Report Date: November 15, 2026 | Industry View: Cautiously Bullish | Horizon: 12-24 months | Coverage: Gas Turbines & Distributed Generation (Equipment, Services & Data Center Power)
One-Line View: AI data centers have pushed the US power system into a multi-year supply gap, and gas turbines and distributed equipment are in the buoyant first half of a simultaneous volume-and-price upcycle — the three major OEMs' combined backlog + slot reservations total ~222 GW, with equipment prices up ~196% from 2019; but order momentum has already shown topping signals in 2026, ~44% of the backlog consists of cancellable slot reservation agreements, and the US-listed leader is priced at ~57x P/E for the cycle — bullish on the direction of the upcycle, cautious on the slope and duration of return realization.
The "gas turbines & distributed generation" industry covered in this report spans three main lines: equipment (heavy-duty H/J-class gas turbines and combined cycle, aeroderivative turbines including fast-power solutions, large reciprocating gas engines, SOFC fuel cells), services (long-term service agreements, LTSA, spare parts and hot gas path component replacement, overhauls), and data center power supply (grid-side new gas-fired generation + behind-the-meter BTM/co-located power). The regional focus is the US (the main battlefield of this cycle), with attention to global and Chinese markets.
A one-line industry chain map: upstream superalloys/large castings and forgings/turbine blade precision casting (Howmet, Yingliu, China First Heavy Industries, etc.) → midstream three major OEMs (GE Vernova, Siemens Energy, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries) plus reciprocating engine/fuel cell makers → downstream utilities, IPPs, hyperscalers and developers.
Scope note: This industry is essentially an "equipment + services" manufacturing business overlaid with the "distributed power supply" application. This report is organized under a utility research framework — levelized cost of electricity and tariff mechanisms as the pricing headline (I4), with the supply side mapped via manufacturing capacity, delivery lead times and service capacity onto the "installed capacity and utilization" axis (I3), without applying mining cost-curve or futures term-structure templates.
US data center electricity consumption was ~185 TWh in 2024 (IEA basis; the LBNL official anchor is 176 TWh in 2023, 4.4% of total US consumption). LBNL's《2025 Update》(commissioned by DOE, released June 2026) projects in its Reference scenario 649 TWh by 2030, or 11.8% of total US consumption, with a scenario range of 522-841 TWh; the IEA's《Energy and AI》Base scenario projects only ~425 TWh over the same period — a divergence of ~34% between the two primary institutions, which is the industry's largest demand uncertainty (see I7 Controversy D1). Global basis: ~415 TWh in 2024 → ~945 TWh by 2030 (IEA Base).
Working backward from 649 TWh to capacity needs: +464 TWh ÷ 8,760 hours = 53.0 GW of average output; at a capacity factor of 0.85 this translates into ~62.3 GW of new installed capacity needed over 2024-2030, split by power supply path as follows (demand bridge):
Turbine equipment (heavy-duty + aeroderivative + reciprocating + fuel cells) totals ~56.1 GW, ~11.2 GW per year (2026-2030); under the LBNL low-end 522 TWh / IEA 425 TWh scenarios, annual demand narrows to 6-9 GW, while the high-end 841 TWh implies ~18 GW — the annual demand range for US data-center-related turbine equipment is 6-18 GW. For comparison: Wood Mackenzie counts 63 GW of gas-fired capacity already locked in by developers through 2030 (all uses included) — the gap between potential demand and locked orders is precisely the space that OEM scheduling and BTM rush builds must fill, but it also flags that this bridge's 60% grid-share assumption sits at the optimistic end.
