| Meta Info | Value |
|---|---|
| Rating | Neutral |
| Target Price | RMB 6.53-8.43 (base-case fair value range, midpoint RMB 7.48) |
| Current Price | RMB 8.69 (close on 2026-10-26, price anchor for this report) |
| Margin of Safety | -25% ((base-case fair value lower bound 6.53 − current price 8.69) ÷ 8.69; no margin of safety) |
| Time Horizon | 6 months |
| Market Cap / Total Shares | RMB 60.826 billion / 6.9996 billion shares (fully circulating) |
| Key Multiples | PB 2.15x; PE-TTM 79.9x (earnings not representative, percentile for reference only); PS-TTM 6.73x |
| Key Coordinates | 52-week range RMB 8.24-14.03, 38% drawdown from high; net cash RMB 23.23 billion (RMB 3.32/share, 38.2% of market cap); TTM dividend yield ~2.3% |
360 turned profitable in 2025 (net profit attributable to parent of RMB 263 million) and delivered RMB 153 million in non-GAAP (recurring) net profit in 2026H1, showing continued recovery. However, the turnaround quality depends on government subsidies, investment income, and concentrated Q4 recognition, and operating cash flow remained negative in 2026H1. At the current price of RMB 8.69, the market cap structure is "38.2% net cash + 52.2% zero-growth value + 47.8% growth option" — nearly half the market cap is an AI transformation option with no report-level revenue verification yet (AI revenue has never been disclosed separately; Nano AI's third-party MAU is only in the millions, two orders of magnitude below Doubao's 419 million). Base-case fair value is RMB 6.53-8.43; the current price is ~14% above the midpoint, and the probability-weighted fair value is ~RMB 7.82 (-10% vs. current), indicating mild overvaluation rather than a bubble: RMB 23.2 billion of net cash, consecutive large dividends, and the lowest-tier PB among peers provide downside cushion. Supply uncertainty from the controlling shareholder's liquidation transfer caps rebound potential. Neutral rating: quality has a floor, the price isn't cheap, and verification checkpoints are imminent (Q3 report on 10-30, annual report in 2027-04). Wait and watch for evidence — neither chase nor short.
For balance, the improvement is equally real: the non-recurring share of attributable profit fell from 86.7% in FY2025 to 28.9% in 2026H1 (H1 government subsidies only ~RMB 50 million); single-quarter recurring profit has been positive for four consecutive quarters since 2025Q3 (159→173→90→64 million), though weakening sequentially. Negative cash flow has a seasonal cause — government/enterprise revenue is settled concentratedly in Q4 (self-disclosed in the semi-annual report under "operational management risks"); whether the full-year figure turns positive depends on Q4. Falsification condition for this thesis: if 2026 recurring profit turns negative, "lack of quality" is upgraded to established; if 9M26 recurring profit ≥ RMB 300 million and the subsidy share doesn't rebound, this thesis fails.
The back-derived market-implied expectations require sensitivity analysis: business value of RMB 37.6 billion at a 40x normalized PE implies sustainable recurring profit of ~RMB 940 million, ~RMB 750 million at 50x, ~RMB 630 million at 60x (net margin 7%-10.7%); reality is 2026H1 annualized recurring profit of ~RMB 310 million, or ~RMB 660 million annualized using 2025H2 run-rate including Q4 concentrated recognition — even on the optimistic run-rate basis, it barely reaches the lower bound of the 60x assumption. The option's internal structure is not homogeneous: internet value-added services have verified revenue (FY2025 +41.38%, gross margin 94.18%, 29.4% of revenue in 2026H1); what's truly "zero-evidence" is the separable verification of AI revenue and Nano AI's independent user scale. If the 2026 annual report shows value-added revenue growth ≥35% and first-time disclosure of AI membership revenue or paying users, this thesis should be downgraded.
Two adjustments to the assessment basis: First, the real usability of net cash has behavioral evidence — restricted raised funds only ~RMB 820 million; FY2025 total dividends of RMB 1.4 billion and an additional RMB 350 million interim dividend in 2026 were both executed; no uncovered losses at the parent level — the RMB 23.2 billion floor is largely credible; but with annual dividend outflows of RMB 1.0-1.7 billion versus operating cash flow of only RMB 150 million (negative in 2026H1), the floor is slowly eroding each year. Second, cheapness must be judged on operating assets: excluding net cash, the RMB 37.6 billion business value is ~7.5x operating net assets (~RMB 5 billion) — the traffic gateway and the 94%-gross-margin subscription business can support a premium, but security-related subsidiaries lost a combined ~RMB 500 million in 2026H1 (partially offset by profitable entities like Qifutong at +195 million and Shijie Xinghui at +145 million over the same period), and advertising gross margin fell 6.78pp to 60.70% in FY2025 — "cheap" is hardly the word. Falsification: if value-added revenue growth falls below 20% or advertising posts negative growth for two consecutive periods, the base logic weakens.
