Rating: Neutral | Target Price: RMB 36–43 | Current Price: RMB 39.95 (close, 2026-10-26) | Margin of Safety: -9.9% | Time Horizon: 12 months Market Cap: RMB 51.34 billion (total shares: 1.285 billion) | Probability-Weighted Expected Value: RMB 38.2 (-4.4% vs. current price)
Kunlun Tech is a scarce A-share AI application platform combining "in-house multimodal models + global proprietary distribution": the Opera browser and StarMaker provide a cash-flow foundation, while the dual AI short-drama platforms (DramaWave/FreeReels) have become the primary growth engine (2026H1 short-drama revenue of RMB 1.535 billion, +163% YoY; June monthly billings exceeded USD 65 million). However, the other side of the financials is stark: the +RMB 1.088 billion net profit attributable to shareholders in 2026H1 was entirely dependent on a one-time gain of RMB 1.479 billion from the capital increase and deconsolidation of Aijiekexin (the company itself labeled it "sustainable: No"). Excluding investment-related gains and losses, the recurring net loss was approximately RMB 1.04 billion per half-year; the selling expense ratio has climbed continuously to 62.3%, and operating cash flow has recorded net outflows for three consecutive periods. Reverse-solving the current RMB 51.3 billion market cap via SOTP implies an AI short-drama segment value of roughly RMB 26.9–31.7 billion, about 5.2–6.1x annualized billings (RMB 5.2 billion) — the market has fully prepaid for the relatively optimistic path of "short drama topping charts + expense ratio inflection." This report's base-case fair range is RMB 36–43; the current price falls in the middle of the range, with no margin of safety. The three-scenario odds are nearly symmetric (bear -53%/base -1%/bull +48%), supporting a Neutral rating. The primary verification checkpoints are the Q3 2026 report due 2026-10-30 (whether the cumulative selling expense ratio falls back from 62.3%) and the Sensor Tower monthly rankings starting November 2026 (whether monthly billings can hold above USD 65 million).
Key Evidence
Short-drama revenue was RMB 1.617 billion in 2025; 2026H1 alone reached RMB 1.535 billion. Based on June's USD 65 million monthly billings (annualized roughly RMB 5.2 billion at a static conversion of USD 1 = RMB 6.668), H2 would need to deliver RMB 1.965–2.765 billion to land within the RMB 3.4–4.3 billion range — the lower bound requires billings to hold at current levels, while the upper bound implies renewed acceleration. Competitive variables are deteriorating: ReelShort (Crazy Maple Interactive; 2025 revenue of RMB 5.72 billion, 3.5x Kunlun's short-drama revenue) is accelerating its AI push and overtook DramaWave in September download rankings; ByteDance's PineDrama (overseas version of Hongguo) surpassed 100 million downloads within nine months of launch and, leveraging TikTok traffic at near-zero user-acquisition cost, poses a paradigm-level threat to the paid user-acquisition model. The "USD 20,000 per episode" cost figure comes from the company's own statements and lacks third-party verification. If the September download slowdown proves to be a pacing adjustment in ad spend rather than a demand inflection (spend contracted sharply that month while billings fell only ~6.6%), the lower bound of RMB 3.4–3.8 billion is defensible; otherwise, growth will converge toward the industry aggregate (September in-app purchases of USD 285 million, slightly down MoM).
Key Evidence
Quarterly breakdown reveals the other side of the inflection: Q1 attributable net profit of -RMB 887 million, Q2 of +RMB 1.975 billion; if one-time items were concentrated in Q2, Q2's standalone recurring loss after stripping out all investment-related items had narrowed to roughly RMB 150 million — a substantial sequential improvement. "The inflection is approaching" and "still a loss of RMB 1 billion-plus on a half-year basis" are two readings that coexist; this thesis takes the latter while flagging the former. Note that stripping investment gains/losses is a double-edged sword: in 2026H1 this line item was in the direction of gains (+RMB 581 million), but in a market downturn the same basis would amplify reported losses in reverse. Also note the aggressive framing by the company: including investment subsidiary gains/losses in the "ex-non-recurring" figure causes ex-non-recurring net profit (-RMB 458 million) to systematically overstate core profitability by roughly RMB 580 million per half-year. Management's statement that "post-2027 marks the beginning of a profitable period" comes from the 2024 annual report summary; at the May 2026 results briefing, when asked twice about the breakeven timeline, the company answered only "per periodic reports" without reiterating it.
Key Evidence
The selling expense ratio trajectory — 32.9% (2023) → 40.7% (2024) → 51.0% (2025) → 62.3% (2026H1) — has risen continuously (company-wide basis, including AI music/social spending). But September produced the first positive leading signal: DramaWave sharply cut ad spend while billings fell only ~6.6%; if the Q3 report confirms the cumulative expense ratio falling from 62.3%, "cutting spend without hurting billings" would gain data support. The turnaround path is not limited to this: AI-driven production cost savings and advertising monetization under FreeReels' free model are independent sources of loss reduction from the expense ratio. As an industry comparison, COL Group cut selling expenses in 2025 and achieved a slim profit in 2026, proving that "cost contraction can produce a turnaround" in this track. The risk lies in seasonality — spending contraction ahead of the Q4 holiday season may be mere pacing adjustment; the expense-ratio inflection requires Q1 2027 not rebounding as a second confirmation.
