Rating: Neutral | Target Price Range: RMB 17.2–23.8 (12 months, base-case fair) | Current Price: RMB 23.26 (closing price, 2026-11-19) | Margin of Safety: -26.1% (base-case fair floor of RMB 17.2 is below the current price; no margin of safety) | Time Horizon: 12 months
Kehua Data is a domestic power equipment manufacturer with a three-pronged layout: "data center power (UPS/HVDC/power modules/liquid-cooling CDU) + energy storage PCS/integration + self-owned IDC services." The AI-computing-driven shift in power supply architecture (UPS → HVDC/Panama power modules → 800VDC) is its most genuine exogenous demand inflection point. The company sits in the first tier but is not the absolute leader in this segment (HVDC's dominant share has historically belonged to Zhongheng Electric/Delta). Of the +40.2% reported net profit growth in the first three quarters of 2026, roughly 34% came from one-off equity disposal gains; recurring (ex-non-recurring) profit grew only +6.16%. The current market price already implies an optimistic path of +30% to +78% growth in 2027 core earnings versus the current run-rate (see valuation chapter for methodology). The stock is down 41% YTD and PB sits at the 13th percentile of the past 5 years — pessimistic expectations have been partially priced in. The controlling shareholder and core executives committed on November 17 to purchases of no less than RMB 40 million, but this represents only 0.23% of market cap. Overall judgment: genuine quality, growth story in progress, price not cheap — at RMB 23.26, the price sits at the upper edge of the base-case fair range (RMB 17.2–23.8), about 14% above the base-case midpoint of RMB 20.4 and about 9.6% above the probability-weighted fair value of RMB 21.23 across three scenarios. Rating: Neutral; await the 2026 annual report (whether revenue reaches the RMB 9.139 bn incentive target threshold) and evidence of accelerating recurring profit in 2027.
Key constraints: ① Impairments have become routine (RMB 130–260 million each year for four consecutive years); ② accounts receivable of RMB 3.485 bn represent roughly 43% of annualized revenue; ③ without disposal gains in 2027, reported net profit could turn negative (if core earnings growth falls below roughly +19%); ④ in the HVDC segment, the company is a challenger under the dominance of Zhongheng/Delta.
Evidence Grade: B | Market Environment: deep correction in the AI computing infrastructure theme + domestic wind-down of large-scale energy storage policy support
The most important sources of future change (ranked by impact):
Primary share price driver: the pace of AIDC order delivery — the single biggest variable for whether the expectations implied by the current price hold; followed by the tug-of-war between 2027 core earnings and sell-side consensus (2027E of roughly RMB 900 million).
Verifiable expectation gap: At 22–25x, the current price back-solves to implied 2027E net profit of RMB 700–800 million, while the company's recurring profit growth in 2026 Q1–Q3 was only +6.16% — the market is paying for "2027 delivery" rather than current earnings. The expectation gap skews toward "pricing ahead of verified delivery": if AIDC volume is falsified or delayed, downside risk exceeds upside (asymmetric odds: -63% to the bear-case midpoint, +32% to the bull-case midpoint); only when 2026 annual report revenue ≥ RMB 9.139 bn and 2027 recurring profit acceleration is verified does the gap turn into upward repair room. Twelve brokers cover the stock (6 Buy / 6 Overweight, no Neutral/Sell), median target price RMB 30.4 (+30.7% vs. current price), and consensus has been revised down -3.7% over the past 90 days — street expectations are more optimistic than the current price implies.
Verification catalysts and falsification conditions: see "Overall Conclusion and Monitoring" at the end of the report.
Of the RMB 483 million attributable net profit in 2026 Q1–Q3, roughly 34% was one-off gains, and core (recurring) earnings grew only +6.16%; Q3 standalone attributable net profit was -14.04% (but +5.09% excluding share-based payment effects, and recurring profit -0.29% — flat, not deteriorating). In 2027, absent disposal gains of similar magnitude, the base-reversal math for reported net profit must distinguish methodologies: using 2026E core earnings (attributable - non-recurring) of roughly RMB 520 million as the denominator, core growth of +10%/+20%/+30% corresponds to reported attributable net profit of roughly -17%/-9%/+1% — i.e., core earnings growth must reach roughly +19% or more for reported profit to stay positive. Meanwhile Soochow's 27E of RMB 740 million implies core growth of roughly +43%, and consensus of RMB 900 million implies even higher — delivery depends on AIDC volume and structural relief (Yunzhu depreciation of roughly RMB 50 million, declining share-based payments, deconsolidation relief totaling roughly RMB 90 million) landing simultaneously. This conditional risk is the largest source of expectation gap at the current price; the counterweight buffer is that the relief items above are genuine, verifiable, automatic repairs.
