 | +78.832 |
| Leverage multiple (ex-client funds) | — | — | 4.04 | 4.39 | 4.70 |
| Asset-liability ratio | — | — | 75.25% (end) | — | 78.73% (end) |
| Cash dividend payout ratio | 30.45% | 30.58% | 30.30% | — | Interim dividend RMB 0.18/share (13.9% of H1 attributable profit) |
Note: FY2023/FY2024 are on the retrospectively restated warehouse-receipt trade net basis (FY2023 revenue before adjustment: RMB 36.578 billion); FY2024 attributable net profit includes a non-recurring RMB 6.336 billion gain on AssetMark disposal (excl. non-recurring: RMB 9.034 billion); gross margin/free cash flow/net debt-EBITDA concepts are not applicable to brokerages and are therefore omitted. Balance sheet stocks are period-end figures; latest as of 2026-06-30.
Reasons for metric changes (YoY ≥ ±20% excerpts, all with company explanations): ① FY2025 brokerage fees +41.5% — company explanation: "mainly due to growth in net fee income from brokerage and investment banking businesses," against a backdrop of A-share turnover of RMB 41.986 quadrillion (+63.36%); ② Net interest income +62.5% — "mainly due to growth in margin financing interest income and a decline in interest expense on interest-bearing liabilities"; ③ Asset management fees -56.6% — the company did not separately explain (this report's note: mainly AssetMark deconsolidation and public fund fee reform effects); ④ Other business income +394.7% (RMB 747 million) — low-base effect after the switch to net-basis accounting for warehouse-receipt trades; ⑤ Total assets at FY2025 end +32.31% — balance sheet expansion in investment/trading and margin financing; ⑥ H1 2026 credit impairments of RMB 1.110 billion (prior-year period RMB 0.01 billion) — "mainly due to impairment provisions on margin financing"; ⑦ H1 2026 FX losses of RMB 2.234 billion (prior-year period RMB 0.636 billion) — expanding overseas business exposure.
H1 2026 revenue was RMB 23.658 billion (+45.86%) and net profit attributable to shareholders RMB 11.692 billion (+54.87%), a record high for the period (Xinhuanet 2026-08-28; Huachuang Securities' commentary noted a "resonance of retail trading and proprietary investing," near the top end of the earnings preannouncement range). By segment: brokerage RMB 6.264 billion (+66.9%), investment banking RMB 1.541 billion (+31.9%), asset management RMB 926 million (+3.7%), net interest income RMB 2.283 billion (+12.1%), investment income plus fair-value changes RMB 14.322 billion (+72.1%, 60.5% of revenue). By quarter: Q1 attributable profit RMB 4.800 billion, Q2 RMB 6.892 billion, with Q2 standalone proprietary income of RMB 9.091 billion forming an exceptionally high base. Total assets grew +25.5% from the start of the year to RMB 1,351.6 billion, with leverage (ex-client funds) rising to 4.70x. The blemishes are in quality: credit impairments of RMB 1.110 billion concentrated in Q2 (RMB 1.041 billion); FX losses of RMB 2.234 billion; derivative financial liabilities rising from RMB 18.2 billion at the start of the year to RMB 71.4 billion (expanding hedging exposure). The results are strong in themselves, but the substance is "market-given" — market data have already reversed in H2, and H1 growth cannot be extrapolated: Q3 trading (turnover approx. -18% QoQ, CSI 300 -12.5% for the quarter) will hit both proprietary and brokerage lines simultaneously; the 10-30 Q3 report is the first validation point.
Business model in brief: A leading full-licensed securities firm with a dual-engine model: asset-light (fee-based income from brokerage/investment banking/asset management, 40.2% of revenue in FY2025, declining to ~37.9% in 2026H1) and asset-heavy (proprietary investing + margin financing interest + market-making/derivatives, ~60%). FCF/CapEx/ROIC concepts do not apply to financials; earnings quality is assessed using brokerage-specific metrics instead.