The magnitude of supply pressure must be viewed objectively: the reduction mechanism has been public since August 2024 and has been digested by two years of share price; this maximum-permitted execution is closer to partial realization of the negative. After transfer completion, the annualized on-exchange channel is ~4% (~RMB 2.4 billion of market cap per year) — a ceiling, not a commitment; the consortium's holdings correspond to ~RMB 500-600 million in annual dividends, and some members have incentives to collect dividends instead of selling. But before the transfer settles, governance structure (voting-rights delegation, 26 months of liquidation limbo) and the market misreading that "transfer = selling pressure begins" will both cap rebound heights. Dividends decoupled from earnings (payout ratio 532% vs. recurring profit of RMB 35 million) look more like shareholder cash distribution demands in a liquidation context. Falsification: upgrade to substantive pressure if consortium holdings decline >1.5%/quarter for two consecutive quarters post-transfer; downgrade to tail uncertainty if holdings stabilize at 52%±0.5% for two quarters with no new reduction plans.
The structural facts hold: a 37% R&D ratio is rigid spending at a revenue scale of RMB 8.7-9.5 billion, and the government/enterprise security entity keeps bleeding (H1 security-related combined ~-500 million; Q4-concentrated recognition of government/enterprise revenue implies a seasonal component to H1 losses, but full-year convergence awaits verification). However, two revisions to the static "either-or lock-in" judgment: First, 0% R&D capitalization is a conservative accounting policy choice, not an economic constraint — peer iFlytek's 2025 R&D was RMB 5.364 billion with a 42.59% capitalization rate; on a similar basis, 360's book recurring profit could be materially higher, and 360 is effectively "disadvantaged" in cross-company profitability comparisons on a reported basis. Second, absolute R&D spending has plateaued (FY2025 +0.72% YoY); if revenue sustains high-single-digit growth and mix shifts toward 94%-gross-margin businesses, the expense ratio will naturally decline and operating leverage will turn positive. The key to profit elasticity lies in revenue-side verification (AI membership/GEO/security recovery), not a forced expense-side either-or. Falsification: value-added revenue growth falling below 20% invalidates the dilution argument; or R&D ratio falls below 30% with still no AI revenue disclosure (defensive signal).
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | 2026H1 (latest period) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (RMB 100M) | 90.55 | 79.48 | 86.93 | 41.72 |
| Net profit attributable to parent (RMB 100M) | -4.92 | -10.94 | 2.63 | 2.16 |
| Recurring net profit (RMB 100M) | -7.56 | -11.81 | 0.35 | 1.53 |
| Gross margin | 60.20%* | 66.10% | 66.54% | 69.66% |
| Net margin attributable to parent | -5.44% | -13.76% | 3.03% | 5.17% |
| Operating cash flow (RMB 100M) | 9.24 | 3.26 | 1.54 | -0.57 |
| Free cash flow (RMB 100M, OCF−CapEx) | 4.23 | -4.32 | -3.35 | -1.81 |
| Cash + cash-like assets (RMB 100M, period-end) | 272.38 | 270.56 | 258.62 | 247.75 |
| Interest-bearing debt (RMB 100M, period-end) | 14.64 | 12.69 | 12.23 | 15.35 |
| Debt-to-asset ratio | 20.71% | 21.23% | 21.86% | 22.81% |
| R&D expenses (RMB 100M, fully expensed) | — | 32.02 | 32.25 | 15.78 |
| PC Safe Guard / Browser MAU | ~400M | ~400M | >400M / ~400M | both ~400M |
*FY2023 gross margin is on a core-business basis; the rest are consolidated-statement figures. The company is in a net cash position (net cash RMB 23.23 billion, as of 2026-06-30); net debt/EBITDA is not applicable; goodwill of RMB 2.313 billion accounts for 8.2% of net assets attributable to parent.
Reasons for metric changes (YoY ≥ ±20% summary, all with company explanations): ① FY2025 non-operating income +1,931.58% to RMB 209 million — company explanation: "mainly due to increased government subsidies" (key support for the turnaround); ② FY2025 investment income swing of +RMB 1.030 billion (equity-method -934 million → +359 million) — company explanation: "increased income from equity-method long-term investments" (Jincheng Bank, etc.); ③ FY2025 selling expenses +20.46% — "to strengthen product promotion and expand market influence," reversing to -6.16% in 2026H1 with "proactively adjusted product promotion strategy"; ④ FY2025 internet value-added services revenue +41.38% — "leveraging self-developed Brain (Zhinao) iteration across the product line... AI membership subscriptions as the main increment"; ⑤ FY2025 smart hardware revenue -21.31% (RMB 798 million) — no separate company explanation; only overseas hit-product growth disclosed, implying domestic contraction; ⑥ FY2025 operating cash flow -52.72% — "mainly due to increased cash paid for goods purchased and services received."