The company's positioning rests on three verifiable pieces of evidence (shortlist with batch delivery, HVDC shipments +200%, new liquid-cooling CDU capacity from fundraising), but the evidence boundaries must be honestly flagged: ① "No. 1 power module market share" comes from a company-commissioned commercial consulting source, coexisting with the third-party 2025 HVDC concentration data (Zhongheng first, CR3 roughly 72%) — Kehua is a challenger in this segment; ② the circulating claim that "in Alibaba's 240MW expansion project Phase 1, over 100MW of liquid-cooling CDUs were delivered" appears only in company promotional material and self-media reposts (2026-10-30); when directly asked about the order amount on the investor interaction platform, the company replied "refer to public disclosure" — this order has no first-hand disclosure of amount or acceptance party; even if all 240MW were attributed to Kehua, at the narrow industry estimate of roughly RMB 300–500 million/GW for power equipment, the corresponding revenue would be only roughly RMB 70–120 million — a single product cannot carry the profit narrative, and delivery depends on larger-scale centralized procurement volume; ③ the "2026 internet major client revenue +90%" target (cited by brokers) could not be verified against company source text. Conclusion: positioning is real, magnitude unproven; concentrated revenue recognition in 2026 Q4 and the public announcement of major-client centralized procurement wins in 2027 are two falsifiable nodes.
The current price of RMB 23.26 (2026-11-19 close; total shares 755.86 million; market cap RMB 17.581 bn) sits at the very top of the base-case fair range (RMB 17.2–23.8), 2.3% below the upper bound, roughly 14% above the base-case midpoint of RMB 20.4, and roughly 9.6% above the probability-weighted fair value of RMB 21.23 across three scenarios. At 22–25x, the current price back-solves to implied 2027E attributable net profit of RMB 700–800 million: requiring +56% to +78% versus 2026E recurring profit (roughly RMB 450 million), or +30% to +48% versus the normalized core base (roughly RMB 540 million) after removing the Yunzhu ramp-up drag and share-based payments — both methodologies are significantly above 2026's actual delivery (+6.16%), but the latter overlaps with Soochow's core +43% path, indicating the current price is not pure narrative excess but "credible, not-yet-delivered growth." The PB's 13th percentile over the past 5 years must be read alongside ROE: weighted ROE in 2026 Q1–Q3 was only 7.39%; the low percentile is the result of the stock's -41% YTD (a roughly 50% drawdown from the May 2026 high of RMB 46.14), not evidence of undervaluation; conversely, at only 19.6x 2027 consensus, pessimistic information is already considerably priced in. Overall: reasonable, leaning to the upper edge; no margin of safety; odds distribution slightly skewed to the downside.
Provisions were RMB 142/258/219/133 million respectively for FY2023 through 2026 Q1–Q3 (the 2026 semi-annual report shows the overall bad debt provision ratio rising further to 11.16%) — impairments have been a recurring cost for four consecutive years, mutually causal with the storage price war and operator/SOE payment cycles. Accounts receivable of RMB 3.485 bn represent roughly 43% of annualized revenue; a 2027 pessimistic impairment assumption (credit RMB 150–180 million + inventory RMB 80–110 million + other RMB 20–40 million, midpoint roughly RMB 290 million) equals roughly 41% of base-case attributable net profit (RMB 650–750 million) — enough to push recurring profit growth back to single digits. Offsetting evidence must be presented alongside: in 2026 H1, balances aged 2+ years fell 6.1% to RMB 684 million; asset impairment losses in Q1–Q3 were -53% YoY (lower inventory write-downs); goodwill had already been impaired by RMB 153 million due to deconsolidation; Q1–Q3 operating cash flow was RMB 678 million with a cash-to-revenue ratio of 1.05 — collections are improving; whether impairments have peaked requires the annual report's aging migration matrix to confirm.
The purchase commitment came after the stock nearly halved YTD and investors questioned market-cap management four times; the grant price of RMB 22.04 and the no-price-band purchases together form a management cost anchor (current price RMB 23.26 is only +5.5% above the grant price); the FY2025 payout ratio jump to 61.7% significantly exceeds the 2024–2026 shareholder return plan minimum (cumulative three-year dividends have reached roughly 90% of average annual net profit). But three records discount the signal: ① one of the purchasers, Chen Sixiong, disclosed a share reduction plan with 4 other executives in June 2025 (Announcement 2025-064, totaling no more than 0.0969% of total shares); ② a 2022 plan by 9 directors/supervisors/executives to purchase RMB 19 million was only 34% completed (RMB 6.46 million) at the halfway point; ③ the RMB 40 million floor is only 0.23% of market cap — spread over roughly 90 trading days in 6 months, roughly RMB 440,000 per day, with no substantive price support function. Verdict: signal value exceeds capital value; limited downside protection.