Cash content and structure of earnings: ① Revenue mix swings with the market — the ratio of fee income (with customer and license stickiness, fluctuating with trading volume) to balance-sheet-driven income (fluctuating with financial investment scale × yield and market beta) passively tilts toward asset-heavy in bull markets (investment income + fair value accounted for 48.0% in FY2025 and 60.5% in 2026H1); ② OCF swings wildly (-RMB 31.458bn → +RMB 68.168bn → -RMB 12.602bn) due to changes in customer deposits and financial assets at fair value; the company explicitly states in its annual report that "operating cash flow movements are not closely correlated with annual net profit" — conventional OCF/net profit analysis does not apply; this is an industry characteristic, not an anomaly; ③ The true yardstick of earnings quality is the ROE driver structure: weighted ROE rose 8.12% → 9.24% → 9.20% over 2023-2025, and ~12.6% annualized in 2026H1 — the improvement came mainly from balance sheet expansion (financial investments RMB 359.8bn → 483.2bn → 580.3bn; leverage excluding customer deposits 4.04x → 4.70x; margin financing +40%) × market beta, rather than organic fee income growth — meaning peak earnings will likely coincide with peak market conditions.
Capital & leverage (replacing capex quality): Parent-company net capital was RMB 94.567bn at end-FY2025 and RMB 103.411bn at end-2026Q1 — ample capital buffer with room for further balance sheet expansion and dividends. Capital consumption goes to financial investments (asset-heavy expansion), not capacity building — for a broker this is capital allocation into "buying beta scale," with returns fluctuating with market cycles.
Moat & quality red flags: The moat lies in the scale effects of its retail wealth platform (Zhangyue #1 with 12.39m MAU, 7.25%-7.47% share of margin financing, top tier in brokerage share) and top-tier net margin advantage (45.75% vs industry 40.55%). Three red flags: ① Rising reliance on proprietary trading (60.5%) — amplified in bull markets, punishing in bear markets; ② Perpetual bonds of RMB 37.3bn receive distributions ahead of common shareholders year after year (annual interest ~RMB 1.2bn), structurally diluting common shareholders' participation in profits; ③ Migration of earnings from FVTPL to FVOCI (other equity instrument investments rose from RMB 126m to RMB 14.613bn in one year) smooths reported volatility but defers income recognition.
Words vs. deeds consistency: In recent years the company has offered only qualitative strategic narratives ("ALL IN AI", internationalization, building a first-class investment bank) with no quantitative revenue/ROE guidance, making commitments hard to verify; but delivery is strong — record 2026H1 results, and international business revenue ex-AssetMark grew +23.82%. Verdict: Strong delivery, unverifiable commitments (pragmatic, leaning neutral). Shareholder friendliness: Payout ratio stable at 30.3%-30.6% over FY2023-2025; cumulative dividends of RMB 42.910bn since A-share listing; cumulative buyback and cancellation of 49.7862m shares over 2022-2025; 2026 interim dividend of RMB 0.18/share went ex-dividend on 10-23. Funding relies mainly on perpetuals/convertibles/offshore bonds, with no dilutive common equity issuance. Verdict: Shareholder-friendly. Risk signals: No controlling shareholder (Jiangsu SOEs hold a combined ~28.7%, stable long-term, no sell-downs); Huatai United Securities received a warning letter from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange over the Fuhuang Steel project (2026-02); the Shanghai Financial Court's final ruling ordered joint compensation of ~RMB 10.04m for snowball product sales violations (2026-07); the Meijite ABS litigation has a provision of RMB 675m booked (second-instance proceedings suspended) — all are isolated incidents with no going-concern implications, but multiple internal-control lapses in investment banking and sales suitability have surfaced, requiring monitoring for potential regulatory escalation.