2026H1 revenue was RMB 4.172 billion (+9.01%), attributable net profit RMB 216 million (prior-year period -282 million), recurring profit RMB 153 million (prior-year period -297 million) — landing at the midpoint of the July guidance range (RMB 180-260 million). Gross margin was 69.66% (+3.12pp), driven by high-margin value-added services rising to 29.4% of revenue and stabilizing advertising gross margin (62.06%). The two main sources of profit recovery were revenue growth and selling expense reduction (-6.16%, -27.6% YoY in Q1), while the R&D ratio held at 37.81% without loosening. Items warranting caution: operating cash flow of -57 million (seasonal government/enterprise Q4-concentrated settlement); single-quarter recurring profit was 90 million in 2026Q1 and 64 million in Q2, weakening sequentially; the upcoming Q3 report (disclosed 2026-10-30) will directly test whether Q3 alone can match 2025Q3's 159 million. The company disclosed no quantitative revenue/profit guidance; sell-side consensus sample count is 0, so "beat/miss" lacks a market anchor — this report benchmarks only against the company's own guidance and historical cadence. Contract liabilities of RMB 1.507 billion (end-2024: 1.328 billion; end-2025: 1.529 billion) grew consecutively, a leading indicator of membership prepayments and security orders.
Business model snapshot: An asset-light hybrid platform — PC traffic entry points (Security Guardian / Browser, each with roughly 400 million MAU) monetized via advertising (50.5% of revenue); C-end AI membership subscriptions and game distribution (value-added services, gross margin 94.18%, net-revenue method); government/enterprise security on a project basis (concentrated acceptance in Q4); and smart hardware (gross margin 31.54%). All R&D is fully expensed, no interest-bearing debt pressure; the recurring component of revenue is rising (value-added subscription share 22.4% → 29.4%), but advertising remains the single largest revenue source.
Cash content of earnings test: OCF/net profit for FY2025 was only 0.61 (below the 0.8 warning line), and negative in 2026H1 (net profit attributable to parent +216 million vs OCF -57 million); FCF/net profit for FY2025 was -1.31, with FCF negative in two of the past three years (-432/-335 million yuan). "Book turnaround" has not yet translated into free cash flow — CapEx has contracted (FY2025: 489 million, -35.5% YoY; CapEx/D&A at 0.68), with the gap mainly from thin profits itself and receivables tied up in government/enterprise business. Recurring earnings test: FY2025 net profit attributable to parent 263 million yuan vs non-GAAP-adjusted (ex-non-recurring) 35 million yuan — non-recurring items accounted for 86.7%; 274 million yuan of government subsidies + 384 million yuan of investment income (including 359 million under the equity method) were the main drivers of the turnaround, with core operating profit only barely positive; the non-recurring share fell to 28.9% in 2026H1, an improving direction. Alternative-caliber flexibility check: A-shares have no self-reported Non-GAAP caliber, so "ex-non-recurring" is the adjusted caliber; note that 0% R&D capitalization actually depresses book profit in cross-company comparison (peer iFlytek's capitalization rate is 42.59%).
Return on capital: NOPAT after stripping out interest and investment income was approximately -184 million yuan; ROIC on invested capital of approximately 30.6 billion yuan was about -0.6% (about 0.86% on the attributable-to-parent caliber), far below the typical 8%-10% cost of capital — the core business has been in value-destruction territory for the past three years and only began climbing out in 2026. ROE was just 0.88% (FY2025), structurally suppressed by 23.2 billion yuan of low-yield net cash.
CapEx quality: No disclosed split between maintenance and growth CapEx; CapEx/D&A at 0.68 indicates investment intensity below depreciation levels, i.e., a contraction phase; no large AI compute CapEx is separately disclosed (security compute of over 1,000PB is a stock figure), and compute costs are mostly reflected in technical service fees within R&D expenses (FY2025 technical service fees of 444 million yuan, +102% YoY, purchasing rather than building in-house).
Moat and red flags: The moat genuinely exists in the PC-side security entry-point monopoly (user switching inertia built up via the free model) and in threat-intelligence assets of 1.5 billion endpoint alert data + 3EB sample library. Red flags (with numbers): profits rely on interest and investment income rather than the core business (see above); large dividends during consecutive loss/marginal-profit periods (28 billion yuan in dividends over three years + 1.5 billion yuan in buyback cancellation vs a three-year average attributable net loss of -441 million yuan); persistent losses at the security business subsidiaries; discontinuation of AI user KPI disclosures (deteriorating verifiability).
Consistency of words and deeds: partially delivered, weakening verifiability. Three comparisons: ① The FY2025 annual report promised "shifting the revenue structure from passive advertising income to user-initiated payments" — in 2026H1 the value-added share rose to 29.4% and ex-non-recurring profit turned positive, an initial delivery (in progress); ② The FY2024 annual report promised AI applications such as Nami AI to drive membership payments (over 6 million in-transit users at end-2024) — value-added revenue +41.38% delivered the growth, but MAU/paying-user metrics have been discontinued or re-calibered since FY2025 (replaced by "over 450 million monthly visits"), weakening tracking metrics; ③ The 2020 private placement proposed raising 9.512 billion yuan for big data/AI projects — actual proceeds were 4.930 billion yuan, with 3.912 billion yuan (80.8% of net proceeds) repurposed, a major change. The company consistently provides no quantitative guidance; operating plans are directional statements that are hard to falsify.
