Rating: Neutral | Target price range: RMB 77.4–105.6 (base-case fair value, midpoint RMB 91.5) | Current price: RMB 88.10 (closing price, 2026-10-29) | Margin of safety: −12.1% (vs. base-case fair value floor, no positive margin of safety) | Time horizon: 6–12 months | Market cap: RMB 90.2 billion (total shares: 1.02386 billion)
Jereh's oil & gas equipment and engineering core business maintained positive growth through 2025–2026, a period of broad pressure on global oilfield services peers (2025 revenue RMB 16.223 billion, +21.48%; first three quarters of 2026 +14.91%), while what truly drives a repricing of the company is the cumulative over USD 3.1 billion (approx. RMB 20.9 billion) of North American data-center gas turbine orders secured since November 2025 — contract liabilities of RMB 7.051 billion (+263% vs. the beginning of the year), together with inventory and prepayments, provide cash-flow-level evidence on the balance sheet. After the stock retreated roughly 49% from its July high of RMB 173.66 to RMB 88.10, the residual method implies the market is pricing only about three-quarters of sell-side 2027 consensus earnings (RMB 7.28–8.09 billion), valuing the gas turbine business at 8–11x 2027E; this report's base-case fair value is RMB 77.4–105.6, with the current price in the lower half of the range. The probability-weighted expected value is about RMB 89, only +1.3% above the current price — odds are nearly symmetric, the left tail is deep (bear case −58% to −68%), and there is no positive margin of safety — hence the Neutral rating. Key constraints: the gas turbine integration net margin has never been disclosed (sell-side implied 24%+ vs. foreign banks' 10–14% under a systems-integrator lens — a huge divergence); cumulative orders from a single cloud customer over 12 months equal about 72% of 2025 revenue; and the implementing rules of US Executive Order 14420 (due by 2026-12-24 at the latest) plus the fading Brent geopolitical premium form a concentrated verification window in 2026Q4–2027H1. Separating quality from price: the asset floor is roughly RMB 23.3/share and EPV (zero growth) about RMB 24.8/share, meaning roughly 70% of the current price rests on the growth option — whether that option pays off is precisely the 2027 delivery and acceptance itself.
Peer comparisons are indeed grim: SPM (Shiyou Machinery) turned to losses in 9M2026, ZM Oil's 9M2026 attributable net profit fell −38.2%, and the three international oilfield-service majors saw 2025 net profits fall 13%–49% across the board; Jereh is one of the few comparable names with positive growth. But on a current basis, quality is discounted in three respects: first, in 2026H1 domestic gross margin actually stabilized and ticked up (27.49%, +0.39pp), while overseas gross margin fell on Middle East delivery timing (34.41%, −3.35pp), narrowing the domestic-overseas spread from 12.4pp to 6.9pp within six months — the hedging power of "overseas offsetting domestic price wars" is weakening; second, 2025 revenue growth of +21.48% includes the already deconsolidated Russia Bright Energy (2025H1 revenue RMB 597 million, net profit RMB 143 million); third, 9M2026 non-GAAP profit grew only +1.36%, with FX losses of RMB 373 million (vs. a gain of RMB 25 million a year earlier) consuming most of the headline growth — management accordingly introduced a new framing that "growth is more pronounced excluding FX." The core-business conclusion: "resilience is real, elasticity is discounted." If the domestic segment gross margin breaches 25% again or the overseas decline widens beyond 5pp, this thesis needs reassessment.
The orders are real and the money has arrived — this is the essential distinction from purely narrative-driven themes. But two figures need to be untangled: the largest effective order is USD 1.465 billion (batch deliveries before November 2027), while "cumulatively over USD 3.1 billion" is the company's own framing, including framework components under the master contract that the buyer can call on at any time; the split is undisclosed. The incremental RMB 7.051 billion of contract liabilities was concentrated in Q3 alone (only about RMB 2.06 billion at end-H1), corresponding to the advance payment of a single order from a single customer. On the industry side, the three gas turbine OEMs (combined market share ~85%) are sold out through 2028 with lead times stretched to 36–48 months, supporting the "buy modules + rapid integration" positioning logic; but GE Vernova has disclosed that capacity will double by 2028 to roughly 24GW/year, so the window for the integration layer is roughly 2026–2028, and foreign banks (HSBC, 2026-08-18) explicitly question the integrator model — "turbine manufacturers' own packaging capability will always be more flexible than procuring brand-new OEM core engines." In short: revenue visibility has contract backing, but net margin (this report's base case takes 20–22%; HSBC, at a systems-integrator gross margin of 30%, implies only ~10–14%) cannot be verified until segment data is first disclosed in 2027 — this is the single largest uncertainty in the entire report.
Both directions must be stated: if gas turbine net margin lands at HSBC's integrator framing (10–14%), sell-side gas turbine net profit of RMB 4.7–5.6 billion would shrink to about RMB 2.0–3.0 billion, and the implied multiple of the current price on gas turbines jumps from "cheap" to 15–25x — the same price is a discount under one margin framing and a premium under the other, which is the root of the stock's beta of ~3.15 and its −29% single-month drawdown. Meanwhile the reference frame itself is loosening: if consensus is cut another 20%, "the price believes only 75%" becomes "the price believes 94%." Base-case fair value is RMB 77.4–105.6 (current price within the range, −3.7% vs. midpoint), probability-weighted expected value RMB 89.2 (+1.3%) — expected return of ~1% against a left tail of −58% to −68% cannot be called "conservatively priced," only "not clearly disadvantageous." The 12–15x anchor for the oil & gas floor rests on independent bases: CNOOC Services TTM at 16.83x and the global oilfield-services normal band of 12–18x; if Brent mean-reverts to sell-side 2027 forecasts of USD 70–85, floor earnings and multiple must be revised down together (core business −20%, 8–12x scenario shrinks the floor to about RMB 27.6–37.2 billion) — this sensitivity is embedded in the bear case.