| Segment | Revenue Share | Segment Margin | Share of Pre-tax Profit | Revenue YoY | One-line Business Logic |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wealth Management | 44.30% | 55.75% (+4.80pp) | 48.09% | +29.85% | Brokerage + margin financing + distribution + advisory; most direct exposure to trading beta |
| Institutional Services | 19.36% | 41.61% (+17.40pp) | 16.06% | +42.42% | Investment banking + research sales + proprietary trading/market-making/derivatives |
| Investment Management | 11.06% | 72.71% (+47.37pp) | 15.64% | +176.35% | Brokerage asset management + PE + alternatives; driven by PE valuation recovery |
| International | 16.53% | 61.87% (-0.62pp) | 19.85% | -46.75% (+23.82% ex-AssetMark) | Huatai Financial Holdings (HK): HK investment banking + derivatives + wealth management |
| Others | 8.75% | 3.65% (-18.38pp) | 0.4% | -19.32% | HQ operations + associates (Southern Asset Management/Huatai-Berry/Jiangsu Bank) |
The profit engine is the Wealth Management segment (48.09% of pre-tax profit), not whichever segment tops the revenue mix; International contributes nearly 20% of pre-tax profit on 16.5% of revenue, making it the second profit pillar (Huatai International net profit HKD 3.284bn in FY2025, ~22.9% of the group). Segment margins vary widely (Investment Management 72.71% vs Others 3.65%, a 69pp gap): Investment Management and International are capital-light fee/license businesses with high margins and scale economies; "Others" is effectively a HQ cost center (associate income is presented within pre-tax profit under the equity method), so its low margin is an accounting artifact. Note that the Investment Management segment's FY2025 pre-tax profit surged +693.7% (the company attributes this "mainly to year-on-year valuation uplift of private equity fund and alternative investment projects") — valuation-driven profit elasticity will likewise bite back in market downturns.
Accounting red flags (by severity): ① Inflating revenue via physical commodity trading (medium) — FY2023 other business revenue of RMB 5.126bn carried near-zero gross margin; from 2025 the company switched to net presentation with retrospective restatement (FY2024 revenue shrank from RMB 8.011bn to RMB 151m), squeezing out the revenue padding — a remediated item; ② Migration of proprietary assets to FVOCI to smooth profits (medium) — other equity instrument investments rose RMB 126m → 14.613bn (+11,498%) and other debt investments RMB 10.1bn → 44.8bn; fair-value swings of high-dividend holdings flow to OCI while only dividends hit the P&L, reducing reported volatility but deferring embedded gains; ③ Sharp shifts in credit impairment provisioning (medium) — FY2023 reversal of RMB 411m → FY2024 charge of RMB 246m → FY2025 RMB 594m → 2026H1 alone RMB 1.110bn (of which RMB 1.041bn in Q2 alone), highly concentrated timing; ④ Abnormal volatility in effective tax rate (low) — FY2024 at -1.1% (likely linked to the tax basis of the offshore AssetMark disposal), rising to 11.0% in FY2025; the company only cited "higher taxable income" without item-by-item reconciliation.
Cross-period consistency: ① Asset management fees fell continuously over FY2023-2025 (RMB 5.264bn → 4.146bn → 1.798bn) without company-specific explanation (mainly the AssetMark deconsolidation and fee reform; stabilized at +3.7% in 2026H1) — unexplained by the company; ② Persistent divergence between operating cash flow and net profit (-RMB 31.458bn/+RMB 68.168bn/-RMB 12.602bn) — company explains as business characteristic, consistent; ③ The reported vs. adjusted earnings divergence is concentrated in FY2024 (RMB 6.317bn gap = AssetMark disposal gain), consistent with announcements; ④ A ~RMB 7.9bn definitional gap around the warehouse-receipt trading restatement has been standardized via accounting policy change.