Shareholder-friendliness: friendly in form, decoupled from earnings in substance. Dividends: 700 million yuan each in FY2023/2024, 1.40 billion yuan in total in FY2025 (payout ratio 532.26%), 350 million yuan proposed for the 2026 interim; 145.8 million repurchased shares cancelled in November 2024 (1.50 billion yuan). Three-year cash return of 4.3 billion yuan vs three-year average attributable net loss of -441 million yuan — returns rest on the 23.2 billion yuan of stock cash rather than operating cash flow, and the timing coincides with the controlling shareholder's dissolution and liquidation (which has a demand to distribute cash to shareholders). No further equity financing and no dilution since the 2020 placement. Overall verdict: neutral-to-friendly cash returns, but sustainability depends on the stockpile rather than earnings.
Risk signals: ① Dissolution and liquidation of Qixin Zhicheng (holding 47.10%, part of the shares frozen) incomplete after 26 months, with voting rights delegated to Zhou Hongyi — a complex control arrangement; ② Hu Huan (6.38%) shares the large-shareholder sell-down quota with Qixin Zhicheng and Zhou Hongyi — institutional arrangements for selling down the ~59% stake held by the system are already in place; ③ 80.8% of IPO proceeds repurposed; ④ shrinking disclosure of key financial KPIs (AI user numbers).
| Segment | FY2025 Revenue / Share | Gross Margin | YoY | 2026H1 Share | Business Logic in One Line |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Internet advertising & services | 4.394B / 50.5% | 60.70% (-6.78pp) | +5.47% | 49.7% | Monetizing 400M PC MAU traffic; rising traffic procurement costs squeeze margins |
| Internet value-added services (games + membership) | 1.950B / 22.4% | 94.18% | +41.38% | 29.4% | AI membership subscriptions (Library/AI Office/Nami AI) + game distribution; high-margin net-revenue method |
| Security & others | 1.446B / 16.6% | 64.50% (-1.03pp) | +12.33% | 7.4% (concentrated in Q4) | Government/enterprise project-based security; Q4 acceptance settlement; loss-making at entity level |
| Smart hardware | 798M / 9.2% | 31.54% (+5.30pp) | -21.31% | 8.3% | Shift from hardware sales to "hardware + cloud services"; domestic contraction, overseas hit products |
| AI-related revenue | Not separately disclosed | Not disclosed | — | — | Embedded in value-added subscriptions and security LLMs; no independent caliber |
Identifying profit drivers: By "revenue × gross margin," advertising contributed gross profit of about 2.67 billion yuan (about 46% of total gross profit) — still the largest gross profit source, but with continuously declining margins; value-added services contributed about 1.84 billion yuan (about 32%) and are expanding at +41%, making it the main driver of both profit elasticity and growth — if it sustains 35%+ growth, its gross profit scale will overtake advertising within two years. Security gross profit is about 930 million yuan, but the subsidiary level is loss-making (expenses front-loaded); high reported gross profit does not equal segment profitability.
Gross margin structure disparity: The gap between the highest (value-added, 94.18%) and the lowest (hardware, 31.54%) is 62.6 percentage points — the former is net-method revenue from subscriptions/distribution (platform commission, almost no direct costs), the latter involves physical manufacturing costs plus channel allocation; advertising sits in the middle (60.70%) due to procurement revenue-sharing with traffic partners. This explains why "revenue structure migrating toward value-added" is the single most important operating variable in this case: 1 yuan of value-added revenue generates 3x the gross profit of hardware.
Accounting red flags: ① Profits highly dependent on government subsidies and one-off items (FY2025 non-recurring items at 86.7% of attributable net profit; government subsidies of 274 million yuan were 7.8x the ex-non-recurring profit) — moderate severity; ② Q4 profit pulse (Q4 attributable net profit 385 million yuan > full-year 263 million yuan; Q4 ex-non-recurring 173 million yuan, about 5x the full-year figure), consistent with Q4 government/enterprise acceptance but quarterly figures cannot be linearly extrapolated — moderate; ③ Large income tax provision in loss-making pre-tax years (FY2024 pre-tax -974 million yuan, income tax expense of 133 million yuan; effective tax rate mismatch stems from loss-making entities unable to offset) — low; ④ 2026H1 inventory +32.12% (raw material increases) diverging from shrinking hardware revenue, with an inventory write-down provision of 7.556 million yuan in the same period — low, monitor consumption.