Key Evidence
The short-drama valuation implied by the current price is roughly 2–3x the industry leader's private-round/IPO pitch valuation; the growth differential (Kunlun +163% vs. Crazy Maple +24%) explains part of the premium, but the premium holds only if the AI cost advantage translates into sustained leadership in retention and user-acquisition ROI — a premise without full-quarter data verification. Three-layer value decomposition: an asset floor of ~RMB 7.6/share (cash-like assets + investment portfolio at deep discount), zero-growth EPV of ~RMB 4.4/share (counting only sustainable cash flows from Opera + StarMaker + gaming and other mature businesses, with AI/short-drama investment-period losses separately treated as option cost), and the growth option accounting for ~89% of the current price — this is an option-dominated pricing structure with weak downside protection. Conclusion: current price ≈ base-case fair value (RMB 36–43); margin of safety -9.9% (base-case fair value floor below current price). Assess quality and price separately — Opera is a validated asset; short drama is an option prepaid for future growth.
Key Evidence
Composition of the support layer: Opera (2026H1 revenue of USD 354 million, +24%; OPRA raised 2026 guidance) + equity investment portfolio with book value of RMB 11.2 billion (other non-current financial assets of RMB 8.11 billion + Aijiekexin long-term equity investment of ~RMB 2 billion, etc.) + net cash of ~RMB 1.4 billion. Risk is unevenly distributed across asset groups: Opera operates steadily with a large impairment buffer; risk is concentrated in StarMaker (stalled growth), gaming (revenue -20%), and the Tiangong model acquisition goodwill. The investment portfolio is currently in the direction of gains (2026H1 fair-value changes of +RMB 459 million), but FVTPL measurement means market drawdowns would directly hit profit on the same basis. The pattern of concentrated Q4 recognition of ~RMB 900 million single-quarter losses for two consecutive years (2024Q4 -RMB 968 million, 2025Q4 -RMB 927 million, from year-end recognition of goodwill impairment + share-based payments + investment losses) makes the reported results of the next two quarters less predictable.
Key Evidence
The Xianlai transaction, at 2025 net profit of RMB 72 million, implies ~10x PE (or ~5.6x annualized on 2026Q1's ~RMB 136 million) — not a no-consideration fire sale — but the acquirer's creditworthiness and installment collection (including RMB 196 million in dividends) constitute recovery credit risk, and the transaction is in substance akin to a management-related buyback, warranting continued monitoring of cash receipt. If the H-share issuance is 15%–25% new shares, existing shareholders face 13%–20% dilution, and H-share pricing discounts could conversely weigh on the A-share valuation anchor; however, if the expense-ratio decline and billings stabilization materialize (C3's leading signals), operating cash flow turning positive would reduce funding urgency — positioning the H-share listing closer to "an accelerator of the global AI strategy" rather than a survival necessity.
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | 2026H1 (as of 2026-06-30) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (RMB 100M) | 49.15 | 56.62 (+15.2%) | 81.98 (+44.8%) | 53.59 (+43.6%) |
| Net profit attributable to shareholders (RMB 100M) | 12.58 | -15.95 (turn to loss) | -15.93 | +10.88 (turnaround) |
| Ex-non-recurring net profit (RMB 100M) | 6.60 | -16.43 | -17.25 | -4.58 (loss narrowed 46.7%) |
| Recurring net profit excl. investment items (this report's estimate, RMB 100M) | — | — | -16.49 | -10.39 |
| Gross margin | 78.8% | 73.6% | 68.6% | 65.6% |
| Net margin | 25.6% | -28.2% | -19.4% | 20.3% |
| Selling expense ratio | 32.9% | 40.7% | 51.0% | 62.3% |
| R&D investment (RMB 100M) | 10.00 | 15.98 | 17.48 (21.3% of revenue) | 8.30 (-0.3%) |
| Operating cash flow (RMB 100M) | 8.85 | 2.90 | -7.36 | -4.67 |
| Free cash flow (OCF-CapEx, RMB 100M) | 4.88 | -1.25 | -9.41 | -5.84 |
| Cash + cash-like assets (period-end, RMB 100M) | — | — | 17.89 (cash basis) | 34.56 (cash 27.20 + trading financial assets 7.36) |
| Interest-bearing debt (RMB 100M, period-end) | — | — | — | 13.94 (plus related-party borrowings of ~6.68) |
| Debt-to-asset ratio (period-end) | — | 17.9% | 22.7% | 23.6% |
| Goodwill (period-end, RMB 100M) | — | — | 48.29 | 44.30 (20.2% of total assets) |
Note: Net debt/EBITDA is not applicable (EBITDA is negative and the company is in a net cash position of ~+RMB 1.4 billion); the 2026 Q3 report is scheduled for disclosure on 2026-10-30.