Current market data (closing price 2026-10-27): Share price RMB 17.35; market cap ~RMB 156.6bn; PB(LF) 0.72x (including perpetuals); 0.876x on a common-shareholder basis ex-perpetuals (BVPS RMB 19.81-20.26), at the 0th percentile over the past 1 year / 39th over 5 years / 19th over 10 years; PE(TTM) 7.63x (0th percentile across multiple windows, percentiles for reference only — TTM earnings are at a cyclical high; if FY2026 lands at RMB 18.5-21.5bn and 2027 recedes, forward PE would rise to 7.4-9.3x); PE(static) 9.56x (27th percentile over 5 years); forward PE ~7.4-8.2x (our 2026E); FY2025 dividend yield 3.17%, 2026E forward ~3.7%-4.1%. H-shares (6886.HK) at HKD 15.16, ~25% discount to A-shares (including FX conversion). The stock is down ~-28.8% YTD, ~32% off its 52-week high of RMB 25.56 — deeper than the CSI 300 (-20% from its high) — brokers suffer on both sides in falling markets.
Market-implied expectations: Backing out via a PB-ROE framework (Ke 9.5%-10.5%, g 2.5%-3%), the current price implies a sustainable ROE of ~8.5%-9.35% (midpoint ~9.0%) — almost exactly the 2021-2025 five-year actual average of 8.78% (9.84%/7.49%/8.12%/9.24%/9.20%). Equivalently: the current price requires Huatai to deliver only its "past five-year average" — the 2026 volume-and-price upturn is entirely excluded, implying mid-cycle assumptions of a RMB 1.6-1.8tn trading center and RMB 2.3-2.5tn margin balance. Against reality: 2026H1 annualized ROE ~12.6%; sell-side consensus implies 2027E ROE ~11.5% (with upward revisions of +9.4% over the past 90 days). The 2.5pp gap between the market and the sell side is fundamentally about whether the trading center has stepped up durably or will revert in a pulse — Q4 volume data will be the arbiter.
Three-tier value (EPV): Asset floor of RMB 20.26/share (end-2026H1, ex-perpetuals; the RMB 23.94 including perpetuals overstates value available to common shareholders, since perpetual coupons rank ahead); zero-growth EPV tier ~RMB 17.8/share (normalized ROE 8.8% × BVPS RMB 20.26 ≈ RMB 1.78/share, divided by 10% cost of equity; for brokers, zero-growth earnings ≈ distributable cash, equity capitalized directly) — parameter sensitivity range RMB 16.6-19.8 (normalized ROE 7.7%-8.8% × Ke 9%-10.5%), with the current price in mid-range; growth option residual ~-2.5%, the market is not only not paying for growth options (wealth platform/AI/internationalization) but applying a slight discount to zero-growth earning power — classic "cyclical peak downturn" pricing; upside options (policy, M&A) are nearly free, but only if the bear case fails to materialize.
Three scenarios & odds (12-month horizon):
| Scenario | Probability | Fair Range | vs. Current Price | Decisive Driver |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 25% | RMB 12.5-14.2 | -28.0%~-18.2% (midpoint -23.1%) | Trading shrinks to RMB 1.2-1.5tn daily average, margin balance falls toward RMB 2.0tn; 2027E net profit RMB 12.5-14bn (ROE 6.5%-7%); PB 0.60-0.68x × 2026E BVPS RMB 20.94 |
| Base | 55% | RMB 16.8-19.1 | -3.2%~+10.1% (midpoint +3.5%) | Volume stabilizes at RMB 1.8-2tn daily average, margin balance RMB 2.4-2.6tn; 2027E net profit RMB 17.0-18.5bn (ROE 8.8%-9.2% ≈ 5-year average); PB 0.80-0.91x (anchored to Guotai Haitong 0.86 and Gordon-consistent range) |
| Bull | 20% | RMB 21.6-24.1 | +24.5%~+38.9% (midpoint +31.7%) | Rally restarts (daily RMB 2.2tn+, margin RMB 2.8tn+) or M&A catalyst; 2027E net profit RMB 20.0-21.5bn (ROE 10.5%+); PB 1.03-1.15x (anchored to peer range 0.86-1.23 and Huatai's own 10-year median PB of 1.15) |
Probability-weighted fair value ~RMB 17.78 (+2.5%); the base scenario equals our target range of RMB 16.8-19.1. Anchoring rationale for the base-case exit multiple of PB 0.80-0.91x: Guotai Haitong at 0.86x (actual 2026-10-27 calculation, at its 10th percentile over 5 years, with ROE similar to Huatai) and a dividend-discount implied range (Ke 9.5%-10%); we did not use "Huatai's current 0.876x" as anchor to avoid circular reasoning; deviating from Huatai's 10-year median PB of 1.15 reflects the risk of an anchor shift driven by sliding ROE rankings and competitive position.