Cross-period consistency: ① Advertising gross margin 66.52% → 67.48% → 60.70%, a 6.78pp single-year plunge in FY2025 with traffic procurement costs +27.44% — unexplained by the company (caliber inconsistency flag); ② OCF and net profit diverging over the long term (losses with positive cash flow → profits with negative cash flow) — the company explains it only as "increased cash payments for goods purchases," and in 2026H1 stated "no material changes"; explanation inadequate; ③ Government subsidies swinging wildly, 350 million → 58 million → 274 million yuan — consistent with disclosures (non-operating income +1,931.58% attributed to increased subsidies); ④ AI user KPI disclosure caliber switched repeatedly (MAU 19 million → 450 million monthly visits → discontinued) — unexplained by the company; ⑤ R&D headcount -12.4% while technical service fees +102% (outsourcing replacing in-house) — unexplained by the company.
2026H1 impairments: H1 asset impairment provisions of 33.295 million yuan (receivables bad debt 20.417 million + inventory write-down 7.556 million + others), a manageable amount, consistent with the interim report's credit/asset impairment line items. Goodwill of 2.313 billion yuan has had no impairment over three years (allocated to the internet and smart hardware asset groups); year-end impairment testing coincides with the Q4 confirmation window — a fixed watch item during annual report season.
Current market data (closing price 2026-10-26): Share price 8.69 yuan, market cap 60.826 billion yuan, P/B 2.15x (1/3/5/10-year percentiles 11%/36%/42%/26%), PE-TTM 79.9x, PS-TTM 6.73x, TTM dividend yield about 2.3%. P/E percentile distortion disclaimer: The company is in a turnaround ramp-up; TTM attributable net profit of 761 million yuan includes roughly 280 million yuan of non-recurring items such as subsidies and investment income, so the P/E percentile is for context only, not a headline of cheapness or expensiveness; P/B and market-cap decomposition are the primary anchors.
| Peer Comparison (2026-10-26) | P/B | PS-TTM | PE-TTM | FY2025 Revenue / Growth | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 360 | 2.15 | 6.73 | 79.9 | 8.693B / +9.37% | 0.88% |
| Qi An Xin | 2.88 | 4.62 | Loss-making | 4.392B / +0.97% | Negative |
| Sangfor | 5.66 | 7.79 | 73.6 | 8.043B / +6.96% | Positive (393M net profit) |
| Venustech | 1.68 | 7.82 | Loss-making | 2.338B / -29.49% | Negative |
| iFlytek | 4.08 | 3.44 | 100.4 | 27.105B / +16.12% | 4.57% |
360's P/B is in the lowest tier among the four security/AI peers, but its ROE is also the lowest — the low P/B is propped up by net cash and narrative, not by profitability. External expectation anchors are extremely weak: consensus EPS sample size is 0; Investing.com aggregated target price is 9.25 yuan (range 9.00-9.50, sample size unclear); Huachuang's individual 10x PS target is 13.7 yuan (cited secondhand, undated).
What the market is implying: Market cap of 60.826 billion yuan = net cash of 23.23 billion yuan + implied business value of 37.596 billion yuan (business PS of 4.16x). Backing out business value at 40/50/60x normalized P/E requires sustainable ex-non-recurring profit of 940 / 750 / 630 million yuan; versus reality — 2026H1 annualized ex-non-recurring profit of about 310 million yuan (conservative caliber) and a 2025H2 quarterly run-rate annualized to about 660 million yuan (optimistic caliber including Q4 concentrated recognition). In one sentence: the current price requires the company to lift ex-non-recurring profit to 600-900 million yuan within two years (net margin 7%-10.7%), while verifiable run-rate calibers only reach 300-660 million yuan; the gap must be filled by AI membership/GEO/security recovery, none of which has earnings-statement evidence today.
Three layers of value: Asset value of 3.71 yuan/share (liquidation reference: attributable net assets of 28.25 billion less goodwill of 2.313 billion) is the extreme floor; EPV (zero-growth value: normalized median free cash flow of about 850 million yuan capitalized at 10% cost of capital, plus net cash of 3.32 yuan/share) is 4.54 yuan/share, covering 52.2% of the current price; the growth option residual is 4.15 yuan/share, or 47.8% of the current price — normalized FCFF construction took the midpoint between Caliber A (as-reported, 580 million yuan) and Caliber B (adding back 15-25% of R&D as growth investment, 950-1,230 million yuan); the option share is sensitive to this assumption (higher under Caliber A, lower under Caliber B). The current price is mainly supported by "net cash + growth option," with nearly half the market cap riding on the option — this is not a mechanical "overvalued" signal, but it makes the valuation highly sensitive to the disclosure cadence of AI revenue.