Reasons for metric changes (items with YoY ≥ ±20%, all with company explanations): ① 2024 turnaround to attributable net loss: company explained "further increased R&D investment……investment income also underperformed the prior-year period, with investment-related losses of RMB 820 million from financial asset price volatility" (Inke fair value -RMB 348 million, iQIYI -RMB 501 million). ② 2025 revenue +44.78%: "mainly due to rapid growth in the AI short-drama platform business, Opera business, and AI software technology business during the reporting period." ③ 2025 operating cash flow turning negative: "increased cash outlays for purchases of goods and services, as well as increased cash outlays for marketing promotion." ④ 2026H1 attributable net profit turnaround of +RMB 1.088 billion: RMB 1.479 billion investment income recognized from passive dilution and loss of control over Aijiekexin following its capital increase (non-recurring, 189.21% of total profit). ⑤ 2026H1 selling expenses +82.75%: "rapid growth of the AI short-drama platform business, with increased marketing promotion and channel fees." ⑥ Short-drama revenue +864.92% in 2025 and +163.28% in 2026H1: paid user-acquisition-driven volume growth; short-drama gross margin fell from 79.19% to 67.49% (eroded by surging costs).
2026H1 revenue was RMB 5.359 billion (+43.55%), of which overseas revenue was RMB 5.203 billion (97% of total); net profit attributable to shareholders was +RMB 1.088 billion (vs. -RMB 856 million in the prior-year period). Earnings quality is the core issue in this report: of the RMB 1.088 billion book profit, RMB 1.479 billion came from a one-off investment gain from the capital increase and deconsolidation of Aijiekexin; after deducting this, the company still posted a loss of RMB 458 million on a non-recurring basis, and after further excluding RMB 581 million of investment-subsidiary P&L that the company classifies as "recurring," the true recurring loss was approximately RMB 1.039 billion. By quarter: Q1 net profit attributable to shareholders was -RMB 887 million and Q2 was +RMB 1.975 billion; after excluding all investment-related items, Q2's quarterly loss narrowed to approximately RMB 150 million — a pace of loss reduction better than the static impression from the half-year aggregate, but still lacking a full quarter of operational verification. By business: AI short dramas RMB 1.535 billion (+163.28%, gross margin 67.49%, down 15.6 percentage points YoY); Opera USD 354 million (+24%); short dramas drove contract liabilities from RMB 224 million to RMB 402 million (+79.4%, subscription/top-up prepayments, a leading revenue indicator). Selling expenses of RMB 3.340 billion (+82.75%) hit a period high, with an expense ratio of 62.3%; operating cash flow was -RMB 467 million (narrowing 16.6% YoY). Judging whether results "beat expectations" must be benchmarked against sell-side revisions after the Q3 report — per this report's criteria: revenue beat sell-side consensus, while profit was dominated by one-off gains; operational loss reduction is directionally right but unproven in magnitude.
Business model snapshot: An asset-light, globalized internet/AI platform — Opera browser (search traffic monetization share with 95.79% gross margin + programmatic advertising at 43.66%) and StarMaker audio social (74.38%) are the existing cash cows; the dual AI short-drama platforms form a user-acquisition-driven, platform-based content economy (subscription + ad monetization); AI software technology (API/technical services) is just ramping up (2025 +430.86% but only 2.5% of revenue). Layered on top is a large equity investment portfolio (other non-current financial assets RMB 8.11 billion + long-term equity investments RMB 3.13 billion), which decouples the income statement from "operations." Revenue is not primarily recurring-subscription-based; short-drama top-ups/subscriptions are consumable in nature and require continuous user-acquisition spending, with no pricing power (blended gross margin fell from 78.8% to 65.6%, declining for four consecutive years).
Cash content of earnings test: OCF/net profit was 0.70 in 2023, 0.46 in 2025 (both-negative basis), and -0.43 in 2026H1; FCF has been negative for three consecutive years (-RMB 941 million in 2025, -RMB 584 million in 2026H1) — book losses compounded by net cash outflows; "high growth" has yet to convert into any freely disposable cash. This is characteristic of a platform in investment phase, but four consecutive years of deterioration show that investment intensity is still rising. Recurring profitability: 2026H1 net profit attributable to shareholders +RMB 1.088 billion vs. recurring basis -RMB 1.039 billion — the ≥15% divergence warning threshold is amplified to a RMB 2.1 billion magnitude; looking only at net profit attributable to shareholders would be severely misleading. Definitions self-check: classifying RMB 581 million of investment-subsidiary P&L as "recurring" is a loose treatment; share-based compensation reached RMB 807 million in 2025 (RMB 488 million in 2024) and keeps climbing, so any "adjusted profit" narrative must first add this back. Return on capital: invested capital of approximately RMB 18.1 billion (net assets RMB 16.7 billion + interest-bearing debt RMB 1.4 billion); 2026H1 operating-basis annualized ROIC was approximately -14% — far below any reasonable WACC; the company is in a "burning cash for share" phase, and the point when ROIC turns positive is when the valuation framework should shift. CapEx quality: CapEx/depreciation & amortization of 0.75 in 2025 (shrinking investment); compute is primarily leased with no heavy-asset build-up; maintenance vs. growth CapEx cannot be separated (not disclosed) — user acquisition and R&D are the true "capital expenditures." Quality red flags: investment income was 189.21% of total profit (the company itself acknowledges it is not sustainable); top-5 customers accounted for 57.86%, the largest at 31.20%, with concentration rising (49.51%/28.60% in 2024; PDD newly added to the top five); a ±10% swing in equity instruments impacts net profit by ±RMB 969 million (per the company's sensitivity disclosure).