Our earnings forecast (reconciliation anchor): FY2026E revenue RMB 40.0-43.0bn (+12%~+20%), net profit attributable to parent RMB 18.5-21.5bn (+13%~+31%) — RMB 11.692bn already locked in H1; Q3E RMB 3.8-5.5bn (CITIC's actual YoY implies ~RMB 4.14bn), Q4E RMB 2.8-4.5bn (2025Q4 low base of RMB 3.65bn); FY2027E revenue RMB 35.5-40.0bn, net profit RMB 16.8-19.2bn (-4%~-16% vs. 2026E midpoint). Our 2026E is ~6% below sell-side consensus (RMB 20.8-22.0bn) and 2027E ~21% below — the core disagreement is the volume center, not company execution.
Conclusion: Fair with a downside bias (judgment=fair, leaning undervalued). Assess quality (No. 3 in profit, top-tier efficiency, platform monopoly power) and price (0.72x PB, implied five-year-average ROE, negative growth option residual) separately: the price fully reflects cyclical receding, while what remains unpriced is the upside tail of policy and M&A — but that is an option, not a margin of safety. Target price RMB 16.8-19.1 (base-case fair value); margin of safety -3.2% (base-case fair value floor below current price), at the current price there is neither a buying safety cushion nor short-selling value.
Industry size: China's securities industry (per SAC, 150 securities firms) posted FY2025 revenue of RMB 541.171 billion and net profit of RMB 219.439 billion (net margin 40.5%); in H1 2026, revenue was RMB 329.810 billion (+31.38%) and net profit RMB 138.664 billion (+23.50%), both record highs for the period (first-hand data from the Securities Association of China, Sep 2026). Industry total assets expanded from RMB 14.83 trillion at end-2025 to RMB 17.23 trillion at end-June 2026. Growth trajectory: FY2024 revenue RMB 438.0 billion (+8.0%) → 2025 +19.9% (Deloitte citing SAC) → 2026H1 +31.4% — 2025-2026H1 is the strongest stretch since 2021; CITIC Securities Research projects 2026 industry net profit +30.3% and industry ROE of about 8.38%, a ten-year high. The main volume driver is the trading turnover center: A-share average daily turnover of RMB 1.72 trillion in 2025 (first time annual turnover exceeded RMB 400 trillion) → RMB 2.65 trillion in Jan-May 2026 (+53% vs. full-year 2025) → Q3 equity/fund daily average RMB 2.77 trillion (-18% QoQ) → down to RMB 1.62 trillion in late October; margin financing balance first exceeded RMB 2.5 trillion in Oct 2025 → peaked at RMB 3.03 trillion on 2026-06-25 → RMB 2.48 trillion in October (approx. -18%). IPO proceeds totaled RMB 223.859 billion in the first three quarters (+194.65%), already about 70% above full-year 2025 (RMB 131.771 billion); refinancing reached RMB 950.865 billion for FY2025 (+326%). Price headwinds are equally certain: the three-phase public fund fee reform concludes in 2026 (cumulative annual concession approx. RMB 51 billion), and commission rates face long-term decline — the industry is in a "volume up, price down" channel.