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | 2026Q1-3 (latest period) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating revenue (RMB bn) | 8.141 | 7.757 | 8.160 | 6.043 (+5.91%) |
| Net profit attributable to parent (RMB bn) | 0.508 | 0.315 | 0.418 | 0.483 (+40.20%) |
| Recurring net profit attributable to parent (RMB bn) | 0.463 | 0.285 | 0.385 | 0.319 (+6.16%) |
| Gross margin | 27.34% | 25.20% | 24.56% | 25.11% |
| Net margin (attributable basis) | 6.23% | 4.06% | 5.12% | 7.99% |
| Net operating cash flow (RMB bn) | 1.402 | 1.512 | 1.162 | 0.678 (+288.97%) |
| Free cash flow (RMB bn, est. = OCF - capex) | 1.097 | 1.191 | 0.818 | — (Q4 is peak for capex and collections) |
| Cash + trading financial assets (RMB bn) | — | — | — | 2.840 (as of 2026-09-30) |
| Interest-bearing debt (RMB bn, short-term + current portion of LT + long-term loans) | — | — | — | 0.893 (as of 2026-09-30) |
| Net cash (RMB bn) | — | — | — | 1.946 (approx. RMB 2.58/share) |
| Debt-to-asset ratio | — | — | — | 54.25% (2026-09-30) |
| Contract liabilities (RMB bn) | — | — | — | 0.460 (+30.82% vs. start of year) |
Note: Balance sheet stock items for FY2023–2025 are not listed here; refer to annual reports for trend comparison. Cash-like assets = cash of RMB 620 million + trading financial assets of RMB 2.22 bn (both at 2026-09-30 statement values); additionally, large-denomination certificates of deposit with maturities over one year of roughly RMB 1.5 bn are not counted as cash-like; if included, net cash would be roughly RMB 3.45 bn; IDC operating lease liabilities of RMB 704 million are not deducted from net cash; if deducted, net cash would be roughly RMB 1.24 bn.
Reasons for metric changes (line items with YoY ≥ ±20%):
For 2026 Q3 standalone: revenue RMB 2.159 bn (+9.43%), attributable net profit RMB 87 million (-14.04%), recurring attributable net profit RMB 76 million (-0.29%); attributable net profit excluding share-based payment effects was RMB 110 million (+5.09%). Quarterly gross margin 26.23% (25.11% cumulative for Q1–Q3, roughly flat YoY). The decline in reported attributable profit was mainly due to the 2025 Q3 base and share-based payment expense concentrated in Q3 (share-based payments totaled RMB 39.71 million for Q1–Q3, of which RMB 22.91 million in Q3 alone); on a core operating basis the quarter was essentially flat — but flat itself is the problem: there is a huge gap between the current price's implied 2027 core earnings growth requirement (+30% to +78%, both methodologies) and the +0.29% quarterly recurring growth — this is the pricing logic behind the stock's accelerated decline after the Q3 report in late October. Positives: Q1–Q3 operating cash flow of RMB 678 million (vs. RMB 174 million a year earlier), cash-to-revenue ratio 1.05; inventory +87.45% and contract liabilities +30.82% point to concentrated Q4 revenue recognition. Management stated clearly in the Q3 report that the Beijing Yunzhu data center is in the rack ramp-up phase, with depreciation and operating costs for Q1–Q3 roughly RMB 50 million higher YoY, and that "as rack utilization improves, project revenue and profitability are expected to improve gradually." On whether results "beat expectations": Simply Wall St (2026-10-30) noted Q3 results slightly below analyst expectations, with some analysts cutting EPS estimates (consensus revised down -3.7% over the past 90 days); Soochow (11-04), conversely, raised 2026–2028E attributable net profit to RMB 550/740/960 million — the divergence within the sell side itself indicates results are in a "could go either way" verification period, not one-sided deterioration.
Business model snapshot: Primarily order-based equipment manufacturing (data center products + new energy + smart power combined ~84% of revenue, revenue recognized upon one-time delivery) + asset-heavy self-operated IDC services (15.73%, recurring rack leasing revenue, asset-heavy with front-loaded depreciation). On the equipment side, there is 30+ years of power electronics expertise and large-customer certification barriers, but downstream customers are telecom operators/Internet giants/central SOE centralized procurement—no overall pricing power: consolidated gross margin fell three years in a row from 27.34%→25.20%→24.56%. Structural bright spots are overseas (FY2025 gross margin 40.86%) and smart power (39.60%).
Cash content of earnings test: This is the most solid part of Kehua's financials. OCF/net profit attributable to parent for FY2023-2025 were 2.76/4.80/2.78, and 1.40 for the first three quarters of 2026; FCF/net profit 2.16/3.78/1.96—book profits convert almost fully, sometimes in excess, into freely disposable cash, mainly because order-based business advances received + payables occupy working capital. Risk point: cash flows are highly concentrated in Q4 (FY2025 single-quarter Q4 operating cash flow of RMB 988 million, 85% of the full year; Q2 was -RMB 59 million), with year-end pulse-type collections repeating across years—quarterly data cannot be linearly extrapolated.
Recurring earnings test: Non-recurring gains/losses of RMB 164 million in the first three quarters of 2026 accounted for 34% of net profit attributable to parent (mainly gains from disposal of Keyun Chenhang); the ex-non-recurring figure of RMB 319 million is the core—the ex-non-recurring figure has been positive and recovering for three consecutive years (285→385 million → annualized ~430-470 million), with no sign of using one-time items to whitewash recurring losses. However, the headline growth rate in 2026 was indeed amplified by disposal gains, and the ex-non-recurring figure still includes two temporary drags (Yunzhu ramp-up depreciation of ~RMB 50 million and share-based payment expense of RMB 39.71 million); after excluding these, the core operating improvement in 2026 is better than the headline ex-non-recurring growth rate. Under the A-share framework there is no Non-GAAP reconciliation table and no aggressive add-back of full SBC-type issues.