Consistency of words and deeds: partially delivered, with a preference for grand narratives and repeated avoidance of key commitments. ① The 2024 annual report summary promised "AI large-model business is expected to turn profitable starting in 2027" — with 2026H1 recurring losses of RMB 1.04 billion, this remains to be verified; and at the May 2026 earnings briefing, on "can 2026 be turned around" and "when will it become profit-positive," the company twice answered only "subject to periodic reports," without reiterating the timetable. ② On 2026-05-11 the company promised "selling expenses will gradually and orderly decline" — yet in 2026H1 the expense ratio rose 13.3 percentage points to 62.3%, not delivered (interim). ③ When investors asked about Aijiekexin's "previously stated tape-out by end-2025," the company gave three consecutive replies of "subject to announcements" on tape-out/mass production — evasion. ④ "High revenue growth throughout 2026" — H1 +43.55%, delivered. Shareholder-friendliness: favors dilution over returns. No dividends for FY2024 or FY2025 due to negative distributable profits; no buybacks during the reporting period; three rounds of equity incentives in 2024-2026 totaling approximately 182 million shares (about 14% of total share capital, with continuous dilution; 2026H1 exercise/vesting increased total shares by 2.36%); 2025 share-based compensation of RMB 807 million fully borne by shareholders. Risk signals: borrowing RMB 518 million from 5% shareholder Li Qiong (since 2023-08) and RMB 150 million from Beijing Lüfan controlled by the actual controller; Zhou Yahui and parties acting in concert committed to no share reduction from 2024-07 to 2029-07 (in effect) with dividend proceeds used for additional purchases, but ex-wife Li Qiong is not a concert party and sold 35.87 million shares in 2023 for approximately RMB 1.3 billion — non-committed parties may still reduce holdings; on the investor-interaction platform, the company frequently replied "subject to announcements" on core operating questions such as retention rates, payment conversion, and expense guidance (at least 9 instances from 2026-07 to October), showing passive information disclosure.
| Segment | Revenue Share | Gross Margin | YoY | One-line Business Logic |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Opera advertising | 37.11% | 43.66% (-7.31pp) | +41.81% | Programmatic ad revenue share; major cost is direct ad costs |
| Short dramas and AI short-drama platforms | 19.73% (rising to 28.6% in 2026H1) | 79.19% (67.49% in 2026H1) | +864.92% | DramaWave subscription + FreeReels advertising; user-acquisition driven |
| Opera search | 18.89% | 95.79% | +16.75% | Search engine traffic monetization share, nearly pure profit |
| Overseas social (StarMaker) | 12.70% | 74.38% | -3.85% | Karaoke social top-up share; growth stalled |
| Games | 4.33% | 96.10% | -20.07% | Includes Xianlai board games (divested) and in-house titles; shrinking |
| AI software technology | 2.50% | 32.30% | +430.86% | B2B API/technical services, just ramping |
The profit engine is Opera, not the short-drama segment with the highest revenue share: based on "revenue share × gross margin," Opera advertising + search contribute roughly 53% of gross profit (34.3/64.4), short dramas roughly 24%, and StarMaker roughly 15%. Opera Ireland's 2025 net profit of RMB 378 million is nearly the group's sole source of profit; short dramas carry high gross profit that is devoured by user-acquisition spending (short-drama operating entity Skywork AI Pte posted a net loss of RMB 1.214 billion in 2026H1). Gross margin structure disparity (high of 95.79% vs. low of 32.30%, a 63-percentage-point gap): search monetization is traffic resale with near-zero marginal cost; AI software must carry compute and R&D costs and is at an early commercialization stage; short dramas' 67-79% gross margin is offset by industry-wide user-acquisition costs — "high gross margin" ≠ "high profitability"; segment tables must be drilled down to net profit to be meaningful. Note: the company's "Tiangong AI segment" figure (2025 revenue RMB 2.369 billion, +251.74%) includes short dramas + games + advertising and is not pure AI revenue; pure AI software revenue is only about RMB 205 million — when citing "AI revenue," use the product definition, not the segment definition.