Value chain and value distribution: Upstream are regulatory licenses and net capital constraints (which cap balance-sheet expansion), exchange channels and settlement systems, and financial IT vendors — securities firms have weak bargaining power upstream, with fee caps set by regulators. The midstream is the securities firm itself; 2026H1 industry revenue structure: proprietary investment RMB 113.097 billion (34.3%, largest revenue source), brokerage RMB 104.135 billion (31.6%), net interest income RMB 40.513 billion (12.3%), investment banking underwriting and sponsorship RMB 16.131 billion plus financial advisory RMB 2.390 billion, asset management RMB 12.142 billion — heavy-asset businesses combined approx. 46.6%, light-asset approx. 42.4%. Downstream are retail investors (commissions + margin interest + fund distribution), corporate issuers (underwriting fees), and public/private funds (research commissions +97.2% YoY in 2026H1, PB custody). Profit elasticity concentrates mainly in the heavy-asset segment (proprietary trading × leverage) and the retail wealth segment (brokerage × margin financing) — precisely Huatai's two core segments.
Supply-demand and competitive landscape: The supply side is characterized by "overall excess, scarcity at the top": 150 licensed firms compete homogeneously (falling fee rates are the pricing manifestation), but capital, licenses, technology, and client bases are accelerating concentration toward the top — 9M 2026 IPO underwriting CR5 approx. 78.76%; 2026H1 listed brokers' net profit CR5 approx. 46.4% (CITIC 23.343 + Guotai Haitong 20.260 + Huatai 11.692 + GF 11.652 + CMS 10.624 = RMB 77.571 billion / 50 firms combined RMB 167.221 billion). The 2024-2026 M&A wave is reducing supply: Guotai Junan absorbed Haitong (completed 2025; total assets RMB 2.11 trillion, industry #1); Guolian + Minsheng, Zheshang + Guodu, Guosen + Wanhe, and Western + Guorong all closed; CICC's "three-in-one" (absorbing Dongxing + Cinda) completed settlement on 2026-10-26 (total assets jump to #4; the 6th trillion-RMB broker); Orient Securities' RMB 25.12 billion acquisition of Shanghai Securities went to review committee on 10-29; the SAC issued its first M&A best-practice guidance (No. 8) on 2026-10-21. Entry barriers: license approval + hard net capital constraints (balance-sheet capacity = trillion-RMB capital) + tech investment + customer switching costs. Substitution threats: internet traffic brokers (East Money), bank wealth management/public funds diverting wealth assets, and foreign investment banks competing for cross-border institutional business.
Cycles and regulation: The industry is in a "high-level pullback within an upcycle" (not the start of a downcycle) — absolute turnover (RMB 1.62 trillion) remains near the 2025 full-year daily average (fluctuating around RMB 1.72 trillion, roughly comparable); whether this is a mid-bull-market correction or a turning point awaits Q4 validation. Leading indicators: daily equity/fund turnover, margin balance (eight consecutive declines), new equity fund issuance (Q3 -34% YoY), monthly new account openings (September the year's lowest), broker sector PB percentile (1.09x / ~9% 5-year percentile, CMS data as of 10-09), and public fund positioning (0.60% vs. 3.13% benchmark weight — historically extreme underweight). Regulatory direction is "support the strong, restrict the weak": since the new "Nine Guidelines," regulators have encouraged top-tier M&A to build "first-class investment banks" (Wu Qing at the Financial Street Forum on 2026-10-19: support industry M&A and follow-up integration, consolidate market-stabilization mechanisms, expand medium-to-long-term capital inflows, deepen public fund reform). The public fund fee reform conclusion suppresses light-asset fee rates, but 2026H1 research commissions +97.2% shows volume can offset; dividend and investor-protection orientation lifts the sector's shareholder-return center. For Huatai: the policy mix (M&A approvals + net capital constraints + medium/long-term capital inflows) is overall favorable to leading full-service brokers.