Return on capital: FY2025 ROIC estimated at ~4.6% (operating profit of RMB 438 million × (1-15%)/(interest-bearing debt of RMB 1.648 billion + equity attributable to parent of RMB 6.407 billion)), significantly below the estimated WACC of ~9.5%—return on invested capital has long been below the cost of capital, mainly due to IDC asset-heavy ramp-up and dilution from low-margin energy storage integration; a "pseudo-growth" warning signal. The improvement path depends on Yunzhu reaching full occupancy and a rising share of high-margin AIDC products—unlikely to see a qualitative change before 2027. Weighted ROE for the first three quarters of 2026 was 7.39%.
Capex quality: FY2023-2025 capex of RMB 305/321/344 million per year, CapEx/depreciation at ~1.1-1.3x—a moderate investment intensity. Construction in progress +74.46% vs. the beginning of the year (liquid-cooling CDU production base)—growth-oriented capex pointing toward AIDC demand, the right direction. The company does not disclose a maintenance/growth split, so precise separation is not possible.
Red flag list: ① Accounts receivable of RMB 3.485 billion, ~43% of annualized revenue (see C4 for details); ② Goodwill of RMB 526 million (7.9% of equity attributable to parent; RMB 153 million already impaired in 2026 due to deconsolidation); ③ Top-5 customer concentration of 18.71%—still manageable, but the trend of dependence on top Internet giant orders is rising.
Word-deed consistency: Pragmatic (4 commitments: 3 fulfilled, 1 in progress). ① Convertible bonds: conversion price revised down from 34.55 to 27.65 yuan in October 2024 to promote conversion; forced redemption and delisting triggered in April 2025; finance costs fell from RMB 62.75 million to 8.16 million—fulfilled. ② Shareholder return plan (2024-05): committed to cumulative three-year dividends ≥30% of average annual net profit; actual ~89.7%—over-delivered. ③ Overseas expansion strategy: FY2025 overseas revenue +42.27%, 2026H1 +135.15%—fulfilled. ④ 2026 restricted stock incentive + employee stock ownership plan: registration completed; performance-based unlock in progress. The company has no habit of issuing quantitative guidance (not mandatory in A-shares); commitment verification mainly relies on contractual targets.
Shareholder friendliness: Neutral to friendly, but with a dilution record. FY2025: RMB 5 per 10 shares dividend + 4.5 bonus shares per 10 shares (payout ratio 61.7%, a sharp increase YoY); no share buyback record (after being pressed twice in July/October 2026, still only verbal responses); the RMB 1.492 billion convertible bond issued in 2023 and forced-redemption conversion in 2025 raised share capital from 462 million to 515 million shares (~11.7% dilution)—already done. The current 2026 incentive shares of 8.51 million shares (~1.1% of share capital) have limited impact.
Risk signals: ① Vice Chairman and President Chen Sixiong, along with 4 other executives, disclosed a share reduction plan in June 2025 (aggregate no more than 0.0969% of total share capital, announcement 2025-064); the current share increase entities had a reduction plan on record 17 months prior (no result announcement found on whether it was actually executed); ② In 2022, a RMB 19 million share increase plan by 9 directors/supervisors/executives was only 34% completed when execution passed the halfway point—a precedent of slow execution of share increases; ③ During the deep share price correction, management responded mainly with statements, only landing the share increase commitment on 2026-11-17. Controlling shareholder Kehua Weiye holds a stable 17.73%, with a pledge ratio of only ~3.68%—no margin-call chain risk. Equity incentive performance targets (2026 revenue ≥ 2025 × 1.12, net profit ≥ × 1.15) clearly align with management interests.
| Segment (FY2025) | Revenue (RMB 100M) | Share | Gross Margin | YoY | Business Logic in One Sentence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| New Energy (storage PCS/integration/PV inverters) | 38.0 | 46.56% | 17.87% (+1.09pp) | +5.31% | Largest revenue source; domestic price war offset by high-margin overseas; volume down, prices stable |
| Data Center Products (UPS/power modules/liquid-cooling CDU) | 22.39 | 27.44% | 31.97% (-0.28pp) | +16.54% | Order-based high-margin equipment driven by AIDC; 2026H1 gross margin 31.10% (-4.96pp) under pressure |
| IDC Services (self-operated rack leasing) | 12.84 | 15.73% | 18.31% (-5.01pp) | +4.33% | Asset-heavy recurring revenue dragged by Yunzhu ramp-up; 2026H1 gross margin down to 12.50% |
| Smart Power (industrial/transport high-end power) | 7.44 | 9.11% | 39.60% (-1.46pp) | -19.32% | High-margin cornerstone but shrinking two years in a row (2026H1 -27.23%); company only offers circular statements without explanation |
| Overseas (cross-segment) | 10.32 | 12.64% | 40.86% (+1.58pp) | +42.27% | Main driver of profit growth; 2026H1 share rose to 21.96% (+135.15%) |
Profit engine judgment (gross profit contribution estimated as revenue × gross margin): the data center industry (products + services, combined revenue of RMB 3.523 billion, gross margin 27.00%) contributes ~RMB 950 million of gross profit, ~48% of the company's total gross profit (~RMB 2.0 billion)—new energy, the largest by revenue (gross profit ~RMB 680 million, 34% share), is not the profit engine; data centers are. This also means the company's earnings elasticity hinges mainly on AIDC power products and IDC rack utilization, not on the outcome of the energy storage price war. Overseas is the brightest part of the gross margin structure (40.86% vs. domestic 21.37%).