Three scenarios and odds:
| Scenario | Probability | Fair Range | vs Current Price | Key Drivers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 30% | 4.45-5.56 yuan (midpoint 5.01) | -49%~-36% | AI monetization falsified + advertising decline + normalized sell-down supply; valuation reverts to 1.2-1.5x P/B on net assets ex-goodwill; no institutional-grade bear-case target externally for comparison — this scenario is an independent stress test |
| Base | 50% | 6.53-8.43 yuan (midpoint 7.48) | -25%~-3% | Ex-non-recurring profit stabilizing at 400-550 million yuan × P/E 50-65x + net cash of 23.2 billion; anchored on Sangfor's 73.6x P/E post-earnings-delivery with a 10-30% discount (weaker earnings quality), and near the lower end of its own 3-year P/B range (1.55-3.31x) |
| Bull | 20% | 9.60-16.18 yuan (midpoint 12.89) | +11%~+86% | AI membership + GEO volume ramp; 2028 ex-non-recurring profit of 800-1,200 million yuan × exit P/E 55-75x (anchored on Sangfor/iFlytek at 73.6-100.4x), discounted at 10% over two years to a midpoint of about 10.4 yuan |
Probability-weighted fair value is about 7.82 yuan, -10% vs the current price: the current price has already moved about 3% above the base-case upper bound (8.43 yuan) — odds structure neutral-to-negative: downside to the bear range of -49%~-36% (buffered by a net-cash floor), reversion to the base range of -25%~-3%, upside to the bull range of +11%~+86%. Margin of safety is negative (base-case fair value lower bound is -25% vs the current price).
In-house earnings forecast (anchor for next results reconciliation): FY2026E revenue 9.43-9.52 billion yuan (+8.4%~+9.6%), attributable net profit 566-746 million yuan, ex-non-recurring 373-473 million yuan — H1 has already delivered 4.172 billion / 216 million / 153 million yuan; H2 extrapolated at FY2025 same-period base of 4.866 billion × +8~10%, with Q4 government/enterprise recognition magnitude and non-recurring items (subsidies/investment income, slightly lower YoY) as the main uncertainties. FY2027E rough estimate: revenue 10.0-10.3 billion yuan, attributable net profit 700-900 million yuan, ex-non-recurring 500-700 million yuan (insufficient inputs; mainly logic-driven extrapolation from membership/GEO/security recovery). No quantitative guidance from management; no sell-side consensus — this forecast is the reconciliation benchmark.
Conclusion: Overvalued, not a bubble. Target price 6.53-8.43 yuan (base-case fair value). Judge quality and price separately: quality is neutral-to-recovering (net cash, traffic base, genuine subscription transition), while the price has already priced in substantial success scenarios. Downside has a floor (lowest-tier peer P/B + 38% net cash + 2.3% dividend), but upside requires earnings-statement evidence to unlock — at the current price there is no margin of safety for buying, nor a clear de-rating catalyst for shorting (sell-down negatives partially priced in; industry recovery signals exist).
Industry Size: 360 spans three tracks, measured under separate methodologies—① China's cybersecurity market: per CCIA's China Cybersecurity Industry Analysis Report, 2023 was approximately RMB 64.0 billion, up only +1.1% YoY (RMB 61.4 billion in 2021 → RMB 63.3 billion in 2022 → RMB 64.0 billion in 2023, growth nearly stalled); under IDC's methodology, USD 11.2 billion in 2024 → USD 17.8 billion by 2029, a five-year CAGR of 9.7%; per Shushuo Security, the digital security industry reached RMB 90.159 billion in 2024, -7.4%—the industry was in a rare negative-growth adjustment period in 2024–2025. The strongest sub-track is AI security: IDC forecasts China's AI security market at RMB 34 billion by 2030, a five-year CAGR above 50%; the security agent application market reaching USD 1.6 billion by 2028, CAGR above 230%. ② China's internet advertising: per QuestMobile, RMB 793.08 billion in 2025, +4.6%, a mid-single-digit steady state. ③ China's AI applications: per CAICT, the AI core industry exceeded RMB 900 billion in 2024, +24%; IDC forecasts China's total AI investment at USD 111.4 billion by 2029, a five-year CAGR of 25.7%; user-side growth is even faster—in September 2026, AI-native apps reached 546 million MAU, +82.1% YoY (QuestMobile), with 1.157 billion deduplicated users of comprehensive AI assistants. Aggregator-based figures (e.g., iiMedia's ~RMB 78.6 billion for cybersecurity) serve only as cross-references and were not adopted as headline numbers.
Value Chain and Value Distribution: Upstream of the security value chain are chips/servers/operating systems (the Xinchuang ecosystem); midstream are security product and service vendors (hundreds nationwide, highly fragmented); downstream are government (25.4% of security spending in 2024), finance (16.8%), and telecom (15.4%) (IDC). Upstream of the internet chain are bandwidth/computing power (intelligent computing cloud at RMB 48.67 billion in 2025, +128%); midstream are traffic entry points and advertising platforms; downstream are advertisers. 360 occupies two midstream positions: its own PC traffic entry (browser desktop share of ~20%, StatCounter) plus a government-enterprise security vendor. Gross profit accrues mainly at the own-traffic entry point and the personal security user asset layer (the internet business has always carried high gross margins), while government-enterprise security and hardware carry thin margins and are persistently squeezed by bidding price wars—the company's 2025 weighted ROE of just 0.88% shows that value retention has been diluted by security investment.
