Industry Research · Low-Altitude Economy | November 15, 2026
View: Divergent (hot and cold across the value chain) | Observation Period: 12–24 months | Conviction: Low-to-Medium
The low-altitude economy covered in this report refers to the sum of economic activities relying on airspace resources below 3,000 meters (core: below 1,000 meters; regulatory focus: 120-meter/Class W airspace and pilot zones below 600 meters); eVTOL (electric vertical takeoff and landing aircraft) is the core incremental vehicle category. The value chain is organized along three lines as specified by the user:
A one-sentence industry map: battery/motor/composite supply chain → airframes (crewed eVTOL · drones) → ATM/vertiport infrastructure → operations services (crewed · logistics · inspection), where airworthiness certification (the three systems of CAAC/FAA/EASA) is the master gate across the entire chain — the first-order variable for this industry's commercialization is the institutional clock, not manufacturing capacity.
| Demand Curve | Current Stage (S-curve position) | Hard Data Anchors | Quality of Demand |
|---|---|---|---|
| ① Drone operations (logistics/inspection/agriculture/emergency) | Early scaling phase | China drone flights in 2025: 45.3029 million hours, +69.9% YoY; 3.287 million registered drones (+51%); 38,872 operating-certificate entities (nearly doubled) (CAAC 2025 Civil Aviation Industry Development Statistical Bulletin) | Real demand: SF Fengyi averages ~20,000 orders/day with 1.1 million+ cumulative flights, some intercity routes at breakeven; Meituan drones past one million cumulative orders |
| ② Crewed sightseeing / scenic-area eVTOL | Demonstration operations phase (eve of 0→1) | EHang cumulative deliveries 489 units (52 in 2023 → 216 in 2024 → 221 in 2025, growth stalled); 40+ operating sites, 3,000+ flight missions | Government demonstration demand: buyers are mainly local culture-tourism bureaus/government platforms, fiscal-funded |
| ③ Urban air taxis | Not yet started | Global public ticket sales = 0; UAE targeting first paid flights late 2026–2027; US after 2027; China awaiting rules | No consumer-side validation yet |
Two disciplined caveats: first, the "real scaling" of the drone curve must be qualified as volume growth is real but unit value is unproven — while flight hours grew +69.9%, airframe output value grew only +20%, with scaling concentrated in low-value, short-duration flights (inspection/training/testing); second, the inflection point of the crewed chain (rule implementation timing × fares × vertiport density) lacks a public ticket-sales data link and is a potential inflection point (pending quantification) — this report does not headline it as a "structural inflection."
Bridge composition (conservative, RMB 192.6 bn/yr → 543.6 bn/yr, CAGR ~10.9%): drone airframe manufacturing +RMB 257.3 bn (13% CAGR extrapolation, conservative low end; using the actual 2025 RMB 176.1 bn base at 15–20% growth, this line item alone exceeds RMB 700 bn); eVTOL airframes + crewed operations +RMB 38.7 bn (~5,000 in-service aircraft by 2035, 1,250 annual deliveries × ASP ~RMB 2.11 million + operations of 5,000 aircraft × 1,000 hours); low-altitude infrastructure +RMB 20 bn/yr (special bonds and urban platform investment, ~RMB 25 bn/yr in 2025 → 45 bn/yr); logistics/inspection/tourism operations +RMB 35 bn/yr. Note: of the RMB 2 trillion net increment in the official figure, the verifiable items above total RMB 351.0 billion, with a residual of roughly RMB 1.649 trillion attributable to supply chain and spillover effects — this is precisely the distance between the "trillion-yuan narrative" and "investable demand."
Special-purpose bonds are the core tool: as of October 2025, low-altitude infrastructure special bonds covered ~36 projects with RMB 23.78 billion total investment (KPMG scope; 26 projects/RMB 19.33 billion at end-2024); Hefei's single August 2025 batch of ~RMB 18.6 billion was the nation's largest (media scope, to be verified); the cap on special bonds usable as capital has been raised from 25% to 30%. Shenzhen's vertiport count is sprinting from 360 in mid-2025 toward a 1,200+ target by end-2026. Government capex is still small in absolute terms (tens of billions of yuan per year, under 1% of total special-bond issuance), but it is almost the sole marginal buyer of crewed eVTOL airframe sales — which determines the fiscal character and volatility of this segment's revenue curve (EHang's 2025 guidance of RMB 900 million → actual RMB 510 million, –43%, was a preview).