PJM capacity auction clearing prices have jumped five steps in four years, with the 2028/29 delivery year hitting the FERC-approved price cap for the third time:
2026/27 rose 11.4x versus 2024/25; although the 2028/29 auction fell back 2.5%, after procuring 138.3 GW there remains a shortfall of ~6.8 GW versus reliability requirements, and PJM's own estimate is that the clearing price would have reached $554.72/MW-day without a cap. ERCOT's official load forecast shows a 2031 peak of 145 GW (+70% versus the 2024 record, of which data center load in 2030 is nearly 78 GW); an April 2026 preliminary version briefly jumped to 368 GW for 2032, which ERCOT itself deemed overheated and initiated a re-estimate — the back-and-forth in load forecasts itself shows the magnitude-of-demand dispute is unresolved. On the retail side: New Jersey electricity bills rose broadly 17%-20% in June 2025 (attributed by the state regulator to PJM capacity costs), and electricity price politics have become a distribution-side variable.
Predominantly structural, but the cyclical component cannot be ignored. Evidence for the structural case: sustained growth in AI inference load (IEA estimates accelerated-server power consumption growing ~30% annually), interconnection bottlenecks locking in demand years in advance, and a supply-structure shift with BTM penetration rising from under 5% toward 15%-25%. Evidence for the cyclical case is equally concrete: cancellable slot agreements (see I3), ERCOT's load forecast re-estimate, Microsoft's downward capex revision. This report judges this cycle to be roughly 60% structural and 40% tied to the AI capex cycle. China and the Middle East are the second growth pole: China's 2030 gas-fired installed capacity target is ~220 GW (versus 161 GW at end-2025, implying annual additions above 11 GW), and Saudi Arabia began construction of 3.6 GW of GTCC in 2025; but Chinese demand is largely met by domestic OEMs (see I3.5).
Global heavy-duty gas turbine new orders reached ~51 GW in 2025 (S&P Global CERA, the highest since 2000; 18 GW in Q1 2026 alone), and the global order backlog stood at ~110 GW at end-2025 (Wood Mackenzie), while pure gas turbine manufacturing capacity globally is only 60-70 GW/year — overbooked by ~1.6-1.8x. This shortage has no event-driven cause such as plant shutdowns or strikes; it is a structural gap arising from capacity discipline (all three OEMs expanding via "existing sites + lean increments," with capex funded by customer prepayments) combined with a 2-3 year production ramp-up period.
GE Vernova 122 GW (2026Q3, of which slot agreements are 58 GW) + Siemens Energy 65 GW (end of FY26, including 39 GW of slots) + Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 35 GW (mid-2026, +52% YoY) total ~222 GW. But ~97 GW (43.7%) of this consists of cancellable slot reservation agreements, with firm orders at ~125 GW, equal to about 2.0 years of global capacity. "Booked out to 2030-31" is a reservation-based, not a revenue-based, measure. More concerning is that a momentum inflection has already appeared: GEV's Q3 new orders + slots were 11 GW against 5 GW of shipments (book-to-bill 2.2x), a sharp sequential decline from Q2's 20 GW/3 GW (6.7x), and the slot pool shrank net from 63 GW to 58 GW — slot conversion into firm orders (13 GW in the quarter) is a quality improvement, but the falloff in new-order momentum corroborates Wood Mackenzie's judgment that "orders peak in 2026."
Heavy-duty H/J-class average delivery is now booked out to 2031 (EPRI, March 2026; WoodMac's US average is 6 years), and all three OEMs' managements are aligned: GEV's new equipment is sold out for 2028, essentially sold out for 2030, with slots for 2031 already over half sold; Siemens Energy's large-unit windows run to 2029-30; Mitsubishi's new orders deliver in 2028-30. Small/mid turbines: 18-36 months; aeroderivative fast-delivery packages (LM2500XPRESS-type): 9-14 months; large reciprocating new orders deliver no earlier than late 2027-2028 (modular solutions commissioning in as fast as 122 days, the VoltaGrid-xAI Memphis case); fuel cells and used/refurbished units are measured in weeks-to-months — this is precisely the supply logic by which BTM and fast-power solutions capture marginal demand.