Accounting red flags: ① Goodwill impairment pacing and disposal sequencing (severity: high): Xianlai goodwill impaired by RMB 229 million in 2024 and RMB 238 million in 2025 (59% of original value cumulatively), then sold in 2026 for RMB 750 million — impairment "squeezing out water" and a discounted exit occurred sequentially on the same asset. ② Aggressive non-recurring definitions (high): RMB 581 million of investment-subsidiary P&L classified as recurring, systematically overstating the core business. ③ Broad "Tiangong AI" revenue definition (med): segment includes advertising and games; pure AI revenue is less than 3% of the total. ④ ~RMB 100 million discrepancy in Xianlai net profit between two disclosures (med): RMB 172 million in the annual report vs. RMB 72 million in the disposal announcement, both "audited" with identical revenue, unexplained. ⑤ Positive income tax expense despite losses (low): despite total profit of -RMB 1.824 billion, RMB 294 million of tax was paid; losses are concentrated in low-tax offshore structures, with RMB 345 million of deductible losses for which no deferred tax assets were recognized. Cross-period consistency: ① Revenue grew +15%/+45%/+44% over three years while OCF deteriorated year by year from RMB 885 million to -RMB 736 million — the company only explained "increased cash spending on marketing" without explaining the deterioration slope; judged "partially consistent"; ② Habitual huge Q4 single-quarter losses (2024Q4 -RMB 968 million, 2025Q4 -RMB 927 million; 58% of full-year losses concentrated in Q4) — year-end concentration of goodwill impairment + share-based payments + investment losses, unexplained by the company; ③ Attribution of rising selling expense ratio is consistent across periods (AI/short-drama promotion), but the promised decline was not delivered — consistent; ④ Under the "All in AI" narrative, R&D headcount fell 6.24% to 1,457 and R&D intensity declined from 28.22% to 21.32% — unexplained by the company.
Current market data and percentile (2026-10-26 close): share price RMB 39.95, market cap RMB 51.34 billion; PS(TTM) 5.23x, PB 3.47x (3rd percentile over 1 year / 52% over 3 years / 64% over 5 years); PE(TTM) 146x — earnings are unrepresentative (net profit attributable includes RMB 1.479 billion of one-off gains; non-recurring basis is negative), so PE and its percentile are not used as pricing signals; for high-growth names, use dynamic PS/EV-Sales instead: based on this report's own estimate of 2026 revenue of RMB 11.8-12.8 billion, dynamic PS is approximately 4.0-4.4x. PB's low 1-year percentile mainly reflects a 38% drawdown from the 52-week high of RMB 64.82; but net assets embed RMB 4.43 billion of goodwill and RMB 11.2 billion of unlisted financial assets — book value warrants a discount. Average daily turnover is about RMB 2 billion (4% of market cap per day), ample liquidity.
Market-implied expectations: what does the current price require? SOTP back-solve (Opera layer RMB 9.5 billion = OPRA market value conversion of RMB 6.97 billion + non-OPRA advertising RMB 2.5 billion; investment portfolio at 20% discount RMB 9.0 billion; net cash RMB 1.4 billion; other businesses RMB 4-5 billion) → implies an AI short-drama segment value of approximately RMB 26.9-31.7 billion, or 5.2-6.1x the current annualized run-rate of RMB 5.2 billion, and roughly 2-3x枫叶互动 (枫叶互动)'s IPO ask (~1.7x PS, unsold, to be verified). Equivalently: the market requires the short-drama business to reach RMB 13-16 billion in revenue by 2027-2028 (2-3x ReelShort) while releasing a 10-12% net margin, or equivalently to deliver roughly RMB 1.6 billion of net profit at a 22x steady-state PE. Reality: industry leader 枫叶互动 (枫叶互动) with RMB 5.72 billion of revenue is still net loss-making, approaching breakeven only at RMB 7.1 billion in 2026, and management explicitly says it "prioritizes dynamic payback efficiency" over margins at this stage — the current price requires a paradigm shift where "AI cost advantages overwhelm user-acquisition costs," not linear extrapolation. That requirement is not impossible (AI short-drama unit cost USD 20,000 vs. live-action USD 150,000-200,000; over 90% of DramaWave new releases are AI-generated), but the evidence is not yet closed-loop.
Three-layer value (EPV): Asset value (floor) approximately RMB 7.6/share (cash-like + deeply discounted portfolio basis; up to about RMB 9.8 with no discount); EPV at zero growth approximately RMB 4.4/share — counting only sustainable FCFF of already-matured, operating businesses such as Opera + StarMaker + games (normalized net profit ~RMB 400 million + D&A RMB 150 million - maintenance CapEx RMB 100 million - working capital RMB 50 million ≈ FCFF RMB 400 million, capitalized at a 9.5% WACC plus net cash of RMB 1.08/share; if the investment-phase net losses of AI/short dramas are deducted at present value, the adjusted midpoint is ~RMB 3.4); the growth option accounts for ~89% of the current price (per this report's EPV calculation) — short-drama ramp-up, AI software, and Aijiekexin all sit in the residual layer. This is not a company "priced only for zero growth"; quite the opposite: this is a price almost entirely supported by the option, with symmetric risk and high two-way volatility.