| System | Player/Aircraft | Status |
|---|---|---|
| CAAC | EHang EH216-S | World's only holder of all four certificates (TC 2023-10/AC/PC/OC 2025-03); 17 months of regular trial operations in Guangzhou + Hefei, ~100,000 cumulative flights; VT-35 long-range variant TC under review |
| CAAC | AutoFlight V2000CG (2-ton cargo) | TC 2024-03 (world's first TC for an above-ton eVTOL) + PC; Indonesian type acceptance (VTC) granted June 2026 — first time a Chinese eVTOL certification finding has been fully recognized by a foreign authority; TC for the crewed "Prosperity I" accepted, G-1 completed |
| CAAC | Wofei Changkong AE200 / XPeng AeroHT X3-F / TF M1B / EHang-owned E20 | Under review: AE200 is China's first tilt-rotor crewed TC application (and first domestic CCAR-135 operating certificate); X3-F targeted for mass production/delivery in 2026; TF M1B cargo expected certified within 2026 |
| FAA | Joby JAS4-1 | 21.17(b) five-stage pathway: Stage 4 (testing & analysis) 83% complete (company figure)/78% (FAA figure), Stage 5 only 25%/14% (2026-11-04 shareholder letter); FAA pilot training scheduled into H1 2027, TIA certification flight testing thereafter — realistic TC window late 2027–early 2028 |
| FAA | Archer Midnight | Closed Stage 3 in April 2026 with 100% of means of compliance approved, now in final stage; also pursuing UAE restricted type certificate (RTC) to grab first operations; received FAA market-survey special airworthiness certificate in November 2026 and entered Los Angeles |
| EASA | No crewed TC | Lilium went through bankruptcy liquidation twice (burning ~€1.5 billion; prototypes scrapped); Volocopter sold to Wanfeng/Diamond for €10 million and pivoted to light sport aircraft (LSA) route targeting certification by end-2026 |
Global nominal capacity already exceeds 3,000 units/yr (Joby's two Ohio plants up to 500/yr + Marina plant; Archer's Georgia ARC plant planned at 650/yr; EHang's Yunfu Phase II 1,000/yr; Eve's Brazil plant 480/yr), but actual 2025 deliveries were ~230 units (~7.7% utilization), and 2026 is expected below 100 units (~2.8%) due to China's regulatory tightening. The bottleneck is not manufacturing but certification and demand — "overcapacity" on a utilization basis is not a bearish signal; order conversion rates are what matter.
EH216-S implied manufacturing cost ~RMB 880,000/unit (2025 revenue RMB 509.5 million × 38.5% cost ratio ÷ 221 units), realized ASP ~RMB 2.11 million/unit (2024 basis: RMB 456 million/216 units), gross margin 61.5% — the world's only airframe maker with a real mass-production cost curve; US FAA configurations (tilt-rotor + transport-category redundancy) cost roughly an order of magnitude more per unit; Joby's mass-production target ~USD 1.3 million/unit (company figure, as relayed, to be verified). Cash runways (Q2/Q3 2026 basis): Joby ~USD 2.2 billion cash, ~11 quarters; Archer ~USD 1.8 billion liquidity, ~10 quarters at current burn (Q4 adjusted EBITDA loss guidance USD 110–140 million/quarter); EHang cash + short-term investments ~RMB 929 million (2026-06-30), ~7 quarters at GAAP net loss of ~RMB 130 million/quarter — all three leaders can cross the 2027 verification point, but the tail has already shown us death (Lilium, Volocopter). Survivor commonalities: thick cash, big-company backing (Toyota/Boeing/Embraer/Geely), or certification first.
Total nominal orders on hand ~13,100 units, ≈ 57x actual 2025 deliveries (230 units) — this number carries no warning value. Breakdown by player:
Orders that will convert into revenue: government platform orders for China's certified aircraft, UAE government ecosystem orders, and airline down payments after TC. Everything else is nominal until certification and budgets land.