Composition of the left tail: cumulative 12-month orders from a single cloud customer of RMB 11.681 billion ≈ 72% of 2025 revenue; per-unit price reduction on failed acceptance capped at ≤10%; turbine module supply dependent on Siemens Energy/Baker Hughes/Kawasaki/FTAI; EO 14420 rules due by 2026-12-24 at the latest; Brent at ~USD 115 (2026-10-29) embeds a geopolitical premium while sell-side 2027 forecasts are USD 70–85. Quantified stress test: if "gas turbines complete only 50–60% of backlog (revenue RMB 5.0–6.0 billion, net margin 8–12%) + core oil & gas net profit of RMB 1.8–2.2 billion," 2027 totals only RMB 2.2–4.2 billion, implying 21.6–41x at the current price — the price is not cheap on trough earnings; if the market simultaneously switches valuation back to traditional oilfield services at 12–15x, market cap would be RMB 31.9–39.9 billion (about RMB 31–39/share). The quality of the buffer also merits a discount: beyond net cash of ~RMB 7.2 billion, RMB 12.95 billion of prepayments + inventory is a bet on a single customer's delivery path; a 20–30% impairment in the falsification scenario would compress the net cash buffer to RMB 3.3–4.6 billion, pushing the bear-case floor down another ~RMB 2–5. Two caveats: EO 14420 rules are a two-sided event (a confirmed exemption removes the policy discount), and this report does not frame them one-sidedly as a risk; the oil price path has no options-market calibration, so the 25% bear-case probability is a subjective judgment. At the balance-sheet level there is no solvency issue (annual OCF floor of RMB 1.5–2.5 billion + net cash of RMB 7.2 billion); the risk lies in valuation and earnings, not in payment ability.
Checked item by item against facts: the payout ratio rose from 15.05% in FY2022 to 32.36% in FY2025, with an interim dividend added, but the most recent year saw only a 0.8pp increase — momentum is slowing; the RMB 150–250 million buyback launched from the April 2025 price low (from RMB 33.67) was completed at RMB 151 million in April 2026 (of which about RMB 109 million in 2025); the RMB 9.3093 million of insider buying (average price ~RMB 140, now deeply underwater) equals only 0.01% of market cap — signaling more than substance; the ESOP hurdles translate to YoY growth of only +7.2%/+20%/+20%, test revenue only (not profit or collections), and the 2026 hurdle requires only Q4 revenue of RMB 5.422 billion (−6.6% YoY) to be met — the hurdle design is lax. On cash flow, 2025 OCF/net profit of 2.01x included large advance receipts and a one-off working-capital release; 9M2026 has already fallen back to 1.28x (Q3 alone RMB 3.161 billion); the wide swings in the three-year series 0.43→0.99→2.01 are driven by large-project advance-receipt timing and should not be extrapolated linearly. The hardest item in the buffer is net cash of ~RMB 7.2 billion as of 2026-09-30 and the management philosophy of "profits backed by cash flow." If the annual payout ratio falls below 25% or buybacks/insider buying stop, this thesis weakens.
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | 2026 Q3 (single quarter) | 9M2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating revenue (RMB 100M) | 139.12 | 133.55 | 162.23 | 43.28 | 119.74 |
| Revenue YoY | +21.94% | −4.00% | +21.48% | +22.97% | +14.91% |
| Net profit attributable to parent (RMB 100M) | 24.54 | 26.27 | 26.80 | 6.91 | 18.87 |
| Attributable net profit YoY | +9.33% | +7.03% | +2.03% | +21.88% | +4.36% |
| Non-GAAP attributable net profit (RMB 100M) | 23.87 | 24.02 | 26.83 | 6.66 | 18.07 |
| Gross margin | 32.75% | 33.70% | 31.69% | 32.8% | 31.63% |
| Attributable net margin | 17.64% | 19.67% | 16.52% | 15.97% | 15.76% |
| Operating cash flow (RMB 100M) | 10.49 | 25.94 | 53.78 | 31.61 (single quarter) | 24.13 |
| Free cash flow (RMB 100M, OCF−CapEx) | −6.62 | 15.15 | 45.05 | — | 16.13 |
| Cash dividends (RMB 100M / payout ratio) | 5.00 / 20.38% | 8.29 / 31.56% | 8.67 / 32.36% | — | Interim RMB 1.53 paid |
Balance sheet stocks (as of 2026-09-30, latest period): cash and equivalents RMB 9.411 billion + trading financial assets RMB 1.922 billion = cash-like assets RMB 11.333 billion; interest-bearing debt RMB 4.134 billion (short-term borrowings 4.17 + current portion of long-term debt 11.97 + long-term borrowings 22.82 + leases 1.08 + long-term payables 1.30); net cash ~RMB 7.20 billion; contract liabilities RMB 7.051 billion, inventory RMB 8.604 billion, prepayments RMB 4.345 billion; debt-to-asset ratio 44.91% (38.88% at start of year; the rise mainly reflects contract liabilities and stocking); goodwill only RMB 102 million (0.4% of attributable equity). The company is in a net cash position; net debt/EBITDA is negative and not applicable.
Reasons for metric changes (all items with YoY ≥±20% carry company explanations): ① contract liabilities +263.34% — "increased advance receipts for major projects this period," i.e., receipt of the advance payment for the J&F data-center gas turbine order; ② inventory +39.50% — "increased procurement and stocking for projects in execution this period," for the gas turbine mega-order, with an impairment provision ratio of only ~1%; ③ prepayments +297.28% — "increased procurement payments for execution of major projects this period," mainly to lock in gas turbine module capacity; ④ short-term borrowings −56.28% — debt repayment at maturity, proactive deleveraging; ⑤ finance expenses up RMB 425 million YoY — FX losses of RMB 373 million (vs. a gain of RMB 25 million a year earlier); ⑥ 2025 OCF +107.37% — "receipt of large advance payments on engineering projects and continued intensification of collection efforts"; ⑦ 2025 oil & gas engineering and technical services revenue +43.29% — natural gas equipment and engineering services revenue RMB 4.026 billion (+48.95%), with a low 2024 base due to ~RMB 2 billion recognized the prior year on KOC JPF-5; ⑧ new energy segment revenue +106.48% — anode material volume ramp-up but still loss-making (cumulative losses RMB 395 million); ⑨ 2026H1 attributable net profit −3.65% — four factors combined: Middle East geopolitical conflict delaying deliveries, FX losses of RMB 264 million, deconsolidation from the sale of Bright Energy (its 2025H1 revenue RMB 597 million / net profit RMB 143 million), and data-center orders not yet at their concentrated delivery phase.