Supply-Demand and Competitive Structure: Demand is driven by three forces—regulatory compliance rigidity (the revised Cybersecurity Law takes effect 2026-01-01, writing AI security provisions into the law for the first time), AI-threat compulsion (monthly average of 4,283 new vulnerabilities in 2025; 61% of Chinese customers surveyed by IDC plan to procure security LLMs within 1–3 years), and Xinchuang substitution. On the supply side: numerous security vendors and homogenized price wars (industry revenue broadly negative in 2024–2025, with QiAnXin and Venustech posting large losses), while 2026 shows early signs of bottoming and recovery (Venustech's 2026H1 revenue +9.01% and back to profit; Sangfor's 2025 net profit +99.52%; QiAnXin's operating cash flow at a historical best). Concentration is broadly fragmented (CR4 ~28.6% under third-party aggregate methodology, to be verified), with clear leaders by segment (CCID: QiAnXin No.1 in endpoint security at 17.5% for eight consecutive years; IDC: Sangfor No.1 in security hardware at 11.1%). The AI application track is highly concentrated and getting more so: Doubao leads decisively at 419 million MAU, Qwen at 158 million, DeepSeek at 123 million, with the top three accounting for over 70% of AI-native app users. Internet ad budgets are heavily concentrated at ByteDance (41.8% of total time spent on TOP50 apps) and Tencent (28.6%). Entry barriers: security relies on qualifications/channels/accumulated attack-defense data (360's 1.5 billion endpoint alert data + 3EB sample library are scarce assets); AI applications rely on computing capex and entry-point distribution (Tencent Yuanbao spent ~RMB 15 billion on user acquisition in 2025). Substitution threat is the sharpest cut in this case: AI search/assistants are a generational replacement of the traditional "browser + search" entry point—threatening both 360's advertising foundation (~RMB 4.4 billion in revenue) and driving its Nano AI transformation.
Cycles and Regulation: The security industry is at an inflection point of "bottoming → weak recovery in late growth stage"; leading indicators are government-enterprise bid awards/Xinchuang budgets, top vendors' gross margins and cash flow (whether the price war has bottomed), and AI security penetration. Advertising is in a mature phase of low single-digit growth; AI applications are transitioning from introduction to growth, with monetization just beginning. Regulation is mostly favorable: the Cybersecurity Law revision + AI provisions + Xinchuang are substantive increments to security demand; the Interim Measures for Generative AI Services and Measures for Labeling AI-Generated Content raise barriers, relatively favoring capable leaders; the "AI+" initiative (2025-08) and the 2026 Government Work Report are the strongest policy tailwinds on the application side; the negative is the Internet Advertising Management Measures constraining pop-up/navigation-based traditional monetization. Geopolitically: the company is sanctioned on both the U.S. Commerce Department Entity List and the DoD 1260H List, restricting access to high-end GPUs and pressuring computing costs (as stated in the company's semi-annual report under "geopolitical risk")—a hard constraint relative to rivals like Doubao/DeepSeek.
Assessment of the Structural Demand Inflection: Hard numbers for an industry-side inflection are ample—AI-native app MAU +82% in one year, AI search penetration ~38.7% (CAICT methodology, secondhand, to be verified), and GEO (Generative Engine Optimization) becoming a new budget category in 2026. But when it comes to 360's share and monetization rate, the evidence does not support a "strong inflection": the Nano AI app's third-party MAU is only at the 1–5 million level (2025-06 methodology) and it did not make the 2026-09 TOP10; 360's share of AI application growth is below 1%. Offsetting evidence: ~20% desktop PC browser share + 400 million Security Guardian installed base + value-added services growing +41%—the weak version holds: AI-based transformation of the existing PC advertising chain + membership subscription monetization is an "option," not a realized order-of-magnitude inflection. Verification indicators: Nano AI's third-party MAU trajectory, GEO orders, and ad eCPM—any one confirmed by financial statements or third-party data would trigger an upgrade.
Company Positioning: A dual-track hybrid of "niche defender + AI chaser." In security, the company is niche-ized—government-enterprise security revenue of RMB 1.446 billion is only 1/3 of QiAnXin's and 1/5.6 of Sangfor's, not in the top three on comprehensive share; the company's self-described "national-level" security capabilities (visibility into advanced threats, 1.5 billion endpoint data) are inconsistent with third-party market share methodology and should be viewed side by side: the company's own methodology emphasizes national-level threat awareness and data asset scarcity, while third-party rankings (IDC/CCID) do not list it among government-enterprise market leaders. In advertising, its share trend is declining (RMB 4.394 billion, roughly 0.55% of the national market, slightly down YoY in 2026H1). In AI, it is a chaser with weak share evidence, but its "AI + security" dual-capability positioning is unique (ranked No.1 in IDC's LLM application firewall evaluation). Overall share judgment: advertising declining, government-enterprise security slightly rising, AI applications not proven to be rising.