Gross margin structure divergence: The gap between the highest (Smart Power 39.60%/Overseas 40.86%) and the lowest (New Energy 17.87%) exceeds 20pp—the former is a niche market with high certification barriers (nuclear power/industrial, strong pricing power), the latter a fiercely competitive red ocean with purchased battery cells + integration (weak pricing power)—two entirely different businesses within the same company, and consolidated gross margin is therefore persistently diluted by New Energy's revenue share.
Accounting red flags:
Cross-period consistency:
Overall judgment: Two medium-level red flags exist (impairment timing, disposal gains embellishment); no aggressive revenue recognition or inventory capitalization-type severe accounting techniques found. The main risk is "the quality of profits" rather than "whether profits are genuine."
Current market data and multiple percentiles: Current price 23.26 yuan (closing price 2026-11-19), total share capital 755.86 million shares (per 2026Q3 balance sheet: 515.4 million shares pre-bonus × 1.45 + 8.51 million incentive shares), total market cap RMB 17.581 billion. PE(TTM) 31.6x (2%/27%/22% percentile over the past 1/3/5 years)—earnings are not representative (TTM net profit attributable to parent of RMB 556 million includes RMB 164 million of one-time gains); ex-non-recurring TTM is ~43.5x; percentiles are for reference only, not a headline cheap/expensive signal; PB 2.64x (13% percentile over 5 years) but weighted ROE for the first three quarters of 2026 was only 7.39%—a low percentile ≠ cheap; dividend yield 1.47%. Forward: at the current price, consensus FY2026E (~RMB 680 million) implies 25.8x and FY2027E (~RMB 900 million) 19.6x; against Soochow's 550/740 million, 32.0/23.8x; PEG ~0.62-0.69 (not expensive if growth materializes—the problem is the growth itself). Liquidity is normal (30-day average daily turnover ~RMB 414 million, ~2.4% of market cap); no low-liquidity discount issue.
Peer comparison:
Kehua at 31.6x is ~74% above the "earnings-comparable group" (Kstar 21.8/Sinexcel 16.6/Sungrow 18.1, median ~18x), and far below the "AIDC narrative group" (Envicool 90.1/Zhongheng 91.7x)—the market has given Kehua a partial AIDC premium but is far from pricing it as pure narrative; this positioning itself shows the market is wavering between "delivery vs. no delivery."
Market-implied expectations: Back-solving the current price at 22-25x (upper end of the earnings-comparable group up to the Huachuang anchor) implies 2027E net profit attributable to parent of RMB 700-800 million. In one sentence: the current price requires the company to grow core earnings in 2027 to 1.3-1.8x of the current run-rate (+30%~+48% on a normalized base of RMB 540 million; +56%~+78% on a 2026E ex-non-recurring base of RMB 450 million), whereas the reality is that 2026 ex-non-recurring grew only +6.2%. Against the industry chain demand math (see E7 demand inflection chain): Alibaba's RMB 380 billion three-year capex, 800VDC ramping from 2027, and the company's presence on major-customer CDU short lists—the implied growth rate is not unreachable, but it requires three links to materialize simultaneously: data center revenue +25-30%, Yunzhu reaching full occupancy, and HVDC centralized procurement ramp-up; as of now, none of the three has year-report-grade completed evidence.
Three-layer value (EPV): Asset value ~8.13 yuan/share (net assets attributable to parent of 8.83 yuan/share excluding goodwill of RMB 526 million); EPV (zero growth) ~8.19 yuan/share (normalized FCFF: first three quarters of 2026 ex-non-recurring annualized and normalized at a 15% standard tax rate, ~RMB 400 million, WACC 9.5%, plus net cash of RMB 1.946 billion); the residual of the current price of 23.26 yuan over EPV is ~15.1 yuan/share, with the growth option accounting for ~64.8% of the current price—what the market is paying for is the growth option in AIDC power, Yunzhu occupancy ramp-up, and overseas energy storage; order and capacity support means it is not pure narrative, but the high proportion means that if delivery is delayed, the room for downward valuation revision is equally substantial. Asset value and EPV are two independent floor references, not to be added to EPV; the double floor near 8 yuan is -65% from the current price, serving only as a reference in the most pessimistic scenario, not as support.