Q3 single-quarter revenue was RMB 4.328 billion (+22.97%, roughly flat QoQ), net profit attributable to parent RMB 691 million (+21.88%, +13.7% QoQ), non-GAAP (deducting non-recurring items) RMB 666 million (+20.85%), gross margin 32.8% (up both YoY and QoQ, per the investor-call minutes) — single-quarter profit growth returned to the 20%+ range, driven mainly by restored delivery schedules (Middle East projects deferred from Q2 were centrally accepted in Q3) and the start of first small-batch gas turbine deliveries. Cash flow showed a structural reversal: H1 operating cash flow was −RMB 748 million, and Q3 single-quarter +RMB 3.161 billion brought the nine-month cumulative to RMB 2.413 billion (still −17.59% YoY), underpinned by receipt of RMB 7.051 billion in contract liabilities (gas turbine prepayments). Relative to market expectations, this was a "below buy-side estimates" quarter (the market had estimated Q3 EPS at ~RMB 0.71 vs actual RMB 0.59), and consensus over the past 90 days has been revised down −5.7%; however, against the sell-side consensus basis, nine-month net profit attributable to parent of RMB 1.887 billion represents 53% of full-year consensus (RMB 3.543 billion), still requiring Q4 net profit of ~RMB 1.4–1.7 billion (Q4 net margin of 22–26%, significantly above the 15.0% in 2025Q4) — achievable is difficult but not impossible. Two swing items are the recognition of first gas turbine deliveries and whether FX losses reverse. The company gave no quantitative guidance; management added a new framing that "excluding FX effects, net profit growth would be more pronounced."
Business model in brief: Order-based high-end equipment manufacturing (drilling & completion / fracturing / natural gas / power equipment, global pricing, technology-gap premium) + oil & gas engineering EPC and O&M (tender-based, advance funding, KOC five-year O&M and other aftermarket) + Canadian oil & gas assets (book value RMB 1.071 billion) + new-energy anode/recycling (loss-making ramp-up). Revenue is mainly recognized on project delivery, not subscription-based; the data-center gas turbine orders introduce a large-prepayment model, front-loading cash flow. Pricing power is clearly tiered: overseas equipment and new gas turbine products command premiums, while under domestic tendering, 2025 gross margin fell −3.98pp to 25.69% (stabilized at 27.49% in 2026H1).
Cash content of earnings: OCF/net profit attributable to parent for 2023–2025 and 9M2026 was 0.43→0.99→2.01→1.28; FCF/net profit was −0.27→0.58→1.68→0.85. Both metrics were below the warning line in 2023 (OCF/net profit <0.8) — a genuine problem that year (CapEx peak of RMB 1.711 billion + weak collections); the following two years saw substantial repair, but driven mainly by the timing of large-project prepayments (2025 included a one-off working-capital release from a 9.03% decline in receivables); the decline to 1.28x in 9M2026 is closer to normal. Recurring profit is essentially identical to net profit attributable to parent: 2025 non-GAAP RMB 2.683 billion vs attributable RMB 2.680 billion (difference −0.1%); 2024 non-GAAP RMB 2.402 billion vs attributable RMB 2.627 billion (non-recurring gains of ~RMB 225 million, mainly government grants and wealth-management returns, manageable in scale) — no sign of one-off gains dressing up results.
Return on capital: 2025 weighted ROE 12.15% (9M2026: 8.00%); this report estimates ROIC at ~9.6% (net profit / (interest-bearing debt + equity)), roughly on par with an equity cost of ~9.5% — below the "long-term ROIC >15%" strong-moat threshold, but not in the <8% pseudo-growth zone. The hybrid structure of equipment manufacturing and engineering dilutes returns; if the gas turbine prepayment model materializes, it will structurally lift turnover and ROIC.
CapEx quality: CapEx went from RMB 1.711 billion in 2023 (lithium battery anode + overseas capacity peak) → RMB 1.078 billion in 2024 → RMB 873 million in 2025 (CapEx/depreciation 0.90), a contraction phase for the core oil & gas business; 9M2026 rebounded to RMB 800 million (+48.55%), alongside commencement of an leased 66,000 m² plant, construction-in-progress of RMB 966 million, and redirection of RMB 1.06 billion in raised funds to "natural gas industrial park expansion + generator set industrialization" — the new upcycle is aimed at gas turbine capacity, not oil & gas equipment. The company does not disclose maintenance vs growth CapEx split; based on use of funds, current incremental spending is mostly growth-oriented.
Moat and quality red flags: Moat = electro/turbine fracturing technology gap + dual certification (API and oil company qualification, 1–5 year adoption cycles) + local capacity and O&M networks in the Middle East/North America. Four red flags: ① customer concentration set to jump (2025 top-5 customers 22.70%, but a single cloud vendor's 12-month orders of RMB 11.681 billion ≈ 72% of 2025 revenue); ② sales financing (guarantees for customer financing of RMB 1.517 billion + installment receivables of RMB 2.537 billion, bearing end-customer credit risk); ③ FX exposure (foreign-currency cash of RMB 6.177 billion; 9M2026 FX losses of RMB 373 million ≈ 19.8% of attributable net profit, with derivative hedge balance of only RMB 2.14 million); ④ lithium battery anode cumulative investment of RMB 1.627 billion, cumulative losses of RMB 395 million, annualized drag of ~RMB 100–150 million.