Peer benchmarking (2026H1 results and 2026-10-27 valuations):
| Company | Revenue (RMB 100M) | Revenue YoY | Net profit attributable (RMB 100M) | Weighted ROE (non-annualized) | PB (LF) | Key differences vs. Huatai |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CITIC Securities | 496.92 | +50.0% | 233.43 (Q3 standalone -20.19%) | 7.81% | 1.23 | All-round leader; strongest institutional/international depth |
| Guotai Haitong | 471.63 | +97.6% | 202.60 | 6.12% | 0.86 | Post-merger scale roughly twice Huatai's; wins on size |
| Huatai Securities | 236.58 | +45.9% | 116.92 | 6.30% | 0.72 | Retail wealth + tech platform; superior efficiency and net margin |
| GF Securities | 268.83 | +74.6% | 116.52 | >8% | 1.04 | Large asset-management license cluster (GF Fund/E Fund) |
| CMS (China Merchants Securities) | 219.02 | +108.2% | 106.24 | >8% | 1.10 | SOE background + direct-investment co-investment elasticity (large quarterly swings) |
| China Galaxy | 168.50 | +22.6% | 77.97 | 6.00% | 1.05 | Offline branch network + retail margin; slowest growth |
(CICC is excluded from the mean comparison for now: its "three-in-one" share swap settlement just completed, with share capital and price mismatch distorting PB (tool-based 2.32x, ~99th percentile over the past year).)
Company positioning within the industry: First tier, the "third profit pole" — 2026H1 net profit attributable ranked #3 industry-wide, revenue #4 (will fall to #5 after the new CICC consolidation), ROE 6.30% ranked #4 among top brokers; net margin of 45.75% consistently above the industry average of 40.55%. Market share trend steady with modest gains: margin share 7.25% (end-FY2025) → 7.47% (end-2026H1), Leading e-Commerce ("Zhangle") app MAU industry #1, equity/fund turnover market share in the top tier for years. Moat sources: platform monopoly in retail wealth management (MAU leads #2 by about 20%; online customer acquisition cost below peers) + AI-native transformation (AI Zhangle launched 9 months ago, 5M+ downloads). Positioning verdict: a hybrid of chaser and leader — scale ranking under pressure (risk of becoming a strong second-tier player), but leading in efficiency and retail (top-tier profit quality); the industry's shift from a scale race to an efficiency race is relatively favorable for Huatai.
Broker valuation and research cannot simply apply industrial-company frameworks. The decisive factors lie in the following five points, which generic metrics systematically miss:
1. Asset structure and the "market-beta content" of revenue. Fee-based income (brokerage/IB/AM) fluctuates with turnover and deal cycles, but fee rates decline long term; heavy-asset income (proprietary × leverage + margin interest) amplifies with financial investment scale and market beta. Huatai's fee-based share fell from 40.2% in FY2025 to approx. 37.9% in 2026H1 — the passive rise of heavy assets in a bull market means current reported margins and ROE carry a high "market-weight," and cross-cycle comparisons must be normalized. This is the fundamental reason this report uses PB as the primary anchor, with PE percentile for reference only.
2. Trading-volume beta is the first exogenous variable. Sensitivity of brokerage and margin income: every RMB 500 billion change in daily turnover (approx. ±25%) corresponds to about ±RMB 2.5-3.0 billion of Huatai brokerage income (historical elasticity below 1); every RMB 300 billion change in margin balance, at 7.3% share and a 4%-5% blended spread, means about ±RMB 1 billion of interest income. Current RMB 1.62 trillion turnover + RMB 2.48 trillion margin balance sit at a "high-level cooling" position — the core adjudicating variable for scenario outcomes.
3. Leverage and net capital regulation set the ceiling on balance-sheet expansion. The risk-indicator framework of net capital regulation (risk coverage ratio, capital leverage ratio, net stable funding ratio, etc.) constitutes a hard industry-wide constraint on expansion; Huatai's indicators are above warning thresholds (unverified). Huatai's ex-client-funds leverage is 4.70x; top-tier industry peers approx. 4-5x — room to expand the balance sheet to buy beta remains, but each round of expansion amplifies the next cycle's amplitude. Perpetual bonds (RMB 37.3 billion) count toward supplementary net capital — a regulatory-basis capital instrument, not common equity; the gap between the two PB bases stems from this.