Three scenarios and odds (12 months):
| Scenario | Probability | Fair Range (yuan/share) | Core Assumptions | vs. Current Price |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 22% | 7.1-9.9 | Domestic energy storage subsidies continue to fade + AIDC delivery falsified + impairments continue; 2027 ex-non-recurring flat at RMB 450-500 million × 12-15x | Median 8.5 yuan, -63% |
| Base | 53% | 17.2-23.8 | Data center products +25-30%, overseas storage continues growing, Yunzhu full occupancy; 2027 net profit attributable to parent RMB 650-750 million × 20-24x | Midpoint 20.4 yuan, -14% |
| Bull | 25% | 31-37 | Major-customer HVDC/power modules ramp up beyond expectations; 2027 net profit attributable to parent RMB 900-950 million × 26-30x | Median 34 yuan, +32% |
Base-case ramp-up calculation (demand-side basis in the industry landscape chapter): 2027 data center product revenue +25-30% (incremental RMB 560-670 million, gross profit increment ~RMB 170-200 million) + Yunzhu loss reduction ~RMB 50 million + share-based payment and deconsolidation structural relief ~RMB 90 million → 2027 net profit attributable to parent of RMB 650-750 million. Anchors for the 20-24x exit multiple: the earnings-comparable group (Kstar 21.8/Sinexcel 16.6/Sungrow 18.1x) at 17-22x as the base, Huachuang's 2027E 25x as the upper reference, PEG≈1—the anchor is independent of the company's current price; the ramp-up valuation (RMB 650-750 million × 20-24x = RMB 13.0-18.0 billion market cap = 17.2-23.8 yuan) fully matches the scenario table. The bull-case multiple of 26-30x is anchored on the lower end of the company's range during its AIDC delivery period (~1/3 discount to the narrative group's 90x). The bear case is constructed on independent stress assumptions (ex-non-recurring stagnation + multiple converging below the earnings-comparable group's lower bound); external reference: the most conservative sell-side, Soochow, at only RMB 550 million for 2026E (implying 2026Q4 single-quarter net profit attributable to parent of ~RMB 67 million, ~-8% YoY) yet maintains a Buy rating with 2027E still at RMB 740 million—there is no Sell rating on the street and no directly comparable bearish target price; our bear-case range is significantly below all sell-side target prices, with the difference stemming from assumptions (AIDC falsified vs. sell-side default of delivery)—it is an independent stress scenario with a different framework, not a comparable revision.
In-house earnings forecast (reconciliation anchor):
| Period | Revenue (RMB 100M) | Net Profit Attributable to Parent (RMB 100M) | Key Drivers |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY2026E | 84.5-87.5 (+3.5%~+7.2%) | 5.9-6.4 (of which ex-non-recurring 4.3-4.7 + one-time ~1.6) | Q4 overseas storage deliveries + strategic inventory converting to revenue; Yunzhu marginal loss reduction; incentive revenue target of 9.139 billion expected to be missed (implied Q4 single-quarter +26% is difficult) |
| FY2027E | 96-104 (+13%~+19%) | 6.5-7.5 (assuming no large non-recurring items) | Data centers +25-30%, overseas continuing to grow, Yunzhu full occupancy, tax rate normalized at 12-15%, impairments provided at a normal 130-180 million |
Laid side by side with management's guidance (no quantitative guidance; incentive targets: 2026 revenue 9.139 billion / net profit 481 million—net profit target already met ahead of schedule, revenue target difficult) and sell-side consensus (2026E RMB 680 million / 2027E RMB 900 million): our 2026E is above Soochow's and below consensus; 2027E is 10-25% below consensus—consensus embeds the optimistic case of an AIDC share leap, which in our framework is the bull case, not the base case.
Conclusion: Fair, at the upper end of the range. The current price already embeds a substantial portion of 2027 delivery expectations; the quality (net cash of RMB 1.946 billion, OCF/net profit attributable to parent at 1.4x, genuine large-customer resources) matches the growth story, but the story has yet to begin delivering. Margin of safety -26.1% (base-case fair lower bound below the current price); probability-weighted expected fair value 21.23 yuan, implied expected return ~-8.7%. Strategically: do not chase highs, do not short—wait for two types of evidence (2026 annual report revenue and data center segment, 2027Q1 ex-non-recurring acceleration) or a price pullback below the base-case midpoint before reassessing entry.
Market Size: Kehua effectively competes on two tracks. ① China UPS/data center power: CCID Consulting estimates approximately RMB 19.1 billion for 2025 (up roughly 26% from about RMB 15.2 billion in 2023; secondary citation, to be verified); Qianzhan Industry Research Institute estimates the 2024 high-end power supply (UPS) sub-segment at approximately RMB 9.77 billion and micro-module data centers at approximately RMB 8.23 billion (+7.4%); the global data center power market (MarketsandMarkets aggregated estimates, for cross-reference only) at approximately USD 35.1 billion in 2025 → USD 50.5 billion by 2030, CAGR 7.5%. ② Energy storage: CNESA figures show China adding 66.43GW/189.48GWh in 2025 (+52%/+73%), with cumulative capacity of 144.7GW; Wood Mackenzie estimates global additions of 106GW in 2025 (+43%); BNEF projects 123GW/360GWh globally in 2026 (+33%); average global battery pack price in 2025 was USD 108/kWh (-8%, BNEF). ③ China IDC: Kezhi Consulting estimates the traditional IDC market at RMB 158.3 billion in 2024 (+8.7%), projected to reach RMB 317.5 billion by 2029 (CAGR ~15%); IDC estimates the 2024 China intelligent computing market at USD 19.0 billion (+86.9%). Structural characteristics: AI data center power is in the early-to-mid stage of simultaneous volume and price increases; domestic grid-scale storage is in a policy phase-out bottoming period; overseas storage is in the mid-stage of an upcycle — the two tracks are on offsetting cycles.