Track record: pragmatic, leaning conservative. Verifiable promise-delivery record: ① KOC JPF-5 (signed 2021-11) → ~RMB 2 billion revenue recognized in 2023, completed in 2024 and transitioned into five-year O&M — delivered; ② North America gas turbine orders: cumulative >USD 1.1 billion at 2025 annual report disclosure → >USD 3.1 billion by August 2026 — significantly above expectations; ③ anode materials "cost reduction to build competitive advantage" → 2025 revenue +106.48% but still loss-making, with the company proactively slowing investment pace — revenue delivered, profit not; ④ 2026 ESOP targets (revenue RMB 17.396 billion) — nine-month revenue RMB 11.974 billion, achievable with only −6.6% YoY in Q4; highly likely to be met. No record of high-profile misses; however, the ESOP metrics only measure revenue (not profit or collections) and the base includes the 2024 down-year — design skews loose.
Shareholder friendliness: shareholder-friendly. Payout ratio rose 15.05%→20.38%→31.56%→32.36% (FY2022–FY2025), adding an interim dividend; RMB 151 million in buybacks at the 2025 low (completed 2026-04); cancellation-based buybacks in 2015 and 2023; after the RMB 2.5 billion private placement in July 2022 (RMB 36.18/share), no further equity financing; ESOP shares sourced from buybacks. The controlling shareholder increased holdings by RMB 60 million in 2025; the chairman and others added RMB 9.31 million in 2026; pledge ratio only 1.21%, fully circulating with no unlock batches.
Risk signals: January 2026 leadership change (Li Zhiyong promoted to chairman, founder Sun Weijie became president); June–July 2026 resignation of VP Li Weibin; July 2026 auditor changed from Zhongxi to Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (audit upgrade, neutral-to-positive). Post-change expectation management with the capital market is untested over a full cycle — the absence of a 2026-07-15 interim profit alert (net profit growth below the 50% mandatory disclosure threshold) triggered concentrated exits at highs and marked the start of the −49% drawdown, as an example.
| Segment (FY2025) | Revenue Share | Gross Margin | YoY | Business Logic in One Line |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| High-end Equipment Manufacturing | 61.74% | 38.19% (−1.25pp) | +9.11% | Global sales of drilling & completion / natural gas / power equipment; technology-gap premium (2026H1 gross margin recovered to 39.82%) |
| Oil & Gas Engineering & Technical Services | 29.08% | 22.58% (−1.19pp) | +43.29% | Natural gas engineering + integrated oilfield-services EPC (low 2024 base) + KOC five-year O&M |
| New Energy & Recycling | 5.89% | ~3.64% | +106.48% | Anode materials + lithium battery / wind-solar recycling; overcapacity ramp-up, still loss-making |
| Oil & Gas Field Development | 2.42% | Not separately disclosed | +12.64% | Alberta (Canada) shale oil & gas (assets RMB 1.071 billion) |
| Data-Center Power (J&F) | To be centrally recognized from 2027 | Not disclosed | Cumulative orders >USD 3.1 billion | Integrated supply of gas turbine gensets; main delivery engine in 2027 |
Equipment manufacturing is the profit engine: by "revenue share × gross margin," 2025 equipment manufacturing contributed gross profit of ~RMB 3.83 billion, or 74.4% of total company gross profit (RMB 5.14 billion); oil & gas engineering contributed ~RMB 1.07 billion (20.7%) — the equipment segment, at 61.7% of revenue, contributed nearly three-quarters of gross profit. Gross margin spread across segments reaches 34.6pp (equipment 38.19% vs new energy ~3.64%): equipment is bespoke systems + certification barriers + global pricing; engineering is tender-based EPC, suppressed by competition and advance funding; new energy is standardized products in oversupply. After gas turbine deliveries in 2027, consolidation of "power equipment" into the equipment segment will change the segment structure; tracking the gas turbine segment's own gross margin disclosure will then be key.
Accounting red flags (with cited evidence): ① Receivables aging deterioration (medium): 3+ year receivables of RMB 559 million, up 94.79% from RMB 287 million at period start; portfolio bad-debt provision ratio raised to 15.95% — total receivables fell but long-aged balances nearly doubled; collection improvement concentrated in short aging buckets. ② Revenue recognition tied to customer financing (medium): installment sales generated long-term receivables of RMB 2.537 billion (discount rates 6–10%) and customer financing guarantees of RMB 1.517 billion — revenue realization risk and contingent compensation obligations are two sides of the same coin. ③ Self-produced equipment capitalized (low): RMB 462 million of self-produced equipment capitalized in the year; internal transfer pricing and depreciation allocation leave estimation room. ④ Retroactive reclassification of warranty costs (low): per Accounting Standards Interpretation No. 18, 2024 warranty costs were retroactively shifted from selling expenses to cost of sales; 2022–2024 gross margins restated — cross-period comparisons must use adjusted figures. ⑤ Impairment direction reversal (low): credit impairment losses went from −RMB 277 million (2024) → −RMB 186 million (2025) → reversal of +RMB 55 million in 2026Q1; reversals on long-aged receivables boosted profit while 3+ year aging rose — the basis for reversals needs verification.
Cross-period consistency: ① OCF/attributable profit swinging sharply 0.43→0.99→2.01 — consistent with management's explanation (timing of large prepayments); ② FX net gains/losses widening each period, −0.28→+0.28→−1.36→−3.73 — the 2025 annual report's claim that "FX fluctuations had no material adverse effect" coexists with 2026's RMB 373 million loss, an inconsistency in framing; a new "excluding FX" framing was introduced in 2026; ③ receivables growth vs revenue growth: 2025 showed reversed improvement, but 9M2026 receivables +16.8% again slightly exceeded revenue +14.9% — unexplained by the company; ④ inventory +4.4%→+15.2%→+39.5% steepening sharply — offset by contract liabilities +263%, order-driven stocking, consistent with the company's explanation (provision rate ~1%). Disclosure spans more than three periods; cross-period assessment feasible; no systematic accounting-aggression pattern overall, but aging deterioration, sales financing, and FX framing warrant continued monitoring.