4. Market share × platform is the only "non-market" alpha. Brokerage market share, margin share, app MAU, and IB underwriting rankings determine relative profit share under the same market conditions. Huatai's market-share portfolio (equity/fund turnover top tier, margin 7.25%-7.47%, Zhangle MAU 12.39M #1, HK IPO sponsorship 22 deals #3) is the explanatory buffer for its PB discount being deeper than its fundamentals ranking — but market share advantages can only smooth volatility, not hedge direction.
5. Industry consolidation is double-edged. The M&A wave simultaneously changes the supply landscape (favoring top-tier concentration) and company rankings (Huatai revenue #4 → #5); Huatai's own option as consolidator (rumors of Jiangsu regional consolidation, unconfirmed) versus risk as a consolidation target (extremely low probability; Jiangsu SASAC holds 28.7% + largest scale) is asymmetric — an upside option structure, not included in the base case.
Rating: Neutral (confidence 0.55, 6-12 months). Huatai Securities is top-tier in quality (#3 in profit, #1 tier in efficiency, monopoly power in the retail platform), but at present "a good company" and "a good price" do not hold simultaneously: the current price of RMB 17.35 already prices in a mid-cycle ROE ≈ 9%; probability-weighted fair value is RMB 17.78 (+2.5%), base-case fair value RMB 16.8-19.1 (-3.2% to +10.1%) — neither a margin of safety nor a significant overvaluation. Q3 earnings pullback and 2027 volume normalization are the base-case assumptions; the policy package and the M&A option are unpriced upside tails. Strategy: stay on the sidelines or hold; do not add. Upgrade only after right-side confirmation signals appear (10-30 Q3 report: standalone quarterly attributable net profit ≥ RMB 3.8 billion with proprietary trading decline smaller than peers + daily turnover back above RMB 2 trillion and margin balance stabilizing); switch to defensive if the Q3 standalone quarter is < RMB 3.0 billion or proprietary trading turns to a loss, or if volume stays below RMB 1.5 trillion.
Risk and catalyst alerts: Downside risks — high-beta proprietary trading (financial investments RMB 580.3 billion × 1pp yield ≈ RMB 5.8 billion pre-tax), margin-account impairment amplifying in a market downturn (collateral ratio 299.80%), a double hit to 2027 brokerage + margin income (combined impact RMB 4.5-6.0 billion), valuation-anchor reset from slipping M&A rankings, and the Mujite ABS second hearing plus regulatory escalation. Upside catalysts — a Q4 policy package (RRR/rate cuts + market-stabilization mechanisms + medium/long-term capital inflows, cf. the sector's elasticity after "9·24" in 2024), brokerage M&A integration landing, low-cost perpetual bond refinancing (annual savings approx. RMB 200 million), FY2026 payout ratio maintained at 30%+ (forward dividend yield 3.7%-4.1%), and smooth conversion of the H-share convertible bond (thickening capital rather than diluting value).
Data and basis notes: price anchor is the 2026-10-27 closing price of RMB 17.35; financials as of 2026H1 (disclosed 2026-08-29), with the 2026Q3 report scheduled for disclosure on 2026-10-30; industry data retrieved as of 2026-10-27. Perpetual bond basis: both PB bases coexist — including perpetuals 0.72x / excluding perpetuals 0.86-0.88x; wherever common shareholder value is involved (EPV, BVPS, dividends), the ex-perpetual basis is used. Earnings forecasts in this report are independent estimates and diverge materially from sell-side consensus (2026E RMB 20.8-22.0 billion / 2027E RMB 22.3-23.5 billion); volume data take precedence in reconciliations.