The 2025 real revenue ranking is this industry's profit-pool map: DJI (70–85% global civil drone share, unlisted) ~RMB 91.2 billion (media/insider scope, to be verified); CITIC Pacific Heavy Industries Helicopter (traditional general aviation + offshore oil transport) RMB 2.235 billion, net profit RMB 309 million; Les Information (ATM systems integration) RMB 1.274 billion but revenue –42% and loss-making in the first three quarters of 2026; EHang RMB 510 million (the only crewed eVTOL airframer with scale revenue globally); Joby ~RMB 380 million in RMB equivalents — but roughly 94–100% of that comes from the acquired Blade helicopter charter business, not eVTOL (of Q3 2026 revenue of USD 55.1 million, ~99.8% was Blade). Total global crewed eVTOL airframe revenue in 2025 was on the order of RMB 1.5 billion, with combined GAAP net losses exceeding RMB 10 billion — this is the "burn cash for certificates" phase, not a profit pool.
①Aircraft price = government platform contract price: The EH216-S is listed at RMB 2.39M / net realized RMB 2.11–2.26M (5–12% discount); cost anchor RMB 880K ÷ 38.5% cost ratio ⇒ ASP floor of roughly RMB 2.26M; US pricing undisclosed (market expectation USD 3–5M per aircraft). ②Ticket price = helicopter-substitute pricing + experience premium: Independent estimate for early stage at USD 7–12 per seat-mile (Valour, 2026-08) ≈ ~USD 10 for single-engine helicopter charter; a real-world reference is Blade's Manhattan–JFK at USD 195 per seat. ③ATM/vertiport = government-enterprise bidding price: Municipal low-altitude platforms won at tens-of-millions level (Jinan RMB 10.01M, Anhui RMB 9.55M); the first county-level low-altitude franchise rights (Pingyin, Shandong) went to a county SOE for ~RMB 924M over 30 years. Subsidies are the hidden source of the buyer's budget (local governments reward up to 20% of total infrastructure investment; Abu Dhabi's Investment Office granted Archer incentives in the hundreds of millions of USD) — when fiscal tightening comes, prices stay but volumes collapse first (China in 2026 is exactly this). A reasonable expectation for the first publicly ticketed flights: USD 150–250 per seat-trip (25-mile leg, i.e., USD 6–10 per seat-mile); China sightseeing tickets RMB 300–800 per person-trip.
Manufacturer claims (Archer's entry at USD 4–5 → USD 1 at scale; Joby's model at USD 95 for 25 miles vs USD 393 for a twin-engine helicopter) rest on three unverified premises: utilization of 2,500 hours/year (helicopter charter reality: 300–500 hours, a 6x gap), 2.3 passengers of 4 seats, and controllable vertiport fees (currently nearly 30% of seat-mile cost and not diluted with scale). Independent estimates (Valour) and full-cost calculations (25-mile eVTOL ~USD 220 vs R66 helicopter ~USD 200) both point to no cost advantage at the current stage. The realistic fare corridor for the next 12–24 months is USD 6–12 per seat-mile; USD 1 requires four conditions to hold simultaneously — mass-production costs + high utilization + vertiport density + remote-pilot certification — with no viable path before the early 2030s. Another hedge: UAE first-paid fares include government subsidies and a six-year exclusive license component — they are showcase pricing and cannot be used to infer that unit economics are validated.
①Dec 2026–2027Q1: Joby's first paid passenger flights in Dubai (the window has slipped repeatedly; as of Nov 2026 the guidance was still "targeting end-2026") — incremental revenue roughly USD 10–30M/year, symbolic more than revenue significance; ②2026Q4–2027: Archer's paid Launch Edition operations in Abu Dhabi — quarterly revenue stepping up from ~USD 5M toward USD 20–50M; ③2027H1: Joby's FAA pilot training + start of TIA flights — the TC milestone-setting event; ④Within 2027: China's expansion of passenger OCs and resumed approvals — EHang revenue recovering from an annualized ~RMB 310M (2026Q2 annualized), base case RMB 300–450M; recovery to RMB 500M+ requires substantive regulatory loosening; ⑤2027: Eve's first deliveries (seen as realistic by Brazil's ANAC) + the four-ministry plan's 2027 milestone review; ⑥2026Q4–2027: FAA Part 108 BVLOS final rule (stuck in White House OMB review since July 2026) — the gate for scaling US drone logistics, an industry increment at the USD 0.5–2B level; ⑦AutoFlight V2000CG cargo ramp-up + SF Express framework landing; ⑧Special-purpose bond projects (36 projects / RMB 23.78B + Hefei RMB 18.6B) recognized with a lag as ATM/vertiport system revenue.