Current market data (close 2026-10-29): share price RMB 88.10, market cap RMB 90.2 billion. PE(TTM) 32.69x (TTM attributable profit RMB 2.759 billion; 1/3/5-year percentiles 27%/75%/85% — during a profit-structure transition, percentiles are for reference only, not a headline valuation signal); PB 3.78x (1-year percentile 20%, 5-year 83%); PS(TTM) 5.07x; forward PE: FY2026E 25.5x, FY2027E 11.3x (consensus EPS 3.46/7.78, n=37); PEG ~0.16 (distorted during step-function growth phase; cross-check only). 30-day average daily turnover ~RMB 1.99 billion (~2.2% of market cap); liquidity normal.
| Company | PE(TTM) | PB | 2025 Revenue / Growth | 2025 Attrib. Profit / Growth | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jereh | 32.69 | 3.78 | RMB 16.223B / +21.5% | RMB 2.680B / +2.0% | 12.15% |
| COSL | 16.83 | 1.34 | RMB 50.282B / +4.1% | RMB 3.842B / +22.5% | 8.5% |
| Sinopec Oilfield Equipment | Loss (meaningless) | 1.55 | RMB 7.204B / −10.4% | RMB 11M / sharp decline | 0.2% |
| Zhongman Petroleum | 30.13 | 2.13 | RMB 3.926B / −5.1% | RMB 510M / −29.8% | 12.25% |
| Schlumberger (SLB) | Not available (normal band 12–18x) | — | USD 35.71B / −2% | USD 3.37B / −24% | 14.3% |
| Halliburton/Baker Hughes | Not available | — | USD 22.2B −3% / FY orders USD 29.6B | −48.7% / −13.1% | 12.2% / 14.5% |
(US stock valuation series unavailable this round; only operating data listed for the three international names; GE Vernova snapshot forward PE ~36–38x (2026-10-28, third-hand source, unverified), as an upper-bound multiple reference for gas turbine power assets.)
Market-implied expectations: residual method decomposition — market cap RMB 90.2B − oil & gas core base of RMB 37.7–45.3B (normalized RMB 2.54B × 12–15x + net cash RMB 7.2B) = gas turbine residual of RMB 44.9–52.5B; against sell-side gas turbine 2027E net profit of RMB 4.74–5.55B, the market assigns only 8.1–11.1x; equivalently, backing out at a fair 15x multiple, the current price only believes in whole-company 2027E attributable profit of ~RMB 6.01 billion (75.5% of consensus median). In one line: the current price requires the gas turbine business to deliver in 2027 only 75% of sell-side expectations — while reality is that orders and prepayments have locked in revenue visibility; what's not locked in is net margin. Two-way check: if net margin lands at 10–14% (integrator basis), gas turbine 2027E shrinks to ~RMB 2.0–3.0B, implied multiple rises to 15–25x, and the conclusion flips from "discount" to "premium"; if delivery goes smoothly and net margin ≥20%, the current price is clearly undervalued. Reference-frame risk: consensus has been revised −5.7% over the past 90 days; median target price of RMB 176.6 mostly issued at highs; a further 20% consensus cut would raise the "implied 75%" to ~94%.
Three-layer value (EPV): Asset value ~RMB 23.30/share (book value per share, including net cash RMB 7.03; Canadian oil & gas assets at book RMB 1.071B); EPV (zero growth, FCFE basis) ~RMB 24.8/share (range 23.6–27.4) = normalized FCFE RMB 2.357/share ÷ equity cost 9.5% (equity basis, net cash not added separately — conservative framing: interest income on net cash RMB 7.03/share not included in FCFE, as net cash is already reflected in asset value and the bear-case floor; normalization base = oil & gas core RMB 2.54B × 0.95 conservative cash conversion; planned capacity and new orders excluded from EPV); growth option residual ~RMB 63.3/share, ~72% of current price (computed with this report's EPV inputs). Roughly 70% of the current price rests on the growth option — this is not a "market paying only for zero growth" situation, but a large option backed by contracts and prepayments, with net margin unverified. The EPV layer (~RMB 24.8) is also one of the bear-case downside references.
Three scenarios and odds (current price RMB 88.10):
| Scenario | Probability | Fair Range (RMB) | vs Current | Deciding Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 25% | 28.5–36.8 | −67.6% to −58.2% | Gas turbine inflection falsified (order cancellation / delivery batch shortfall / rules broadened) + oil price mean reversion: oil & gas core RMB 2.2B × 10–12x + net cash RMB 7.2B = RMB 29.2–37.7B market cap; if prepayments + inventory impair 20–30%, floor drops another ~RMB 2–5 |
| Base | 50% | 77.4–105.6 | −12.1% to +19.9% | Gas turbine delivery revenue RMB 18–22B × net margin 20–22% = RMB 3.60–4.84B + oil & gas core RMB 2.5–2.6B → 2027E attributable RMB 6.1–7.4B × exit 13–15x, discounted 10% one year; exit multiple anchored independently: COSL 16.83x, global oilfield services normal band 12–18x, steady-state power equipment 15–20x (current TTM 32.7x for reference only, not an anchor) |
| Bull | 25% | 123.5–158.9 | +40.2% to +80.4% | New customer / sovereign AI orders ramp + gas turbine net margin 22–24% → 2027E attributable RMB 8.2–9.5B × 16–18x (deep discount to GEV forward 36–38x: growth duration and capital intensity inferior to GEV, no multiple above 20x given) |
Our own profit forecast (reconciliation anchor): FY2026 revenue RMB 18.3–19.2B, attributable profit RMB 3.29–3.59B (consensus RMB 3.543B; no company quantitative guidance; ESOP target revenue RMB 17.396B highly likely to be met; risk = Q4 net margin must reach 22–26%, significantly above 2025Q4's 15.0%); FY2027 revenue RMB 30–36B (gas turbine RMB 18–22B + oil & gas and others RMB 12–14B), attributable profit RMB 6.1–7.4B — 5–15% below sell-side consensus (RMB 7.28–8.09B), mainly due to a conservative net margin band of 20–22% and deliveries spread evenly over contract terms. Management's framing (gas turbine deliveries exceeding RMB 10B in 2027) corresponds to the upper end of this forecast range.