Value Chain and Value Distribution: The data center power chain runs "diesel generators → medium-voltage distribution/transformers → UPS or HVDC/Panama power modules → terminal precision power distribution → precision cooling/liquid cooling." Kehua sits at the core power conversion segment (Soochow Securities estimates gross margin for intelligent computing center products at ~35%, significantly higher than the 20%+ for IDC leasing), and is one of the few players in the industry with a full-chain portfolio of "power equipment + micro-modules + precision cooling + self-operated data centers." In the storage chain "cells → PCS → system integration → owners," PCS is one of the thickest-margin segments, while domestic integration bidding prices trended downward in 2025, compressing profits. Kehua holds strong bargaining power over upstream suppliers (cells/power semiconductors, an oversupplied buyer's market) and benefits from input cost tailwinds; it holds weaker bargaining power over downstream customers (operators/central SOE bulk procurement), relying on market share and customization capabilities; overseas certification barriers with major vendors confer relative pricing premiums (FY2025 overseas gross margin 40.86% vs. domestic 21.37%).
Supply, Demand, and Competitive Landscape: Global UPS players converge on Huawei, Vertiv, Eaton, Schneider, Mitsubishi, Delta, and domestic players Kehua/Kstar — two coexisting market-share measurements: by CCID's overall market measure, Huawei has ranked first for five consecutive years; by Qianzhan (commissioned by the company), Kehua ranked first in 2024 in the high-end power supply (UPS) sub-segment — the former covers all power ranges, the latter limited to high-power high-end segments; these are differences in measurement scope, not contradictions. Data center HVDC: DCMap estimates Zhongheng Electric + Delta Greentech + Vertiv collectively held ~90% in 2022 (secondary citation); third-party estimates for 2025 show CR3 at ~72%, with Zhongheng at ~31% leading — high concentration but loosening, with Kehua in the chasing tier alongside Megmeet and Hopewind. Storage PCS: By CNESA's 2024 global market China enterprise ranking, Sungrow ranked first and Kehua Energy second; the company itself claims "No. 1 in storage PCS shipments in the Chinese market" — company and third-party figures are inconsistent, and both are presented for reference. Storage integration: WoodMac's 2024 figures show Tesla 15%/Sungrow 14%/CRRC 8% (CR3 ~36%); by InfoLink, CR3 fell to 30% in 2025 — concentration declining, competition intensifying; domestic system integrators are severely oversupplied, with 121.5GWh of storage system contracts awarded in 2025 (+140%) while unit prices fluctuated downward. Entry barriers: high-power power electronics topology and reliability track records (long certification cycles for financial/operator qualification), grid-forming technology (Kehua's cumulative grid-forming PCS shipments exceed 8GW, No. 1 in China), custom co-development with hyperscale customers, and overseas certifications and channels. Substitution risk is primarily architectural rather than product substitution: traditional double-conversion UPS being partially replaced by Panama power modules/HVDC/future 800VDC + solid-state transformers — a relative positive for Kehua, which leads in power modules (Qianzhan 2024 measure).
Cycles and Regulation: AI data center power/intelligent computing infrastructure is in the early-to-mid upcycle (domestic hyperscalers ramping capex; 800VDC volume inflection not until 2027); domestic grid-scale storage is in a bottoming transition after Document No. 136 (NDRC Price [2025] No. 136, abolishing mandatory storage pairing and full market entry for renewables) — domestic new installations fell 18% YoY in 2026H1 (Caixin), with the industry pivoting to independent storage/spot arbitrage/grid-forming technology; overseas storage is rising but subject to policy disruption: US Section 301 tariffs on non-EV lithium batteries rising from 7.5% to 25% effective 2026-01-01; under OBBBA, ITC step-down for projects commissioned after 2027-12-31 (exempt if construction began before 2026-07-04), compounded by FEOC supply chain restrictions — limited direct impact on the company (overseas base is in India/Middle East/Europe/Southeast Asia), but the closure of the US market redirects Chinese storage supply toward Europe/India/Middle East, indirectly intensifying overseas price competition. Regulatory summary: compute policy + AI capex clearly benefit data center power; domestic storage is a near-term negative but a long-term positive for grid-forming technology leaders (Kehua is in the grid-forming first tier).