The hardest bottleneck is hot-section precision casting: GE Aerospace's acquisition of caster CPP for $11.75 billion (closing H2 2027) and SpaceX building its own Texas casting plant both testify to the strategic scarcity of single-crystal blade capacity; next come large castings and forgings (China First Heavy Industries' 300MW-class F-class rotor forgings only passed qualification in early 2026) and skilled labor (2-3 year ramp for new lines). Expansion pipeline: GEV shipments 20 GW/year (2026, already at rate) → 24 GW (2028) → 30 GW (2030); Siemens Energy GT capacity up more than 50% from FY26→FY30 (US investment of $1 billion); Mitsubishi's Savannah plant $490 million expansion, doubling capacity from 2024; Caterpillar large-engine capacity 25 GW/year (2024) → 65 GW/year target by 2030; Cummins to 55 GW/year; Bloom capacity 2→3 GW/year (end of 2026). The concentrated capacity release window is 2028-2030 — the race between supply response and the demand curve determines the price path (I4.5, I7-D2).
Services are the core of the business model: the three major OEMs' combined installed turbine base exceeds 700 GW (GEV's baseload turbines ~200 GW, targeting a doubling to 400 GW; Siemens Energy expects ~250 GW of fleet additions over FY24-30), and new equipment orders are usually signed concurrently with LTSAs (explicitly stated by Mitsubishi); GEV's services backlog is $88 billion (+12%/year), and Siemens Energy's Gas Services backlog is ~€74 billion. On the China side: Dongfang Electric's G50 (50MW-class F-class) achieved its first complete-unit export to Canada in August 2026, 30 units/2.1 GW (~RMB 4 billion, roughly $563/kW — about one-quarter of current Western OEM prices); China United Heavy Gas Turbine's 300MW-class F-class 453 MW demonstration plant in Dongguan starts up in 2028 — but a generational gap remains versus the three OEMs in 500MW+ H/J-class heavy-duty machines, and China will struggle to shake the CR3 in mature overseas markets near term.
A 2026 availability × cost matrix from the data center customer's perspective ($/MWh; basis in note):
Basis note: Reciprocating BTM 56-62 and new CCGT 62-70 are self-calculated in this report using heat rates (reciprocating ~8,000 Btu/kWh, CCGT ~6,500) + capex + O&M (HH gas at $3.37, CF 85%-88%, 20-year term); third parties (GR1D, 2026-11) estimate reciprocating BTM at 88-122 and Bloom at 94-152, with the differences mainly in capex and discounting assumptions — this table primarily uses self-calculated figures, with third-party ranges disclosed side by side. Grid retail figures are EIA 2026-to-date averages (industrial 91 / commercial 140 $/MWh); aeroderivative/simple cycle 103-126 (GR1D); Lazard's LCOE+ basis shows CCGT 51-129 and peaking gas turbines 144-276 (as reported by Utility Dive). Equipment and full-plant costs: new-equipment prices are on the order of $500k/MW (see 4.5), full-plant EPC costs rose within six months from ~$2,000 toward $3,000/kW (EPRI basis), with new units all-in at ~$2.0-2.5 million/MW, quality used units at $1.5-1.7 million, and refurbished ~$1.3 million/MW (Reuters, 2026-11-09).
Why data centers will pay 1.2-2x grid retail on an all-in basis: 4-8-year interconnection queues directly make projects infeasible, while IT-side revenue is tens of times the power cost — at a speed premium of $40/MWh, a 100 MW campus's annual premium is ~$29.8 million, merely a small fraction of the revenue lost by missing one GPU product cycle. The essence of the speed premium is arbitrage of GPU time value against power cost.