Conclusion: reasonably undervalued; separate quality from price. Target price range RMB 77.4–105.6 (base-case fair value); the current price sits in the lower half of the range; margin of safety = (base floor − current price) / current price = −12.1%, i.e., no positive margin of safety. Probability-weighted expected value across three scenarios ~RMB 89.2 (+1.3%) — odds nearly symmetric with a deep left tail. Growth-quality gate: ROIC ~9.6% roughly equals WACC (mediocre for the traditional core); the gas turbine prepayment model could lift it if realized; orders locked by international cloud giants' contracts, not pure narrative. Overall judgment: quality asset + neutral price — wait for verification rather than chase.
Industry Size. Jereh's total addressable demand is global upstream oil & gas investment: approximately USD 603 billion in 2024, falling below USD 570 billion in 2025 (IEA: upstream oil & gas investment −6% in 2025, the largest decline since 2016, with US tight oil seeing the biggest drop), with upstream oil investment expected to fall below USD 500 billion in 2026 and natural gas at approximately USD 330 billion (IEA WEI 2026, media-cited figures pending verification) — total investment declining for the third consecutive year, but with the mix tilting toward the Middle East and offshore (global offshore E&P investment up more than 3% in 2026, accounting for approximately 36% of upstream, CNOOC Group Energy Economics Institute). From the supplier perspective, global oilfield services procurement: USD 625 billion in 2019 → USD 473 billion in 2020 → approximately USD 642 billion in 2025 (Rystad, forecast published in 2020, pending verification; aggregator data used only for cross-reference). There is no authoritative independent size estimate for China's fracturing equipment submarket (only the scale evidence of CPTDC leasing a single batch of 164 electric fracturing units in 2022). The structural increment lies in gas turbine power: AI data centers building their own gas-fired power supply — gas turbines were already the largest power source for US data centers in 2024 (over 40% share, Essence Securities citing IEA/industry data); IEA forecasts data center electricity consumption at approximately 640 TWh by 2035; JPMorgan statistics show 38 GW of new global gas turbine orders in 2026Q2, up 71% YoY, with the three major OEMs booked out to around 2030. The quantified chain of the demand inflection (driver × unit consumption × penetration × share): AI chip production growth of approximately 40–50% vs overseas power supply growth of only 10–20% (cited by Orient Securities); AI chips may face a power shortfall of at least 15 GW by 2027 (Musk's estimate); the unit price of a single 100 MW skid has risen from approximately USD 100 million to USD 140 million (Guohai estimate); gas turbines' share of North American data center power supply exceeded 40% in 2024 and could exceed 50% by 2035; Jereh has signed cumulative contracts exceeding USD 3.1 billion since November 2025, and a core major customer plans 2027 power demand at 10x its 2026 level (Zheshang Machinery estimate) — nearly 2 GW to be delivered in 2027 (backlog basis), turbine supply capacity of 4–7 GW/year in 2027–2028. This chain has been quantified down to order values and delivery timing, constituting a verifiable structural volume expansion rather than a narrative.
Value Chain and Value Distribution. The chain runs: gas turbine prime movers/engines and other core OEMs (GE Vernova, Siemens Energy, Baker Hughes, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki, FTAI — the supply bottleneck, with 36–48 month lead times and the strongest bargaining power) → turnkey integration and equipment manufacturing (the highest-margin segment: Jereh's equipment manufacturing gross margin of 38–40%) → oil companies/oilfield service providers/data center end users (tender-based procurement with price pressure, but prepayment models front-load cash flow for data center customers). Jereh spans both midstream equipment and downstream EPC: it has relatively weak bargaining power over upstream prime movers (must prepay to lock capacity: prepayments +297%), while its bargaining position with downstream has improved thanks to certification barriers and scarce capacity; aftermarket (parts/repair/O&M, including the five-year KOC O&M contract) provides repurchase stickiness. Gross profit mainly accrues to the equipment integration segment, which is also the company's ballast of value.
Supply-Demand and Competitive Landscape. Demand is driven by three forces: ① geopolitical oil prices (Iran war/Strait of Hormuz transit disruption in late February 2026; Brent up 89% YTD to approximately USD 115); ② China's "increasing reserves and production" policy (crude output floor above 200 million tonnes, accelerated shale gas/deep coal-seam gas development; the Big Three's combined 2026 upstream capex plans up 4% YoY; though CNOOC's 2026 budget of RMB 112–122 billion is roughly −12% versus 2024's actual RMB 132.7 billion, a modest pullback from highs); ③ North America's fracturing equipment replacement cycle from "diesel-driven → electric/turbine-driven" (North America holds approximately 71% of the global installed fracturing fleet) plus AI data center power demand spillover. Supply side: fracturing/cementing equipment manufacturing in China is a duopoly of "Jereh + Siji Machinery (SPM)" (no authoritative CR figures); global oilfield services are highly fragmented (SLB + HAL + BKR combined revenue is only about 9% of global oilfield services procurement); the gas turbine OEM market has a CR3 of approximately 85% with capacity locked through 2028. Entry barriers: API system certification + dual qualification with oil companies/oilfield service providers (1–5 year validation cycles for non-standard turnkey equipment) + technology generation gaps in electric-drive/turbine systems + Middle East local capacity and track record. Domestic competition is price-war-like (Jereh's domestic gross margin 25.69%, −3.98 pp), while overseas and new turbine products carry premiums. Substitution threats: long-term energy transition caps oil & gas capex upside; on the data center power supply side, gas turbines compete with grid expansion/SMR/energy storage routes (the company has hedged via SMR, energy storage, and solid-state transformer positioning).
Cyclicality and Regulation (cycle timing detailed in the next chapter; regulation listed here only): OPEC+ began monthly production increases of 188,000 bpd from April 2026, completing in September the unwinding of its 1.65 million bpd voluntary cuts; the 2022-era cuts of approximately 2 million bpd remain in place through end-2026, with a shift to capacity-based quota negotiations in 2027 (the UAE exited OPEC+ in May 2026); China's reserve-increase and production policies provide a floor for domestic capex; on the US side, tariffs on China from 2025 raise export costs to the US, and Executive Order No. 14420 of August 2026 (grid equipment review, implementation details due by 2026-12-24) is the largest policy variable for the North American turbine business. Directional judgment: the energy security narrative is overall positive for equipment orders; negatives are US policy disruptions and the episodic impact of Middle East conflicts on EPC acceptance and FX (the company sold off and deconsolidated Russia's Svetly Energia in late 2025).