On the "TC obtained and volume deliveries made" basis, passenger eVTOL has CR1 ≈ 100% (EHang exclusively); the FAA line is a Joby/Archer duopoly (together ~80% of top-tier liquidity, with Boeing becoming Archer's largest shareholder and Toyota tied to Joby); industrial drones CR1 > 50% (DJI); ATM automation led by LAIS; logistics operations a Fengyi/Meituan duopoly with closed-loop self-use. The aircraft OEM end is clearing rapidly and concentrating toward "first-to-certify + cash-rich + big-tech anchor" — two European deaths and Vertical launching a strategic review in Sep 2026 are continuations of this.
Three places making real money now: ①Drone OEMs (DJI: share + profitability, the only high-ROIC segment, but unlisted — the absence of a listed asset has let concept-stock speculation substitute for it); ②closed-loop logistics operations (Fengyi breaking even on some routes, Meituan improving efficiency via self-use); ③traditional general aviation (China Southern Air Helicopter: 2025 net profit RMB 309M, operating cash flow RMB 988M). Three places relying on government orders: passenger eVTOL OEMs (all loss-making), ATM integration (LAIS net margin 4.5% → loss-making in 2026), vertiports (government-investment led, no listed profit pool). Migration direction over the next 2–3 years: scaled cargo operations (AutoFlight × SF Express, Fengyi network) → volume OEM deliveries post-certification (EHang/Joby/Archer 2027–2028) → system integration and O&M services after airspace opening; the yielders are tail-end OEMs and government subsidies themselves.
OEMs have medium bargaining power upstream (~80% of the supply chain is shared with EVs, but airworthiness-grade avionics/motors/MCUs are scarce); weak downstream — local governments/SOE platforms (bidding-based, price-squeezing, slow payments; LAIS operating cash flow of -RMB 248M is the proof), overseas sovereign buyers (premium but policy-locked), B2B logistics (self-developed, self-used). Three elements to identify order quality: whether prepayment is included, whether per-unit deliveries and registration numbers are disclosed, and whether framework agreements are renewed at expiry.
No Shenwan industry index for the low-altitude economy; the concept anchor was the sector's PE-TTM of ~93x in Nov 2024 (Wind basis). Representative stocks (2026-11-14): China Southern Air Helicopter PB 1.64 (10th percentile of the past 3 years, the most solid in the sector); LAIS has turned to losses (PE-TTM invalid), with 2026 first three quarters revenue -42.3%, single quarter -67.8%, and operating cash flow -RMB 248M — yet it kept winning low-altitude intelligent network projects in Nov 2026, with order catalysts and earnings collapse coexisting; US: Joby market cap ~USD 5.16B (YoY -65%), PS (FY2026E guidance midpoint) ~37.5x, cash USD 2.2B; Archer market cap ~USD 3.2B, down ~45% in 2026, -48.5% in a single day after Q3 earnings. Cyclical conclusion vs valuation: in a bifurcated landscape, valuation position determines stock selection — the same "policy acceleration" carries completely different odds on China Southern Air Helicopter at the 10% PB percentile versus on collapsing-earnings ATM concept stocks.
Overall, money is hard to make in this business: passenger eVTOL OEMs are "certificate options" rather than profit pools (government-dependent revenue, industry-wide losses, unvalidated unit economics); ATM integration has real but thin revenue and swings with fiscal policy; the genuinely good businesses are drone OEMs (DJI) and logistics closed-loop operations with proven unit economics. This sets the baseline for the economics axis: return quality "medium" (bimodal distribution), value-trap risk "high" (A-share concept stocks and high-PS US names).
China is fastest: the Interim Regulations on the Administration of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Flights (effective Jan 2024) established the legal channel; the newly revised Civil Aviation Law takes effect Jul 1, 2026 — the first national law explicitly defining the low-altitude economy (Article 74 requires airspace designation to accommodate it); the world's first passenger eVTOL Operator Certificates (OC) were issued in Mar 2025 to Guangzhou EHang General Aviation / Hefei Heye. The US is catching up: the eIPP integration pilot (8 projects / 26 states selected in Mar 2026) opens a controlled operations channel for eVTOL ahead of TC; the powered-lift safety continuum rule finalized Aug 2026 (four-tier certification by seats/weight) improves regulatory certainty but diverges from European standards. Europe's framework is mature but implementation is fragmented: SC-VTOL means of compliance have iterated to the fifth edition (Nov 2026). No mutual recognition exists: the China/US/EU systems are disjoint, and Chinese aircraft going overseas depend on country-by-country VTCs.