Henry Hub baseline: EIA STEO (November 2026 edition) puts the 2026 average at 3.37 and 2027 at 2.88 $/MMBtu (mild winter + ample inventories; August 2026 spot briefly touched $2.76). Fuel cost = heat rate × gas price: CCGT (6,500 Btu/kWh) at 2.88/3.37/5.0/5.5 dollars corresponds to 18.7/21.9/32.5/35.8 $/MWh; large reciprocating (8,000) to 23.0/27.0/40.0/44.0. Every +$1/MMBtu in gas prices adds $6.5/MWh to CCGT LCOE and $8 to reciprocating; reciprocating BTM all-in costs rise to ~65-71/73-79 $/MWh at the 4.5/5.5 dollar levels — LNG exports rising to 19 Bcf/d in 2027 (+26%) alongside record power-sector gas demand constitute a tail risk; if long-term contracts lack fuel-indexation clauses, project sponsors bear it alone (an implicit risk point in Microsoft-Chevron-type twenty-year PPAs). The base case of soft gas prices is a tailwind for gas turbine economics.
Dual-track pricing: grid side = regulated retail tariffs + capacity markets (PJM's three consecutive caps at 325-333 $/MW-day, equivalent to ~$15/MWh on a baseload basis) + T&D adders (the commercial-industrial spread is ~$40-60/MWh); BTM side = 10-20-year take-or-pay PPAs with hyperscalers, exempt from T&D charges and queues. Policy is compressing the two-sided arbitrage: FERC's June 2026 order directing six major RTOs to reform large-load interconnection tariffs (reply deadline November 16, 2026 — a validation point within this very week), Texas SB6 granting ERCOT curtailment rights over co-located data centers plus interconnection fees, and PJM's price cap artificially suppressing prices. But the gap persists: 2028/29 still short 6.8 GW, with an uncapped modeled price of $554.72 — this report judges the BTM premium window to remain open through 2027-28, then narrowing from 2028 as interconnection accelerates and reciprocating capacity ramps, converging to within 1.2x of grid prices.
GEV's FY2026 free cash flow guidance is $16-17 billion (~$10.5 billion combined in Q2/Q3, driven by slot prepayment inflows — cash generation is real but delivery conversion must be tracked), with the quarterly dividend doubled to $0.50 and the buyback authorization expanded to $20 billion; Siemens Energy's FY26 pre-tax free cash flow is ~€8.8 billion (nearly doubling), dividend €2.30 (over 3x the prior year), and a new buyback of up to €9 billion (through 2030). Equipment makers' cash flow quality is at its best historical stage, but is structurally dependent on prepayments — at cycle reversal, free cash flow elasticity turns negative (revenue falls while expansion capex is rigid).
Wood Mackenzie: equipment prices rise from ~$203/kW in 2019 to $600/kW by end-2027 (+196%); GEV's basis shows 2026 new-order pricing ~50% above 2025, with H1 order prices more than 20% above Q4 2025. Base path (12 months): ~$520-550 in Q4 2026 → peak at $600/kW by end-2027, then easing through 2028-29 as capacity comes online to around $500; the pricing framework = capacity-gap pricing (book-to-bill still above 2x) + a precision-casting cost floor + the hyperscaler ability-to-pay ceiling. Note that the same institution (WoodMac) simultaneously judges orders to peak in 2026 and prices to peak in 2026-27 before declining with new capacity — this report internalizes that as the base case's "peaking" rather than "continued rise" (I7 scenario table), with the bear case being an earlier pullback in H2 2027 to $450-520.
Heavy-duty gas turbines (>100 MW) CR3 is ~90% (GE Vernova/Siemens Energy/Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, cumulative orders since 2015, per McCoy/IEEFA); GEV's installed base accounts for roughly half of the global fleet (>7,000 units). Five barriers: installed base + LTSA service lock-in (GEV >800 GW installed), hot-section component technology and decades of operating data (cannot be reverse-engineered), H/J-class operating track record certification, capacity scarcity itself booked out to 2030, and speed-to-power turnkey capability. Assessment of new entrants: China's three major power equipment makers have broken through at the 50MW-class midsize segment and are going overseas (Dongfang Electric G50, 2.1 GW in Canada); fast-power integrators (Jereh, cumulative North America orders of ~RMB 11.68 billion) are capturing price-sensitive marginal demand; but given the H/J-class technology gap, the CR3 monopoly in large machines will be hard to shake before 2030.