Three scenarios and odds (12 months, 2027 view):
| Scenario | Probability | Fair Range | vs. Current Price | Swing Factors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 25% | RMB 17.7-19.5 (RMB 22.8-25.0bn) | -53% (midpoint) | Short-drama run-rate peaks and rolls over at USD 65 million/month (ReelShort counterattack + PineDrama free-tier squeeze), forced pullback on deteriorating user-acquisition ROI, goodwill impairment of RMB 1-2 billion, portfolio discount widened to 35%, H-share window narrows |
| Base | 55% | RMB 36-43 (RMB 46.2-55.2bn) | -1% (midpoint) | ARR reaching USD 800 million-1 billion within 12-18 months (mid-2027), 2027 short-drama revenue RMB 5.5-7.0bn, selling expense ratio 34%→29-31%, non-recurring loss narrowing to -RMB 300 million to +RMB 200 million, H-share listing completed in 2027 (13-20% dilution already factored in) |
| Bull | 20% | RMB 56-62 (RMB 72.0-80.0bn) | +48% (midpoint) | Dual confirmation of short-drama leadership + profit inflection (2027 ARR USD 1.2-1.5bn, net margin 8-12%), Aijiekexin tape-out success triggering revaluation (equity value RMB 3.9-4.9bn vs. book RMB 1.95bn), OPRA converging toward sell-side targets |
Basis for the base-case exit multiple (independent of the company's current price): short-drama segment at 2027 revenue of RMB 5.5-7.0bn × 3.5-4.5x PS — benchmarked against枫叶互动 (枫叶互动)'s IPO ask of ~1.7x PS plus a growth premium for Kunlun's revenue growth (+163%) vs.枫叶互动 (+24%); the Opera layer anchored to OPRA's listed market price (2.1-2.3x PS); the company's in-hand dynamic PS of 4.0-4.4x serves only as reference, not an anchor. Probability-weighted expectation RMB 38.2, -4.4% vs. current price; margin of safety -9.9% (= (base-case fair low RMB 36 − current price RMB 39.95) / current price). Odds structure is near-symmetric, slightly negative.
Our earnings forecast vs. third-party comparisons:
| Basis | FY2026 | FY2027 |
|---|---|---|
| This report | Revenue RMB 11.8-12.8bn; net profit attributable +RMB 800m~1.3bn (one-off driven), non-recurring -RMB 800~-600m | Revenue RMB 13.5-15.5bn; net profit attributable ≈ non-recurring +RMB 200-600m (operational turnaround) |
| Management anchor | Incentive target: 2026 revenue ≥ RMB 8.5bn (63% completed in H1, nearly zero informational value); "profit phase after 2027" (2024 annual report basis) | Cumulative 2026+2027 revenue ≥ RMB 17.5bn |
| Sell-side consensus | FY2026 EPS RMB 0.745 (n=4, net profit ~RMB 957m, incl. deconsolidation gains); AVIC Securities forecasts net profit attributable -RMB 74m | FY2027 EPS RMB 0.10 (n=9, net profit ~RMB 129m); AVIC forecasts RMB 133m |
Sell-side dispersion is extreme (2026 net profit forecasts -RMB 74m vs. +RMB 957m — the gap is definitional treatment of one-off gains); the consensus median target price of RMB 64 (range RMB 64.05-74.30) is inconsistent with its own FY2027 earnings forecast (implying ~400x PE) — the target price is anchored to the bull-case path. This report's 2027 net profit range is above consensus; the disagreement centers on the pace of loss reduction.
Conclusion: Fairly priced (fair). Target price range RMB 36-43 (= base-case fair value), margin of safety -9.9%. Separating quality from price: Opera + the investment portfolio are a real floor (~RMB 20-25 billion), while short dramas are an expensive option — based on current evidence, the option's price is already close to its probability-weighted value.
Market size. Kunlun Tech's actual niche lies at the intersection of "Generative AI applications (AIGC applications) + overseas content platforms." Scale data: ① Global large-model platform and native application market is expected to reach USD 46.5 billion in 2026, +91% YoY (Frost & Sullivan, cited in the company's 2026 interim report); IDC estimates the global generative AI market will reach USD 284.2 billion by 2028, with a five-year CAGR of 63.8%, and China's total AI investment will reach USD 111.4 billion by 2029. ② Overseas short drama: overseas micro-drama App dual-platform in-app purchase revenue of approximately USD 2.03 billion in 2025, +115.3% YoY (Diandian Data/CBNData); another measure shows total revenue of USD 2.329 billion (+133%) and total downloads of 1.199 billion (+26%) (Securities Daily citing industry reports); Sensor Tower's measure exceeds USD 2.8 billion — all three measures are consistent in magnitude (USD 2.0–2.8 billion); this report adopts the USD 2.0–2.8 billion range with multiple sources noted. ③ AI music generation: USD 440 million in 2023 → USD 2.79 billion by 2030, CAGR 30.4% (Grand View Research, aggregator-sourced figure pending verification); Goldman Sachs estimates generative AI will contribute approximately USD 3.3 billion in incremental value to the music industry by 2035. ④ AI Agent: USD 7.84 billion in 2025 → USD 52.62 billion by 2030, CAGR 46.3% (MarketsandMarkets). ⑤ Opera's browser market: global share — Chrome approximately 68%, Safari 17%, Opera approximately 2–3% (StatCounter 2024) — niche but stable.