For traffic-platform companies, the generic financial framework misses three defining metrics, listed separately below:
① Volume and Quality of the Traffic Base: PC Security Guardian and browser MAU each ~400 million, flat for three years—the base has not deteriorated but has not grown either (mobile discloses only 1.5 billion cumulative endpoint coverage, no MAU metric; mobile absence is a structural weakness). By this report's rough methodology, FY2025 advertising revenue of RMB 4.394 billion ÷ ~400 million MAU ≈ RMB 110/MAU/year in monetization; the -6.78pp gross margin indicates per-unit traffic monetization efficiency under pressure (traffic procurement costs +27.44%). Against the backdrop of AI search substitution, long-term monetization assumptions for the PC entry point should be revised downward; membership (direct user charging) is the hedge direction.
② Speed and Substance of the Membership Transition: Internet value-added services revenue grew +41.38% in FY2025 to RMB 1.950 billion, with 94.18% gross margin, rising to 29.4% of revenue in 2026H1 (RMB 1.226 billion, ~+36% YoY)—this is the company's highest-quality revenue. The problem is that its substance cannot be disaggregated: AI memberships (Nano AI/Wenku/AI Office) and game co-publishing are mixed in one segment, and the company does not disclose paying member counts; Nano AI's own user metrics have shifted repeatedly (MAU 19 million → "over 450 million monthly visits" → disclosure halted), and third-party app MAU at the million level diverges hugely from the company's "No.2 on website rankings" methodology. The same company shrinking its disclosure methodology on products where third-party data is unfavorable means user data should be discounted for consistency—this is the technical reason the valuation option cannot be priced, and the single most important observation point for the 2026 annual report (due 2027-04).
③ New Ad Inventory (GEO) and B-End Agents: From 0 to 1: 360 Zhijian GEO launched in 2026-03, already upgraded to 2.0, with over 300 partner service providers; Nano Work enterprise agents released in 2026-07 (first-batch users each receiving 100 million Tokens, targeting 1,000 small enterprises). Neither has revenue-level disclosure; the verification path is government procurement award announcements, whether the annual report adds new disclosure line items, and whether the advertising segment's growth rate can escape single digits. Big-tech entrants like Tencent's AnswerBit validate the track while intensifying competition.
Overall judgment: Neutral, confidence 0.55, time horizon 6 months. 360 is a transformation-stage statement of "thick asset base, thin earnings, expensive options": RMB 23.2 billion in net cash + 400 million PC MAU + a 94%-gross-margin subscription business constitute a genuine floor, and the 2025–2026 direction of consecutive recovery in adjusted (deducting non-recurring items) profit is correct; however, the current price of RMB 8.69 carries a ~14% premium to the central value of the baseline fair range of RMB 6.53–8.43 (probability-weighted fair value of RMB 7.82, -10% vs. current price), nearly half the market cap is growth options with no revenue verification, supply uncertainty from the controlling shareholder's liquidation transfer remains unresolved, and a 37% R&D expense ratio continues to suppress profit elasticity. Directionally, there is neither the margin of safety required for a buy, nor the clear de-rating catalyst required for a short (the sell-down negative is partially priced in, industry recovery signals exist, and external anchors are broadly above the current price)—wait and watch for evidence is the optimal action at current odds.
Strategy Points: Above RMB 8.43 (upper bound of baseline fair value), valuation repair is complete and upward momentum requires new evidence; below RMB 6.53 (lower bound of baseline fair value), it enters value territory and can be reassessed; a break below RMB 7.76 (October 2024 low) would require re-examining the floor assumption.
Risk and Catalyst Summary (Written): Core falsification conditions—2026 annual report adjusted profit turning negative, value-added revenue growth falling below 20%, annual goodwill impairment exceeding RMB 200 million, post-transfer system shareholders selling more than 1.5% per quarter for two consecutive quarters, or the stock price breaking below RMB 7.76. Core catalysts—the 10-30 Q3 report (9M adjusted profit and Q3 standalone quality), 2026 annual report disclosure of value-added/AI revenue, completion of the liquidation transfer and additional lock-up commitments, volume in security LLM contract wins (verifiable on government procurement sites), and potential buybacks/insider purchases.
Data and Methodology Notes: Financial data are as of the 2026 semi-annual report (disclosed 2026-08-20, unaudited); balance sheet stock figures (cash/cash-like/interest-bearing debt/goodwill/net assets attributable to parent) are all as of 2026-06-30; price and market cap anchor is the 2026-10-26 closing price of RMB 8.69; peer multiples use the 2026-10-26 closing basis. 360's 2026 Q3 report is scheduled for disclosure on 2026-10-30 and is not included in this report.