Profits are currently concentrated in the OEM "equipment + services" dual segments: GEV Power segment EBITDA of USD 3.14 billion in the first three quarters of 2026 (19.0% margin, +510bps YoY; 21.4% in Q3 alone); Siemens Energy Gas Services FY26 revenue ~EUR 14.5 billion with a 16.4% margin (vs. ~13% prior year). Upstream hot-section components come next (Howmet gas-turbine-related revenue +45%, EBITDA margin ~33%; Yingliu's aero-engine & gas turbine new orders exceeded RMB 2 billion); the EPC/developer segment is fiercely competitive with the thinnest margins—the cost of equipment price hikes and delivery scarcity is almost entirely passed through to the middle of the chain.
Migration direction over the next 2-3 years: ① The installed fleet is entering a concentrated LTSA renewal window, with parts and long-term agreements repriced to new price books—services are the highest-quality profit (annuity-like, auto-growing with the installed base); GEV service backlog is USD 88 billion, Siemens Energy GS backlog ~EUR 74 billion. ② Scarce capacity itself becomes a profit source (slot fees + data center premium contracts; ~20% of GEV's contract backlog corresponds to data centers, priced 10-20 points higher). ③ Upstream blade/precision casting bargaining power rises, with OEMs ceding some profit to component makers. Beware timing mismatch: the service super-cycle profit release comes after the installed base expands in the 2030s—potentially precisely offsetting the 2027-29 downcycle in equipment profits.
Upstream: component suppliers are shifting from passive to proactive (Howmet adding capacity surcharges; Yingliu's overseas revenue exceeding domestic for the first time); clear divergence within the chain (Himile's revenue up but profit down in the first three quarters of 2026, net profit -9.8%). Downstream: utilities/IPPs are fragmented, giving OEMs extremely strong pricing power; hyperscalers are highly concentrated, yet in the current "capacity grab" they are paying premiums (outbidding utilities to lock in 2029-30 slots)—during the scarcity period, the windfall accrues to the supply side. Post-2028 capacity release + maturing hyperscaler self-build power capability is the biggest variable for a reversal in bargaining power.
Return quality is clearly tiered: the three major OEMs and hot-section components are the "real money" segments (order visibility + pricing power + service annuities, EBITDA margins jumping from 13-14% to 16-21%); BTM integration/developers earn hard-earned money (pass-through of equipment price hikes + delivery execution risk); Bloom-type fuel cells have ~34% gross margin but negative operating cash flow—high-risk revenue growth without profit; most China-chain names are "real orders, unverified profits" (Jereh: first-three-quarter revenue +14.9% but net profit attributable to shareholders only +4.4%; gas turbine deliveries concentrated in 2027).
Valuation position (prosperity conclusions must be checked against valuations): US stocks have already fully re-rated—GEV at ~57x 2026E P/E (estimate; share price down ~32% from its 52-week high, 20 of 25 sell-side analysts at Buy, crowded positioning), Siemens Energy ~30x TTM; A-share OEMs remain at historically low-to-mid percentiles—SW Other Power Equipment II PE 41.24x (37th percentile since 2014) / PB 2.50x (47th percentile), Dongfang Electric PE(TTM) 15.8x (41st percentile over 3 years), but Yingliu at 51.7x has already fully priced its chain scarcity. "Rising prosperity × high US valuations" coexists with "rising prosperity × low A-share percentiles but unproven earnings"—stock selection matters more than sector beta.
Bulls: LBNL Reference 649 TWh (bottom-up, updated to early 2026), PJM/ERCOT load jumps, backlog locked through 2030. Bears: IEA Base only 425 TWh (-34%); ERCOT's own 368 GW forecast self-identified as overheated and is being re-estimated; Microsoft has already cut 2026 capex guidance; slot agreements account for 44% of backlog and are cancellable. Monitor: Big Four cloud quarterly capex and AI monetization; PJM 2029/30 auction (2026-12-09); GEV quarterly new orders and slot pool (Q3 already showed a 63→58 GW net shrinkage); LBNL annual update.