The National Basic Airspace Classification Method (Dec 2023) established uncontrolled Class G/W airspace (Class W flyable below 120m true height); the Central Air Traffic Management Committee's six-city pilot (Hefei/Hangzhou/Shenzhen/Suzhou/Chengdu/Chongqing, launched Nov 2024) delegates parts of airspace below 600m to local governments — this is the most critical airspace-liberalization move for eVTOL commercialization; the official full text is unpublished and represents the largest swing variable. Approval is evolving from "case-by-case" toward "fixed routes + platform-based routine filing" (Hefei already runs 98 logistics routes routinely).
Central: the low-altitude economy has been in the Government Work Report for three consecutive years, upgraded to "emerging pillar industry" in 2026; special-bond capital ratio cap raised from 25% → 30%; the 2026 new local special-bond quota is RMB 4.4 trillion (low-altitude share still <1%). Local representatives: Shenzhen (one-time RMB 15M award for passenger eVTOL airworthiness certification, RMB 1M for the first commercial route), Hefei (RMB 18.6B special bonds + the world's first OC), Guangzhou (the nation's first local low-altitude economy regulation), Zhuhai (the nation's first low-altitude transport special-zone regulation), Suzhou/Chengdu pilots.
Chinese standards breaking ice overseas: AutoFlight's V2000CG received an Indonesian VTC (Jun 2026, the world's first eVTOL foreign type acceptance); EHang's "Global Fast Track" country-by-country certification (Sri Lanka/Vietnam/Thailand/Malaysia). US restrictions on China tightening: FY2025 NDAA Section 1709 + the FCC adding DJI/Autel to the Covered List in Dec 2025 — new-equipment authorizations banned + federal procurement restricted, blocking Chinese drones from the US market, favoring US domestic alternatives, with global supply-chain "de-China-fication" and non-Chinese substitution running in parallel. Upstream lithium batteries/motors/rare-earth magnets are China-dominated; if export-control retaliation escalates, US/EU OEM costs would rise (a risk item, not yet realized). The real ESG constraint is safety regulation and urban noise, not carbon.
Net policy direction: positive, but the slope of realization depends entirely on regulatory timing — 2026 revenue remains dominated by pilots and government orders, with scaled cash flow anchored to 2027.
| Scenario | Probability | Narrative | Implication |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 35% | UAE paid passenger flights slip again or are only symbolic; FAA TC pushed past 2028; Chinese approval tightening persists, EHang 2027 revenue < RMB 300M; special-bond fade | A-share concept stocks de-rate further; US PS compresses toward cash; second clearing in passenger eVTOL private markets |
| Base | 45% | UAE achieves subsidized first paid flights within 2027 (USD 6–12 per seat-mile); Chinese OCs gradually resume, EHang 2027 revenue RMB 300–450M; Joby TC lands end-2027 to early 2028; Part 108 takes effect, drone logistics sustains 15%+ growth | Industry revenue grows fast off a low base but small in absolute terms; investment themes = drone-chain cash flow + event-driven "certificate options" in the passenger chain |
| Bull | 20% | China substantively loosens approvals (EHang back to RMB 500M+, OCs expand to multiple cities); Joby's TIA flies smoothly and TC lands early in 2027H2; UAE ridership ramps to routine; drone output sustains 20% growth | Passenger eVTOL re-rates into "revenue visibility"; XPeng AeroHT's volume conversion exceeds expectations, becoming the largest domestic increment |
| Time | Event | Directional Impact | Debate |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-12 | Joby Dubai first paid passenger window (target end-2026, slipped repeatedly) | Delivered → base case confirmed; slipped again → bear path weighted | D1 |
| 2026Q4–2027Q1 | FAA Part 108 BVLOS final rule (in OMB review) | The gate for scaling US drone logistics | D2 |
| 2027H1 | China passenger OC expansion / approval resumption watch point (EHang quarterly deliveries >50 aircraft as the signal) | China revenue curve restart | D1 |
| 2027H1 | Joby FAA flight testing (TIA) start and Stage 5 progress | TC timing milestone | D1 |
| 2027H1 | XPeng AeroHT volume delivery ramp data (conversion of 7,000 pre-orders) | Validation of the largest domestic OEM revenue pool | D3 |