Quantified chain of the demand inflection point (structural). Overseas short drama is the exogenous demand inflection point identified in this research: driver variable = rapid maturation of multimodal video generation models in 2024–2026 (SkyReels-V4, ByteDance Seedance, Kuaishou Kling, etc.); change in unit usage = AI generation reduces per-episode short drama production cost from USD 150,000–200,000 to under USD 20,000 (company measure); AI-generated share of new DramaWave episodes exceeded 90% as of July 2026 (leaping from a low base to dominance within one year); penetration ramp = AI short drama supply in the 0→1 volume phase, with industry monthly in-app purchase market of approximately USD 285 million (2026-09 TOP20 measure, annualized approximately USD 3.4 billion); the company's share = first by user measure (2026H1 combined MAU of both platforms ranked first in the overseas short drama market, FreeReels ranked first in overseas downloads, per Sensor Tower cited by the company), catching up by revenue measure (ReelShort USD 332 million + DramaBox USD 295 million in 2025 in-app purchases, together approximately 27% of the industry; DramaWave's revenue share undisclosed) — user and revenue measures presented side by side, with third-party monthly rankings as the reference. The company's combined dual-platform monthly gross billings grew from approximately USD 36 million at end-2025 to over USD 65 million by June 2026 (+81% in half a year), implying ARR above USD 570 million (early 2026Q3 measure). But the flip side of the inflection point is the simultaneous influx of competition: in September, industry-wide in-app purchases declined slightly QoQ for the first time and total ad creative volume fell -15% QoQ; the track has moved from "everyone making quick money" into an elimination round.
Industry chain and value distribution. Upstream compute (GPU/AI cloud) is in short supply with the strongest pricing power; the mid-stream foundation/vertical model layer is fiercely competitive (407 domestic generative AI services registered, 2,839 algorithms registered, price wars and free offerings); downstream application demand is strong but customer acquisition costs are high. Kunlun Tech spans the full chain of "compute equity stake (Ajie Kexin 48.6%) — proprietary models — AI applications — owned distribution (Opera 288 million MAU + StarMaker)," with value concentrated at the application and distribution ends: weak bargaining power against upstream compute (a major cause of non-GAAP losses), reliance on paid user acquisition downstream but with owned traffic entry points (Opera + StarMaker, approximately 300-million-level MAU) providing a customer acquisition cost buffer — a structural difference relative to pure paid-acquisition peers (e.g., COL Group's short drama business).
Supply-demand and competitive landscape. China's large-model C-end has become a duopoly: Doubao MAU 226 million + DeepSeek 135 million (QuestMobile 2025), CR2 accounting for 80%+ of the 440 million total MAU of AI-native Apps; survival space for independent AI applications beyond third place is narrowing — Kunlun has proactively differentiated by going overseas. Overseas short drama landscape: ReelShort + DramaBox revenue CR2 approximately 27%, landscape not yet consolidated; ByteDance's PineDrama, leveraging TikTok traffic, surpassed 100 million downloads within 9 months (already exceeding ReelShort in Brazil), with a free + advertising model disrupting the paid model. AI music: three leaders — Suno/Udio/Mureka; Mureka V9.5/O3 topped musician evaluations (company measure) but ARR is only approximately USD 12 million (2025Q1). Entry barriers: extremely high at the foundation model layer (capital + talent); low at the application layer but with high barriers to scaled profitability (industrialized content production capacity, multilingual localization, paid acquisition ROI operations, compliance licensing). Substitution threat moderate-to-high: YouTube/TikTok short-drama-ization, and entry-point-level substitution of standalone tools by general AI assistants.
Cyclicality and regulation. The AI industry is in the early volume ramp-up phase transitioning from "model capability breakthroughs → scaled application validation"; overseas short drama is in a rapid growth + shakeout phase; audio social is in maturity. The regulatory direction is neutral-to-favorable for leaders: the Micro-Drama Development Administration Measures (effective 2026-09-01, the first dedicated regulation) + mandatory filing for AI micro-dramas (from 2026-04-01) + mandatory labeling of AI-generated content (from 2025-09-01) raise compliance thresholds and accelerate the elimination of smaller players; with 97% of revenue overseas, the company's true tail exposure lies in EU/US enforcement on AI content/minor payments/GDPR.