Peer Benchmarking (operating data in the valuation chapter's comparison table): versus the three international oilfield service majors, Jereh's scale is only about 6% of SLB's, but its 2025 revenue growth of +21.5% compares with SLB −2%/HAL −3%, and it grew against the tide in a year when the Big Three's net profits broadly fell 13%–49% — the difference comes from structure (equipment + EPC vs asset-heavy services) and the second curve (gas turbines); versus domestic peers: COSL is tied to offshore capex (asset-heavy, ROE 8.5%), SPM is mired in losses, ZPEC's profits are directly exposed to oil prices (2025 net profit −29.8%) — Jereh is the only peer pursuing "equipment manufacturing + overseas EPC + power second curve" on three fronts simultaneously, with the highest ROE (12.15%).
Company's Industry Position: #1 domestic market share in fracturing/cementing equipment (Cinda Securities estimate); first tier globally in electric fracturing (won every CNOOC/CNPC tender, with the 2022 CPTDC 60-unit leasing project the world's largest single award); the company calls itself "the world's only supplier of complete turbine fracturing equipment" (2023 investor meeting minutes), with no independent third-party verification — both claims are listed side by side, with credence given to the latter disclosure; Huaxi Securities estimates its global oilfield services share at only single-digit percentages, positioning it as "a domestic leader and global follower." Share trend is upward: overseas revenue was 48.32% of the total in 2025 (overseas revenue +29.85%) → 50.38% in 2026H1, with overseas gross margin consistently above domestic. The moat derives from: technology generation gaps + dual certification + Middle East/North America local capacity and O&M networks + "equipment–EPC–service" integration.
Historical Cycle Templates: the last three complete cycles — ① 2014–16 supply-shock downturn: shale output surge + OPEC defending market share; Brent fell from approximately USD 115 to 27, US rig count from approximately 1,600 to 480, and global upstream investment halved; ② 2020 demand-collapse: upstream investment −29% to USD 383 billion, oilfield services procurement USD 625 → 473 billion, Brent briefly below USD 20; ③ 2021–22 upcycle: the Russia-Ukraine conflict pushed Brent into the USD 128 range, with global upstream spend of approximately USD 570 billion in 2022. Subsequently, the 2024–25 downturn (2025 Brent average USD 68.19, −14.55%; upstream investment −6%; US rig count down to a low of 548 in November 2025); 2026 year-to-date is a geopolitically driven price-shock upcycle (Brent rose from 60.75 to a high of 118.35, closing at USD 114.88 on 2026-10-29).
Current Percentile of Key Indicators: Brent at approximately USD 114.9 sits in the top zone of the past decade (estimated at the 95th+ percentile, comparable only to the Russia-Ukraine phase in H1 2022), 2.9% below its 52-week high; US rig count of approximately 600 (October 2026) = approximately 38% of the 2014 peak and approximately 78% of the 2022 peak (771 rigs) — an absolute level in the low-to-middle percentile range, but up 9% YoY from 2025 lows; North American frac fleet count (Primary Vision) at 194–203, below the 2022–23 boom zone (approximately 270–290) but above 2025 lows; CNOOC's 2026 capex budget roughly −12% versus 2024 actuals (a pullback from highs). Combined profile = price indicators at top + volume indicators in moderate recovery + order indicators strong: a geopolitically driven "price first, volume follows" upcycle in its early-to-middle stage, whose reversibility hinges on the ceasefire and the fate of OPEC+'s remaining ~2 million bpd cut layer — this is the largest asymmetrical risk on the cycle dimension.
Supply Response: after the 2020–21 shakeout, oilfield service suppliers have been reluctant to invest, raising prices instead of expanding capacity (Rystad: frac fleet/OCTG and other prices at decade highs); equipment makers have diverged — Jereh expanding countercyclically (Middle East capital increase of USD 120 million, North America expansion, Vietnam capacity) while SPM is contracting; the three turbine OEMs' capacity is locked through 2028 (GEV doubling capacity to approximately 24 GW/year by 2028), so the scarcity window for the integration segment runs roughly 2026–2028, with new capacity release after 2028 a structural risk point.
Through-Cycle Earnings: normalized earnings for the core oil & gas business = the 2024–25 average of RMB 2.54 billion in non-GAAP (recurring) net profit (mean of 2.402 billion in 2024 and 2.683 billion in 2025), normalized EPS of RMB 2.48; normalized P/E at ±5x brackets: 7x → RMB 17.4, 17x → RMB 42.2 (pricing band for the pure oil & gas business, turbine option extra); scenario trough (oil & gas capex returning to a 2015/2020-style deep trough, core net profit halved to approximately RMB 1.3 billion) → EPS of approximately RMB 1.2–1.3. Current P/E verdict: middle stage + structural shift — TTM of 32.7x is above the 3-year/5-year medians (15.1x/16.1x), but the core business's annualized profit of RMB 2.4–2.5 billion is not at a cyclical peak (≤ FY2025's RMB 2.683 billion), and turbine profits have not yet been consolidated; the binary framework of "low P/E at peak / high P/E at trough" fails here, and the current forward P/E is prohibited as the sole anchor. Asset value floor: net assets per share of RMB 23.30 (including net cash of RMB 7.03).
Downside Stress Test (trough basis consistent with the above scenario, aligned to true earnings lows — the lowest reported growth year in recent years was 2024 (revenue −4%/recurring profit +0.65%); in the 2025 oil price downturn, recurring profit still grew +11.69%; the company has not experienced a true earnings trough in recent years, so the following is scenario inference rather than realized history): Brent falling back to USD 60–70 + continued weak domestic tenders + further Middle East EPC delays + turbines completing only 50–60% of the backlog (revenue RMB 5.0–6.0 billion, net margin 8–12%): core oil & gas net profit of RMB 1.8–2.2 billion in 2027, turbine segment RMB 0.40–0.66 billion, total approximately RMB 2.2–4.2 billion (base case RMB 2.66 billion) — the current price implies 21.6–41x trough earnings; at trough earnings, the current price is not cheap. If valuation simultaneously reverts to the traditional oilfield services multiple of 12–15x, market cap would be RMB 31.9–39.9 billion (approximately RMB 31–39/share). The balance sheet can cope: net cash of RMB 7.2 billion + an annual OCF floor of RMB 1.5–2.5 billion, no liquidity risk, but the impairment path on the RMB 12.95 billion of prepayments + inventory would erode the buffer.