Quantified Demand Inflection Chain (the core industry variable of this study): Driver variable = AI compute capex — Alibaba announced in February 2025 over RMB 380 billion of cloud and AI investment over three years (exceeding the prior decade's total), with ~RMB 190 billion invested as of June 2026; ByteDance is reportedly discussing up to USD 70 billion for AI data centers in 2026 (Bloomberg, unconfirmed); globally, Vertiv posted FY2025 revenue of USD 10.2 billion (+17%), FY2026 organic growth guidance of ~+38%, and single-quarter order growth exceeding 100%. Unit value uplift = NVIDIA announced 800VDC adoption starting 2027 with Kyber racks, rack power exceeding 1MW, targeting ~30% TCO reduction; AI server power supply unit value is over 4x traditional levels (Soochow estimate); Vertiv estimates ~USD 1.4 billion of revenue per GW of IT load for 2025-2030. Adoption pace = Panama power (10kV direct conversion to 240/336V, 97.5% efficiency, 2.5MW per unit) is already in scaled commercial deployment at Alibaba/Tencent; 800V HVDC domestically began with ByteDance pilots, brokers expect volume ramp starting 2027, reaching ~45% of new capacity by 2030 (secondary citation, to be verified). Company share = No. 1 in prefabricated power modules in 2024 (Qianzhan commissioned measure); HVDC installations exceeded 2,000 units in 2025 with +200%+ shipments in 2026Q1; shortlisted and shipping in volume 1.2MW CDUs to hyperscalers — positioned as a first-tier chaser, but exact HVDC share undisclosed; the "share" link in this chain is qualitative and is the largest unverified variable in this valuation.
Peer Comparison Table (as of 2026-11-19; data for the first three quarters of 2026 unless noted):
| Company | Revenue Scale / Growth | Profitability / ROE | PE (TTM) | Positioning and Differentiation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kehua Data | RMB 6.043B/+5.9% | Net profit attributable RMB 483M (incl. one-off items)/ROE 7.39% | 31.6 | Data center power + storage PCS + IDC, three lines; leading in high-end UPS/power modules, HVDC chaser |
| Kstar (002518) | 2025 RMB 5.270B/+26.7% | 2025 net profit RMB 611M/ROE 13.36% | 21.8 | Also dual UPS + storage businesses, skewed toward small/mid power and residential/C&I storage exports, no self-operated IDC; superior earnings quality vs. Kehua |
| Zhongheng Electric (002364) | RMB 2.137B (2025)/+8.9%; first three quarters +30.1% | Non-GAAP net margin only ~4% | 91.7 | Pure-play HVDC/Panama, deepest hyperscaler ties (primary supplier to Alibaba/Tencent), small scale, priced on AIDC narrative |
| Sinexcel (300693) | RMB 3.463B (2025)/+14.1%; first three quarters +25.1% | Net profit +32.3%/ROE 16.42% | 16.6 | Storage PCS + EV charging + power quality, ~40% gross margin (highest), reference floor for sector profitability pricing |
| Envicool (002837) | RMB 6.068B (2025)/+32.2% | 2026 first three quarters net profit -7.6% (front-loaded expenses) | 90.1 | Data center "cooling" (liquid cooling) leader, NVIDIA MGX ecosystem, AI monetization faster than Kehua; complementary to Kehua's "power" side |
| Sungrow (300274) | First three quarters revenue -26.4% | First three quarters net profit -44.5%/ROE 13.74% | 18.1 | Global storage integration first tier, in a solar/storage price downcycle; indicates the sector's pricing anchor during "profit downturn" |
| Vertiv (VRT.US) | FY2026 organic growth guidance +38% | First three quarters net profit +91.8% | N/A (overseas) | Global data center power leader, core of NVIDIA's 800VDC ecosystem — the template for Kehua's AIDC story upon full realization |
Company Industry Positioning: A hybrid of niche leader + chaser — leading in high-end UPS/power module segments (No. 1 by commissioned measure), storage PCS No. 2 among Chinese companies (CNESA)/company-claimed No. 1 in China (inconsistent measures, both cited), a second-tier player in storage integration suppressed by Sungrow/CRRC, and the highest-elasticity HVDC chaser. Share trends: data center product side rising (shipments FY2025 +39.59%), smart power shrinking, storage under pressure domestically while scaling overseas. Market cap of RMB 17.581B represents a ~60% discount to Envicool (~RMB 44.3B), placing it in an "AIDC second-tier" valuation trough — but the key to the trough (an HVDC share leap) remains in others' hands.
Overall Rating: Neutral, confidence 0.55, 12-month horizon. The investment thesis for Kehua Data can be compressed into one sentence: buying an AIDC chaser with genuine positioning but unverified delivery, at the price of a 65% growth option. On fundamentals, cash flow quality is excellent (OCF/net profit attributable 1.4-4.8x), net cash of RMB 1.946B, hyperscaler relationships and grid-forming technology are real; but ROIC at ~4.6% is below cost of capital, impairments are recurring, and the smart power business is shrinking without explanation. On price, the current price sits at the upper edge of base-case fair value, ~9.5% above the weighted fair value, with a margin of safety of -26%. The payoff distribution is asymmetric (bear median -63% vs. bull median +32%); until the 2026 annual report and 2027Q1 non-GAAP evidence land, upside odds are not favorable.
Strategy: Holders may continue holding pending Q4 revenue recognition and annual report verification (controlling shareholder share purchases and incentive grant price of RMB 22.04 provide weak support); non-holders should not chase — below the base-case midpoint of RMB 20.4 (corresponding to ~18-19x 2027E base-case net profit attributable), odds turn favorable; if the 2026 annual report shows revenue reaching the RMB 9.139B assessment threshold and data center segment growth of +25% or more, upgrade to Cautious Buy.
Risk and Catalyst Alerts (presented in standardized language):
This report is based on independent research using publicly available information. Data as of the 2026-11-19 close (price freeze anchor); cited materials are annotated per section.
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