Bulls: firm orders ~125 GW ≈ 2 years of capacity; precision casting bottleneck unsolvable before 2027; delivery relief no earlier than 2029-30. Bears: WoodMac sees orders peaking in 2026, and its analysts explicitly expect prices to peak in 2026-27 and then decline; GEV Q3 new orders halved sequentially (20→11 GW); historical templates are brutal—GE heavy-duty gas turbine shipments fell 323→175 units (-46%) in 2002-03; after HA unit sales plunged in 2018, the Power segment took write-downs; the last "super-cycle" consensus collapsed in just 18 months; 2028-30 is exactly when the three major OEMs + CAT/Cummins concentrate capacity additions. Monitor: GEV new orders <10 GW for two consecutive quarters or further net slot-pool shrinkage; new-order ASP quotes falling below USD 500/kW; WoodMac/McCoy annual order data confirming YoY negative growth in H1 2027.
Bulls: PJM shortfall of 6.8 GW, uncapped simulated price of USD 554.72, queue times of 4-8 years with no short-term fix. Bears: FERC interconnection acceleration + SB6 curtailable rights + PJM price caps advancing on three fronts compress BTM premiums; reciprocating capacity ramps in 2027-28; nuclear PPAs/SMRs divert demand post-2030; EPA repeal under litigation, 2028 election swing could revive carbon rules (scenario: new-build gas turbine costs +10-20%). Monitor: FERC six-RTO responses (11-16) and new rate implementation pace; CAT/Cummins capacity ramp; EPA litigation milestones; SMR PPA pricing.
| Scenario | Probability | Narrative | Implication |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 25% | AI capex deceleration (two or more cloud providers' 2027 guidance growth <15%), wave of slot cancellations (2002 template), plus 2028 election swing + judicial revival of carbon rules; ASP falls early to USD 450-520/kW in 2027H2, secondary prices lead declines | OEM earnings cuts × valuation mean reversion double hit (high-PE names like GEV hit first); BTM order premiums vanish |
| Base | 50% | Orders peak in 2026 but firm-order deliveries remain tight through 2028-29; ASP rises to USD 600 by end-2027, then drifts down to ~USD 500 in 2028-29; OEM margins peak in 2027, services take over but scale in the 2030s; BTM premium narrows from 2028 | Equipment makers' earnings still in expansion; pick reasonably valued segments; A-share chain awaits profit verification |
| Bull | 25% | Cloud 2027 capex steps up again + precision casting bottleneck unsolved + Middle East/China bidding up capacity; ASP rises to USD 640-700; BTM penetration exceeds expectations | Volume-price re-acceleration across the chain; highest torque in high-BTM-purity reciprocating/SOFC and second-tier OEMs |
| Date/Window | Event | Directional Impact | Debate |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-16 | FERC six-RTO large-load interconnection reform response deadline | Faster interconnection → compresses BTM premium | D3 |
| 2026-12-09 | PJM 2029/30 capacity auction | Clearing price and shortfall = demand thermometer | D1/D3 |
| 2027-01-10 | US-China rare earth/tariff truce expiry | Superalloy upstream risk | Policy |
| Late Jan 2027 | GEV Q4 earnings: new orders & slot pool inflection verification | Two consecutive quarters <10 GW = bear signal | D1/D2 |
| Jan/Feb 2027 | Big Four cloud Q4 earnings & 2027 capex guidance | First-order demand signal | D1 |
| 2027H1 | EPA repeal litigation key milestones | Carbon rule revival risk | D3 |
| 2027-04 | ERCOT official load forecast (result of 368 GW re-estimate) | Demand magnitude calibration | D1 |
| Mid-2027 | WoodMac/McCoy annual order data | Verification of 2026 peak | D2 |
| 2027H2 | GE-CPP precision casting delivery, GEV 24 GW ramp | Supply response milestone | D2 |
Top-right "Core allocation": GE Vernova/Siemens Energy/Mitsubishi Heavy Industries/Caterpillar—order visibility + pricing power + service annuities. GEV and Siemens Energy earnings upgrades are still in progress, but GEV's ~57x valuation already discounts much of the upcycle; pullbacks are better entry points. Bottom-right "rising prosperity but questionable returns": Bloom Energy (high gross margin but negative operating cash flow; hit first in an AI deceleration scenario), the EPC/developer segment (the shock absorber for equipment price hikes and scarcity), Yingliu (real volume-price gains but ROE ~6%, negative operating cash flow, 51.7x valuation), Jereh (real orders but unverified profits)—bullish prosperity does not equal worth buying; the common feature of these four placements is that cash flow or execution verification stands between industry windfall and shareholder returns. Dongfang Electric sits upper-right but mid-position: 15.8x PE undervaluation + G50 overseas option, but current profit improvement comes mainly from coal retrofit and O&M rather than gas turbines—an "inexpensive good company + undelivered turbine option."