Peer comparison table (most recent fiscal year measures):
| Company | Revenue Scale | Revenue Growth | Gross Margin | ROE | Valuation | Key Differences vs. Kunlun |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kunlun Tech | RMB 8.20 billion in 2025; RMB 5.36 billion in 2026H1 | +44.8%/+43.6% | 68.6% (declining) | Negative (non-GAAP loss) | Market cap RMB 51.3 billion, forward PS 4.0–4.4x | Full stack of proprietary models + owned distribution, primarily overseas C-end |
| Wondershare | RMB 1.53 billion in 2025 | +6.5% (AI-native applications +90%+) | ~90% (pressured by compute costs) | -6.9% (2026H1) | Market cap RMB 9.7 billion, PS 6.5x | Tool-based subscription going overseas, no content platform |
| COL Group | RMB 1.66 billion in 2025 | +42.9% | Not obtained (sales expense ratio 57.5%) | -56% (first three quarters of 2026) | Market cap RMB 17.0 billion, PS 11.5x | Web novel IP + equity stake in Fengye Interactive (ReelShort), indirect exposure to short drama |
| iFlytek | RMB 27.11 billion in 2025 | +16.1% | 39.8% | Low single digits | Market cap RMB 93.2 billion, PE 100x | B/G-end AI solutions, already profitable; complementary to Kunlun's model |
| Kuaishou (1024.HK) | RMB 142.78 billion in 2025 | +12.5% | 55.7% | Profitable (adjusted net profit RMB 20.6 billion) | PE 6.5x, PB 1.25x | Video models (Kling) + domestic traffic base; Kunlun's "endgame reference" |
Company positioning within the industry: a scarce A-share AI application platform with "proprietary multimodal models + global owned distribution"; a leader in the industry's second tier / high-beta chaser. Share trend: rising by user measure (first in MAU/downloads), catching up by revenue measure; moat = vertical SOTA models (SkyReels-V4, Mureka topping third-party evaluations) + approximately 300-million-level overseas MAU in owned traffic + full-stack layout. Core weaknesses: persistent losses, two-way squeeze from compute and paid acquisition costs, and the need for sustained investment to maintain the model leadership window.
A generic financial framework would miss three decisive indicators for this type of company: ① Gross billings vs. recognized revenue: the company discloses "monthly gross billings" (over USD 65 million in June, selectively disclosed via the investor interaction platform, uncorroborated by periodic reports) — there are timing-of-recognition and channel revenue-share differences between gross billings (recharge/subscription bookings measure) and recognized revenue in financial statements; this report uses monthly billings × 12 × FX rate 6.668 to derive annualized billings of approximately RMB 5.2 billion as the valuation denominator, and notes that this measure has not been audited. ② Unit economics: AI short drama per-episode cost < USD 20,000 vs. USD 150,000–200,000 for live-action dramas (company measure) — the approximately 90% cost reduction is the core argument of the "paradigm shift" thesis, but ReelShort already topped download charts in 2026 with AI-generated dramas, so the pace of assimilation of the cost advantage may be faster than expected; customer acquisition unit cost is undisclosed and can only be indirectly inferred from the company-wide sales expense ratio (62.3%) and the "September acquisition pullback with only slight billing decline" for marginal changes in acquisition ROI. ③ Rankings and user measures: DramaWave/FreeReels MAU (combined first overseas in H1), monthly download and in-app purchase rankings (Sensor Tower monthly rankings, as relayed by media) are the only high-frequency third-party verification sources — the -40% QoQ download decline in September is the first negative signal identified in this report; October–November monthly rankings are needed to verify whether it is due to acquisition pacing. Leading operational indicators: contract liabilities (+79.4% to RMB 402 million) reflect subscription/recharge prepayments and are a leading indicator of revenue; short drama ARR (above USD 570 million) and month-over-month billings are the two figures closest to the value of the "growth option."
Overall rating: Neutral, confidence 0.58, time horizon 12 months. Kunlun Tech's asset structure is clear — Opera + investment portfolio + net cash form a certain floor of approximately RMB 20–25 billion, while AI short drama is a high-volatility option accounting for approximately 89% of market cap. The current price of RMB 39.95 falls in the middle of the base-case fair value range (RMB 36–43), with probability-weighted expectation of RMB 38.2 (-4.4%); odds are nearly symmetric but slightly negative: upside requires bull-case fulfillment (dual confirmation of short drama topping charts + profitability inflection, probability approximately 20%), while the downside scenario reaches -53% (probability approximately 25%). Strategy: do not add at current price; for existing holders, use RMB 36/43 as reassessment boundaries (reassess if it breaks below 36; treat as overvaluation if it breaks above 43 without evidence of a profitability inflection); holders of no position should await the binary verification of the October 30 Q3 report — if cumulative sales expense ratio falls ≥3 percentage points from 62.3% while revenue growth holds ≥43%, the loss-reduction thesis is confirmed and valuation converges toward the upper end of the base case; otherwise (expense ratio ≥65% or monthly billings stalling), reassess along the bear-case path.
Key risk disclosures: ① failure of the paid acquisition model (sales expense ratio rising instead of falling + billings stalling, a double kill to the growth thesis); ② impairment risk on RMB 4.43 billion of goodwill and investment portfolio volatility (±10% impacts net profit by ±RMB 969 million, with the惯性-like pattern of concentrated Q4 losses for two consecutive years); ③ misleading profit measure risk (parent-attributable profit driven by one-off gains); ④ H-share dilution and recovery risk on Xianlai installment consideration; ⑤ short drama regulation and overseas data compliance.
This report is based on public information as of 2026-10-27 (company periodic reports and announcements, earnings briefing minutes, investor interaction platform disclosures, third-party industry data and media reports). The price anchor is the closing price of RMB 39.95 on 2026-10-26; USD figures are statically converted at 1 USD = RMB 6.668 (as of 2026-10-27). This report does not constitute investment advice.