| 2027H2 | Eve first deliveries; Archer Abu Dhabi paid operations expansion | Second tier of global deliveries | D1 |
| 2027H2–Early 2028 | Joby FAA TC window | The master gate unlocking US-line commercialization | D1 |
| 2027Q4 | Four-ministry plan 2027 milestone review (eVTOL urban air mobility/logistics/emergency commercial applications) | Policy acceptance and acceleration node | D2 |
Piercing the value-trap logic: a bullish cycle ≠ worth buying. The lower-right quadrant concentrates assets with "an upward cyclical narrative but unproven/diluted returns" — Archer (0.4% order-book prepayment rate + ongoing dilutive financing, cycle delivery dependent on a single UAE event) and EHang (certificate first-mover, 61.5% gross margin, but government-dependent revenue, ~7 quarters of cash runway, GAAP losses — a "certificate option," not a profitable business). The lower-left quadrant's ATM integration (LAIS-type) is the cycle-down + poor-returns avoid zone. The upper-right quadrant's drone chain (DJI/CATL aviation batteries/logistics closed loop) is the true "cycle × returns" dual-win main line — but DJI is unlisted, and A-shares lack the real asset, which is precisely the root of the concept speculation. China Southern Air Helicopter sits in the upper left: core business cyclically neutral-to-weak (offshore oil cycle + 2026 first three quarters net profit -46%), but at the 10th percentile PB of the past 3 years, with profits and cash flow — the sector's only low-valuation defensive play + low-altitude option.
Beneficiaries (preferred):
Avoid:
Archer (ACHR.NYSE) is rated cautious rather than avoid: ~USD 1.8B liquidity and ~10 quarters of runway, with no near-term survival risk; but order-book fluff + dilutive financing + high dependence on a single UAE event place it in the matrix's lower right — if the UAE delivers within 12 months, there is event-driven upside (asymmetric risk), suitable for event-driven capital rather than value capital.
| Scenario | Biggest Beneficiaries | Biggest Losers |
|---|---|---|
| Bear (35%) | CITIC Offshore Helicopter (defensive cash flow); Joby (deepest cash reserves, able to weather the winter) | EHang (dual squeeze from revenue and refinancing), XPeng AeroHT supply chain (mass production expectations dashed), ATC concept stocks (further valuation compression) |
| Base (45%) | EHang (approval recovery elasticity), AutoFlight (freight ramp-up + SF Express delivery), Joby (TIA/TC milestones) | Eve (deliveries further postponed), Archer (dilution and UAE uncertainty coexist) |
| Bull (20%) | EHang (back to RMB 500 million + repricing), XPeng Motors (AeroHT conversion exceeding expectations), Archer (largest event beta from UAE delivery) | ATC concept stocks relatively underperform (capital rotates to names with real deliveries) |
①Prolonged tightening of China's passenger-carrying approvals (no timetable for lifting restrictions as of the June 2026 accident) — suppresses the world's only passenger-carrying market with revenue; ②Further FAA TC delay beyond 2028 — double blow to US-listed PS multiples and refinancing windows; ③Declining local government payment capacity (debt resolution prioritized over low-altitude pilot programs) — second round of downward revisions to aircraft and ATC orders; ④First batch of public ticketing data disproving unit economics (ticket price × passenger flow × utilization rate any below estimates) — the 5x divergence in 2040 fleet forecasts (Aviation Week ~10,000 aircraft vs Bain ~45,000 aircraft) converges downward; ⑤Deepening geopolitical decoupling (FCC list expansion / export control retaliation) — two-way damage to supply chain costs and market access; ⑥Substitution risk: expansion of ground robotaxi networks diverting urban short-distance travel, suppressing the eVTOL ticket price ceiling.
This report presents industry research views based on public information and company disclosures, with data as of November 15, 2026. Figures marked "to be verified" are sourced from media/secondary reports, noted as such at adoption. This report does not constitute individual stock investment advice; dedicated dossiers with target prices and buy/sell point analysis are available for specific names (e.g., EHang Intelligent, Joby, CITIC Offshore Helicopter).