Management's Cycle Discipline: positives are concentrated — with oil prices falling in April 2025, the company launched a buyback at a low of RMB 33.67 and completed RMB 151 million; payout ratio rose for four consecutive years; the controlling shareholder added RMB 60 million at lows in 2025; capacity expansion follows the "new cycle" rather than the old oil & gas cycle (after CapEx contracted from RMB 1.711 billion in 2023 to RMB 873 million in 2025, it turned up in 2026 toward turbine capacity and a natural gas industrial park, with RMB 1.06 billion of raised funds redirected to turbine industrialization). Verdict: countercyclical returns + procyclical expansion along the new cycle — good discipline.
Jereh's revenue is order-driven; understanding three leading indicators matters more than watching quarterly profits. New orders: RMB 13.956 billion in 2023 (+9.65%) → RMB 18.232 billion in 2024 (+30.64%) → RMB 20.097 billion in 2025 (+10.23%); 2026H1 was RMB 10.046 billion (+1.67%, turbine orders not included in this metric); book-to-bill (new orders/revenue) approximately 1.24 in 2025 and approximately 1.31 in 2026H1. Order backlog: RMB 7.549 → 10.155 → 12.331 → 13.995 billion (end of 2026H1, +13%); note that this metric "does not include open-ended contracts, framework agreements, and some contracts not yet meeting statistical conditions" — the RMB 20.9 billion turbine mega-order is reflected in contract liabilities; if turbine orders are consolidated in the 2026 annual report, the backlog metric could jump to the RMB 25 billion level. Transmission lag: non-standard turnkey equipment takes 1–5 years from order to delivery, EPC projects 2+ years (KOC signed in 2021-11 with revenue recognized only in 2023); quarterly revenue fluctuations stem mainly from delivery timing rather than demand — the 2026H1 Middle East delivery delay + FX losses of RMB 264 million caused net profit of −3.65%, while the +23% single-quarter rebound after concentrated Q3 acceptance is illustrative. Collections and Receivables: receivables turnover days of approximately 179 → 142 → 146 days (2024 → 2025 → 9M2026); 2025 receivables of −9.03% outperformed revenue growth of +21.48%; however, the +94.79% growth (+RMB 559 million) in balances aged over 3 years is a dark spot in collection quality; customer financing guarantees of RMB 1.517 billion + long-term installment receivables of RMB 2.537 billion expose a portion of revenue to credit risk. Watch List: quarter-over-quarter contract liabilities (rising before delivery, falling after recognition), inventory/prepayment digestion, the share of turbines and domestic business within new orders, and the provision ratio for long-aged receivables.
Overall Verdict: Neutral (confidence 0.50), 6–12 month horizon. Jereh is a combination of "a quality cyclical asset (ROE 12%+, net cash RMB 7.2 billion, the only peer still growing) + a contract-backed structural growth option (RMB 20.9 billion turbine orders, RMB 7.051 billion in advance receipts)." At the current price of RMB 88.10, the stock sits in the lower half of the base-case fair value range of RMB 77.4–105.6 and implies about three-quarters of sell-side 2027E estimates — capturing neither a margin of safety nor paying bubble prices for the turbine option. The probability-weighted expected return of approximately +1.3% against the bear case's −58% to −68% left tail means the risk/reward does not support chasing; nor do fundamentals (orders not deteriorating, chip overhang cleared, management interests aligned) support shorting or panic exits. Strategically: current holders should let verification points determine whether to stay; non-holders should wait for better odds — a pullback to near the base-case floor of RMB 77 without fundamental deterioration, or the dual verification of 14420 implementation details granting exemptions + first-batch delivery acceptance passing, are the two add-position watch triggers.
Key Milestones over the Next 6–12 Months (matched to monitoring conditions): before 2026-12-24 — implementation details of US Executive Order 14420 (exemptions for behind-the-meter/off-grid → policy discount removed; scope expansion → North American order thesis impaired, two-way); 2026Q4 — confirmation of FTAI Mod-1 commercialization and first-batch turbine delivery acceptance results; December 2026 — OPEC+ 2027 production baselines and quota negotiations (the steering wheel of Brent's geopolitical premium); January 2027 — the 2026 annual results preview window (whether the 50% growth threshold is triggered); around April 2027 — the 2026 annual report: start of turbine revenue recognition, 2027 guidance, and judgment on the ESOP assessment (RMB 17.396 billion revenue line); from 2027Q2 — volume deliveries against the USD 1.465 billion order, a jump in revenue, and a decline in contract liabilities. Falsification and Invalidations (any trigger requires re-rating this report): a single cloud customer canceling/cutting effective orders by more than 40%, or contract liabilities declining QoQ for two consecutive quarters without new order replenishment; first-batch acceptance triggering volume price concessions or management cutting the "RMB 10 billion+ delivered in 2027" target; implementation details bringing behind-the-meter/off-grid power equipment under controls; Brent falling below USD 75; the stock price falling below RMB 60 (below the middle of the bear-case pricing zone); the annual payout ratio falling below 25%. Upside exit condition: the stock price rising above RMB 106 (top of the base-case range, expectation realized, re-evaluate).
This report is based on the 2026-10-29 closing price (RMB 88.10) and public information as of 2026-10-30; the three-scenario probabilities and odds are this report's judgments, with opportunity grades and real-time odds calculated under a unified methodology. Timeliness risk of key assumptions: sell-side consensus estimates are in a downward-revision channel, and most external target prices were published when the stock was at highs — time points are noted where cited.