Beneficiaries (ranked by conviction): ① GE Vernova—dual engines of slot pricing power + service repricing, 122 GW backlog (58 GW slot pool), Power segment EBITDA margin 21.4%; only caveat is valuation overhang requiring timing. ② Siemens Energy—greatest US data center order elasticity (FY26 US orders +70.8%), ~30x TTM relatively reasonable, dividend/buyback initiated. ③ Caterpillar—power generation products revenue +30%, total backlog USD 78 billion; an undervalued steady beneficiary of the power upcycle. ④ Wärtsilä/INNIO—pure BTM reciprocating torque play; note its premium window narrows in 2027-28. ⑤ Dongfang Electric—low A-share percentile for OEMs + overseas option (price as an option until profit verification).
Avoid: pure EPC/integrated developers without slot lock-ins (margins squeezed by price hikes and delays); Bloom Energy (cash flow quality; torque reverses if AI decelerates); Yingliu/Jereh (current earnings unproven + scarcity already priced; reassess for upgrade after 2027 delivery and gross margin verification).
| Scenario | Best Positioned | Worst Hit |
|---|---|---|
| Bear (25%) | Caterpillar/Cummins (backup power demand + diversified cycle hedge) | GEV (57x valuation double hit), Bloom/Jereh (order cancellations and delivery delays) |
| Base (50%) | Siemens Energy, GEV (earnings expansion + services handover) | Pure EPC developers (continued pass-through squeeze) |
| Bull (25%) | Wärtsilä/INNIO, Bloom (BTM penetration beats) | Pure retail grid-dependent utilities (share eroded by BTM) |
① AI capex deceleration triggering a wave of slot cancellations (97 GW of cancellable slots is a hidden lever on the industry's balance sheet); ② concentrated capacity additions in 2028-30 colliding with a demand plateau, ASP and margin mean reversion (2002/2018 templates); ③ grid counterattack faster than expected (FERC interconnection acceleration + capacity price caps + SB6), closing the BTM premium window early; ④ gas price tail risk (LNG exports + harsh winter; projects without fuel pass-through clauses in long-term contracts under pressure); ⑤ policy reversal (EPA repeal litigated, 2028 election swing); ⑥ US-China rare earth/tariff truce expiring January 2027, hitting superalloy upstream.
Data and Methodology Notes: All key figures in this report cite primary sources (LBNL/IEA/EIA/PJM/EPA/Wood Mackenzie/company filings); secondary and aggregated data are explicitly labeled. Heat rates, capacity factors, and discounting assumptions for self-calculated costs are noted in I4.1. The three major OEMs' backlogs are direct sums from their respective filings (statistical timing differs slightly); GEV's valuation multiple is an estimate. Both US and A-share names can be individually profiled for target prices and sensitivity analyses under this framework.